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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Looking back on nearly forty years of service at the 
highest levels of the British government, Lord Hankey asked 
the following question: 
••• whether the whole of the control of war should not be 
delegated by the government to the military authority; 
in other words, whether a war should be controlled by 
statesmen or solely by fighting men.l 
His question is deceptively simple; yet it strikes at the 
very heart of any theory of civil-military relations. Whether 
it is during peace or during war, the role of the military 
in policy formulation is central to the security of the state. 
The question is what form that role will take. While it is 
correct to say that in democratic societies, based on civilian 
control, the military performs in an advisory capacity, that 
answer really only begs the question. If the military are to 
advise the civilian leadership, then what considerations 
should the military officer incorporate into his thought pro-
cess as he strives to fulfill that advisory function 
Within any society, that.advisory function is restrict-
ed to a handful of senior military professionals who interact 
with the political leadership. In the United States, this 
advisory function, since the outbreak of World War II, has 
1Lord Hankey, Government Control in War (Cambridge: 
At the University Press, 1945), 11. 
1 
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fallen upon the shoulders of one particular group of military 
professionals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By law, they·are 
the "principal military advisors" to the President, the 
secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. 
Organizationally, the JCS consists of the military heads of 
the four services, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. They 
are assisted in their duties by a vast internal organization 
made up of several thousand military and civilian members. 
This structure not only advises the civilian leaders on the 
military aspects of national security questions but it also 
coordinates and implements the military aspects of the 
civilian leadership's decisions. Residing within the Chiefs' 
purview is: the development of war plans, the supplying of 
military input into the defense budget process, weapon 
systems acquisition decisions, foreign policy issues, and a 
multitude of other tasks. All of these have important 
military and political consequences. The magnitude of these 
decisions is fully realized when one considers that for 
almost all of the period since the end of World War II, the 
defense budget has been the nation's largest single expendi-
ture. 
Unfortunately, examining the statutory functions of 
the Joint Chiefs reveals only the tip of the iceberg concern-
ing their actual role within the national security policy 
making system. One problem in attempting to determine their 
3 
role has been the secrecy that shrouds the inner workings of 
the JCS. Even governmental task forces examining the activ-
ities of the Department of Defense complain that they are not 
allowed within the inner sanctum of the JCS to observe its 
operations. Despite this shortcoming, it is apparent that 
the period between 1945-1960 was crucial in the development 
of the organization. Although first established during 
World War II, it was during the first decade and a half after 
the war that the JCS evolved structurally and defined its 
relationships with other elements concerned with national 
security policy. In this regard the Truman and the Eisen-
hower administrations were the gestation period for the JCS 
as well as the whole national security policy making struc-
ture. 
At the outset of this period, the whole structure 
was organized without any unanimity as to what the final 
product should look like. Although the National Security 
Act of 1947 supplied a general framework, it went through 
three major reorganizations, 1949, 1953, and 1958, as the 
structure evolved to meet new requirements. With the 1958 
reforms the basic structure of the JCS as well as the other 
elements within the defense community had been finalized. 
Over twenty years later the nation's military forces are 
still operating under this basic system. The importance of 
this gestation period is not exclusively a function of 
4 
structure. By the end of the Eisenhower presidency, the 
basic relationships between the Chiefs and the remainder of 
the defense policy arena had solidified. The apparent 
revolutionary changes that occurred in the Defense Department 
during the 1960s were merely a continuation of the basic 
trends that already had begun during the 1950s. Thus by the 
end of this gestation period, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had 
not only completed its organizational development, but had 
clearly established its role within the defense policy making 
structure. An understanding of the events surrounding that 
period is essential to comprehend how and why defense related 
organizations interact today. 
Thus far I have referred to the JCS as part of a 
national security policy making system. The concept of a 
policy making system is not as precise a scientific phenom-
enon as some social scientists would like to believe. 
Instead, it is merely an intellectual construct consisting 
of those sub-systems (e.g. individuals, groups, or organiza-
tions) whose participation is necessary to reach a decision 
and to make policy. For the purposes of this study we are 
concerned with those decisions that involve the national 
security. While the number of possible sub-systems or actors 
that might be involved in a particular national security 
issue are almost limitless, all of those issues ultimately 
are associated in one way or another with the nation's 
5 
military migllt. 
Since the Joint Chiefs are the political leadership's 
"principal military advisors," they are an integral part of 
that policy system and thus the process of policy integration. 
If military power is to have any use it cannot exist within 
a vacuum, but must support the nation's goals. This requires 
the development of an integrated political/military policy 
that carefully considers all aspects of national power before 
ascertaining the nation's political commitments. Through 
this process the policy maker guarantees that those commit-
ments are compatible with the ability of the nation to 
support them. But merely identifying an organization as 
an actor within a specific policy system tells us little 
about the role it plays. Attempting to determine, by 
administrative and structural examination, an organization's 
influence and manner of participation in the policy arena, 
places the analyst in a position similar to Plato's cave 
dwelling characters, who only see vague shadows of reality. 
Part of the reason for this is that the nature of an 
organization's participation or role is as much molded by 
bureaucratic forces and self-perceptions as it is by formal 
structural relations. In order to more carefully define the 
nature of an organization's participation, and thus the 
parameters of its role, I propose a heuristic model that 
consists of four interdependent variables. Despite the 
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limitations that are associated with all social science 
models, it will supply a framework within which an effec~ive 
understanding of the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
defense policy making may be developed. 
The first of the variables is the sub-system's place 
within the formal organizational and administrative structure. 
This structure, along with various statutes, charters and 
functions papers, identify the key participants and define 
the formal relationships between them. For the JCS, the 
National Security Act of 1947 and its ensuing amendments 
supply this skeleton. An understanding of that framework 
is an essential first step because the role of the JCS is 
worked out within the context of that formal structure. 
The second variable is the sub-system's own internal 
organizational dynamics. This consists of the nature of its 
bureaucracy and its organizational goals. These factors 
determine how the sub-system will respond to outside agencies 
and what kind of product it will produce as input for the 
policy system. Within the JCS, the peculiar nature of its 
bureaucratic structure is instrumental in influencing the 
type and content of the Chiefs' advisory input. Furthermore, 
the nature of bureaucracy impacts upon the Chiefs' relation-
ship with other agencies. 
The third variable is the perception of other actors 
within the system as to what role the sub-system should play. 
7 
How important those perceptions are in actually molding the 
sub-system's role depends-on the hierarcbical relationship 
that exists between them. Among the various agencies within 
the national security policy system, the executive leader-
ship's perception of the Joint Chiefs' role is the most 
important. That leadership appoints the Chiefs, looks to 
them for advice, and is their superiors within the military 
chain of command. 
The fourth variable is the sub-system membership's 
own perception of what their role should be. What the Chiefs 
believe their own role to be is a crucial factor, because 
those beliefs will motivate them to act in whatever manner 
is appropriate to that perception. Granted, outside pres-
sures will have some impact, but it can never equal the self-
generated beliefs of the Chiefs themselves. In this regard, 
the Chiefs' perception of themselves as military profes~· 
sionals is quite· important. It supplies the normative basis 
for their participation not only in the policy process, but 
also for their relations vis-a-vis the parent society. But 
professionalism is important beyond its ability to shape the 
behavior patterns of the officer corps; it also forms the 
basis of much of the administration's perceptions as to the 
Chiefs role. Those perceptions are founded upon certain 
historically derived assumptions as to the nature of civilian 
control of the military, and of the military professional's 
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role vis-a-vis the government. Those assumptions in turn 
are inextricably connected to specific interpretations as 
to the nature of mili ta·ry professionalism and what subje.cts 
the professional may advise the government on·. An integral 
part of the officer's advisory function is the determina-
tion of what factors to take into consideration while 
developing that advice. The criterion by which the offi'c_er 
makes that determination is based upon his own interpretation 
of professionalism. Thus the perception of what is the 
proper nature of military professionalism not only affects 
the officer's relationship with other institutions, but also 
affects the product he inputs into the policy making system. 
With this framework in mind, my study of the JCS 
will proceed in the following manner. First, I will examine 
the nature of military professionalism and how it specifi-
cally developed in the United States. This will supply the 
definitional basis for the officer's interpretation of what 
it means to be a professional within the American context. 
Next, I will examine the formation of the Joint Chiefs as a 
wartime exigency and attempt to ascertain the role it played 
during that conflict. With the end of the war, the Joint 
Chiefs had institutionalized some of its basic internal 
structures and developed certain patterned relationships 
with outside agencies. This pre-1947 background will form 
the necessary basis to analyze in turn each of the four 
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variables in my role model: the defense organizational struc-
ture, the JCS bureaucracy and the impact of bureaucratic' 
relations on the Chiefs, the administration's perceptions of 
the Chief's role, and finally the Chiefs' own perceptions of 
their role. Once this has been accomplished I will look at 
the Chiefs' actual participation in the process of policy 
integration. This should supply us with enough insight and 
empirical data from which I can draw some conclusions as to 
the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
CHAPTER II 
MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND THE OFFICER CORPS' 
ROLE IN POLICY FORMULATION 
To understand the role the United States Joint Chiefs 
of Staff play it is first necessary to comprehend the nature 
and the historical background of military professionalism •. 
The former supplies the basis upon which the military pro-
fessional determines what his role in policy formulation 
ought to be, while the latter, to a great extent, determines 
exactly wba~ his role will be. It would be a mistake to 
assume that these factors only impinged upon the American 
military. On the contrary, a·great deal of the organiza-
tional framework within which the Joint Chiefs operated was 
borrowed from Europe. With this in mind this chapter will 
first proceed to examine the sociological definitions of 
military professionalism, and then determine in some norma-
tive fashion what role the military professional has in the 
development of national policy. Next, it will examine the 
manner in which that role has evolved historically in both 
the Prussian and the American experiences. The Prussian 
experience, in particular, has a great deal to offer, because 
the general staff model was designed to offer the military 
a means of contributing to policy formulation. How that 
10 
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staff model was transferred to the United States and how it 
blended with the American approach to professionalism is the 
framework within which the JCS developed. 
It was during the sixteenth century that the military 
first began to develop into a profession, a development that 
was inextricably connected to the rise of entrepreneurial 
capitalism and the Protestant Work Ethic. 2 Prior to this 
period, there had been military leaders who devoted their 
lives to combat service, but sociologists do not consider 
them professionals because they lacked the three fundamental 
characteristics that separate a professional from other 
occupations within the society: expertise, responsibility, 
and corporateness. Professional expertise is considered the 
acquisition of unique knowledge or competency gained through 
specialized education, training, or experience. Responsi-
bility is the professional's obligation to the service of his 
society, and the ethical utilization of his expertise. 
Corporateness is the common bond and sense of unity that 
exists between members of a profession, and creates the 
2Jacques van Doorn, The Soldier and Social Change: 
Comparative Studies in the History and Sociology of the 
Military (London: Sage Publications, 1975); Samuel Hunting-
ton, The Soldier and the State: Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations (New York: Vintage Press, 1964); Bengt 
Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power 
(London: Sage Publications, 1972); Morris Janowitz, The 
Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrai_t __ 
(Glencoe, Illinois: Freepress, 1960); Alfred Vagts, A His-
tory of Militarism: Civilian and Military (New York: A Free 
Press Paperback, 1967); G. Teitler, The Genesis of the Pro-
fessional Officer~' Corps (London: Sage Publication, 1977). 
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self-perception that they are different from other social 
groups. Some of that sense of corporateness is imposed by 
the profession's own regulations, but some of it is simply 
a sense of uniqueness and comradery that grows out of a 
b f . 3 common ase o exper1ence. 
The feudal or pre-feudal concept of officership 
was based more on class distinction than on individual 
competency. "Being a warrior and an officer," according 
to Coates and Pelligrim, "was simply a facet of the 
aristocratic feudal responsibility." 4 That responsibility 
was not to the society, but to a class structure. Further-
more, as Coates and Pelligrim point out, the "skills 
required of the mass of fighting men were directly available 
in the civilian populace with little if any specialized 
military training." The result was that the lack of a dis-
tinctive corpus of military expertise, plus the class 
connection to responsibility and corporateness, tended to 
eliminate pre-modern forms of officership from the profes-
sional category. 
3
charles Coates and Roland J. Pelligrim, Military 
Sociology: A Study of American Military Institutions and 
Military Life (University Park, Maryland: Social Sciences 
Press, 1965), 201-203; also see Huntington, Soldier and the 
State, 7-19. 
4 Coates and Pelligrim, Military Sociology, 204. 
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As the modern nation-state began to take form through 
increased centralization, simultaneously a bureaucratic/ 
technocratic infrastructure came into existence, based upon 
specialized expertise. Military power was an integral part 
of the state's consolidation of power and as such the managers 
of that military power naturally were incorporated into the 
infrastructure. It was with this modernization process in 
mind that Swedish sociologist, Bengt Abrahamsson, suggested 
that one definition of professionalization should be the 
"historical transition of a particular organization under the 
impact of major political, economic and technological 
5 developments." 
The transition that Abrahamsson suggested occurred 
from the sixteenth century on, but was accelerated by the 
industrial and technological revolutions that went hand in 
hand during the latter part of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. It led to the mass army, the division 
organization with its concomitant bureaucratization, the 
development of new weapons and logistics systems, and the 
movement toward technical specialization. The nature of 
warfare now demanded of the military officer skills that 
were not readily available in the civilian community. During 
the early stages of this transformation the only specialized 
5Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization, 16. 
14 
expertise that the military officer needed, that was not 
found within his own social upbringing, was in the area. of 
artillery and engineering because of their extensive mathe-
matical basis. At first, the milita~y relied exclusively 
upon civilian specialists, but during the eighteenth century 
they began to develop their own military academies which 
were essentially artillery and engineering trade schools. 
As nineteenth century industrialism forced the officer to 
acquire even more complex skills, especially in the area of 
industrial and logistics planning, the military education 
system was restructured and most Western nations established 
post-graduate military schools. 6 
The growth of this unique specialized military 
expertise not only fostered modern military professionalism, 
but also the perception on the part of the officer corps that 
they were indeed professionals. This perception caused the 
military to redefine its relationship to the society, 
especially in light of the fact that the officer corps 
ceased to be merely military hirelings. Now the professional 
officer wanted the same kind of relationship vis-a-vis 
society that other professionals enjoyed. An essential 
6Phillip H. Stevens, Artillery Through the Ages 
(New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1965), 15-16; also see 
Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World (Durham: Duke Uni-
versity Press, 1959), 16. It was for this purpose that West 
Point was originally established as an engineering and 
artillery school. See Stephen Ambrose, Duty, Honor, and 
Country: A History of West Point (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
Press, 1966), 12. 
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aspect of the development of expertise was that the profes;.... 
sion took upon itself the responsibility to use that 
expertise in the name of its client, in this case the 
society. The military professional sought a doctor-patient 
relationship analogue. The specific nature of that pro-
fessional relationship is described in Allan Millet's 
recent study of militaTy professionalism. 
The professional, however, asks that he, and not his 
client, set the conditions under which his knowledge 
and skill are utilized and that the client accept the· 
professional's definition of what the problem really 
is. In return for his professional authoritativeness, 
the professional enters a compact with the client not 
to go beyond the 'functional specificity' of the 
profession.7 
It is the nature and the precise definition of this "func-
tional specificity" that has been the cause for a reoccurring 
debate within the profession. This debate has tended to 
focus on two contending and prescriptively divergent insti-
tutional models. While they have been characterized by 
Arthur Larson as "radical" and "pragmatic" professionalism 
and by Donald Bletz as "traditional" and "new" professional-
ism, they are always associated with Samuel Huntington's The 
Soldier and the State and Morris Janowitz's The Professional 
7Allan Millet, Military Professionalism and Officer-
ship in America, A Mershon Briefing Paper #2 (Columbus, Ohio: 
Mershon Center, 1977), 3. 
16 
Soldier, respectively. 8 Both identify the military as a 
profession, but they markedly differ in their prescription 
for the professional's role and relationship vis-a-vis the 
parent society, and the professional's role in an advisory 
capacity. 
Huntington views the professional soldier as pri-
marily a manager of violence in the Laswellian context, i.e., 
the primary goal of the soldier is to achieve a high degree 
of expertise within the narrowly defined boundaries of that 
management function. The military professional becomes the 
technically proficient, politically neutral tool of the 
state. In order to achieve this goal, a divergent military, 
isolated from the larger, more liberal society becomes a 
necessity. Naturally, this restricts the professional 
soldier's role in policy formulation to advising on only the 
military perspective of any issue. To do otherwise would 
be unprofessional, and theoretically impose a threat to 
civilian control. Implicitly, such an approach can only be 
optimized when the officer views the world as a series of 
easily definable compartmentalized groupings of factors, 
within which one can discern the military parameter from 
others. 
8A:rthur J,arson, "Military Professionalism and Civil-
ian Control: A Comparative Analysis of Two Interpretations," 
Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. II, No. 1 
(Spring, 1974); Donald Bletz, The Role of the Military Pro-
fessional in U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1972), 
67-72. 
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Janowitz, on the other hand, views the military as 
a sub-system of the larger society. This leads him to reject 
the radical professionals' isolation and to replace it by a 
military more congruent with the parent society, i.e., a 
pragmatic or "constabulary force." Janowitz assumes that as 
the traditional uses of military power become altered by 
technological advances and a changing political environment, 
so also does the traditional dichotomy between war and peace. 
In its place stands the ambiguous nature of limited conflict, 
where victory becomes an illusive goal. To operate effec-
tively within such an environment, the constabulary officer 
corps must be cognizant of the non-military factors which 
characterize modern international conflict and incorporate 
those factors into his input. 
This debate between the "radical" and the "pragmatic" 
positions stems from confusion as to the military's role 
within the state's political structure. "Radicalism" pre-
supposes that war is a uniquely different phenomenon from 
peace, and concludes that the political and the military 
aspects of the state are separate. The "pragmatist" rejects 
this bifurcation of political and military matters, believ-
ing instead that war and peace both belong on the same con-
tinuum as do other forms of the political intercourse of the 
state. If the "radical" approach is correct, then the 
military, based upon the client-professional relationship, 
18 
should demand complete autonomy in military matters. Further-
more, the only measure of success and competency within· the 
"radical" perspective can be victory on the battlefield. Maxi-
mizing combat efficiency is just one more rationale for the 
"radical's" claim to autonomy. 
The key variable in both of these approaches is the 
relationship of professionalism to the officer corps' proper 
role in policy formulation. That, in turn, is based upon what 
factors the officer incorporates into his analysis and has 
internalized into his cognitive process. For Janowitz,the 
lack of such factor incorporation results in an "absolutist" 
professional, who believes that the objectives of the state 
are achieved through military victory, and that the more 
total the victory, the more total the achievement of those 
goals. Limited war becomes inconceivable since total victory 
is the only objective worth attaining. For Huntington, the 
internalization of non-military factors violates the officer's 
professionalism, and undermines "objective civilian control" 
which is the only way the state can remain non-militarized. 
Obviously, Huntington rejects the viability of fusionism, 
which is the melding of non-military considerations and 
perceptions with the military ones. Janowitz, on the other 
hand, demands it. It is within this paradigm that all 
analysis involving the professional military officers' role 
in policy formulation resides. 
19 
Unfortunately, the radical model has focused its 
attention on the issue of civilian control of the militarj, 
as opposed to the more crucial issue of the development of 
sound military advice. Both contending positions agree that 
military power is a necessary tool and should support the 
policy goals of the state. On this point, they differ little 
from the ideas of the nineteenth century military philosopher, 
Carl von Clausewitz. While Clausewitz never addressed these 
issues in terms of differing sociological models, his exami-
nation of the nature of war and the professional soldier~s 
role in policy formulation substantiates the correctness of 
the pragmatic position. 
Clausewitz bases his claim to pragmatism upon his 
universally famous definition of war: 
War is not merely a political act, but also a real 
political instrument, a continuation of political com-
merce, a carrying out the same by other means.9 
War is not only an act of political intercourse, a form of 
conflict resolution, but it is also an instrument to achieve 
political goals. The use of the term "by other means" does 
not mean that war is different from other forms of political 
interaction. On the contrary, war is simply one type of 
political interaction that exists between states, the only 
9
carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. by J.J. Graham 
(London: Kegan, Paul Tranch, Traubner, & Co., Ltd., 1908) 
I, 23. 
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10 difference is that it is "settled by bloodshed." There 
exists a spectrum of potential instruments at a government's 
disposal, ranging from peaceful trade to war itself. None 
of these are totally separable from each other just as the 
colors of a spectrum are inseparable • 
.•• That war is nothing but a continuation of political 
intercourse with a mixture of other means. We say mixed 
with other means in order thereby to maintain at the same 
time this political intercourse does not cease by the war 
itself, it is not changed into something quite different, 
but that in essence, it continues to exist whatever may 
be the form of the means that it uses.ll 
Thus in one sense the term "politics" was broadened to 
include all aspects of state power. 
For Clausewitz it was axiomatic that the amount of 
conflict that existed between states determined how states 
interacted and how war or any other tool of statecraft was 
used. The greater the importance or emotional tie to a goal 
the greater the propensity to use force. Thus the objective 
will be the standard for determining the means. 12 
Since war was a political act, military power should 
never be divorced from its guiding political policy. Military 
action of itself without the successful resolution of 
10Ibid., I, 121. 
11 Ibid., III, 121; also see I, xxiii-xxiv. 
12Ibid. 
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political conflict becomes "a senseless thing without an 
object."13 If it does not have policy to guide it, military 
power will establish its own calculus of success, which will 
be measured in military terms, i.e., victory. Janowitz's 
theoretical model of the absolutist who strives for the 
defeat of the enemy regardless of the political goals of the 
state, results from the separation of military power from 
policy. While the radical theorists may attempt to discon-
nect themselves from such absolutism, their claim to profes-
sional autonomy and the rejection of fusionism is the basis 
for absolutism. In order to avoid this situation, the 
rational development of foreign policy by a government must 
carefully consider its military option. 
The process by which a state chooses which instrument 
to use is the formulation of foreign policy. For policy to 
be effective, it must conceptualize the political goals of 
the state and take into consideration the power or capabi-
lities which the state has at its disposal. Out of necessity, 
the state's military capabilities must be compatible with the 
state's political goals or commitments. 14 Implicit within 
this logic was the assumption that a state's policy goals 
are constrained by the physical capabilities the state has at 
13 Ibid., I, 122. 
14 Ibid., III, 124. 
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its disposal. Obversely, a state's capabilities must be 
structured and utilized in such a manner so as to fulfill 
its commitments. Only through rational guidance supplied 
by the political/military decision making structure can a 
nation avoid imbalancing its commitments and capabilities. 
It is in the process of developing this rational 
policy that the military officer's advisory role comes into 
play, or as Clausewitz points out that "innermost part of 
its [war's] domain, where all the other threads meet." 15 
That domain is the development of war plans, or in a broader 
context, the development of policy. If war or power is to 
be a useful political tool or a political act, then a well 
organized policy is the key. In many ways, it may have 
been the most tragic part of Clausewitz's premature death, 
that Book VIII (which dealt with the question of policy 
formulation) was only in preliminary draft form. Clausewitz 
hoped to fully develop his ideas on the spectrum of war "by 
which everything will be simplified," and to "iron out the 
many creases in the heads of strategist and statesmen, and 
at least to show the object of action and the real point to 
16 be considered in war." This chapter is critical to our 
study since it is here that Clausewitz outlines the method 
by which efficient policy was to be made and the role of 
15Ibid., III, 99. 
16 Ibid., I, xxiv. 
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the military officer in that formulation. By doing so he 
prescribed the proper nature of military professionalism. 
From the above, it is easy to come to the conclu-
sion that the crux of good policy is the identification of 
those goals that the state considers important. That is an 
over simplification. How does a state arrive at that 
identification, especially if one considers that the capabi-
lities to achieve those goals must be commensurate with 
those goals? The apparent solution to this problem is 
bureaucratic interface between the military officer who 
deals in capabilities and the politician who supplies the 
commitments or goals. But there is a danger of being drawn 
into a chicken and egg dilemma when attempting to discern 
which should be the dominating factor--the policy or the 
military force to support it. Despite all the above, this 
is not as ridiculous a fear as it may appear. While 
Clausewitz emphasized it would be contrary to his whole theory 
if "policy makes demands on war it cannot respond to," he 
was a very practical military officer. He fully realized 
that the types of problems confronting the professional 
military advisor necessitate immediate solutions, and 
normally military solutions at that. This combination 
creates a situation where it may well be possible to posit 
logically that capabilities guide commitments, and thus 
situations ought to be analyzed from that perspective. On 
24 
this point Clausewitz answered: 
The subordination of the political point of view to the 
military would be contrary to common sense, for policy 
has declared the war; it is the intelligent faculty, War 
only the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordi-
nation of the military point of view to the polifical 
is, therefore, the only thing which is possible. 7 
If the military point of view became dominant, it 
would mean that the military goal had replaced the political 
goal as the objective of the state. But the term "subordi-
nation" contradicts our earlier conclusion that war is a 
political act. If this is true, then there can be no 
"military" wars, only "political" ones. 18 In this context, 
war takes on a multiplicity of meanings from actual military 
conflict to military planning during peacetime, but such 
planning without regard to the political environment 
"becomes nothing more than a combination of a few factors of 
time and space, directed toward an arbitrary goal."19 If 
military planning is to perform any function at all, it must 
become another form of political planning designed to achieve 
the political goals of the state. 
It is the actual exercise of policy formulation that 
produces the cohesive direction by which a state achieves 
17Ibid., III, 124-125. 
18 Ibid., III, 126. 
19 Quoted in Peter Parot, Clausewitz and the State 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1976), 379. 
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its goals. If the synonymous relationship between political 
and military planning is correct, then the corollary is·the 
absence of any differentiation between the political and the 
military points of view. Once it is understood that there 
are no military wars, only political ones; then there is no 
military point of view, only varied political views with the 
integration of different modes of effort. 
According to this point of view, to leave a great mili-
tary enterprise, or the plan for one, to a purely mili-
tary judgement and the decision is a distinction which 
cannot be allowed, and is even prejudicial, indeed it is 
an irrational proceeding to consult professional soldiers 
on the plan of war that they give a purely military 
opinion upon what the Cabinet ought to do.20 
To avoid this not only is bureaucratic interface 
between the statesman and the soldier required, but intellec-
tual fusion as well. This process can only occur if the 
soldier incorporates into his intellectual process an aware-
ness of non-military factors. For the officer to preface 
his advice with the caveat "from the military point of view" 
is absurd as well as dysfunctional, because "there can be no 
question of a purely military evaluation of a great strate-
gic issue, or a purely military scheme to solve it." 21 All 
military considerations and all strategic plans are 
political in nature. The military officer who fails to 
20
c1ausewi tz, On War, I I I, 126; (emphasis added) . 
21Quoted in Parot, Clausewitz, 380. 
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incorporate such considerations ~nto his advice is a failure 
to his profession because, in the last analysis, "none of 
the principal plans which are required for a war can be made 
without an insight into political relations." 22 
But what of the civilian political decision maker; 
what was his role in the Clausewitzian scheme of things? 
Obviously, there must be an inextricable relationship between 
the political and the military advisors so policy does 
reflect the maxim that war is a political act. The politi-
cian must understand the state's capabilities and work to 
keep them in tune with the state's commitments. It is the 
politician who must never allow the military point of view 
to become dominant by forcing commitments to conform to 
capabilities: 
But still more absurd is the demand of theorists that a 
statement of the available means of war be laid before 
the General, that he may draw out a purely military plan 
for the War or for campaign in accordance with those 
means.2 3 
In the final analysis, any artificial distinction between 
the military aspects of national power and the political 
aspects undermines the totality of Clausewitz' approach to 
22
clausewitz, On War, III, 126. As part of this 
intellectual fusion between the soldier and the civilian, 
the civilian decision maker must have an understanding of 
the capabilities which his military possess. But even more 
important is an understanding of the proper use of the 
military instrument. " ••• a certain knowledge of the nature 
of war is essential to the management of political inter-
course." Clausewitz, On War, III, 127. 
23 Ibid., III, 126. 
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policy making. In order to ensure the realization of that 
approach both the soldier and the statesman must reject· any 
compartmentalization of political from military planning, 
and with it the "radical" model of military professionalism. 
Thus it is through the "pragmatic" model of profes-
sionalism that the military can exercise "responsibility" 
and help pave the way for the effective integration of 
political and military policy. While Clausewitz supplied 
the intellectual and theoretical framework for the develop-
ment of coordinated political/military policy, he failed to 
offer an organizational structure that could implement 
this theory. The closest he came was to suggest that the 
head of the military should be a member of the cabinet so 
"that he may take part in the councils and decisions on 
. t t . "24 1mpor an occas1ons. He apparently failed to compre-
hend that modern war had become too complex for one man to 
fully understand the ramifications and interrelationships of 
various actions. The policy planner needed a staff of 
experts to digest that mass of material and to rationally 
develop a policy after examining all the possible options. 
In theory, such an organization could have been the Prussian 
General Staff. 
24
clausewitz, On War, III, 127; implicitly Clausewitz 
is calling for civilian control of the military, but such 
controls were within a fusionist environment. 
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The formation of the general staff system was sYffipto-
matic of the managerial revolution that occurred in the in-
dustrial West during the nineteenth century. Whereas earlier 
staffs were merely functional specialists, usually in col-
lateral civilian fields, 25 the general staff model oft~~ed 
the managerial tool to enable the government's leadership to 
control and direct its vast resources in time of war •. 
Scharnhorst, who is considered the father of the modern 
Prussian General Staff, realized that the successful US€ of 
the mass army, with its independent corps and divisions, 
necessitated the creation of an organization that was 
"capable of ensuring the effective subordination of the 
independent units to central control." 26 Unfortunately, 
concentrating only on controlling combat units ignored the 
staff's greater potential. By placing the General Staff at 
the highest organizational levels it could effectively 
subordinate and control the various elements of national 
power, and become in the words of professor Frank Simonie 
25Alvin Brown, The Armor of Organization (New York: 
Hibbert Print Co., 1953), 29-53; Dallas Irvine, "The Origins 
of the Capital Staffs," Journal of Modern History, Vol. X, 
No. 2 (June, 1938), 166-67; Walter Goerlitz; History of the 
German General Staff: 1657-1945, trans. by Brian Battershaw 
(New York: Praeger, 1973), Chapter 1. 
26Quoted in Herbert Rozinsky, The German Army (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1944), 43. 
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"the bureaucratization of supreme military power." 27 
The precise nature of a general staff has become lost 
in the confusion of myth and the varied national interpreta-
tions of the concept. A staff officer is a primary assistant 
of the commander. He is a source of information and advice, 
normally on a specific functional area, and it is through 
him that orders related to that area are issued and followed 
up on. While the staff officer may issue orders, he does so 
only in the name of the commander because a staff officer 
never commands. As war became more complex, it was necessary 
to broaden some of the supervisory functions of certain staff 
officers and they evolved into a managerial elite. Spencer 
Wilkinson, whose book. The Brain of an Army, greatly 
influenced the formation of the British and the American 
staff structures, described the Prussian General Staff in 
the following way: 
The duties of command are so multifarious that some-con-
sistent distribution of functions among the officers of 
a large staff is indispensable. In Prussia this distri-
bution is based on a thoroughly rational and practical 
principle. The general's work is subdivided into 
classes, according as it is concerned with the direction 
of the operations against the enemy. All that belongs 
to administration and discipline is put upon one side 
of a dividing line, and upon the other side all that 
directly affects the preparation for or the management 
of the fighting--in technical language, all that falls 
27Frank Simonie, "Structure and Policy: The 
Evolution of the Military Staff", (Unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation, New York University, 1975), 176. 
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within the domain of strategy and tactics. The·off~cers 
entrusted with the personal assistance of the general in 
this latter group of duties are in Prussia called his 
"general staff." They are specially trained in the art 
of conducting operations against an enemy ••• 28 
Wilkinson, as most analysts of the General Staf~, 
has focused his attention on the staff's operational mission, 
i.e., guaranteeing operational integrity and unity of action. 
Within this aspect of the General Staff's mission, the 
"radical" approach to military professionalism dominat.e.s~-
and operational efficiency, combat effectiveness, and the 
staff officer's technical proficiency are considered para-
mount. But Wilkinson, in his discussion of the Prussian: 
Staff tends to ignore the staff's planning mission. If one 
considers the analogue that Wilkinson has constructed by· 
titling his book The Brain of an Army, then the staff ''s 
operational mission is similar to that of the human nervous 
system, while the planning mission is that of the controlling 
brain. Granted planning occurs concurrently within opera-
tional organizations, but at the highest level operational 
considerations become less important as political/military 
planningtakesplace. It is at this level that Clausewitz' 
call for pragmatism should be implemented. From the prac-
tical viewpoint, the Prussian General Staff implemented this 
dual but interrelated staff function. One group of staff 
28
spencer Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army: A 
Popular Account of the German General Staff, second edition 
(Westminister: Archibald Constable & Co., 1895), 6. 
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officers (Truppengeneralstab) were distributed to the field 
commands to guarantee unity of operations. A smaller group 
(Grosser Generalstab) remained in Berlin to develop war 
plans and were concerned with the development of military 
input into political/military planning. Thus the general 
staff model consists of military planning at the highest 
level, and then the operational implementation of those 
plans through the field commands. 29 
The comparison of the general staff model to a 
managerial tool is drawn as a result of the developmental 
analogue between the growth of the state and large corpora-
tions. Just as administering large businesses became too 
complex for the individual entrepreneur to maintain 
control, so governing of the state became too complex for 
the individual statesman. Managerial scientists, such as 
Frederick W. Taylor, suggested that the solution was to be 
found in the formation of a planning staff. Such a plan-
ning department would not only be concerned with the effec-
tive day-to-day running of the factory, but also long-term 
growth and reinvestment. The same is true of the general 
staff; it would be concerned with not only the immediate 
operational aspects of war plans, but also long-range 
29 Carey Brewer, "The General Staff of the German 
Army: A Lesson in Military Organization,'' U.S. Naval Insti-
tute ?roceedings, Vol. 82, No. 2 (February, 1956). 
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. t t. 30 poliCY 1n egra 1on. 
The Prussian General Staff had the potential to ·help 
institutionalize the integration of political/military 
policy, but its role and theoretical base became perverted 
over the remainder of the century due to a narrow definition 
of military professionalism. The result was an over-concern 
for its operational function at the expense of policy inte-
gration. Slowl~ the military point of view became dominate. 
By the end of World War I, the concept of war as an exte:n-
sion of politics had become reversed as a result of 
Ludendorff's sophistry. Ludendorff's rule subordinated the 
political goals of the state to the military point of v.iew 
as war was totalized. Since he and the General Staff were 
the true military experts, and the only means of achieving 
victory in total war was to maximize military efficiency, 
it was only natural that Germany should be run as a military 
dictatorship. 31 
In America, on the other hand, Clausewitz was not 
just perverted, but totally rejected. Instead of the 
fusionism that was demanded by his theories, diplomacy was 
30Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The 
Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977); see 
also Brown, The Armor of Organization, 63. 
31Hans Speier, "Ludendorff: The German Concept of 
Total War," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. by Edward 
Mead Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941). 
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compartmentalized from military planning and a professional 
military ethic developed that inculcated this compartmentali-
zation. The reason may be found in a series of inextrica-
bly related factors stemming from America's colonial heritage 
and the nature of the military profession. 
From the very beginning of the colonial experience, 
Americans viewed themselves and their New World as something 
quite different from the Europe they left behind. This new 
hemisphere represented a rejection of feudalism, Catholicism, 
despotism, and political persecution. Out of this particu-
lar world-view developed the American image of war and its 
relationship to policy. As the Republic matured, the 
colonial sense of escape was transposed into political isola-
tionism and a repudiation of the time honored European system 
of Realpolitik. 32 According to the American perception of 
the world, only despotic states had power as their goal, and 
deceit and secret diplomacy as their means. Americans 
apparently believed the line from Pericles' Funeral Oration 
"We alone do good to our neighbors not upon the calculations 
of inte~est, but in the confidence of freedom and in a frank 
32The question of American idealism and its impact 
on American foreign policy was surfaced in the early 1950s 
by three major works, Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-
Interest in American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1953); George Kennan, American Diplomacy: 
1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); and 
Hans Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1950). For a discussion of the 
growth of American idealism see Daniel Boorstin, The Americans~ 
The Colonial Experience (New York: Vintage Books, 1965). 
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and fearless spirit." 
After rejecting power politics as an acceptable· 
approach, it was logical to establish a clear delineation 
between war and peace. Since it was the search for power 
that brought on war, America's liberal optimism posited that 
democracies would never launch an aggressive war. Thus all 
wars fought by democracies were, by definition, defensive 
and just. 33 War became a holy crusade with good ultimately 
triumphing over evil. Since war was rejected as an act of 
policy or even as a part of the normal political inter-
course or states, it became compartmentalized from diplomacy. 
The second factor that led to the bifurcation of 
diplomacy from military planning was the nation's image of 
the military. This image, which manifested itself in the 
form of civilian supremacy and anti-militarism, resulted 
from America's colonial heritage and Anglo-Saxon traditions. 
Since England.was not a continental power, it was possible 
to base its army on a militia system; while the fear of 
another Cromwell made it desirable. Aside from these tradi-
tions though, there were practical reasons for the success-
ful transplanting of the militia system to the New World. 
The communal nature of the early colonies did not allow for 
33 Robert Tucker, The Just War (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1960), 11. 
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the luxury of a non-productive military, and the omnipresent 
Indian threat secured the militia's place in colonial 
society. 
34 
The consequences of this very necessary commitment 
to the citizen soldier were great. First, it contributed to 
the myth of the militia's effectiveness and preparedness, 
which in turn laid the basis for the nation's mobilization 
posture up to World War II. Second, it obviated the neces-
sity for having a professional standing army. No matter 
how effective or necessary a professional military became, 
it was considered a necessary evil that had to be isolated 
from the mainstream of American society. 
Such isolation did occur, both as a requirement of 
mission and as a desire of the society. The Navy's mode of 
operation isolated it during its long cruises, and the Army 
became isolated because of its exile to duty on the frontier. 
These necessary separations from society conformed to the 
desires of many of its members. Echoing this sentiment, 
Albert Gallatin, member of Congress and former Cabinet 
official wrote: 
The distribution of our little army to distant garrisons 
where hardly any other inhabitants are to be found is 
the most eligible arrangement of that perhaps necessary 
34Louis Morton, "The Origins of the American Military 
Tradition," Military Affairs, Vol. XXII, No. 2 (Summer, 1958); 
Boorstin, The Americani, 351. 
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evil that can be contrived. But I never want to see the 
face of one rsoldier] in our cities and intermixed with 
the people. 35 
This isolation was made even worse by the attitudes of the 
civilian decision makers. Inculcated with the concept of 
civilian control, they took the idea too literally, and trans-
lated civilian control into the absence of military input 
into the policy making structure. This attitude was not just 
restricted to the military's involvement in wartime policies. 
William Jennings Bryan's famous cry that military officers 
"could not be trusted to say what we should or should not do, 
till we actually got into war," referred to peacetime foreign 
1 . d . . 36 po 1cy ec1s1ons. 
That this isolation would have an impact on the self-
perceptions of the officer corps was only natural. Professor 
Burton M. Sapin in his study of the military's role in Ameri-
can foreign policy noted that this isolation "was bound to 
have some impact on their [the officers'] view of the world, 
and more practically, on their ability to consider 
35Henry Adams, The Life of Albert Gallatin (Phila-
delphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1879), 304. For a general 
overview of the American Public's view_of the military, see 
Robert Kimble, The Image of the Army Officer in America: 
Background for Current Views, Contributions in Military 
History Number 5 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
1973). 
36Louis Morton, "Origins of Pacific Strategy," 
Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. XIL, No. 8 (August, 1957), 42. 
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non-military factors in their planning, training, and 
operations."37 Sapin's observation alludes to the growth of 
"radical" professionalism among the American officer corps •. 
This professionalism restricted the officer from incorporat-
ing non-military factors and limited him to looking at the 
world exclusively from the military point of view. If 
"radical" professionalism did dominate, it would negate any 
chance of the officer corps developing "pragmatism," and 
result in the military officer simply being incapable of 
supplying the type of advice that the civilian policy maker 
needed. Just as it is "an irrational proceeding to consult 
professional soldiers on the plan of war that they give a 
purely military opinion " 38 it is equally irrational for the 
military to perceive the world in purely military terms. 
Within this environment, the American military 
developed all the external manifestations of professionalism: 
a formalized education system, specialized journals, social 
37Burton Sapin and Richard Snyder, The Role of the 
Military in American Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday, 
1954)' 3. 
38
clausewitz, On War, III, 126. 
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organizations, and so forth. Concomitant with these insti-
tutions were the internal criteria of expertise, responsi~ 
bility and social cohesion. While the latter two criteria 
strengthened the individual's internal solidarity with the 
group, it was expertise that separated the professional 
soldier from his arch competitor--the militiamen. It was 
only natural for the professional, believing in his own 
expertise, to postulate that war had so fundamentally 
changed during the second half of the nineteenth century, 
that only the expert could deal with it. With a certain 
amount of justification, the professional looked upon 
himself as the sole reservoir of that expertise. At first 
his new self-awareness was directed against the profes-
sional's old enemy, the militia, but slowly the civilians 
who "controlled" the professionals became a point of focus. 
The civilian policy maker was no better prepared to deal 
with the complex strategic-military issues of modern war 
than the militia was to fight those wars. 
This professional perception of the failure of the 
American military system was most effectively articulated 
39
west Point was merely the first of the various 
institutions that were formed to instill expertise and with 
it professionalism. In 1881 the Command and General Staff 
College was formed at Fort Leavenworth, and in 1901 the Army 
War College was established. Each school was formed with 
~he idea of furthering the professional officer's education 
ln his area of military expertise. The Navy went through a 
similar experience but slightly earlier, with the Naval War 
College being established in 1884. 
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in the writing of one man, General Emory Upton. A Civil War 
general and later an instructor at West Point, Upton was the 
author of numerous works on military policy. He was writing 
his most important work, The Military P6licy of the United 
states, at the time of his suicide in 1881. 40 This work not 
only reflected a growing sense of professionalism,but helped 
proselytize it. On the surface, it is a polemical attack 
on the traditional American assumption of a militia based 
military. It develops a strong argument for a professional 
army and an officer corps based upon the criterion of exper-
tise; but the argument implicitly carries beyond the 
question of the militia's ability to fight, and questions 
the civilian's ability to lead. The fact that the civilians 
continue their infatuation with the militia is, to Upton, 
just a further exhibition of their lack of understanding 
of the complex military realities of the day. For Upton 
and many of the professionals, congressional and administra-
tion interference during the Civil War epitomized such 
civilian incompetence. "If you want to know who was the 
cause of three years of war after we created a disciplined 
40 Emory Upton, Military Policy of the United States, 
reprint of 1904 edition (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968). 
Elihu Root was given a copy of the unpublished draft, and 
it was the Secretary of War that promoted its publication 
in 1904. 
40 
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armY of 600,000 men, it was Stanton." His solution to the 
problem that faced the professionals was encapsulated in ·a 
single sentence: 
Under our Constitution, Congress has the power to raise 
and support armies, and subject to the supervision of 
the President, only professional soldiers should command 
them. 4 ~ 
Upton was not actually questioning the principle of civilian 
control, because he, like most of the other professionals, 
had accepted it as part of their professional dogma. It is 
just that he sought to isolate war time operations from the 
non-professionals. Unfortunately, once expertise became the 
criterion for determining control, then civilian control itself 
came into question. 
The direction in which Upton's arguments would lead 
is clearly seen in a somewhat prophetic civil-military con-
flict that occurred some twenty years after his death. 
After the Spanish-American War the pacification of the 
Philippine Islands was placed under the direction of General 
Arthur MacArthur. During his tour, he had a confrontation 
over powers and prerogatives with the civilian governor of 
the islands, William Howard Taft. Taft's power was based 
upon a set of orders issued by the President of the United 
41Peter Michie, The Life and Letters of Emory Upton 
(New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1885), 423. 
42 Upton, Military Policy, xi; emphasis added. 
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states. MacArthur viewed such Presidential instructions 
as "an unconstitutional interference with his oreroga- · 
tives as Military Commander of these islands." 43 It is 
apparent that the elder MacArthur believed that once a 
military officer had been given a mission, the civilian 
leadership should allow him to complete it without inter-
ference. Such expertise, if unhindered, would not only 
achieve the required defeat of the enemy, but do it quickly 
and efficiently. The insertion of non-military factors can 
only detract from this mission. This example was sympto-
matic of the officer corps• acceptance of "radical" 
professionalism. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the American 
military professional was exhibiting many of the same traits 
as his German counterpart. Both claimed, by virtue of 
their expertise, complete autonomy in military operations, 
to the exclusion of political considerations; but the 
American professional, because of his heritage and liberal 
values, never really threatened civilian control. Unfor-
tunately, the bifurcation of political considerations from 
military planning, which was an offshoot of that same 
liberal tradition, destroyed any chance of generating the 
43Ralph Minger, William Howard Taft and United 
States Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 1975), 48-49. See also Rowland T. Berthoff, "Taft 
and MacArthur, 1900-1901: A Study in Civil-Military 
Relations," World Politics Vol. V. (January, 1953). 
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kind of fusionism that true policy integration demands. 
The assumption that fusionism would somehow lead to Prus-
sianization failed to take into consideration the differences 
in the political and social structure between the two states. 
Despite these impediments to policy integration, the 
changing role of the United States during the last part of 
the nineteenth century demanded some form of organizational 
reform. These efforts culminated after the Spanish-American 
war with the formation of the Army General Staff, the Navy 
General Board, and the Joint Board of the Army and Navy. 
Of these three organizations, only the Army created some-
thing that resembled the European general staff model. 
The other two organizations were essentially coordinating 
boards without any institutional staff support, and in the 
case of the Joint Board no authority. 44 
The Army came out of the Spanish-American War badly 
in need of organizational reform. The War revealed its 
internal defects to such an extent that they could not be 
ignored. The selection of poor camp sites in the Southern 
part of the United States, the problems in issuing proper 
arms and equipment (to include woolen uniforms to troops 
going into a tropical climate), the massive confusion in 
44Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The 
American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 66. 
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transporting the U.S. forces to Cuba, and the scandals that 
were reported involving the efforts to supply the troops· 
(tO include the imamous embalmed beef scandal), ultimately 
reflected coordination and planning difficulties. These 
difficulties in turn highlighted the power struggle between 
three competing loci of power: the Secretary of War, the 
commanding General of the Army, and the bureau chiefs. 
Although there was no question as to the role of the Presi-
dent as commander-in-'chief, "the difficulty," according to 
Major General Otto Nelson, "arose on the level just below 
the President where a duality of control existed that had 
caused bickering and confusion for more than a century." 
Although the Secretary of War was the regularly consti-
tuted official through whom the President's wishes 
were presumably to be effectuated, the General Command-
ing the United States Army had come to occupy, through 
a long-standing custom aided by Congressional action, 
a position which was in some respects coordinate with 
that of the Secretary of War.45 
The result of this duality of command was that many of the 
subordinate elements within the War Department considered 
themselves to be under the exclusive control of the Secre-
tary or the Commanding General. The independence that many 
of the bureau chiefs maintained, based upon political ties 
to Congress and the tenure of their position, exacerbated 
this situation. Thus there was no single agency in a 
45
otto Nelson, National Security and the General 
Staff (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 14-15. 
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position to coordinate the various organizations. 
In order to implement this badly needed reform·, 
President McKinley appointed Elihu Root as Secretary of-the 
Army. Root came from a business and legal backgrOU·hd, and 
was thus sympathetic to managerial solutions to organiza-
tional problems. He "saw clearly how the muddles alt 'stem-
med from the failure of the parts of the Army structure to 
work in unison, " 46 and offered as a solution the cr·eat-ion of 
a brain to coordinate the service's various activities~ 
The establishment of this brain required two important and 
interrelated organizational reforms. First, he sought to 
replace the Commanding General of the Army with a new posi"'-
tion, Chief of Staff of the Army. Second, he wanted to 
create a general staff to help the new Chief of Staff ful"'-
fill his duties. Both of these reforms came about in 1903. 
These reforms eliminated the duality of command 
that existed earlier. Even in the Prussian system, where the 
Chief of the German General Staff actually commanded the 
army, he did so in the name of the king, who was the com-
mander-in-chief. In place of command, the new American 
Chief of Staff would head the staff and as such would be 
the primary advisor to the Secretary of War. Root explained 
this change of title and function as follows: 
46Alvin Brown, The Armor of Organization, 197. 
45 
The title chief of staff---denotes a duty to advise, 
inform, and assist a superior officer who has command, 
and to represent him, acting in his name and by his . 
authority, in carrying out his policies and securing 
the execution of his commands. The officer who accepts 
the position assumes the highest obligation to be 
perfectly loyal to his commander, to exclude all per-
sonal interests from his advice and representation, and 
to try, in the most wholehearted way, to help him to 
right conclusions and to successful execution of his 
policies, even though his conclusions may not agree 
with the advice given.47 
Superficially, it seemed that this completed the organiza-
tional restructuring. 
Unfortunately, Root's reforms failed to take into 
consideration the growing sense of professionalism within 
the Army and the bureaucratic imperatives of the institution. 
In theory the Chief of Staff is powerless to act on his own 
for he is not a commander, but he is still the senior 
officer within the Army. Within the military frame of refer-
ence the senior officer is normally regarded as the commander. 
From the officer corps' perspective, the issue at stake was 
the unity of responsibility and authority. The old military 
adage, "that a commander is responsible for everything that 
his units do or fail to do," reflects the importance of 
authority. This, in turn, led the military professional to 
want to keep unified the planning function and the command 
function. The ultimate responsibility for the actions of a 
47
war Department, Five Years of the War Department. 
!ollowing the war with Spain as shown in the annual Reports [-f the Secretary of War, 1899-1903 ( 1904), 297-98; quoted in 
ammond, Organizing for Defense, 18-19. 
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staff falls upon the commander of that staff. The resuJ.t of 
this institutional desire to merge military responsibility 
and military authority was that the Army perceived the Chief 
of Staff as the Commander. As the Chief of Staff began to be 
considered the senior officer in the service, an issue that 
was not fully resolved until after the First World War, and 
as he assumed the role of senior spokesman for the profes-
sional establishment, the confusion over his command role 
. d 48 
simply 2ncrease • This duality of functions between p~an-
ner and commander will be addressed in greater depth in later 
chapters. 
In order to support the Chief of Staff in his plan-
ning and coordinating functions, Root proposed to create a 
general staff along the European model. But the Uptonian 
professionalism that inculcated the officer corps forced the 
new staff to become overly concerned with operational and 
administrative details, to the detriment of its planning 
function. 49 This was not exclusively the fault of the officer 
corps. For even if they had been prepared to deal with issues 
related to policy integration, there was no other agency out-
side the Army with which to coordinate. 
Just as the Army had to initiate reform in order to 
accomodate the changing American strategic role, so did the 
48 Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The 
American Military Experience in World War I (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), chapter 6. 
chapt 49see Nelson, National Security and the General Staff, 
ers 2-4. 
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Navy. The major difference was that the Navy never did 
accept the highly centralized notions that were implic:it in 
the Root reforms. Instead, it maintained a decentralized 
structure. The reason was not exclusively narrow prof~$-
sionalism. In fact one may argue effectively, as does·' 
Richard Challener, that the Navy, because of the nature of 
its mission, had a greater understanding of the political 
realities of the world than did the Army. 50 This sense· of 
pragmatism can be seen in the writings of Alfred T. Mahnh. 
Despite this pragmatism, demands for the creation of a Navy 
general staff by some of the young turks failed, and the 
Navy managed to avoid staff centralization up to World War 
II. 
Some marginal internal reform was initiated in the 
wake of the Spanish-American War. Although a general staff 
was never created, the Navy did establish the General Board 
in 1900. This organization had no executive responsibility 
nor authority. It was primarily a planning agency. In this 
regard, it may actually have been closer to a general staff 
than the Army version. One of the major impediments to 
centralization was the clear distinction between support/ 
administrative aspects of the Navy, and the combat portion. 
The former remained under the control of the bureau chiefs 
50Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals and 
~merican Foreign Policy: 1898-1914 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1973), 12-45. 
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who maintained their autonomy, not only by political power, 
but through functional specialization. One abortive effort 
to centralize power in the Navy occured in 1915 with the 
formation of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. Paul 
Hammond in his study of military organizations suggests that 
the original intent by Navy reformers was to establish a 
position analogous to that of the Army's Commanding General, 
a position that would centralize all naval organization. 
Unfortunately, through a combination of internal naval dis-
agreements and the desires of the civilian leadership, such 
centralization never occured until World War 11. 51 
The Joint Board of the Army and the Navy, formed the 
same year as the General Staff, held out the potential for 
becoming an organization for policy integration. Originally 
established in order to facilitate Army-Navy planning, which 
was relatively unsuccessful during the Spanish-American War, 
the Joint Board's creation was an essential step toward 
policy integration, because the services themselves had to 
reach agreement on strategic issues before military policy 
could be integrated with political policy. Prior to its 
formation, as Lawrence Legere points out, "there never 
existed, except in the person of the President himself, any 
regular constituted agency to provide coordination of the 
51 f h Hammond Organiz1ng forHDe ense, c apter 3. 
49 
planning and activities of the Army and Navy." 52 Root had 
considered the creation of a joint planning structure, the 
obvious managerial companion to his own Army General Staff, 53 
but the lack of authority and a supporting staff destroyed 
whatever value the Board had. One senior officer was so 
disenchanted with the structure that he wrote that what was 
accomplished "could have been solved by other means or 
placed in a waste basket without seriously affecting either 
. 1154 
serv1ce. 
While such criticism was correct, it failed to con-
sider the impact of traditional bifurcation of political and 
military policy and its concomitant introverted military 
professionalism. The Department of State, "jealous of its 
legal and historical responsibility for the formulation and 
conduct of America's foreign policy," excluded the Joint 
Board from its planning process, thus leaving the military in 
52 Lawrence J. Legere, "Unification of the Armed 
Forces," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 
1950)' 2. 
53Elihu 
United States: 
and James Brown 
1916)' 431. 
Root, The Military and Colonial Policy of the 
Addresses and Reports, ed. by Robert Bacon 
Scott (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
54Quoted in Legere,"Unification;• 57; also see Vernon 
Davis, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: 
Qrganizational Development (Historical Division, Joint 
Secretariat, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1972), 
Vol. I covers the development of the Zoint Board up to the 
creation of the JCS after the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
50 
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a perceived policy vacuum. The result of this vacuum was 
to leave the Joint Board in a quandary. They were the pro-
fessional military experts who were to advise the civilian 
leadership on military matters, but how could they do so 
unless they had some idea of the long range goals the 
civilian leaders wanted to achieve? In 1908 the Joint 
Board's President, Admiral George Dewey, succinctly expres-
sed this dilemma: 
What may be the facts determining the international 
relations only the administration can know, and until 
this knowledge is communicated to the Joint Board, it 
can not intelligently make recommend~eions as to the 
specific disposition of the fleet ••• 
Later that year this statement was repeated almost verbatim 
when the board informed the President that they could make 
no specific recommendation on the defense of the Pacific 
until "the facts determining international relations" were 
given to them and they were told what policies and interests 
55Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals, & Ameri-
can Foreign Policy: 1898-1914, 51. In 1909 the Solicitor 
of the State Department responded to the Joint Board's call 
for a conference with the following statement, "as the 
Department of State is charged with the administration of 
foreign affairs, and as this conference ••• falls within the 
jurisdiction of this department, it would seem that the 
Department of State might well refuse to surrender its prero-
gatives." Quoted in Challener, Admirals, 53. Later in the 
1920's the State Department again rejected coordination with 
the Joint Board, see Ernest May, "The Development of Political-
Military Consultation in the United States," Political Science 
~uarterly, Vol. LXX, No. 2 (June, 1955), 169-172. 
56 Quoted in Challener, Admirals, Generals & American 
!oreign Policy: 1898-1914, 51. 
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theY were to defend. 57 
This perceived lack of guidance forced the military 
at times to rely on their own assumptions, which were 
naturally produced from a service and military perspective. 
At times, this resulted in inter-service rivalry which under-
mined the Joint Board's credibility. At other times, it 
resulted in advice which was opposite that which the civilian 
leadership desired. 58 One such example occurred in 1913 
during the war scare with Japan. The Joint Board recommended 
the movement of ships into the Eastern Pacific in an effort 
to prepare for the worst case. Secretary of the Navy Josephus 
Daniels' response to this recommendation was "nothing could 
be more injurious to peaceful negotiations than the movements 
recommended and that the Board had exceeded its functions 
because what it recommended might precipitate war." 59 
Secretary of State Bryan remarked: 
While we were discussing how to prevent a threatened war, 
these men were busying themselves with plans of how to 
57Quoted in Morton, "Origins of Pacific Strategy," 41. 
58For a discussion of how inter-service fighting 
created havoc on efforts to develop a cohesive plan in regards 
to the naval bases in the Philippine Islands, see Morton, 
"Origins of Pacific Strategy; " William R. Braisted, "The 
Phillipine Naval Base Problem, 1898-1909," The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, (August, 1957). 
59Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era, Years of Peace, 
!910-1917 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1944), 163; see Morton, "Origins of Pacific Strategy." 
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get us in. It is enough for the Army and Navy to make 
plans when the Commander in Chief calls upon them to do 
so.60 
In this case the President dissolved the Joint Board, 
but it merely illustrates the fundamental problem in 
integrating American political and military policy. On the 
one hand, the professional military officer feels that he is 
not receiving the kind of guidance that is necessary for him 
to produce relevant military input; on the other hand, the 
civilian leadership perceives that the kind of advice they 
do get from the military ignores the broader ramifications 
of military operations and thus is essentially useless. 61 
During the Naval Conferences of the 1920's and 1930's the 
American naval high command was explicitly excluded for this 
62 
reason. The history of American policy in the Pacific is 
60
rbid., 165. For a further examination of the civil-
military problems that occurred during the Wilson Presidency 
see Warner R. Schilling, "Civil-Naval Politics in World War I," 
World Politics, Vol VII, No. 4 (July, 1955). 
61For an examination of this problem see Fred Green 
"The Military View of American National Policy, 1904-1940," 
The American Historical Review, Vol. LXVI, No. 2, (January, 
1961); May, "Political Military Consultation;" Louis Morton, 
"Interservice Cooperation and Political-Military Collabora-
tion," in Total War and Cold War, Harry S. Coles, ed. (Columbus, 
Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1961); Louis Morton, "War 
Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strategy," World Politics, Vol. XI, 
No. 2 (January, 1959); Albert C. Stillson, "Military Policy 
Without Political Guidance: Theodore Roosevelt's Navy," 
Military Affairs, Vol. XXV, No. 1 (Spring, 1961). For the most 
detailed study of the pre-World War I period see Challener, 
Admirals, Generals and American Foreign Policy: 1898-1914. 
62 Raymond G. O'Connor, "The 'Yardstick' and Naval Dis-
armanent in the 1920's" The Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, Vol. XLV, No. 3 (December 1958). 
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1 f 1 k f . t t . 6 3 Th . . t t a further examp e o ac o 1n egra 1on. 1s 1s no o 
say that the State Department was oblivious to the impo!-
tance of the military tool, but appreciation did not neces-
sarilY lead to integration. Furthermore, bureaucratic 
acumen was something fundamentally different from pragmatic 
. 64 
professionalism. This continued compartmentalization of 
the political and military spheres, partially brought about 
by an exaggerated sense of civilian control of the military, 
and partially by the military's own professionalism, continued 
until the Second World War. 
As war seemed more likely during the late 1930's, the 
United States began to develop organizations to facilitate 
policy integration. The first of these was the Standing 
Liaison Committee of the State, War, and Navy Departments 
(usually referred to as S.L.C.) formed in April 1938. Origi-
nally, the Standing Liaison Committee proposed to deal with 
the specific problem of German involvement in Latin America, 
but it held the potential to become the long missing insti-
tutional means of policy integration. Unfortunately, even 
63 Morton, "War Plan Orange." Also see Robert J. 
Quinlan, "The United States Fleet: Diplomacy, Strategy and 
the Allocation of Ships (1940-41)," in American Civil-Military 
~ecisions: A Book of Case Studies, ed. by Harold Stein 
(Birmingham, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1963). 
64Mable E. Deutrich, Struggle for Supremacy: The 
.£.areer of General Fred C. Ainsworth (Washington: The Public 
Affairs Press, 1962); for a full discussion of the political 
machinations that were occurring in Washington, especially in 
regard to the formation of the General Staff, see Otto Nelson, 
~tional Security and the General Staff. 
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before its first official meeting the seeds of its destruction 
were planted. President Roosevelt named the military heads 
N th . t t" 65 of the Army and · avy as e serv1ce represen a 1ves. When 
a year later the Joint Board was brought into the executive 
office, it was only natural for the military chiefs to look 
to the President for guidance and ignore the Standing Liaison 
committee as a coordinating agency. 66 Once this happened 
s.L.C. •s lack of corporate contact with the White House, 
coupled with traditional bifurcation of military and political 
planning, emasculated its effectiveness. 67 
Aside from the Standing Liaison Committee there were 
other efforts at coordinating political and military policy. 
For a while, weekly meetings between Hull, Secretary of War 
Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox tried 
to fill the void. In 1940 this unofficial coordination was 
replaced by a more formal structure, the War Council. The 
Council, consisting of Hull, Stimson, Knox, Chief of Staff 
of the Army George Marshall, and Chief of Naval Operations 
Harold Stark, met once a week with the President. While it 
65
navis, Organizational Development, I. 34-35; Harvey 
Mansfield, Walter Millis, and Herold Stein, Arms and the State: 
Civil Military Elements in National Policy (New York: Twen-
tieth Century Fund, 1958), 19; see also Legere "Unification," 
196. 
66
william Emerson, "FDR", The Ultimate Decision: The 
~resident as Commander in Chief, ed. by Ernest May (New York: 
George Braziller, 1960), 135-136. 
67Mansfield, Millis and Stein, Arms and the State, 43. 
55 
did become in the words of Secretary Hull, "a sort of clear-
ing house for all the information and views we had under. 
discussion," it was never fully utilized, partially because 
of the unique relationship the military had with the Presi-
dent. Once the United States entered the war in 1941 
politics became secondary and with it the State Department. 
Despite Hull's protests, the traditional separation between 
military and political planning became standard operating 
68 procedure. As Secretary Stimson recalled, "when Mr. 
Roosevelt learned to like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1942, 
he allowed himself to dispense with any general meeting on 
war policy."69 It was not until 1943 that the problems of 
the future post-war environment forced the necessity for 
more coordinated politicallmilitary policy planning. 
This lack of high level policy integration had its 
impact on the services as they attempted to formulate long-
range strategic plans. The instrumentality for such planning 
existed in the service war plans divisions, which in theory 
were being coordinated by the Joint Board. But the Board, 
although vastly improved since its conception, was still 
hampered by inter-service distrust, a lack of authority, and 
a continued perception on the part of its members that they 
68
cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: 
MacMillan Company, 1948), II, 1109-1111. 
69 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active 
~ervice in War and Peace (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 
563. 
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were receiving insufficient political guidance. This resulted 
in the same kind of policy vacuum that the Joint Board had 
complained of some thirty years earlier. It was on this point 
that Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
emphasized in a January 1941 memorandum:: 
..• the desirability of obtaining at once some light upon 
the major decision which the President may make for guid-
ing our future naval efforts in the event of war and in 
future immediate preparations for war.70 
On the verge of America's entry into the Second World 
war, the basic traits of military professionalism: expertise, 
responsibility, and corporateness, had established firm roots 
in the United States. Unfortunately, the American military 
had accepted the "radical" definition of professionalism. By 
its nature "radicalism" emphasized the unique character of 
military expertise in order to rationalize its claim to 
autonomy in military matters. As the late nineteenth century 
world became increasingly dominated by technocratic managers, 
the military professionals' claim to be "managers of vio-
lence'' seemed appropriate. But the radical's claim to auto-
nomy ultimately led to a bifurcation of military from 
Political matters. This in turn led to "absolutism" in the 
Janowitzian sense. The result was that military power, which 
originally had been one of many means to achieve political 
ends, now became an end in itself. Victory was the yardstick 
--------~~---------
70Tracy Kitterage, "U.S. -British Naval Cooperation: 
1910-1945" (Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Monograph), 
Chapter XII, pp. 12. (This document was only written in a draft 
form in which the chapters were never collated.) 
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bY which the professional measured his own competen-cy. This 
type of absolutism was completely compatible with America's 
liberal idealistic philosophy. Since America's domestic con-
sensus on the role of the military, and the officer bdrps' 
"radical" professionalism were in congruence, no one :ques-
tioned the relationship of "radicalism" and the offi'ce.r corps' 
responsibility to the society. In fact, within the :ribei-al 
interpretation, "radicalism" was not only responsible., but 
ethically correct. If nothing else it kept the officer corps 
out of the political mainstream and thus guaranteed c-ivil-ian 
control. 
Ironically the same technological expertise that 
fostered "radicalism" also required a coordinating agent ·to 
organize and effectively use that expertise. Such an orga-
nization was the general staff model. But the staff model 
itself was neutral, not emphasizing either form of profes-
sionalism. For the model to work effectively it demanded 
both forms of professionalism to be working in concert, with 
the radical skills guaranteeing operational efficiency and 
the pragmatic skills supporting political/military planning. 
However, the dominance of "radicalism" meant that the 
operational function of the staff received primacy over the 
long-range planning function. The staff could develop highly 
sophisticated operational plans, but the equally important 
Political/military plans, which helped develop the goals for 
58 
which military power existed, would only come about if the 
officer corps was imbued with "pragmatism.'' 
The result of the primacy of "radicalism" was that 
the Clausewitziart notion of political/military fusion had 
been rejected as a threat to the liberal definition of 
civilian control of the military, and the professional 
officer's outlook was restricted to the military point of 
view. This "radicalism" led to a failure to utilize the 
general staff to its maximum, and appeared to the military 
officer to cut him off from the kind of policy guidance that 
he thought was necessary to fulfill his planning function. 
From the civilian leadership's perspective this "radicalism" 
resulted in "useless" input into the policy making process. 
Thus they felt they were not getting "responsible" profes-
sional advice. This failure to develop policy integration 
would result in fundamental problems in planning the military 
aspects of the forthcoming world war. 
CHAPTER III 
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor it was 
apparent to both the British and the American military 
leadership that some form of common institution was needed 
to facilitate the interchange of information and to generate 
a unified military approach to the war. To begin accomplish-
ing this, a conference code named "Arcadia," took place in 
washington, D.C. between 24 December 1941 and 14 January 1942. 
"Arcadia's" purpose was to formulate a political/military 
blueprint for the early stages of the war, while dealing with 
the immediate crisis in the Pacific. Out of these conversa-
tions came not only a reaffirmation of certain strategic 
principles, such as the Germany first decision; but also the 
establishment of a supreme U.S.-British military body to 
direct the military aspects of the war effort--The Combined 
Chiefs of Staff (CCS). The Combined Chiefs were directly 
responsible to the President and the Prime Minister as a 
combined executive. From the very beginning this was exclu-
sively an Anglo-American organization, due in part to the 
bureaucratic difficulties entailed in incorporating the 
Russians into the CCS, and in part to the establishment of 
59 
60 
71 
spheres of control over the war effort. 
Acting in the capacity as the military advisors.· to 
the Prime Minister, the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) were 
in a position to discuss authoritatively the British view on 
strategic questions. The Americans on the other hand had no 
equivalent to the COS except the moribound Joint Board •. 
Furthermore, the American staff structure had little previous 
experience in dealing with inter-nation political/military 
policy formulation. The inadequacy of the American syst.em 
was clearly conveyed in a letter from Field Marshal Dill to 
71Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
acknowledged the fact that the war was to be divided up into 
two spheres of control; the Americans running the Pacific War 
up to the Asian mainland; while the British ran the war in the 
Middle East, India, Burma, and the Indian Ocean. The war in 
Europe was apparently going to be controlled by the Combined 
Chiefs, although the British seemed to have assumed that they 
would have more to say because of their commitment and the 
resources that had been allocated. Arthur Bryant, Turn of the 
Tide: A History of the War Years Based Upon the Diaries of 
Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1957), 254; Vernon 
Davis, A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: 
Organizational Development (Historical Division, Joint Secre-
tariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1972), I, 190-200; Grace P. 
Hayes, A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: 
The War Against Japan (Historical Section, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 1953), I, 119; also see "Brief Statement of the Origin 
and Composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," (Historical 
Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Novem-
ber 20, 1969, Mimeographed), hereafter referred to as "Brief 
Statement;" John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, October 1944-August 
~' Vol. VI of History of the Second World War, United King-
dom Military Series, Grand Strategy, ed. by Sir James Butler 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1956), 339. (Here-
after referred to as United Kingdom Military Series Grand 
Strategy. ) ' 
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Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke: 
There are no regular meetings of their Chiefs of Staff, 
and if they do meet there is no secretariat to record 
their proceedings, they have no joint planners and 
executive planning agency ••• then there is great dif~ 
ficulty of getting the staff over to the President. 
He just sees the staff at odd times, and again no 
record. The whole organization belongs to the days of 
George Washington.72 
The creation of the American Joint Chiefs of.S:taff 
was a result of the institutional necessity to supplY; Atneri~ 
can participation in the "Arcadia" conversations. Although, 
there was no specific American organizational counterpart to 
the British Chiefs of Staff, "there never seemed to ha"Ve been 
any uncertainty as to what American officers would provide 
authoritative representation vis-a-vis the British within the 
Combined Chiefs." 73 The British Chiefs of Staff Committee 
consisted of the First Sea Lord (Admiral Sir Dudley Pound), 
the Chief of the Air Staff (Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles 
Portal), and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (then 
General, later Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke). The American 
participants were selected by virtue of the fact that they 
held positions which corresponded to that of the British 
Chiefs, or to use the term of the day, they were the "United 
States opposite numbers." Those officers were U.S. Army 
Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, Commander-in-Chief 
72Dill to Alanbrooke 3 January 1942; Bryant, Turn 
~f the Tide, 233-34. 
73
"Brief Statement," 1. 
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S Fleet (COMINCH), Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of the u. . 
ArmY Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, 
Lieutenant General Henry H. (Hap) Arnold, and until March 
1942, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark. 74 
The immediate problem that needed to be addressed at 
"Arcadia" was the deteriorating situation in the Pacific and 
southeast Asia. General Marshall, who had great faith in 
unity of command suggested that the appointment of a unified 
theater commander might help stabilize the situation: 
I am convinced that there must be one man in command of 
the entire theater--air, ground, and ships. We cannot 
manage by cooperation ••• there should be sup:Leme authority 
74Based upon the "Opposite Number" formula General 
Marshall's position was analogous to that of General Alan-
brooke's. The American Navy's position was complicated by 
the fact there was a dual chain of command. Since 18 Decem-
ber 1941 there had been two official heads of the Navy. On 
that date the President, by Executive Order, increased the 
significance of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, to which 
he appointed Admiral King. Stark, the CNO, from then on 
concentrated on administrative matters, until his appoint-
ment as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, in 
March of 1942. With Stark's departure, King was the sole 
Navy representative on the JCS. Arnold's presence was the 
result of the fact that the Royal Air Force was an indepen-
dent entity, and thus the U.S. had to supply an "Opposite 
Number." The logical choice was Arnold. Since he was 
junior to all the other U.S. representatives he deferred to 
them on strategic issues and was generally recognized as 
Marshall's subordinate. As the war progressed and U.S. air 
Power played an increasing role, Arnold's power within the 
JCS and CCS grew accordingly so that he was promoted to 
five star rank with the other members of he JCS. See "Brief 
Statement," 1. 
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over everyone. Suitable limitations cou~d be imposed to 
safeguard the interests of each nation.7 
Marshall's remarks were directed only at the Pacific situa~ 
·tion, where he wanted to create a unified command to direct 
the American, British, Dutch, and Australian (ABDA) forces in 
the area. The selection of the ABDA commander was extremely 
political because neither the British nor the Americans wanted 
to be shackled with the blame for the debacle. For this 
reason, the British Chiefs first opposed such a command struc-
ture, and it was not until the intervention of Prime Minister 
11 h th A . . t . t . d 76 Churchi t at e mer1can posl 1on was sus a1ne • 
Marshall had first brought up the discussion of a 
unified command on Christmas Day, 1941, but it was not until 
75ABC 4, JCSSs 2, 25 December 1941, "Arcadia" Con-
ference Proceedings, Combined Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower 
Library, Abilene, Kansas (Hereafter referred to as Proceed-
ings, CCS). General Marshall brought up this question again 
on 27 December 1941, JCSSs 4, item #5 and inserted a pro-
posed draft of a Unified Command Order, JCSSs 4, annex 1. 
On 28 December 1941 Prime Minister Churchill agreed to the 
creation of the ABDA command. This partially reflected the 
British desire to establish spheres of control. General 
Wavell received his orders on 10 January 1942, JCSSs 8. 
For a further discussion of the creation of the CCS 
a~d the formation of the ABDA Command see Davis, Organiza-
tlonal Development, I. 139-178; Hayes, The War Against Japan, 
I~ 45-80; Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Opera-
tlons Division (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Department of the Army, 1951), 87-106; Maurice 
Matloff and Edwin Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition 
~are: 1941-42 (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Department of the Army, 1953), chapter 5; J.M.A. 
Gwyer, Grand Strategy, June 1941-August 1942, Vol. III, part 1 
of United Kingdom Military Series, Grand Strategy, (London: 
Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1964), 375-388. 
76Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate 
[istory (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), 457. 
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the lOth of January that British General Sir Archibald 
wavell was appointed Supreme Commander in the ABDA theater. 
It was during this interval that the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
began to take form. The necessity far such an "appropriate 
joint body" was obvious to the political leadership of both 
nations; but the problem was institutionalizing it, without 
allowing, in the words of Harry Hopkins, "everybody and his 
grandmother" to be a member. 77 While the Combined Chiefs 
bad in practice been in operation since the beginning of 
"Arcadia," the establishment of a de jure unified commander 
demanded the formation of a de jure Combined Chiefs. The 
first official meeting of the CCS took place on the 23rd of 
January, 1942. With the agreement to a combined document 
entitled "Post-Arcadian Collaboration," the basis for all 
77Ibid., 469. 
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. ·l•t d. t• t 78 future Anglo-Amer1can m1 1 ary coor 1na 1on was se • 
The American desire for a unified commander, wh1le 
operational at the theater level, was simply impractical any 
higher. No single individual could possibly control the 
complex military operations needed to conduct world-wide 
war. Furthermore, neither principal ally could politically 
afford to hand over the supreme command to an officer from 
the other nation, especially since the President and the 
Prime Minister were political equals. Thus the Combined 
Chiefs had to remain a committee. But even the CCS could 
not meet continuously, because the military leaders of both 
nations had to continue to perform their national command 
functions. A solution was found in naming Washington, D.C. 
78
obviously, the CCS had been operating in a de facto 
manner since the arrival of the British. At the meeting on 
13 January 1942, Admiral Pound proposed that arrangements be 
made to extend combined collaboration outside the ABDA area, 
JCSSs 11, 13 January, "Arcadia" Conference,Proceedings, CCS. 
The following day the Chiefs approved the "Post-Arcadian 
Collaboration" document which specified the existence of the 
CCS, a Combined Secretariat, and Combined Planners, 14 Janu-
ary, JCSSs 12, Proceedings, CCS. The original first draft of 
the "Collaboration" was submitted on 10 January, JCSSs 8, 
annex ~ Proceedings, CCS, but at that time it was rejected 
and reworked for later submission·. The logic of the CCS grow-
ing out of the creation of theABDA command was first noticed 
in a December 24th paper entitled "Higher Direction of the 
War in the ABDA area," Lawrence Legere, "Unification of the 
Armed Forces," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Uni-
v:rsity, 1950), 237-245. The CCS was first publically men-
tloned in a press release on 6 February 1942, and the Presi-
dent signed the CCS's charter on 21 April 1942, "Brief State-
ment;" Cline, Washington Command Post, 100-101. It was 
during this period that the term "combined" began to refer to 
two or more nations in collaboration, while the term "joint" 
referred to the inter-service collaboration of one nation. 
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the permanent seat of the Combined Chiefs and having the 
British post a liaison group there. This liaison group, 
commanded by Field Marshal Sir John Dill, supplied permanent 
British staff counterparts to interface with the growing JCS 
bureaucracy. Dill's placement. in Washington, temporarily 
created the fear, that he would become an intermediary body 
between the Prime Minister and the CCS, especially since he 
would have continual access to the U.S. Chiefs when the full 
ccs was not meeting. After a great deal of discussion it 
was decided that there would be no super-war cabinet inserted 
between the Anglo-American political leaders and their 
1 d . 79 mi itary a v1sors. While this did eliminate the danger of 
imposing another bureaucracy over the Chiefs, it did create 
a situation that allowed for a maximum amount of political 
guidance as well as interference. 
The mere identification of individuals to participate 
in the joint discussions did not alleviate the inherent prob-
lems that Dill had pointed out to Alanbrooke. Obviously, 
if the CCS was to perform its function and manage the war 
effort, it needed staff support to monitor and plan specific 
79By the seventh meeting of "Arcadia" it was clear 
that Washington was going to be the permanent seat of the CCS 
and that the Americans were not going to allow a military 
representative to be placed between the political leadership 
and the Chiefs. There was going to be only one Combined 
Chiefs of Staff. On this point the British gave in and 
appointed Dill the head of the delegation to Washington and 
did not make him special representative to the President. 
JCSSs 11, 13 January 1942, "Arcadia" Conference, Proceedings, 
~· Also see Davis, Organizational Development, I, 183-88. 
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aspects of the conflict. Such a Combined Staff began to 
take form shortly after "Arcadia" began. Slowly a series of 
combined committees were established to deal with func-
tional areas such as plans, intelligence, etc. These com-
mittees had both British and American representation, with 
the u.s. officers being drawn from the JCS's own parallel 
joint committee structure. Despite Joint Chiefs Historian 
vernon Davis' observation that the JCS did not follow any 
"large and conscious design" 80 as it formed its committees, 
there were certain factors that helped mold its structure. 
During the late 1930s the Joint Board began to develop a 
series of supporting staff committees, most noticeably in 
the areas of plans and intelligence. These committees were 
staffed by officers whose primary assignment was to the ser-
vice staffs of these related fields. They worked together 
on the Joint Board Committees only as a part-time duty. Thus 
the members of the Joint Planning Committee were full-time 
members of the Army General Staff's War Plans Division and 
the Chief of Naval Operation's War Plans Division. Theo-
retically, these officers were to "consider this joint work 
as their most important duty," but invariably they had to 
devote their primary attention to their own service jobs. 81 
80Davis, Organizational Development, II, 354. 
81 Ibid., I, 30. 
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Despite this problem the Joint Board's organizational support 
supplied the nucleus for the forthcoming JCS bureaucracy, 
which also tended to model itself after the British Chiefs of 
staff structure. 
Unfortunately, the American staff retained its part-
time flavor, as opposed to assigning full-time joint staffers. 
While the committee structure and the individuals involved 
changed during the war, the basic pattern of U.S. representa-
tion on Combined Committees was that the senior U.S. officers 
were also the senior service staff specialist in that specific 
field. Thus the senior US members on the Combined Intelli-
gence Committee were the Chiefs of Army and Navy Intelligence. 
Similarly, Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner, Assistant Chief of 
Staff (Plans), COMINCH, was the U.S. Navy representative to 
the Joint Staff Planners (JPS), and along with an Army Counter-
part made up the senior U.S. representation to the Combined 
Staff Planners (CPS). For the most part these joint committees 
had to rely on service staffs for support, although some of 
the committees had permanent sub-committees made up of full-
time staff officers to support them. 82 
The part-time relationship between the services and 
the joint committee reflected an American commitment that 
82As an example of how the committee structure worked 
the JPS consisted of five members, the Assistant Chief of 
Staff (Plans of COMINCH) and two assistants; and the Chief of 
the Strategy and Policy Group of the War Department's Opera-
tions Division (OPD) and the Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans) 
of the Army Air Staff. 
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planning would not occur in a vacuum. By having the senior 
member of the committee the senior service planner, unity of 
purpose was achieved. But this relationship also fostered a 
tendency for the joint planner to support his own service 
position. The British tried to make their staff planners free 
agents, whose responsibility was to the committee as a cor-
porate group, and not to the service. Thus the British fully 
anticipated that their planners might go against their ser-
vices' interest on some issues. The American officers, on the 
other hand were used to responding to the desires of their 
superiors, and achieving concurrence at every level. Thus 
the American planners tended to be more of a service advocate 
than their British counterpart. The result was, "not to pro-
duce the best paper possible within a reasonable time, but a 
'perfect' paper, in which all differences had been adjusted 
t th t . f t . f th . . It 83 o e sa 1s ac 1on o e var1ous super1ors. The place-
ment of senior staff officers as the U.S. representatives 
simply exacerbated this problem, which in turn increased 
inter-service conflicts within the staff. Therefore, the 
American staff planners might be split along service lines, 
While the British planners always spoke in a single voice. 
Following closely behind the establishment of the 
Combined Chiefs, was the de jure establishment of the 
83D . av1s, Organizational Change, II, 384. 
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American Joint Chiefs of Staff, who held their first official 
meeting on 9 February 1942. From the very beginning their 
functions and duties were never delineated beyond the genera-
lities of coordinating and directing the war effort. For the 
completion of this mission the JCS was directly responsible 
to the President. The authority of the Chiefs came from two 
sources: the members own statutory responsibilities and 
functions, and their direct relationship to the President. 
"So long as the Joint Chiefs of Staff retained the confidence 
of the President," wrote one JCS historian, "the wartime pre-
84 
rogatives of the agency was secure." It was imperative for 
the Chiefs to maintain the President's confidence and support 
if they were to sustain their viewpoint before the Combined 
Chiefs. In order to enhance this working relationship, 
General Marshall became convinced that a fourth member of 
the JCS should be designated to preside at the JCS meetings 
and to maintain a liaison with the White House. In order to 
placate Admiral King, General Marshall proposed that the new 
member be a naval officer. Thus on 20 July 1942, Admiral 
William D. Leahy was appointed to the newly created position 
of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and 
the Navy. 85 
84
"Brief Statement," 5. 
85Admiral Leahy was a close friend of the President, 
and was recalled from his post as Ambassador to Vichy, France. 
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The appointment of Admiral Leahy was inextricably 
connected to a series of reforms that occurred within the 
services. Both services realized that unity of command was 
essential for victory, but too much centralization in the 
hands of a chief would strangle the bureaucracy and crush the 
chief beneath the weight of trivia. Thus the goal was to 
balance centralization with decentralization so the chief 
could concentrate on the broad strategic issues. The Army 
had begun to think about some form of reorganization during 
the fall of 1941, when it became apparent that General 
Marshall would not be able to command the American Expedi-
tionary Force as doctrine called for. Such an approach 
would only be feasible in a one theater war, as in the case 
of World War I. For a world wide conflict, a new organiza-
tion was required. Such a reorganization occurred in March 
1942, under the direction of Lieutenant General Joseph 
McNarney. It centralized the diverse elements within the 
Army into three major commands, Army Air Forces, Army Service 
Forces, and Army Ground Forces. The latter two commands 
centralized all non-Army Air Forces logistics and training 
functions under their control, while the former paved the way 
for Air Force autonomy. Men and material were then sent from 
these commands to the theaters of operation. In order to 
handle the vast planning and operational function incurred 
by the war effort, the War Plans Division within the General 
72 
staff was redesignated the Operations Division (OPD). It 
was through the OPD that General Marshall controlled the Army, 
just as a commanding general would have. This reorganization 
guaranteed General Marshall primacy in the military sphere, 
vis-a-vis Secretary Stimson, who increasingly became exclu-
sively concerned with administrative matters. 86 
During the same time period the Navy was also going 
through a reorganization. While the Army's effort was at 
controlled decentralization in order to free the Chief of 
staff for strategic issues, the Navy had to centralize its 
organization in order to achieve unity of command. For a 
variety of reasons, the Navy had developed a dual command 
structure, with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) primarily 
concerned with administrative and planning matters, and the 
Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet (COMINCH) acting as the combat 
commander. In December 1941 Admiral King was appointed 
COMINCH, explaining the presence of both Stark and King at 
the "Arcadia" meetings. Increasingly, it became apparent 
that this duality was dysfunctional and in March 1942 Stark 
was relieved of his duties as CNO, thus placing King, 
86 .. 
Dav1s, Organizational Development, I, 234-37; Otto 
Nelson, National Security and the General Staff (Washington: 
Infantry Journal Press, 1946), chapter 8; James E. Hewes, 
From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 
1900-1963 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 
United States Army, 1975), 67-78. 
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who now assumed both the CNO and COMINCH duties, in a posi-
87 
tion analogous to that of Marshall. 
These March reforms tended to supply each service 
chief with a great deal of wartime power and thus made them 
less interested in the creation of a super agency along the 
lines of a chief of a joint general staff. The insertion of 
such an agency would tend to negate the positive effects of 
the March reforms. Still the Chiefs, and in particular 
Marshall, felt that the President needed professional staff 
assistance to effectively perform the duties of the commander-
in-chief.88 In a March 1942 memorandum, General Marshall 
explained that his notion of a chief of the joint general 
staff would not be that of a supreme military commander above 
the services, "but that the office would be established to 
provide some one person not at present involved in the War or 
Navy Departments who would coordinate and brief information 
and opinions,"89 so that the President could make the neces-
sary policy decisions. 
The role of Admiral Leahy has always been an extremely 
difficult one to ascertain primarily because, like the 
87Davis, 9rganizational Development, I, 237-8; King's 
assumption of both Navy offices meant that the Army outnumbered 
the Navy two to one. 
88 Ibid., I, 239-50. 
89Ibid., I, 251. 
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president's commander-in-chief. power, Leahy was given a title 
without a corresponding list of functions. There is a cer-
tain amount of ambiguity in Marshall's proposal for a chief of 
the joint general staff. Undoubtedly, Marshall never en-
visioned Leahy becoming the commander of all U.S. military 
forces. This could violate the President's constitutional 
power, as well as undermine Marshall's own position, that in 
effect had been elevated to that of commanding general as a 
result of the March 1942 reforms. Instead Marshall was think-
ing of a typical military chief of staff who acted as coordi-
nator of the staff, an avenue of expression for the commander, 
and a means of communication between the commander, the staff, 
and the commanders in the field. This is precisely the kind 
of role that Marshall outlined in March 1942. The ability to 
be a neutral arbitrator between the various factions within a 
staff is typically one of the chief of staff's primary func-
tions. This explains Marshall's desire to have a neutral 
chairman for the JCS who could arbitrate inter-service con-
flicts. This was one of Leahy's strong suits. Not only would 
his appointment equalize the number of army and navy officers 
on the JCS, but Marshall "was willing to trust Leahy to be a 
neutral chairman •••• " 90 
Originally, the President did not see the necessity 
for such an individual, maintaining that he was his own chief 
90 Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Ordeal and 
!_.o_p_e_: __ ~l~9~39-1942 (New York: Viking Press, 1966), 298. 
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of staff. Although, the President was finally persuaded as 
to the value of such a position, his own desire never to· I.et 
power reside outside his immediate control tended to degrade 
the position. 91 General Marshall pointed out that Leahy 
increasingly became "the Chief of Staff to the President and 
less the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff •••• " 92 The apparent 
derogatory tone of Marshall's statement conveys the notion 
that Leahy was not allowed to become as involved in the formu-
lation of policy as Marshall thought he should by virtue of 
. t. 93 his pOSl 10n. 
The British Official History, while not describing 
this transformation, clearly notes that Leahy's role was to 
94 
"explain rather than formulate." The President himself 
described Leahy's role as "a sort of 'leg man,' who would 
help him [Roosevelt] digest, analyze, and summarize a mass of 
material with which he had been trying to cope with 
91 Ibid., 299. 
92Ibid., 300. 
93 The role of General Hastings Ismay, personal Chief 
of Staff to the Prime Minister, may have been the model that 
Marshall was basing his ideas on. He may also have been 
thinking of a role that would be analogous to that of the 
Secretary of Defense as the position was first conceived in 
1947. 
1945 
_, 
94John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, October 1944-August 
344. 
d d ,95 singlehan e • 
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In the final analysis Leahy became primarily 
an avenue of information and feedback between the President 
and his military advisors. Unfortunately, as Leahy was drawn 
into the President's political conversations toward the end 
of the war, this avenue at times became blocked. 96 
Whatever Admiral Leahy's role, his presence greatly 
facilitated the operations of the Joint Chiefs, but the lack 
of an official organizational charter continued to be a prob-
lem. In January 1943, the Secretary of the JCS circulated a 
proposed charter among the Chiefs, who subsequently sent it 
to the President for approval. The charter specified that 
the Chiefs were to act as the military advisors to the Presi-
dent, make joint plans, issue joint directives, and exercise 
. . d . t . t t d t . 97 L h h JUrls 1c 1on over s ra egy an opera 1ons. ea y, w o 
opposed such a document, believed that the Joint Chiefs 
functioned effectively without one. Since the JCS already 
had direct access to the President, Leahy believed that such 
a document could only constrain their relationship and limit 
th f th · t · . t 98 A t 1 th P . d t e scope o e1r ac 1v1 y. pparen y, e res1 en 
95
william D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1950), 97-101; after the war Leahy recal-
led that the relationship of the JCS toward the President was 
exactly as a staff to a commander. 
96 Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, 300. 
97Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," 246. 
98D . av1s, Organizational Development, II, 440. 
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agreed with his Chief of Staff, because he rejected the 
charter with the following note: 
It is my understanding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
are encountering no new conditions currently requir-ing 
clarification of their status or a new definition OI 
their functions. It seems to me that such an order 
would provide no benefits and might in some way impair 
flexibility of operations. Consequently, I consider 
the issuance of an Executive Order now as superfluous. 
If at a latter date an Executive Order seems nec-essa-ry 
to meet ~ new situation, the matter can be recon~ 
sidered. 9 
President Roosevelt's refusal to grant the Joint 
Chief's a charter suggests something of his administrative 
desires and supplies insight into his perceptions ag to ~hat 
role the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to play during the war. 
It is generally admitted that Roosevelt was a poor aamini-
strator, who liked to handle things personally. This personal 
control,which maximized his flexibility and allowed him to 
utilize his very potent political skills, may help explain 
the transition in Leahy's role. This administrative attitude 
is part of four interrelated factors that must be considered 
in determining the Joint Chief's war-time role. These four 
factors were: (1) Roosevelt's war-time political objectives 
and his self-perception as c·ommander-in-chief; ( 2) the 
political objectives of the British and their effective 
Political!military planning structure which sought to 
247. 
99Quoted in Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," 
78 
guarantee the achievement of those goals; (3) the Joint 
Chiefs' own strategic concepts and self-image as mili tar·y 
officers and advisors to the President; (4) the committee 
nature of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 
Despite the appearance of unity within the Anglo-
American alliance, there existed profound political and 
strategic differences. To the degree that the membership of 
the ccs was responsible to the political leadership of their 
respective nations, these disagreements permeated the 
military discussions. Due to the committee nature of the 
Combined Chiefs, none of the members were capable of forcing 
a successful resolution of an issue except by using the age 
old political methods of persuasion and compromise. "The 
combined organization ..• " one British Chief wrote, "gives us 
the constitutional right to discuss on equal terms." 100 This 
equality meant that each Chief had effectively the power to 
veto any CCS action. Since the Chiefs had no organizational 
superior other than their political leadership, it was 
only from that level that a decision could be imposed. When 
divergent views clashed and compromise failed, the issue had 
to be dealt with at the highest level. In practice this 
meant that support by the political leadership determined 
one's ability to impose one's views on opposing Chiefs. 
348. 
100 Ehrman, Grand Strategy, October 1944-August 1945, 
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Under such a system, the British possessed certain 
inherent advantages. In the first place, the British policy 
structure optimized politicallmilitary planning and assured 
support from the political leadership. In the second place, 
the British unity of purpose combined with their preponder-
ance of military resources in the European Theater led to 
their dominance in strategy up until 1943. 101 Finally, the 
American Chiefs were split over strategic matters, with the 
naval representatives far more concerned with the Pacific 
102 Theater than were their army counterparts. 
The fact that these inter-service conflicts existed 
was partially the fault of the committee nature of the Joint 
Chiefs. Just as it was within the CCS, it was impossible to 
impose a decision from within the Joint Chiefs on a recalci-
trant member. Thus a great deal of "quiet military diplomacy" 
101 Ibid., 332, 338. 
102 Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, 279; H. H. Arnold, 
Global Mission (New York: Harper and Row, 1949), 338; Henry 
L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and 
War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 515. 
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was required to "reconcile the diverse service theories •. " 103 
In regard to the Pacific area of operations, where the Joint 
Chiefs were autonomous, the services negotiated with each 
other over strategic issues as if they were sovereign nations. 
Despite these internal conflicts the Chiefs were very reluc-
tant to reveal their differences to any outside agency. To 
do so might allow the decision making power to gravitate else-
where. Reflecting on this point, Admiral King remarked that 
"matters of major import that required presentation to the 
President could be counted on the fingers of one hand. We 
usually found a solution. S t . . "104 orne 1mes a comprom1se. Under 
these circumstances Admiral Leahy performed a vital function, 
103Maurice Matloff, "American Leadership in World 
War II," Soldiers and Statesmen, Proceedings of the Fourth 
Military History Symposium, USAF Academy, 1970 (Washington: 
Office of Air Force History, 1973), 94. The individual veto 
power of a Chief was exemplified in 1942 when the JCS con-
sidered cutting back on the number of capital ships that were 
to be ordered so that more landing craft could be built. Only 
Admiral King was opposed to this. When Admiral Leahy remarked 
that it looked as though "the vote is three to one,n King re-
Plied that as far as he was concerned the JCS was "not a 
voting body on any matter that concerns the Navy." Quoted in 
Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification: A 
Study of Conflict and the Policy Process (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1966), 18. 
104Quoted in Caraley, The Politics of Military Unifi-
cation, 19; one example of the conflicts that existed within 
the JCS was the issue of British naval reinforcement to the 
Pacific late in the war. The President had agreed to the 
Royal Navy sending a fleet, but Admiral King was opposed. At 
~ CCS meeting King even refuted the President, to which Admiral 
eahy remarked, "I don't think we should wash our linen in 
~Ublic," Andrew B. Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey (London: 
utchinson & Co., 1951), 612. 
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because it was through him that the Chiefs discovered the 
president's strategic predilections and thus they were able 
to avoid revealing many of their internal differences. One 
knowledgable insider, Captain Tracy Kitterage of the U.S. 
Navy maintained that such a process actually enhanced the 
President's control over military decisions: 
It may be true that the President formally overruled them 
[JCS] on a very few occasions, but this was only because 
informal discussions of the President with Leahy, Marshall, 
King, and Arnold usually led them to know in advance the 
President's views. They, no doubt, frequently recognized 
the advantages of accepting the President's suggestions 
with their own interpretations, rather than of risking an 
overruling by presenting formally proposals they knew 
would not be accepted.l05 
The picture presented of Presidential-JCS interaction 
is one of decentralization. While this reflected the Presi-
dent's desired mode of administrative control, the nature of 
such decentralization leads automatically to unstructured 
lines of communication. General Marshall, in particular, 
despised such operational methods and complained to British 
Field Marshal Alanbrooke that there were occasions he did 
not see the President for four to six weeks at a time. 106 
Under these circumstances Marshall was forced to use Admiral 
Leahy, Harry Hopkins, and even Field Marshal Dill to dis-
cover the White House's thoughts on certain matters. At 
105 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 957n. 
106 Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, 242n. 
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other times, though, all the members of the JCS went to the 
president and discussed strategic issues. 107 Lawrence Legere 
bas correctly observed that since President Roosevelt was not 
a skilled administrator, he liked to have "cooperating, but 
not highly coordinated subordinates," which resulted in the 
JCS being "tailor-made for his taste."108 This structure 
allowed the President to easily impose his desires on the 
organization, thus making his attitudes and his role all 
important. 
Probably no aspect of Roosevelt's Presidency is more 
controversial than his wartime role as commander-in-chief and 
his impact on military decisions. The reason is the inextri-
cable relationship between these decisions and the subsequent 
development of the Cold War. Obviously, many of the "military 
decisions" made during this period had long term political 
consequences and vice versa. It thus becomes important to 
ascertain the extent of the President's impact on such deci-
sions. 
There is little doubt that Franklin Roosevelt took 
his responsibilities as commander-in-chief very seriously. 109 
107 Leahy, I Was There, 103; Washington Command Post, 
104; Kent Roberts Greenwood, American Strategy in World 
!ar II: A Reconsideration (Baltimore: John Hopkins Univer-
Sity Press, 1963), 54. 
York: 
108 Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," 289-90. 
109
cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New 
The MacMillan Co., 1948), IL. 1111. 
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His personal commitment to the President's military function 
combined with the 1939 order that brought the Army Chief of 
staff and the Chief of Naval Operations into the Executive 
Office resulted in a close rapport between the JCS and the 
White House. Even if the President had had no desire to 
fulfill his Constitutional role, the very nature of the Com-
bined Chiefs would have thrust him into the military arena. 
The extent to which the President controlled military 
decisions is difficult to determine, due to conflicting 
impressions and interpretations of his actions. Admiral Leahy 
stated in his memoirs that the President "was the real 
110 Commander-in-Chief of our Navy, Army, and Air Force." Some 
historians, though, have taken the view advocated by Samuel P. 
Huntington in his book The Soldier and the State. Huntington 
maintains that the civilian decision makers unofficially 
abdicated their responsibilities and allowed the military to 
run the war. He bases his contention on the belief that the 
President rarely overruled his military advisors and defended 
their positions at international conferences. This abdication 
forced the military to make crucial decisions of a political 
nature. 111 
110 Leahy, I Was There, 345. 
111
samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1964), chapter 12. 
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This thesis does supply a rationale to explain the 
failure of American post-war policy, but the record fails to 
substantiate it. In a recent study by Kent Roberts Green-
field, formerly Chief Historian of the United States Army, at 
at least twenty-two examples of Presidential decisions made 
"against the advice or over the protests of his military 
advisors," and another dozen examples of Presidential initi-
atives in strategic matters were identified. Significantly, 
Greenfield found that the only point of contention between 
the President and the JCS after 1943 was over the recall of 
General Joseph Stilwell from China. 112 Greenfield's work 
paints the portrait of a President deeply involved in the 
military progress of the war. But why after 1943 was there 
a sudden absence of conflict between the President and his 
military advisors? Professor Paul Emerson, in his study of 
Roosevelt as commander-in-chief, suggests that the President's 
political goals and the military objectives of the Joint 
Chiefs coincided near the end of the war, thus abrogating any 
need for Presidential intervention: 
The political considerations seen by the President and 
the logistical and strategic considerations seen by the 
Chiefs paralleled one another in 1943 and afterwards. 
112Greenfield, American Strategy, 80. This list by 
no means exhausts the number of times the President was 
involved in the decision making process. General Arnold 
records that it was the President that suggested the island 
hopping strategy used in the Pacific, Arnold, Global Mission, 
372. 
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The consequence w~s close concurrence of political and 
military views. 11 . 
If Emerson is correct then the President's political goals 
form the basis for determining the role of the Joint Chiefs. 
It is generally assumed that the President's primary 
wartime goal was victory, possibly even at the expense of 
114 post-war problems. While this is essentially true, it 
may be suggested that victory was only a means to a greater 
end. James McGregor Burns, in his biography of Roosevelt, 
describes the President as: 
.•• both a soldier of the Faith, battling with his war-
rior comrades for an ideology of peace and freedom, and 
a prince of the State) protecting the interests of his 
nation in a tumultuous and impioy~ world. His difficulty 
lay in the relation of the two.l 
The ideological objective that Roosevelt sought was a reformed 
world based upon his Four Freedoms, but in order to accomplish 
that goal the evil of fascism had to be eradicated. Within 
this framework, unconditional surrender was a concrete mani-
festation of total war. It was with this framework in mind 
113
william Emerson, "F.D.R., 1941-1945," in The Ulti-
mate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief, ed. 
Ernest May (New York: George Braziller, 1960), 162. 
114Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, inter-
View with members of the staff, January 1975. 
115 James McGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of 
Freedom (New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1970), 549. 
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that Roosevelt could say to Churchill,"the political con-
siderations you mentioned are important factors, but military 
operations based thereupon must be 
operation of striking at the heart 
secondary to the primary 
116 
of Germany." 
As Burns noted, though, Roosevelt was also a prince 
of the state attempting to promote and to protect American 
national interest. Winning the war was not only an ideo-
logical goal, but also a very practical political policy. 
central to achieving this goal was keeping the coalition 
together. Roosevelt may have spoken in terms of a world 
structured on the Four Freedoms, but he apparently envisaged 
a world governed by the Four Policemen; the United States, 
. E 1 d d Ch' 117 Russ1a, ng an , an 1na. 
Within this overall structure there were stages when 
certain policies were more important than others. Paul Emer-
son observed three such periods: prior to the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt's main policy was to deter aggres-
sion; after December 1941, and until the end of 1943, the 
main goal was coalition unity; after 1943, it was ending the 
war in such a way as to avoid any long term commitments to 
118 Europe. Greenfield's study of Presidential military 
of the 
Press, 
116Ibid., 548; also see Hans Morgenthau, In Defense 
National Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago 
1950). 
117Robert Devine, Roosevelt & World War II (New Ycrk: 
Penquin Books, 1970), chapter 4. 
118 Emerson, "F. D. R. , " 176. 
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decisions tend to support Emerson's theory. Prior to the 
attack on Pearl Harbor the main po~nts of contention between 
the President and the Chiefs were over the allocation of the 
limited American resources to support Britain and the use of 
119 American military and economic power to deter Japan. Once 
the United States had entered the war the decisions made by 
Roosevelt were aimed at keeping the coalition together. The 
most visable manifestation of this policy was Roosevelt's 
support of the invasion of North Africa (Operation "Gymnast/ 
Torch"), in which he overturned the American commitment to a 
h 1 . . 120 d . t d th JCS' d . cross-e anne 1nvas1on an reJec e e s a v1ce to 
concentrate instead in the Pacific. 121 Secretary of War 
Stimson wrote after the war that: 
The Torch decision was the result of two absolutely 
definite and final rulings, one by the British and the 
other by the President. Mr. Churchill and his advisors 
categorically refused to accept the notion of a cross-
channel invasion in 1942. Mr. Roosevelt categorically 
insisted that there must be some operation in 1942.122 
One consequence of Roosevelt's commitment to coalition 
unity may have been his neglect for the long term political 
119Greenfield, American Strategy, 80-84. 
120 J.R.M. Butler, Grand Strategy: June 1941-August 
~' Vol III, part 2 of the United Kingdom Military Series 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1964), 563-583. 
121Ernest J. King and Walter M. 
~~ral King, A Naval Memoir (New York: 
Inc., 1952), 425. 
Whitehead, Fleet 
W.W. Norton & Co., 
122
stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 425. 
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questions involved in restructuring the post-war world. This 
is the thesis advanced by Under Secretary of State Sumner 
Wells. Wells believed that this commitment stemmed from the 
President's "conviction that as Commander-in-Chief his para-
mount obligation was to permit nothing to jeopardize the win-
h 11123 ning of t e war. Wells may have been wrong though in 
believing that short term unity was the President's only 
political goal. According to Emerson, after 1943, the Presi-
dent was primarily concerned with winning the war as quickly 
as possible in order to avoid any long term commitments to 
Europe. Emerson's thesis is based upon a letter from Roose-
velt to Acting Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.: 
I do not want the United States to have the post-war 
burden of reconstructing France, Italy, and the Balkans. 
This is not our natural task .••• It is definitely a 
British task in which the British are far~·more vi tally 
interested than we are ••• our principal objective is not 
to take 1~~rt in the internal problems of Southern Europe. 
This letter not only reflected Roosevelt's understanding of 
the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy, but it 
also referred back to his image of the world based on the 
Four Policemen. Such a system would leave Europe to the 
English and the Russians. Any effort to solve all the 
123
sumner Wells, Seven Decisions that Shaped History 
(New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1950), 145. 
124Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition 
!arfare: 1943-1944 (Washington: Office of the Chief of 
Military History, Department of the Army, 1959), 491. 
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various and complex political problems in Europe might well 
alienate the Russians, whose support was sorely needed to 
complete the grand design. 
As the war reached its inevitable conclusion, the 
necessity for a Russian-American understanding became more 
apparent. In a Joint Chiefs memorandum of July 1944, this 
issue was discussed: 
After the defeat of Japan, the United States and the 
Soviet Union will be the only military powers of first 
magnitude ...• The relative strength and geographic posi-
tions of these two powers preclude the military defeat 
of one of these powers by the other, even if that power 
were allied with the British Empire.l25 
The memorandum concluded that with the end of the war the 
British Empire will have "lost ground both economically and 
militarily." Based on this analysis it made sense that 
Roosevelt would want to postpone any confrontation with the 
Russians. Moreover, the faster the war ended the faster the 
post-war restructuring of the world could begin, even if 
it meant the disruption of the Anglo-American alliance. It 
is within this context that Roosevelt's rejection of 
Churchill's Balkan schemes must be analyzed. As the war came 
closer to its conclusion, the military and political goals of 
the United States increasingly coincided. Although there 
may have been differences between the President and his 
125Ibid., 523-24. 
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militarY advisors over specifics, there was a real unity in 
purpose between them. Both had as their primary goal the 
defeat of the enemy; for the President it was a means; for the 
militarY it was an end. If keeping the coalition together in 
1942 meant that the cross-channel invasion would have to be 
cancelled and replaced with an invasion of North Africa, then 
that was the way it was to be. But as the political and 
military goals of the JCS and the President coalesced, the 
military point of view appeared to become dominant. 
From the beginning, the President's political goals 
were the guiding factor in the formulation of strategic 
policy, and this was enhanced by the close relationship that 
existed between the JCS and the White House. 126 It was to 
the President and not to the State Department that the Chiefs 
looked for guidance. In fact it was the President who became 
the point of coordination for all aspects of policy formula-
tion; much to the dismay of the British: 
The Americans have never been accustomed, in considera-
tion of military or quasi-military matters, to link 
harmoniously the civil and the military interests. They 
have no War Cabinet and they have no Defense Committee at 
which requirements, both civil and military can be scruti-
nized and programs formed with due regard for the merit 
of the case. Nor have they any means by which the con-
flicting views of the several agencies can be harmonized 
and the common policy reached. The whole burden of 
grouping the extravagant demands of the War Department 
and of co-ordinating the action of the many agencies which 
126Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, inter-
View with members of the staff, January 1975. 
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have been created fall on one man--the President. 127 
While the British criticism succinctly analyzed the 
failure of American political/military planning and Roose-
velt's mode of administration, it failed to consider that the 
committee nature of the Combined Chiefs forced the Chiefs of 
staff of both nations to rely upon their political leadership 
in order to achieve a successful resolution of issues before 
the CCS. A general study of the major CCS decisions made 
during the war reveal an interesting pattern. When the Pre-
sident failed to support the American Chiefs' position in the 
face of British unity, it normally failed; when he did sup-
port the American Chiefs, they prevailed. The decision to 
undertake the cross-channel invasion is one case in point. 
The American commitment to the cross-channel invasion, 
which stemmed from the Germany first decision made at "Area-
dia," was specifically formulated in March and April of 1942. 
Almost immediately the British began to disclaim support for 
the operation and proposed instead the North African venture. 
The Americans fully realized that implementing Operation 
"Torch" would postpone the cross-channel invasion to 1943, 
at the earliest. For this reason General Marshall fought hard 
against the African project. He maintained that the only way 
to defeat Germany was to invade the Continent and fight the 
127 Gwyer, Grand Strategy: June 1941-August 1942, 
Part 1, 394. 
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decisive battle in Northern France. 128 The President on the 
other hand, was far more interested in coalition politi~s 
and thus rejected Marshall's advice. At the Casablanca Con-
ference, in 1943, Marshall was again put in a position of 
advocating the European invasion without Presidential support. 
Before the American contingent left for Africa, the President 
held a conference with the JCS and inquired whether the Ameri-
cans should meet the British "unified in advocating a cross-
channel operation.'' Roosevelt was well aware that the Brit-
ish would be unified in opposition to such a plan and would 
recommend a continuation of the Mediterranean strategy. While 
Marshall favored a unified confrontation, the President sought 
to postpone it and favored some form of compromise. In the 
end there was no understanding between the military and their 
commander-in-chief. Roosevelt left the Chiefs free to voice 
their own views, while remaining uncommitted himself. In the 
face of unified British opposition the invasion was cancelled 
until 1944. 129 
128Leo J. Meyer, "The Decision to Invade North Africa," 
in Command Decisions, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington: 
Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the 
Army, 1960); Richard W. Steele, The First Offensive, 1942: 
~oosevelt, Marshall and the Making of American Strategy (Bloom-
lngton, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973); Matloff and 
Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942 
266-297; Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, 339-40; J.R.M. Butler, 
Grand Strategy: June 1941-August 1942, part 2, 563-583. 
129 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition 
Warfare: 1941-1942, 379-380; Winston S. Churchill, Hinge of 
~' Vol. IV of The Second World War (Boston: Haughton Mif-
flin Co., 1950), 588. 
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It was not until the President decided to make a 
stand on the invasion that the American position finally pre-
vailed. Roosevelt first began to support his military ad-
visors during the Washington "Trident" Conference in May of 
1943. Within the Combined Chiefs a confrontation was inevi-
table. The American Chiefs hoped that "the strength of the 
force to be employed in the Mediterranean will be so limited 
as not to prejudice the success of a cross-channel operation 
in 1944."130 The British on the other hand maintained "the 
attack on Italy must be carried out relentlessly to insure 
her elimination from the war and thus opposed weakening allied 
' 131 forces below that level." While this deadlock existed 
within the Combined Chiefs, a similar confrontation occurred 
in the White House between the President and the Prime Minis-
ter. Although the President's support for the cross-channel 
attack was by no means as stringent as the American military 
would have liked, a l May 1944 date was agreed upon for the 
130ccs 219, Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of 
Staff, "Conduct of the War in 1943-44," 14 May 1943, Trident 
Conference, Proceedings, CCS. This was a further defense of 
CCS 215, Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff, "In-
vasion of the European Continent from the United Kingdom in 
1943-44," 13 May 1943, Trident Conference, Proceedings, CCS. 
Also see Leahy, I was There, 160. 
131ccs 229, Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff, 
"Operations in the European Theater between HUSKY and ROUND-
UP," 14 May 1943, Trident Conference, Proceedings, CCS. This 
was the British response to CCS 215. 
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132 invasion. Despite this commitment, Marshall was still 
unsure of Roosevelt's support. Not until the first Quebec 
"Quadrant" Conference in August 1943 and at the Teheran Con-
133 ference two months later was the issue fully settled. 
Obviously, this has been an over simplification of 
the Overlord decision. It bas excluded discussing tactical 
feasibility as well as Soviet influence. Despite these 
weaknesses, it is still useful in leading us to some interest-
ing observations. As long as Marshall failed to have Presi-
dential support he found it simply impossible to force a 
successful resolution of the cross-channel issue within the 
committee structure of the Combined Chiefs. This was especi-
ally true as long as the Prime Minister was adamantly opposed 
to it. Churchill insured this by keeping his Chiefs under 
very tight control. According to Lord Portal, Chief of the 
Air Staff, Churchill browbeat the CCS "like they were a 
bunch of pickpockets." 134 With Presidential support though, 
132Mns. lst meeting, Trident Conference, 12 May 1943 
Proceedings, CCS. Also see Richard M. Leighton, "OVERLORD 
versus the Mediterranean at the Cairo-Tehran Conferences," in 
Command Decisions, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington: 
Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the 
A~my, 1960); Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coali~ 
t1on Warfare: 1943-1944 (Washington: Office of the Chief of 
Military History, Department of the Army, 1959), 126-146. 
133ccs 303, ccs 30311, and ccs 303/3, Quadrant Con-
ference, Proceedings, CCS, 
134Forest Pogue, "The Wartime Chiefs of Staff and the 
President," in Soldiers and Statesmen, Proceedings of the 
Fourth Military History Symposium, USAF Academy, 1970 (Wash-
ington: Office of the Chief of Air Force History, 1973), 74. 
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it was possible for the American military's position to pre-
vail.135 This reinforces the contention that the President 
was the only point of contact for the coordination of poli-
tical/military policy. While he might be able to direct the 
American military toward his political goals, there was no 
effort made to institutionalize such coordination. If the 
president did not handle it himself, it simply was not done. 
At times this resulted in leaving the Joint Chiefs in a 
guidance vacuum which put the Americans at a disadvantage 
136 
vis-a-vis their British counterparts. This problem was 
never more apparent than during the Casablanca Conference in 
January 1943. 
The main issue at the conference was the direction 
of allied strategy during the remainder of the year. The 
main point of contention was the American supported cross-
channel invasion versus the British desire to continue 
operations in the Mediterranean Theater. The leading advo-
cate for the American position, as discussed earlier, was 
General Marshall, who maintained that "Germany must be 
135Two such examples of Presidential influence occur-
red when the President supported the American position on 
daylight bombing in the face of British opposition, Arnold, 
Global Mission, 393; and the lack of Presidential support 
meant that the JCS desire to conduct the "Anakim" Operation 
in the China-Burma-India Theater could not occur in the face 
of British opposition; Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coali-
tion Warfare: 1943-1944, 139-142. 
136Cl" 1ne, Washington Command Post, 104. 
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defeated by a powerful effort on the continent." He and the 
other American Chiefs were anxious to avoid "interminable 
operations in the Mediterranean" that would postpone the 
. . d f. . t 1 137 invas1on 1n e 1n1 e y. 
Unfortunately, for Marshall and the other American 
planners, their effort was doomed from the start. There were 
three factors undermining their position. The first was not 
only the lack of Presidential support, but a lack of political 
guidance upon which they could base their arguments. The 
second was that the British military arguments against the 
invasion were extremely valid. The last was that the Ameri-
cans confronted a unified British team supported by its 
l •t• 1 1 d h. 138 po 1 1ca ea ers 1p. This was in marked contrast to the 
American delegation, whose military advisors were themselves 
divided over strategic questions. 
From the very beginning, the British took the Casa-
blanca Conference very seriously. Arthur Bryant, in his 
biography of Lord Alanbrooke, records how the British planned 
their confrontation with the Americans with all the care of 
a military operation. Prior to the conference, the Prime 
137 Casablanca Conference; Proceedings, CCS, 208-239. 
138Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York: 
Doubleday and Co., 1964), 166; for a general discussion of 
the Casablanca Conference see, Matloff, Strategic Planning 
for Coalition Warfare: '1943-1944, 18-43. · 
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Minister told his Chiefs of Staff that "they were not to 
hurry or try to force an agreement, but to take plenty of 
time, there was to be full discussion and no impatience--
the dripping of water on a stone.'' While the British Chiefs 
worked on their American counterparts, the Prime Minister 
planned to work on the President. 139 Not only were the Brit-
ish better unified for the conference, but they were also 
better equipped. They arrived with a large number of staf-
fers, an effective communications system, and a six thousand 
ton ship converted into a floating reference library. 140 
In the words of one American planner, General Albert 
Wedemeyer, the British: 
Swarmed down upon us like locusts with a plentiful supply 
of planners and various other assistants with a pyramid 
of plans to ensure that they not only accomplished their 
purpose but did so in stride and with promise of continu-
ing their4~ole of directing strategically the c0urse of the war.l l 
Wedemeyer went on to note that, "one might say we came, we 
listened, and we were conquered."142 In the end the Americans 
139 Bryant, Turn of the Tide, 445. 
140Ibid., 443. 
141 Wedemeyer to Handy, 22 January 1943, ANFA Memo 
14-23 January, 1943, Box ~Documents of Allied Commands-CCS, 
Military Documents, Beddle Smith Papers, Eisenhower 
Library, Abiline, Kansas. 
142Ibid. 
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figuratively "lost their shirts" at the conference. 143 
The British success at Casablanca was due to several 
factors. Probably, the most important factor was the British 
unitY of purpose, which existed from the Prime Minister down 
through the staff planners. The Americans, in contrast, not 
only failed to have the President behind them, but they them-
selves were internally split. Admiral King at times was 
ambivalent, at times sided with the British, but constantly 
d . . th P "f" 144 Th d supported increase operat1ons 1n e ac1 1c. e secon 
important factor was the superior British staffing and pre-
paration. While the British staffers were assigned full time 
to strategic planning, most of the American staffers had 
primary responsibility within their own services. This divi-
sion of their time was reflected in their staff work. 
In the end the Casablanca Conference was a perfect 
example of the type of artificial compartmentalization that 
existed between American political and military planning. 
The President's political goals (which obviously had military 
143The final destruction of the American effort at 
Casablanca is revealed in a pair of cables sent from General 
Wedemeyer to General Handy (AGWAR): 17 January 1943, "We still 
have our shirts but we have lost a few buttons pd Looks like 
HUSKY." On 19 January 1943, Wedemeyer wrote, "The shirt is 
gone •.. HUSKY is Next." References 245 and 320, "ANFA Cables: 
Outgoing, 14-26 January 1943, Box 1, Military Documents, Bed-
dle Smith Papers, Eisenhower Library, Abiline, Kansas. 
144JCS Meeting, 6 January 1943. Casablanca Confer-
ence, Proceedings, CCS, 239. 
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aspects) were totally contradictive to the JCS's military 
goals (which had an equal amount of political aspects). The 
British on the other hand were fully cognizant of the poli-
tical ramifications of the military decisions to be made at 
casablanca, and acted accordingly. The problem the /~erican 
Chiefs faced was one of a lack of guidance. The President 
did not support the urgency of the cross-channel invasion, 
and the State Department was not involved. The American 
Chiefs were determined that there would never be a repetition 
of the Casablanca debacle. Massive changes were made within 
the JCS structure in order to guarantee that American plan-
ners would be better prepared for their next confrontation 
with the British, 145 but restructuring the Joint Chiefs' staff 
system could not substitute for the lack of institutional 
political/military coordination. In a memorandum written in 
June 1943 General Wedemeyer addressed this particular problem: 
The JCS frequently requires information and advice as to 
how the military decisions will effect our foreign and 
national policies, or as to whether the decisions are in 
conformity with international law, or as to what effect, 
if any, their decisions will have on our national 
interests. Some solution will be necessary if we are to 
achieve that unity of national effort which is so well 
exemplified in the British organization.l46 
l45D . 
aVlS, 
l46c1 . lne, 
Organizational Development, II, chapter XI. 
Washington Command Post, 317. 
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one month later General Marshall followed up Wedemeyer•s 
memorandum with a letter to Mr. James Byrnes, then Director 
of War Mobilization: 
The U.S. Chiefs of Staff have been aware for a long time 
of a serious disadvantage under which they labor in their 
dealings with the British Chiefs of Staff. Superficially, 
at least, the great advantage on the British side has been 
the fact that they are connected up with other branches 
of their government through an elaborate but closely knit 
Secretariat. On our side there is no such animal and we 
suffer accordingly. The British, therefore present a 
solid front of all officials and committees. We cannot 
muster such strength.l47 
It is apparent that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff 
were acutely aware of the need for better coordination of 
political/military policy. Hnving the President as the sole 
point of coordination bad been a failure. As the war progres-
sed to its inevitable conclusion, the need for such coordi-
nation became increasingly important. Uufortunately, the 
military blamed the breakdown in coordination solely on the 
civilian leadership 1 s lack of political guidance. The Chiefs• 
concern over this problem manifested itself earl~ in a Decem-
ber 1942 Joint Staff Planners memorandum entitled, "A Proposed 
National War Planning System." This system started with a 
"determination of the national concept of the war," by the 
civilian leadership. This "national concept of war" included 
Political, economic, military, and other factors. From there 
the military determined a strategic policy, upon which plans 
147Ibid., 106. 
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and operations were based. The proposal was never offi-
cially acted upon, and the Chiefs never did consider that 
this breakdown in communications was a two-way street, stem-
ming from the traditional perceptions of both the civilian 
and military leadership. 
It must never be forgotten that the members of: the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff were a product of an American system 
that inculcated a set of perceptions that resulted in the 
compartmentalization of political from military policy· .. 
They had been brought up to believe in civilian control of 
the military, which meant, from their perception, that the 
civilians controlled all of the political decisions and the 
military were to restrict themselves to "purely military" 
matters. This view of civil-military relations had been 
described by one insider as the "strick constructionalist" 
149 
approach. This view was manifest from Admiral Leahy 
through the members of the JCS and down to the field com-
manders. Leahy had exhibited a tendency to think in such 
"strict constructionalist" terms during his tenure as Chief 
of Naval Operations and continued to do so as the Chief of 
Staff to the President. During the Potsdam Conference the 
British suggested that the term unconditional surrender 
needed to be explained in greater detail. Leahy's reaction 
View 
148Davis, Organ~zatioual Development, II, 380. 
149Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, Inter-
with members of the staff, January 1975. 
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was that it was a political issue and thus outside the pur-
view of the Combined Chiefs. 150 General Marshall elaborated 
on this theme during an interview in 1957: 
I do not think the military authorities should make any 
political decisions unless they are instructed acco~d­
ingly, because the effects are too wide-reaching,. there 
are too many influences involved, and it is quite a 
question of how much of !+his would be familiar t~ the 
military participants.l5 
What is of interest is the implication by Mar-shall 
that the military officer should not be effectively schooled 
in the political ramifications of his actions. But what of 
supplying input into the political decision making pr.o"G·ess? 
We [JCS] probably devoted more time in our discussions, 
our intimate discussions, to such matters [political 
than] to any one [other] subject, because we were: fear-
ful that we might find our whole campaign upset by some 
political gesture. I frankly was fearful of Mr. Roose-
velt introducing political methods, of which he was a 
genius, into a military thing which had to be on a fixed 
basis. 
In expanding this theme General Marshall went on to say: 
[Diplomatic matters were] Mr. Roosevelt's [responsibi-
lity], and our problem was to be on the guard that the 
military picture--Army, Navy and Air--was not completely 
disjointed by what I will call some irrelevant political 
gestures which were made without due thought to what was 
going on at the time ••• 
As to British criticism that the American Chiefs did not 
exhibit any political awareness, Marshall answered that "we 
didn't discuss it [political decisions] with them [the Brit-
ish] because we were not in any way putting our necks out as 
150Mns. 193rd meeting of the CCS, 16 July 1945, Termi-
nal Conference, Proceedings, CCS. 
151Pogue, Organizer of Victory: 1943-1945, 316. 
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to political factors which were the business of the head of 
state--the President--who also happened to be the Commander-
. f .,152 
in-Chle • 
The portrait of the Joint Chiefs that the Marshall 
interview reveals is that of a group of officers who are 
highly cognizant of the political ramifications of military 
operations, but were equally cognizant of their role within 
an international committee structure. Thus superficially, 
the military seemed to be performing their function along the 
lines that Clausewitz had originally outlined. It also appears 
to be the antithesis of the Huntington argument. This posi-
tion is reinforced by Admiral King, who described his role at 
Yalta as "advisory in nature." 153 Marshall's explanation, 
moreover, of the JCS's role vis-a-vis the British Chiefs may 
be an excuse for Leahy's actions on the British query on 
unconditional surrender. But if the JCS were fulfilling the 
Clausewitzian perfection of civilian control of the military, 
then why was the lack of politicallmilitary coordination 
emphasized so extensively by the key members of the wartime 
administration? 154 Furthermore, if the Chiefs did have real 
input into the political decision making process, then how 
is one to explain Admiral King's description of the process 
152Ibid., 315. 
153King, A Naval Memoir, 592. 
154
see chapter IV, "Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense 
Organization: 1945-1960." 
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at the Potsdam Conference? 
••• the main business of the conference was the affair of 
the political heads of state, assisted by the State 
Department representatives. This was in no way surpris-
ing, for it is a long established government practice to 
reach political agreements without reference to the 
military forces that must be relied upon to pull the 
chestnuts out of the fire when f!~5 political agreements 
do not work out as anticipated. 
Admiral King's description reflects more than the 
traditional compartmentalization of politics from military 
policy. It appears to be a clear contradiction of General 
Marshall's previous statement; or is it? It would appear· 
that the Chiefs were fully aware of the political ramifica-
tions of their military actions, but this awareness may have 
been only an internal systemic input, and not fully incor-
porated into the externally transmitted advice consumed by 
the civilian decision makers. Admiral King was not only cri-
ticizing the compartmentalization of policy formulation, but 
implicitly legitimizing it by virtue of its traditional 
source. The expectation was that such compartmentalization 
was part of the American professional military ethic, despite 
its obvious dysfunctional aspects. This expectation became a 
self-fulfilling prophesy, by virtue of the inculcation of 
that expectation. Thus the military officerwasfully aware 
of the political ramifications of the military operations he 
wasplanning, but he had been socialized to believe that it was 
155King, A Naval Memoir, 611. 
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not his role to externalize those opinions. Furthermore, 
the perception of compartmentalization that had been incul-
cated, led the military officer even to question the value 
of integrating political factors into operational decisions. 
General Omar Bradley noted that "as soldiers we looked 
naively on the British inclination to complicate the war 
1 . t. 1 b. t. 156 with po 1 1ca o Jec 1ves. Mr. Robert Murphy, political 
advisor to General Eisenhower's headquarters in Africa, re-
ported not only this naive confusion over the political 
aspects of war, but real alienation toward him because of 
his role: 
One day an American Major General asked me: "Will you 
please tell me what in the hell the State Department has 
to do in an active theater of war?" He was asking for 
information, so this, in effect, is what I told him: 
"War is a projection of policy when other means fail. 
The State Department is responsible to the President for 
foreign policy ••.• It was directly concerned in the 
political decisions inevitably to be made during the 
military operations, and it will have to deal ~~th the 
postwar political aspects of this campaign .•• 1 
While, internally the Chiefs may have perceived the 
need for the integration of political perceptions, externally 
they manifested the ethic of compartmentalization. When 
supplying advice to the civilian decision makers, the Chiefs 
Prefaced their input with the caveat "from the military point 
156 Omar Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Henry 
Holt and Co., 1951), 531-32. 
157 Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 155-156. 
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of view." They thus looked at extremely political issues 
dl 1 d them "l"t "1 158 Th" f . and suppose y ana yze m1 1 ar1 Y~ 1s pro es-
sionalized· attitude was reinforced by the desires of the 
civilians, and in particular the President. During the Casa-
blanca Conference Roosevelt did not bring any State Depart-
ment advisors with him primarily because he viewed the con-
159 ference as "essentially military" in nature. This view 
coincided nicely with the military's perception and explains 
the lack of State Department involvement in policy formula-
tion all through the war. Furthermore, the President's 
apparent desire to compartmentalize decision making allowed 
the military to manifest its tendency to make war absolute. 
The Chiefs could analyze issues in terms of missions and 
objectives, and rationalize goals toward the achievement of 
158As typical examples of the type of political deci-
sions the JCS dealt with and then cloaked their recommenda-
tions in military expertise, see the following taken from 
Admiral Leahy's papers at the Naval Operations Archives in 
Washington, D.C. 
Memo to SecWar, 30 December 1944: "There are no 
military objections to any occupations of Austria by U.S. 
Forces," (in file entitled "Correspondence-1944"). 
Memo to SecWar and SecNav, April 1945; sub: French 
Proposal for Zone of Occupation in Germany and Austria. "The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered from the military point 
of view the proposals of French Government." The JCS did 
not oppose the French getting a zone nor did they oppose the 
F~ench return to Vietnam but warned of avoiding American com-
m1 tmen t, (found in file '~anuary-April, 1945".) 
159Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 163; the JCS 
Official History of the Second World War goes out of its way 
t~ ~mphasize the fact that the Chiefs were only involved in 
m1l1tary discussions at Yalta and not any of the political 
meetings, Hayes, The War Against Japan, II, 347. 
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military success. Originally, a product of the marri~ge of 
nineteenth century professional military perceptions and 
American moral values, this outlook increasingly became in-
stitutionalized in the twentieth century. This was the view 
that was being articulated in 1931 by General Douglas M~c-
Arthur when he said "decisive victory in the field of battle 
invariably results in the attainment of the national purpose 
h 1 t d 11160 for which t e appea o arms was rna e. During the war 
General Marshall ~eaffirmed this view when he stated that all 
strategic decisions were made subordinate to the defeat of 
161 Germany. If this analysis is correc~ then the military 
considered victory to be the primary goal with political con-
siderations secondary. In order to test this assumption we 
will examine the decision in 1945 not to seize Berlin but to 
halt at the Elbe River. 
This decision was possibly the most important, 
if not the most criticized .ecision of the European War. As 
the role of Berlin became more important in the subsequent 
Cold War, this decision took on new importance. The British 
160
walter Millis with Harvey Mansfield and Herold 
Stein, Arms and the State: Civil-Military elements in 
National Policy (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), 
113-115. Also see Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 
Chapter 13; and Chapter II of this dissertation. 
161Pogue, Organizer of Victory, 197. 
108 
in particular have been extremely critical of the American 
failure to take this most important "political" objective. 
"The Americans," wrote Montgomery, "could not understand that 
it was of little avail to win the war strategically if we 
lost it politically."162 Essentially the issue may be 
bisected into two sub-questions or issues. The first deals 
with the physical ability of the American's to actually take 
Berlin before the Soviets. Stephen E. Ambrose in his book 
Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945: The Decision to Halt at the 
~; develops a convincing case, based on logistics and 
military mobility, that the U.S. forces did not have the 
physical capability to take the city. 163 While the military 
capabilities may well have been an overriding constraint, 
the question which is important for our purpose is why was 
an attempt not made? The answer to that question is found in 
the military's perception of looking at the world from the 
military point of view. 
The single most important driving force behind Eisen-
hower's decision to halt at the Elbe was his belief, shared 
by other military officers, that the war should be ended as 
162 Bernard Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal 
the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (London: Collins, 1958), 
332. 
163
stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945: 
~he Decision to Halt at the Elbe (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co., 1960), 88-98. 
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quickly as possible with as few political complications as 
possible. This perception was reinforced by Eisenhower's 
initial directive that ordered him to "undertake operations 
aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her 
164 
armed forces." As the war wound down there was an in-
creased fear on the part of the Western Allies that the 
remnants of the Nazi regime might attempt to continue the war 
from an Alpine redoubt. This would by no means change the 
outcome of the war, but would indefinitely lengthen it. Thus 
the overriding imperative was the destruction of the German 
Army in the field, whose existence made such a redoubt a 
possibility. For Eisenhower the decision became a choice 
165 between taking Berlin or destroying the German Army. 
While the fear of the redoubt became the rationalization 
for a military decision, Berlin was identified as a political 
objective and the military's desire to avoid political corn-
plications led them to avoid Berlin. On the llth of April, 
the day that General Simpson reached the Elbe River, Eisen-
hower made this very point most clearly: 
164Forest Pogue, "The Decision to Halt at the Elbe," 
in Command Decisions, ed. by Kent Roberts Greenfield (Wash-
ington: Office of Chief of Military History, 1960), 481. 
165
see Pogue, "The Decision to Halt at the Elbe," 
480-81; Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 70-79. 
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From a tactical point of view it is highly inadvisable 
for the American Army to take Berlin and I hope political 
influences won't cause.me to take the city. It has no 
tactical or strategic value ••• l66 
But Eisenhower was not alone in analyzing the situation from 
a military point of view. Four days earlier he had appealed 
to the Combined Chiefs for guidance on this particular point. 
He began by making it very clear that he was basing his plans 
on military assumptions; he then went on to discuss the Ber-
lin issue: 
I regard it as militarily unsound at this stage of the 
proceedings to make Berlin a major objective, particu-
larly in view of the fact that it is only 35 miles from 
the Russian lines. I am the first to admit that a war 
is waged in pursuance of political aims, and if the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide that the Allied 
effort to take Berlin outweighs purely military con-
siderations in this theater, I would cheerfully readjust 
my plans and my thinking so as to carry out such an 
operation.l6 7 
It appears that the CCS never considered Eisenhower's appeal 
for guidance, which can only be interpreted as confirmation 
f h . 'l't . t' 168 o 1s m1 1 ary assump 1ons. 
The decision not to consider taking Berlin was an 
example of perceiving an issue in purely military terms. It 
is apparent that the military fully understood the "political" 
nature of Berlin and for that reason the city was anathema. 
166Quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 97. 
167Quoted in Pogue, "The Decision to Halt at the 
Elbe," 486. 
168Ibid. 
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ThiS compartmentalization of the political from the military 
was not only revealed by Eisenhower's communications and the 
lack of guidance from the JCS and the CCS but was also mani-
fested by the civilians. In mid-April the representatives 
of the European and Russian Affairs Division of the State 
Department reported that "for governments to direct movements 
of troops definitely indicated political action and that 
such movements should remain a military consideration at least 
until SHAEF is dissolved and the A.C.C. (Allied Control Com-
• • ) 1' s set up. " 169 ID1SS10n We can thus see that while the mili-
tary did perceive the Berlin decision from a military point 
of view, they were conforming to their mandated role. It is 
also clear that the Joint Cheifs considered victory to be 
the primary goal, with political considerations secondary. 
Within this context the Berlin decision makes sense, as much 
sense as the JCS commitment to bring the Soviets into the 
Pacific War, despite its obvious political ramifications. 170 
The Chiefs supported the President's desire to postpone major 
political confrontations with the Soviets until the war was 
over. This point was stressed by former Assistant Secretary 
of State Sumner Wells: 
It was altogether natural that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
should constantly warn the President that, whatever the 
theoretical future advantages of trying to settle 
169Ibid., 481, footnote #4; emphasis in the original. 
170 Pogue, Organizer for Victory, 505-536. 
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political and territorial problems during the war, they 
were offset by the immediate dangel~1 of the controversies 
with Russia that might be aroused. 
As the war came closer to its conclusion, it became 
more and more difficult to postpone dealing with those polit-
ical controversies. Moreover, the issues that began to sur-
face were far more political than were the decisions that 
had had to be dealt with earlier. One issue that was of par-
ticular importance was the resolution of the political/mili- · 
tary questions revolving around the occupation of enemy ter-
ritories, especially Germany. In February 1943, the Presi-
dent gave the State Department the proponency for the occupa-
tion of enemy countries. 172 Unfortunately, the State Depart-
ment's mission ran directly into the~ Chief's control of 
military operations. By the beginning of 1944 these two 
organizations were working in opposite directions. The 
bureaucratic conflict between these two organizations has 
been completely documented in Paul Hammond's study "Direc-
tives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Contro-
versy." Hammond identifies the War Department's opposition 
to the State Department's interference in what the War Depart-
ment considered a military mission: 
171
wells, Seven Decisions, 133-134. 
172
stimson, On Active Service, 559. 
113 
••• the War Department viewed civil affairs as an intrus-
ion upon its primary responsibilities, both because_these 
•non-military'matters seemed to threaten the involvement 
of the Army in politics.J. and because they were rivals of 
military requirements.l'3 
ostensibly, the Chiefs opposed the fusion of civil affairs 
planning on the grounds of security problems, the desire to 
postpone political decisions until the termination of the con-
flict, and because they felt that the European Advisory Com-
mission was controlled by the British. In reality their 
opposition probably resulted from their inherent desire to 
compartmentalize planning. At the same time the military was 
complaining about the lack of guidance upon which to build 
their plans, they were isolating their own plans from the 
civilians who needed to coordinate political efforts. Thus 
the State Department was forced to conduct some of its plan-
174 
ning in a vacuum. 
The result of such planning can be seen in the failure 
of political/military coordination of key issues and decisions 
made toward the end of the war. The American representative 
to the European Advisory Commission, Ambassador John Winant, 
was forced to rely on the military to supply him with infor-
mation on American policy. As a result Ambassador Winant 
--------~~---------173 Paul Hammond, "Directives for the Occupation of 
Germany: The Washington Controversy," in American Civil-
~ilitary Decisions, ed. by Harold Stein (Montgomery: Univer-
sity of Alabama Press, 1963), 325. 
174 Ibid., 331. 
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a ssured by the War Department that there was "no military was 
necessity for an access stipulation" into Berlin. 175 
In conclusion what can we say about the role of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Second World War? To some 
degree Huntington was correct in that the military was given 
a freer reign than would normally be acceptable under the 
concept of civilian-control of the military. But Huntington 
was wrong in drawing the conclusion that they lost their pro-
fessionalism by,virtue of having to make political/military 
decisions. On the contrary, the military never did lose their 
professional perception and continued to analyze the world 
from the military point of view. When they were allowed to 
make politicallmilitary decisions they made them from the 
perspective that the civilian leadership wanted them to make. 
A case in point was the Berlin decision,when the State Depart-
ment supported Eisenhower's views. Obviously, a greater 
degree of intellectual fusion and political}military coordi-
nation would have eliminated some of the worst of the post-
war problems, but probably not all of them. As the war 
neared to its conclusion, the political goals of the Presi-
dent and the military goals of the JCS coincided, thus allow-
ing the military greater impact on the decision making pro-
cess. As Roosevelt's political goals became more military 
175 Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 232. 
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t this tended to confuse even further the efforts at in na ure 
'l't d' t' 176 political m1 1 ary coor 1na 1on. 
In the long run what were the lessons to be derived 
from our study of the war. It is apparent that the President 
bad greater control over military decisions than he is nor-
mally credited with. The JCS, working within a committee 
structure, revealed all the problems and weaknesses that are 
normally associated with such systems. This included the 
surfacing of inter-service fighting over numerous issues, 
some important and some trivial. Furthermore, it was apparent 
that the President remained the sole point of coordination 
of political/military policy. In this regard the creation 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not substantially improved 
the structure from the way it operated at the turn of the 
century. One could even argue that the JCS became a focus 
for problems that previously were scattered and relatively 
benign. Granted in terms of military operations the JCS had 
been successful. It allowed for effective interface with the 
British Chiefs of Staff and its committee staff structure 
176This may well explain Leahy's remark, that the JCS, 
in 1945, were under no civilian control, quoted in Huntington, 
Soldier and the State, 338. Why should there be when the 
civilian and th8 military objectives coincided perfectly? 
Apparently Leahy was referring to some form of objective con-
trol. This problem became complicated in 1945 with the death 
0~ Roosevelt. Truman, coming in somewhat cold to the situa-
tlon, was very wary of asserting himself until he became more 
familiar with the military and the international situation. 
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marked the beginning of a joint planning structure, but on 
the level of political/military planning it had clearly 
failed. 
What was obviously needed was an institution t·hat 
would break down the compartmentalization of political con-
siderations from the military ones. In such an institution 
the JCS would be an important element, but not the only,· one. 
While institutional measures were established in 1947 its 
success could not hang upon the existence of mere bureau-
cratic interface. What was imperative was the destruction 
of the mindsets that existed in both the civilian and mili-
tary communities that lead to that compartmentalizationr177 
For the military to have meaningful input into the new 
National Security Council structure created in 1947, the 
internalized military perception that demanded analyzing the 
world from strictly a military perspective had to be elimi-
nated. Unfortunately, these kinds of mindsets are difficult 
177The civilians felt that the military had no busi-
ness interferring into what was considered political deci-
sions. This attitude was reflected by Senator Vandenberg, 
who wrote in his diary, "It remains to be seen whether one 
of his [N.arshall's] general officers [Wedermeyer], who here-
tofore has sought a chance to testify, will come and still 
say that our military leaders totally disagree with the com-
mitments made by Roosevelt and Churchill at Casablanca--
their function being solely to work out the achievement of 
the military plans upon which FDR and Churchill agreed." 
Arthur Vandenberg, Jr. ed. with the collaboration of Joe 
Alex Morris, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston! 
Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 48-50. 
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to eradicate, and would be a major obstacle in the ensuing 
efforts during the next decade and a half to develop an 
institution to facilitate political/military planning. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND 
DEFENSE ORGANIZATION: 1945-1960 
Despite the successful outcome of the Second World 
war, the American political/military decision making and 
coordinating structure was clearly found to be deficient. 
The most glaring problem was the lack of an institutional 
means short of the President to coordinate policy. Not that 
bureaucratic interface guarantees positive results, but the 
organizational linkages established by such interface are 
a necessary prerequisite for political/military coordination. 
While this defect was minimized during the war by a centra-
lity of purpose and the apparent compatibility of political 
and military goals, the necessity to coordinate the plethora 
of post-war political/military problems magnified this flaw. 
This point was made emphatically clear by Secretary of War 
Henry L. Stimson, who sought the solution in some form of 
war cabinet, "which might have done in war diplomacy what the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff did in military strategy." For Secre-
tary Stimson the reasons necessitating such an organization 
were obvious: 
118 
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Problems like those of China and France were not merely 
diplomatic, the State Department could not and would not 
take the whole labor of determining in areas where ·the 
military interest was so significant.178 
From Stimson's perspective, the problem was not a civilian 
problem nor a military problem, but one that demanded the 
integration of bureaucratic objectives in order to effectively 
develop policy. Unfortunately, since the demise of the Stand-
ing Liaison Committee, no such organization had existed. 
Over the next fifteen years, two presidential admini-
strations initiated four major governmental reorganizations 
and numerous smaller actions in an effort to achieve policy 
integration. Since the Joint Chiefs would be an integral 
part of that structure, an examination of these organiza-
tional changes would be a useful guage in determining the 
effectiveness of the Chiefs as well as identifying any 
fundamental flaws. Understanding this organizational frame-
work is also important for one other reason. It describes 
the theoretical relationships that exist between institutions 
and supplies the parameters within which these organizations 
define their own roles. 
178 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active 
Service in War and Peace (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1948), 562. There did exist two loosely constructed organi-
zations that are referred to as the war council and war 
cabinet. Both were essentially improvised and lacked all 
forms of staff structuring to support their efforts. U.S. 
Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs, Report to Hon. 
James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy on Unification of the 
War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National 
Security. Senate Committee Print, 79th Congress, 1st Session, 
1945 (Hereafter cited as Eberstadt Report), 54. 
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During the summer and fall of 1944, the problems 
relating to occupied territories and post-war planning in~ 
creased the importance of developing some form of institu-
tional or organizational means of coordination. Out of 
necessity, the State Department "adopted" the procedure of 
writing directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for its 
information. This ad hoc coordination effectively eliminated 
the service's civilian secretaries from the decision making 
process. In November 1944, Secretary Stimson, always mind-
ful of his prerogatives, formally objected to Secretary of 
state Httll, stating that his responsibilities required that 
he " •.. must participate actively in the formulation of 
military policy and in the expression of the military point 
of view ...... 179 This particular point was further raised 
in a joint memorandum addressed to the Joint Chiefs from 
180 the Secretaries of Navy and War. This memorandum was not 
exclusively concerned with secretarial prerogatives. It 
noted the lack of any "established agency of the Joint 
179 Eberstadt Report, 76. 
180Memorandurn for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the 
Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy, undated, subject: 
Coordination of Political-Military Problems Between the Secre-
tary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, Leahy Papers, folder "JCS Misc. Memos," U.S. Naval 
Archives, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter referred to as U.S. 
Naval Archives.) 
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Chiefs of Staff primarily charged with developing for the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff political, economic, and fiscal 
policy ..•• ", and it raised the larger question of political/ 
military planning at the highest levels: 
In recent months an increasingly large number.of problems 
considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff involve questions 
having a political as well as a strictly military aspect. 
In the final stages of the war, as well as in the period 
immediately following the close of hostilities in the 
various theaters political aspects of military events 
inevitably are emphasized and matters affecting the 
overall defense policy of the nation in the post-war 
period emerge. The problems can be of great signifi-
cance and the full judgment of the Chiefs of Staff and 
the respective Secretaries should be made readily 
obtainable by the other Agencies of 8~he Government, par-ticularly the Department of State.l l 
In December 1944, after the retirement of Secretary 
Hull, the first steps were initiated to institutionalize 
the ideas put forth in the joint memorandum. Hull's succes-
sor, Edward Stettinius, immediately reinstituted the State-
War-Navy Secretarial Committee and helped establish an inter-
departmental organization, the State, War, Navy Coordinating 
Committee (SWNCC). SWNCC was given the responsibility for 
the working groups that were so necessary for the coordina-
tion of political/military policy. 182 While SWNCC did become 
a conduit for the exchange of political/military advice, it 
operated at such a low level within the bureaucratic 
181 Ibid. 
182Robert G. Albion and Robert H. Connery, Forrestal 
~nd the Navy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 
165-166. 
122 
hierarchy that it was little "more than a clearing house for 
information." 183 It was not until October of the following 
year that the respective departmental secretaries designated 
it as "the agency to reconcile and coordinate action ••• and 
establish policies on political/military questions •••• " 184 
In the final analysis, though, the State, War, Navy Coordi-
nating Committee did not have broad enough powers to deal 
h . th t 1. t f t. 185 with t e 1ssues a was con ron 1ng. 
The formation of SWNCC, despite its failures, 
reflected a very real desire on the part of the civilian 
leadership to facilitate coordination. Only six days after 
assuming the presidency, Harry S. Truman wrote in a memoran-
dum that "[today I] Authorized State, War and Navy to confer 
on matters affecting political and military problems in the 
war area."
186 Interestingly, the President pointedly 
placed at the bottom of the page the following notation, 
183Eberstadt Report, 54. Timothy W. Stanley, Ameri-
can Defense and National Security (Washington: Public Affairs, 
1956)' 10. 
184 Stanley, American Defense and National Security, 11, 
quoting Department .of State Bulletin, Vol XIII, No. 333 (1945), 
745. 
185 Eberstadt Report, 54. 
186President's Notations, April 18, 1945, Harry S. 
Truman Papers, Personal Secretary File, box 82, folder "Presi-
dential Appointment Daily Sheets: April, 1945," Harry S. Truman 
Library, Independence, Missouri. (Hereafter referred to as 
Truman Papers and Truman Library.) 
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"Hadn't been done before." The fact that SWNCC had been 
operational for almost six months prior to this notation, 
is a fitting evaluation of the organization. But the Presi-
dent's desire did not materialize in an organizational 
structure to expedite planning. Over a year later, Sec-
retary of the Navy James Forrestal was still echoing the 
President's sentiments when he wrote, "what was everywhere 
demanded was a far closer coordination of the diplomatic and 
military arms, ..• better use of the military/political 
187 instrument we possessed." 
Thus the civilian leadership was fully aware that the 
central problem resided in the coordination of political/ 
military plans and that in turn revolved around balancing 
the nation's commitments (a product of the State Department) 
and the nation's military capabilities (a product of the JCS). 
They were also aware that existing institutions had failed 
to develop the needed integration. Central to this issue 
was that the military had to be involved in some aspect of 
the decision making process. This had been the thrust of the 
joint War-Navy memorandum in the fall of 1944. Inextricably 
connected to the solution of inter-departmental coordination 
Was the need to elicit unified military advice. Thus the 
Post-war battle over unification was a conflict to solve 
187 James Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, ed. by Walter 
Millis (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 187. 
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two interconnected problems; the first, service unification; 
and the second, inter-departmental politicallmilitary policy 
making. It was in an effort to solve these two problems that 
the National Security Act of 1947 was written. 
The issue of unifying the military services wa~by no 
means a new one. While the military was fully cognizant of 
d t t b d f . . t 1 . 188 th id the a van ages o e accrue rom JOln p ann1ng, ~ · ea 
of political unification was a far different question. 
Obviously, the Joint Chiefs had played a pivotal role ih 
achieving victory, but inter-service conflicts over every-
thing from strategic policies to Pentagon office space had 
189 permeated the war effort. Secretary Stimson, in particu-
lar, blamed the committee nature of the JCS for aggravating 
these differences: 
••• the Joint Chiefs of Staff was an imperfect instrument 
of top level decision •••• It remained incapable of 
enforcing a decision against the will of its members •. 
Any officer, even a minority of one, could employ a 
rigorous insistence on unanimity as a means of defending 
the interests of his own service .••• Only the President 
188 Lawrence Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1950), 
253. 
189
stimson, On Active Service, 504-518. One classic 
case of competition involved the use of aircraft in an anti-
submarine role. For a discussion of the different service 
attitudes see Stimson, On Active Service, 504-516; Ernest 
King and Walter M. Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval 
~ecord (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1952), 451-
459, 465-471; Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: 
Harper, 1949), 362-364. 
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was in a position to settle disagreements by a definite 
and final ruling.l90 
The Secretary of War felt that unification would eliminate 
the worst aspects of these conflicts. 
While the nation's civilian leadership was identify-
ing dysfunctional aspects in the command structure, the 
military were reassessing their own internal organization. 
As early as September 1942, General Marshall asked the Joint 
Chiefs to eliminate some of the ambiguities stemming from the 
theater concept of unity of command. The Navy already in-
volved in a series of inter-service controversies, was 
suspicious of the War Department's intentions and buried the 
issue in joint committee. But this did not end the desire 
on the part of both the civilian and military leadership of 
the War Department to unify the whole military establishment 
in its own centralized image. From the spring of 1943 on, 
various organizations within the War Department and the JCS 
began to study intensively the unification issue. 191 These 
studies culminated in a memorandum originating from General 
Marshall, entitled "A Single Department of War in the Post 
War Period." In this memorandum, Marshall suggested a single 
190
stimson, On Active Service, 515-516; also see 
~erstadt Report, 61; Otto Nelson, National Security and the 
~neral Staff (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 
586 ff. 
~vy: 
Press, 
19lv. t D . lncen av1s, 
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Hill: University of North Carolina 
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military agency composed of four functional departments,. 
ground, air, naval, and supply. Each of these departments 
would be directed by an under-secretary and a chief of staff. 
In place of the present JCS structure, there would be a Chief 
of Staff to the President and a United States General Staff. 
While such a unified structure was, for General Marshall,. 
the necessary response to the increased complexity of future 
wars; 192 it also signified the opening shot of a four year 
battle over unification. The War Department's centralized 
approach ran counter to the Navy's decentralized management 
structure. These organizational differences were compounded 
by the perceived fear by sea power advocates who, in the 
words of Lawrence Legere, were "afraid of what might happen 
if sea power came to be judged by men ignorant of its 
potentialities."193 
Within the JCS the reaction to Marshall's memorandum 
was predictably split along service lines. Despite opposi-
tion from the Naval members of the JCS, the Army continued 
its advocacy for a single military department. In the spring 
of 1944, during the House of Representative's investigation 
into "Post-War Military Policy," (the Woodrum Committee), 
19~egere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," 250. 
193 Ibid., 402. 
f 
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secretary Stimson became the first civilian secretary ever 
to openly advocate the unification of the services. In his 
mind, the weaknesses inherent in the JCS committee structure 
merely reflected the essential structural weaknesses of the 
194 
whole military system. After Secretary Stimson compl.eted 
bis statement, the Army's proposal for unification wag pre-
sented by General Joseph T. McNarney of the Army Air Force. 
His proposal, which reflected Marshall's influence, called 
for a single Secretary of the Armed Forces, with three under 
secretaries for the Army, Navy and Air Force, a common supply 
service and the continued existence of the JCS under a; new 
designation, the United States Chiefs of Staff. This new 
Chiefs of Staff organization had four members just as i.ts 
predecessor organization did. Of special interest was the 
role McNarney gave the Chiefs in determining the budget. 
While they would be involved in the traditional duties of 
developing military strategy, they would also make the 
"general determination of budgetary needs and the alloca-
tions involved in their recommended strategic deployment for 
national defense." The power of the Chiefs in budgetary 
matters was such that the Secretary of the Armed Forces could 
194u.s. Congress, House, Proposal to Establish a Single 
~~partment of Armed Forces, Hearings before the Select Com-
~lttee on Post-War Military Policy, 78th Congress, 2nd Ses-
Sion, 1944, 31 (hereafter cited as Woodrum Committee). Also 
see Stimson, On Active Service, 519. 
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onlY communicate the Chiefs' proposals to the President 
with his own recommendations attached. He could not change 
195 
them in any way. 
The Navy correctly perceived that the plan was the 
- Army's attempt to force through a fait d'accompli. From 
that time on, it attempted to fight a rear guard actiorr and 
h d . . 196 delay t e ec1s1on. Under Secretary James Forrestal~ who 
became the Navy's chief spokesman following the untimely 
death of Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, attacked the 
Army's proposal at its weakest point, the budgetary process. 
Forrestal and other Navy witnesses played upon the Congress' 
traditional fear of losing civilian control of the military. 
In the end, the Woodrum Committee could only recommend post-
197 paning determination of the issue until the war was over. 
While the congressional investigation was in progress, 
the Joint Chiefs themselves designated a "Special Committee 
for Reorganization of National Defense" to examine the issue. 
This committee is usually referred to as the Richardson Com-
mittee, after its senior member, Admiral J. 0. Richardson 
(Retired). After five months of investigating the issues 
and interviewing key field commanders, the committee 
195 U.S. Congress, House, Woodrum Committee, 34-35. 
l96Alb. 1on, Forrestal and the Navy, 259-260. 
197
stimson, On Active Service, 519. 
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announced its findings on 11 April 1945. With the exception 
of the senior member, the committee was unanimously "in favor 
of a single departmental system or organization for the Armed 
Forces of the United States~ 198 The majority of the committee 
felt that unification would increase efficiency, eliminate the 
worst aspects of inter-service competition, and guarantee civil-
ian control. In the final analysis, the majority believed that 
such unification would lead to better "Correlation of Military 
Preparedness and National Policies." 199 Admiral Richardson's 
dissent was based upon a dislike for an autonomous Air Force, 
fear for the future of the Marine Corps, and a basic abhor-
renee of a single military commander. The Navy rebutted the 
majority report with a 160 page document of its own that 
attacked every one of the majority's assumptions. While Mar-
shall himself did not fully concur with the highly centralized 
view projected by the report, he advocated that it be forwarded 
to the President with a statement of principle supporting a 
198u.s. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National 
Defense (hereafter cited as the Richardson Report), Leahy Papers, 
box 77, folder "Reorganization of the National Defense Structure 
and Comments: October and November, 1945," page 1, U.S. Naval 
Archives. 
199Ibid., 43. 
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200 
a single departmental structure. Internally, the JCS was 
so badly split over the report, that it was not forwarded to 
President Truman until 16 October 1945, and then it was accom-
panied by the split opinions of the four chiefs. 201 
Although the services' leadership may have agreed on a 
superficial level that some form of organizational reform was 
needed, service imperatives and fears blocked any consensus on 
the format. For the services, the fight over unification was 
a foreshadowing of future inter-service conflicts over stra-
tegy, budgets, and resources. Samuel P. Huntington has sug-
gested that "interservice rivalry was the child of unifica-
tion,"202 but the wartime inter-service conflicts over the 
direction of the war effort, resources, and even trivial mat-
ters such as promotions suggest the opposite. It would in-
stead appear that the rivalry was fostered by the tensions 
resulting from increased military commitments being carried 
out by comparatively decreased resources. The Army's desire 
for unification was based on the belief that it would foster 
200u. s. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Secretariat, 
Historical Division, Major Changes in the Organization of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 1~4~-1969, 23 January, 1970, 11-12. 
(Mimeographed) (Hereafter cited as Major Changes). 
201
within the same file as the Richardson Report was 
also the Navy's 160 page rebuttal, and the Chiefs' written 
positions on the Report when it was finally forwarded to the 
President. Leahy Papers, box 77, folder "Reorganization of 
the National Defense Structure and Corrments: October and 
November, 1945," U.S. Naval Archives. 
202
samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic 
Programs in National Politics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1961), 371. 
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greater budgetary stability and a more logical and equitable 
division of the military budget. Any division of the military 
budget would be based upon need, and need would be determined 
by the mission of the service. The Navy, preferring to main-
tain the status quo, realized that this logic could be used to 
rationalize the Marine Corps out of existence, based on the 
grounds of duplication of functions; 203 and a similar rationali-
zation could ultimately lead to the absorption of its carrier 
fleet into the newly created and autonomous Air Force. 
Previously, the Navy had hoped to either postpone 
unification, or if that failed, at least to implement it on 
its own decentralized terms. The report of the Richardson 
Committee badly undermined that strategy, and the death of 
President Roosevelt the day after the report's release destroy-
ed it. The new President was a strong advocate of unification 
believing "that the antiquated defense setup of the United 
States had to be organized quickly as a step toward ensuring 
our f t f t d . ld 204 u ure sa e y an preserv1ng wor peace. 
In the face of such growing solidarity on the unifi-
cation issue, Secretary Forrestal realized that the Navy 
could no longer postpone reorganization, and that unless it 
203u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Armed Ser-
vices, Hearings on Department of Defense Reorganization Act 
of 1958, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, 360-365. From this 
hearing it is apparent that the Marine Corps still had not lost 
its fear of being eliminated. 
204 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs of Harry S. Truman (New 
York: Doubleday & Co., 1956), II, 46. 
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wanted to be excluded completely as obstructionist, it had 
better supply some acceptable alternative to the Army's 
centralization plans. In May 1945, Forrestal stressed this 
very point before the Navy's Organization Policy Group: 
Having gone before the Woodrum Committee last year and 
been a party to their postponing consideration at 
that time, I feel that we have got to be very positive 
this time in some kind of plan which is a Navy Plan. I 
don't think we can be negative any further as far as 
Congress is concerned. I don't think the reaction of the 
public last year was too favorable to our position. I 
don't think we can again say "Let's postpone this, let's 
postpone that."205 
A week later Senator David Walsh, Chairman of the Naval 
Affairs Committee, wrote Forrestal a letter along exactly 
the same lines, suggesting that the Navy Department make a 
"thorough study of this subject" and propose its own plan for 
. t. 206 organ1za 1on. 
This political necessity prompted Secretary Forrestal 
to ask an old personal friend, Ferdinand Eberstadt, to head 
a task force to explore the unification issue. Their friend-
ship had started before the war as members of the prestigious 
New York investment firm of Dillon and Read and continued 
during the war as members of the Army and Navy Munitions 
Board. Specifically, For~estal asked Eberstadt to prepare 
a report on the following questions: 
205Albion, Forrestal and the Navy, 262. 
206Eberstadt Report, iii, iv. 
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l. Would unification of the War and Navy Departments 
under a single head improve our national security? . 
2. If not, what changes in the present relationships 
of the military services and departments has our war 
experience indicated as desirable to improve our national 
security? 
3. What form of postwar organization should be established 
and maintained to enable the military services and other 
Government departments and agencies most effectively to 
provide for and protect our national security?207 
Eberstadt's report concluded that "unification of the 
Army and the Navy under a single head" would not necessarily 
improve the nation's security and that a "coordinated system" 
based upon decentralization would be more functional. It 
emphasized the vast administrative difficulties connected 
with any single secretarial structure, and the dangers to 
civilian control of the military. As an alternative struc-
ture, the Report favored an independent Army, Navy and Air 
Force, each administered by its own civilian secretary of 
cabinet rank. In order to deal with the complicated problem 
of political/military coordination within such a confederated 
structure, Eberstadt proposed the creation of a National 
Security Council and a National Security Resources Board. 
These organizations, whose membership included the serv]ce 
secretaries, would advise the President on policy and coordi-
nate planning and execution. 
207 Ibid., l; Albion, Forrestal and the Navy, 227. 
134 
The Report found the Joint. Chiefs of Staff to be a 
highlY successful organization that should be maintained in 
its present form. Although it reaffirmed the weaknesses con-
comitant to a committee structure, it felt that the "record 
does not indicate that they could have performed their duties 
better if a supreme military commander had been inserted 
between them and the President." This was clearly a rejec-
tion of McNarney's centralized organization. The Eberstadt 
Report apparently assumed that the Chiefs could work together 
in a crisis situation, but that they must be given legal 
status to define their duties and responsibilities. Further-
more, as an organization they must be integrated into all 
other aspects of the national planning structure. To faci-
litate the workings of the JCS, a joint staff was to be 
provided. 
The plan that Eberstadt proposed corresponded extremely 
well to Forrestal's own views of defense organization. For-
restal, who had fought centralization within the Navy all 
through the war, realized that the most important aspect of 
an organizational plan was that it must allow for integration 
of the various capabilities of all the services. He fully 
appreciated that on some issues there were bound to be 
differing professional viewpoints, whether military or 
Civilian; but he felt as Secretary of the Navy "that his task 
Was to create an organization, in which both views could be 
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freely developed and upon which a decision could be made." 208 
One week after the Eberstadt Report was released the 
Army countered with a new unification proposal put forth by 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins. 
The Collins plan, which addressed only the organization of 
the military hierarchy, envisaged a single Department of the 
Armed Forces headed by a single civilian secretary. The JCS 
was to remain essentially as before, except for the addition 
of a fifth member, a Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, whose 
functions were unspecified. The plan furthermore recommended 
the Joint Chiefs be an advisory body, and as with the McNarney 
Plan, they be given the authority to prepare and recommend 
to the President the military budget. The civilian secretary 
could comment upon, but not amend these budgetary recommenda-
t . 209 lOllS. 
After the release of the Eberstadt and the Collins 
plans, it was apparent that the services had reached an 
impasse. Under these circumstances, the President took the 
initiative and on 17 December 1945 submitted his own plan for 
unification. President Truman's interest and attitude toward 
unification can be traced back to an article he wrote for 
208Alb" lOll, Forrestal and the Navy, 277. 
209u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, 
~epartment of Armed Forces, Department of Military Security, 
~earings, 79th Congress, lst Session, 1945, 157 ff. 
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Colliers magazine during the 1944 Presidential campaign. In 
this article, Truman's arguments for unification were based 
on economics and the elimination of waste and duplication. 
Underpinning this argument was the apparent conviction that 
some type of coordinating and planning authority was needed 
to deal with defense problems as an interrelated whole. He 
attacked the JCS committee structure and expressed his desire 
that "a General Staff in full charge of tactics and strategy, 
viewing the nation's offense and defense as an indivisible 
whole and totally unconcerned with service rivalries" be 
created. 210 
These ideas were easily identifiable in the President's 
1945 reorganization plan. As a result of his disenchantment 
with the JCS structure, he called for the establishment of a 
civilian Secretary of National Defense and a single military 
chief of staff. Furthermore, the plan eliminated the present 
Joint Chiefs' structure and substituted a military advisory 
body with unspecified duties. 211 Thus, in December of 1945, 
the Pres~dent's dislike for the JCS led him to the conclusion 
210Harry S. Truman, "Our Armed Forces Must be Unified," 
Colliers. CXIV (~August 1944), 64. 
211u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Armed 
Services, National Defense Establishment, Unification of the 
Armed Forces, Hearings on S. 758, 80th Congress, 1st Session, 
1947, pt. 1, 9-10. (Hereafter cited as National Defense 
Establishment). 
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that some form of centralization under a single chief of 
staff would eliminate the ills of the military organization. 
Yet by 22 May 1946, the President had totally reversed himself 
and saw a single chief of staff as a threat to civilian con-
trol of the military. 212 
The explanation for this complete reversal may be 
partially found in a memorandum written by Clark Clifford on 
18 December 1945. In this memorandum, Clifford warned of 
the dangers of a single chief of staff and felt that such an 
individual would be in a position to "override the civilian 
secretaries' views on future controversies." 213 Clifford 
argued forcefully that the retention of the present JCS 
structure allowed for the continuation of pluralist decision 
making and that this in turn permitted diverse views to sur-
face to the attention of the civilian leadership. Such 
pluralism maximized civilian control. 
The Clifford memorandum goes a long way toward explain-
ing the change in Truman's attitude, but it also surfaced 
212Harold D. Smith Papers, Box l, Truman Library. 
This box contains the diary of Mr. Smith who was director 
of the Bureau of the Budget. In his diary Mr. Smith notes 
that the President desired to institute a single chief of 
staff on 13 December 1945. This coincides with his own 
unification plan. On the 22 May 1946, Mr. Smith records that 
the President had come to see a single chief of staff as a 
threat to civilian control of the military. There is no 
comment on why the change occurred or when it came about. 
213 Memorandum, Clark Clifford to Samuel Rosenman, 
18 DecEmber 1945, Clark Clifford Papers, folder, "Post War 
Military Unification, Primary Folder," Truman Library. 
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another possible explanation, the administration's concept 
of structuring its relationship with the military. While 
Roosevelt had controlled and guided the military by the force 
of his personality, Truman looked toward institutions to 
214 
accomplish that goal. Clifford was very sympathetic with 
Forrestal's belief that foreign policy and military policy 
had to be fully integrated, but it was only through insti-
tutions that such integration could be optimized. In a note 
written on 13 December 1945, Clifford emphasized that only 
in the integration of the nation's "foreign, military, and 
economic policies •.• [was there] hope for preventing our 
participation in another war." 215 Unification of the ser-
vices was only one aspect of the effort toward total inte-
gration. Within this framework, though, a single chief of 
staff held out a potential danger, not only from the point 
of view of stifling diverse opinions, but such an individual 
could also develop a narrow perspective of the world around 
him. A single chief of staff could potentially be "in no 
214Richard Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman 
as Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1973), 30. 
215 Memorandum, Clark Clifford to Samuel Rosenman, 13 
December 1945, Samuel Rosenman Papers, box 4, folder "Unifi-
cation Folder #1," Truman Library. 
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position to view the overall problems of politics, diplomacy, 
'l't ry affairs." 216 It was thus through the instru-and m1 1 a 
mentality of a pluralistic Joint Chiefs that such a situation 
could be avoided. 
Conversely, one should not give Clifford total credit 
for Truman's transformation, nor mistakenly assume that the 
primary motivation for the National Security Act was effi-
ciency.217 If the latter was the case, then a single chief 
of staff would have been ideal. Wilber Hoar, long time chief 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, maintains 
that the reason for the 1947 legislation was to give guidance 
to the military. 218 While this is partially true, it is also 
probable that the administration was as much concerned with 
controlling the military as directing it. Truman's own per-
ception of the military was essentially one of distrust and 
dislike. In his later years, the former President described 
this in language that was typically Trumanese: 
216Memorandum, Clark Clifford to Samuel Rosenman, 18 
December 1945, Clark Clifford Papers, folder "Post War Military 
Unification, Primary Folder," Truman Library. 
. 
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see Paul Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The Ameri-
£!~ Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: 
Pr1nceton University Press, 1961) for an analysis of defense 
organization based upon efficiency. 
218
wilber Hoar, "Truman" in The Ultimate Decision: The ~sident as the Commander in Chief, ed. Ernest May (New York: 
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y 0 u always have to remember when youTre dealing with 
generals and admirals, most of them, they're wrong a 
good deal of the time •••• Th~y're most of them just: 
like horses with blfgders on, they can't see b~yond the 
end of their nose.2 
Naturally, this view did not extend to all the military,, 
because the President had the greatest respect and confidence 
in Leahy, Marshall, and Bradley, but this belief led him to 
a total commitment to civilian control, not only in theory, 
but in practice. 220 Logically, the President was extremely 
protective of his prerogatives as Commander-in-Chief, and 
felt that he had to have complete control of the military:; 
I took the position that the President, as the Commander-
in-Chief, had to know everything that was going on. I 
had just enough experience to know that if you are not 
careful, the military will hedge you in.221 
The ideas of Presidential prerogatives and civilian control 
of the military were deeply intertwined. This conviction 
was never more evident than during the Truman-MacArthur con-
222 troversy. 
Whatever President Truman's motivations were, it was 
the force of his office that generated the inter-service 
compromise that resulted in the National Security Act of 
219Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: an Oral Biography of 
Harry S. Truman (New York: Berkley Publishing Corp., 1974), 
205. 
220 Truman, Memoirs, I, 210. 
221 Ibid., 88. 
222M.ll l er, Plain Speaking, 287; Hoar, "Truman," 199-208. 
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l947. 223 The heart of that compromise was Eberstadt's de-
centralized approach. Central to the legislation was the 
creation of a National Defense Establishment headed by a 
civilian secretary. Conforming to the Eberstadt view of 
decentralization, though, the powers vested in this secretary 
were very limited. He was given the power of "general 
authority, direction and control," over the three services. 
Since the service secretaries were also of cabinet rank, it 
meant in a practical sense that the Secretary of Defense's 
power was nil. Moreover, the impotent nature of the Secre-
tary's role was exacerbated by the fact that all three of 
the service secretaries were also members of the National 
Security Council. This political reality was legally 
reflected in the fact that the National Defense Establish-
224 
ment was not an executive department. This also led to 
223For a full discussion of the political machina-
tions that went into putting the National Security Act 
through Congress see Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of 
Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and Policy 
Process (New York: ColumBia University Press, 1966). 
224
rt appears that Truman originally did not want the 
service secretaries to be of cabinet rank. U.S. Congress, 
Senate, National Defense Establishment, 184. 
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the criticism of too much military influence in the NSc. 225 
In regard to the JCS, there was a surprising consen~ 
sus of thought on what role the Chiefs were to take and how 
theY were to be structured. Congress, in particular, had great 
confidence in the organization and stated that its duties 
should be "substantially as at present and permit function-
ing in accordance with procedures developed by war experi-
ence."226 Similarly, the military themselves had reached a 
consensus that whether or not there would be a single chief 
of staff, the JCS should structurally continue as it had pre-
viously. Thus, the original proposals relating to the JCS, 
developed by the Army and Navy negotiators, Lieutenant General 
225Memorandum for the President, 7 February 1947, sub-
ject: Comments of the Secretary of State on Draft of Bill to 
promote the National Security (Fourth Draft, dated January 28, 
1947), Clark Clifford Papers, box 17, Unification Correspon-
dence, folder "Unification: Congressional Hearings," Truman 
Library. In this memorandum General Marshall notes that the 
proposed establishment of the NSC would "give predominance 
in the field of foreign relations to a body composed of not 
less than six, of which at least four would be the civilian 
heads of military establishments. I think it would be unwise 
to vest such a council by statute with broad and detailed 
powers and responsibilities in this field." Marshall went on 
to say that "there is also a strong feeling that the direction 
of policy, foreign or domestic, should be dominated by the non-
military branches of government." This point was brought out 
, in the interviews conducted by the 1948 Hoover Commission, 
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the 
Government, Task Force on National Security Organization 
(Appendix G), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1949), 62. (Hereafter cited as the Hoover Commission.) 
226u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, ~ational Security Act: Report to Accompany S. 758, 80th Con-
gress, 1st Session, 1947, Senate Report 239, 13. 
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Loris Norstad and Vice Admiral Forest Sherman, were accepted 
almost in their entirety by Congress. 227 
The provisions of the National S~curity Act that 
established the Joint Chiefs of Staff named the Chiefs of t.he 
ArmY, Navy, and Air Force and "the Chief of Staff to the 
commander-in-Chief, if there be one," as its members. 228 T.he 
incorporation of Leahy's position is somewhat paradoxical in 
light of the President's newly acquired dislike for a single 
chief of staff. While it is true that Truman had a great deal 
of respect for Roosevelt's Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-
Chief, and thus may have been motivated to continue the 
personal relationship, a more plausible explanation may be 
found in Truman's faith in institutional control of the military. 
Leahy, by virtue of his proximity to the President and his rank, 
could serve as a means of control and a conduit of guidance for 
the Chiefs. 
Aside from specifying the membership of the JCS, the 
National Security Act also identified their functions, starting 
by naming them the "principal military advisors to the Presi-
dent and the SE':cretary of Defense." Noticeable by its absence 
227M . Ch 17 aJ or anges, . 
228 . The Commandant of the Marine Corps was not con-
Sidered a member of the JCS in 1947. On 28 June 1952 with pas-
sage of Public Law 416 the Commandant was made an equal to the 
other chiefs when discussing matters affecting the Marine Corps. 
In Practice this has almost always meant the presence of the 
Commandant at JCS meet.ings. In 1980 the Commandant was made a 
full and equal member of the JCS. 
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was the fact that the Cheifs were not made advisors to the 
National SE':curity Council. This apparent anomaly may be 
explained by remembering that Truman was deeply concerned 
about his prerogatives as Commander-in-Chief. To make the 
JCS advisors to a committee that contained individuals out-
side the military chain of command might in some way dilUte 
this prerogative. In an agendum written in February ~949, 
this relationship between the President and his military 
advisors was clearly articulated. This agendum suggested 
that the President speak to the JCS informally on the fact 
that: 
The Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of Defense 
depend upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide the 
professional information, analysis, and decisions upon 
which the President must, in turn, make decisions of 
great moment to the nation. (In this essentially stra~ 
tegic, professional process, no authority other than 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and 
the President can intervene.)229 
Such an outside authority would be the National Security 
Council. Moreover, the specific role of the NSC was still 
very much in doubt at the time of the passage of the National 
Security Act. While its duties were outlined, the nature of 
229
undated "Suggested Agenda" from the Secretary of 
Defense to the President, Truman Papers, Personal Secretary 
File, box 91, folder "Presidential Appointment Daily Sheets: 
· February 1-15, 1949," Truman Library. 
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its relationship with the executive was still in question. 230 
Aside from this advisory function, the other specific 
functions assigned to the Joint Chiefs were: 
(l) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the 
strategic direction of the military forces; 
(2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the 
military services logistic responsibilities in accor-
dance with such plans; 
(3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when 
such unified commands are in the interest of national 
security; 
(4) to formulate policies for joint training of the 
military forces; 
(5) to formulate policies for coordinating the education 
of members of the military forces; 
(6) to review major material and personnel requirements 
of the military forces, in accordance with strategic 
and logistic plans; and 
230The State Department leadership was opposed to 
g1v1ng too much power to the NSC because it attacked their 
institutional prerogatives. In the February 7th Memorandum 
to the President, Marshall, noted that "the constitutional and 
traditional control of the President in the conduct of foreign 
affairs, principally throughout our history with the aid of the 
Secretary of State, is deeply rooted," Memorandum for the Pre-
sident, 7 February 1947, subject: Comments of the Secretary 
of State on Draft of Bill to Promote the National Security 
(Fourth Draft, dated January 28, 1947), Clark Clifford Papers, 
box 17, Unification Correspondence, folder "Unification: Con-
gressional Hearings," Truman Library. The Secretary of State 
furthermore said that the envisioned legislation would make the 
Secretary "the automaton of the Council." Acheson also had 
his doubts about the value of the NSC. Forrestal records that 
General Norstad believed that Acheson would "try to castrate 
its effectiveness." Forrestal, Diaries, 315. Also see 
Chapters VI and VIII for further discussion on Truman's use 
Of the NSC. 
(7) 
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to provide United States representation on the 
Military Staff Committee of the United Nations ~n 
accordance with the provisions ofthe Charter of the 
United Nations.231 
. To help accomplish these functions, the statute established a 
Joint Staff consisting of one hundred officers supplied 
equally from the three services. 
The formation of the Joint Staff exemplified the pres-
sures that were at work during the unification process. It 
seems to have been a foregone conclusion that the Staff's 
organization would resemble the existing committee structure 
that had evolved during World War II. The Chiefs agreed that 
they should name the Joint Staff's director as soon as pos-
sible and allow him to recommend the Staff's internal orga-
nization since that was not outlined in the statute. With 
that in mind, Major General Alfred M. Gruenther was appointed 
on 25 August 1947 and one month later submitted his recommenda-
tions for the Joint Staff's organization. 
General Gruenther's plan kept the basic outline of the 
World War II committee structure, although the internal 
agencies were renamed. He recommended a structure based 
around three full-time staff groups that supported three 
senior part-time inter-service committees. As was the case 
during World War II, the membership of the committees were 
231Public Law 253, Title II, sect. 2ll(b). Hereafter 
Cited as National Security Act 1947. 
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part-time representatives from the service staffs. The staff 
groups were designated the Joint Intelligence Group, the Joint 
strategic Plans Group and the Joint Logistics Plans Group. 
These three groups would support the Joint Intelligence Com-
- mittee, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, and the Joint 
Logistics Committee. In order to guarantee better coordina-
tion between the joint committee and its supporting group, the 
group's director sat in with the senior committee. 
The newly created Joint Staff thus consisted of the 
Director of the Joint Staff and the three joint groups. 
General Gruenther built his recommendations upon the assump-
tion that the JCS was going to remain a "planning, coordi-
nating, and advisory body, and not an operating or implement-
ing group." But the Joint Staff was not the only organiza-
tion that supported the JCS. A larger, less distinct institu-
tion, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), of 
which the Joint Staff was a part, was also available for that 
purpose. Along with the Joint Staff, the OJCS consisted of 
the Joint Secretariat and a variety of functional committees, 
such as the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. The specific 
Dumber and designation of these other agencies changed during 
the 1947-1958 time frame, but the basic organizational struc-
ture remained the same. In October 1947 the JCS approved 
General Gruenther's recommendations. 232 
232Major Changes, 18-20. 
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The small size of the Joint Staff guaranteed a con-
tinued reliance upon the service staffs for support. This 
was quite acceptable to the services who wanted to maintain 
their avenue of expression on service issues and their ability 
to influence decisions. In practice, an issue was sent out 
of the Director's office through the Joint Secretariat,, to 
the appropriate joint committee. The joint committee deter-
mined which of the Joint Staff groups would support the pro-
ject. It was within these groups that the actual paperwork 
was produced, although the service staffs might become in-
volved. Upon completion, the project was forwarded to the 
appropriate joint committee for concurrence. Before that was 
accomplished though, a paper might be returned to the joint 
group for revision or be sent to the service staffs for 
examination. Either way, the requirement for service con-
currence guaranteed the protection of service interests before 
the project was sent forward to the Joint Chiefs. 233 
There was one major deletion from the original statu-
tory provisions that pertained to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
The original version stated that the JCS was to "make recom-
mendations for the integration of the military budget." This 
Was obviously a retention from earlier Army proposals in the 
budget area. While this deletion enhanced civilian control, 
. 
233u.s. Congress, House, Committee on Government Opera-
tlons, Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, Department of Defense: ~arings on H. J. Res. 264, 83d Congress, 1st Session, 1953, pp. ~44-149. (Hereafter cited as House, Reorganization Hearings 
~.) 
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it left the JCS without a specific role in the budgetary pro-
cess. As a result the Chiefs' role in budget matters varied 
234 during the period of our study. 
The passage of Public Law 253 (the National Security 
Act of 1947) gave the Joint Chiefs legal status for the first 
time and identified their place within the policy making 
structure. The reasons for the deliberate specification of 
the duties of the Chiefs (as well as other organizations 
covered by Public Law 253) were twofold. The first was to 
clearly place the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs within 
the governmental system. The second was to indicate not only 
the extent of the Chiefs' functions, but also their limita-
tions. For the first time in American history, the act 
attempted to create a single system for the development of 
political/military planning and policy. Unfortunately, 
the lines within that system were so complex and overlapping 
that at times they became totally indiscernible. Despite 
this complexity, there are three fundamental levels within 
the system. At the top is a totally civilian level consist-
ing of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 
of State, and others. The lower level is that of an 
234The original JCS budgetary function was mentioned 
in a 16 January 1945 memorandum from Patterson and Forrestal 
to the President. This memorandum states that the JCS "will 
formulate strategic plans, assign logistics responsibilities 
to the services in support thereof, integrate the military 
requirements and, as directed advise in the integration of 
~he military budget." U.S. Congress, Senate, National Defense 
~ablishment, 2. 
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implementing bureaucracy in charge of any particular function. 
In dealing with military questions this level is all military. 
In the context of this study, these two levels may be identi-
fied as the political and the military levels or, in functional 
terms, developing commitments and developing capabilities. On 
defense matters the middle level is made up of mixed civilian 
and military agencies such as the National Security Council 
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In theory, 
this middle level is the point of contact, or to use contem-
porary bureaucratic parlance, the 'interface' between the 
bureaucracies involved in developing commitments and capabi-
lities. The Chiefs, as representatives of an implementing 
bureaucracy, enter into the system at this point. It was for 
this reason that President Eisenhower considered the Joint 
Chiefs the "hinge" between the military establishment and the 
h . h . "1. t l 235 1g er c1v1 1an con ro • They are positioned at that point 
within the system where the nation's commitments and capabi-
lities are meshed and hopefully balanced. 
While the Joint Chiefs may have been the hinge between 
commitments and capabilities, the National Security Act did 
not explain how the various organizations would actually 
function. In this regard, the JCS was no different from any 
235Andrew J. Goodpaster, "The Role of the Joint Chiefs of 
:ta~f in the National Security Structure," in Issues of 
Vat1onal Security in the 1970's, ed. Amos A. Jordon (New 
ork: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1967), 229. 
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other organization established in 1947. Obviously, the 
Chiefs' advisory function was their reason for being. The 
civilian leadership would look to the JCS to supply expert 
military advice on military matters. But what exactly a 
"military" matter was, was never defined. We can assume, that 
given America's traditional compartmentalization of political 
from military policy, this implied a "radical" form of pro-
fessionalism. All of the other functions specified in the 
statute were specifically related either to developing mili-
tary advice or to maximizing military command and control. 
This may partially explain the deletion of the JCS's budget-
ary function. In any case, the role that the Chiefs were to 
play would have to be worked out between the institutions 
involved. 
The provisions incorporated into Public Law 253 concern-
ing the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense 
contained certain inherent difficulties and contradictions. 
The elimination of these inherent problems would be the 
subject of three massive reorganizations and several minor 
changes in the Defense Department structure during the Truman 
and Eisenhower administrations. The National Security Act 
gave the Chiefs dual and sometimes conflicting roles. On 
the one hand, as a corporate body, they are the principal 
military advisors to the President and the Secretary of 
Defense; on the other hand, they are the military heads of 
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their respective services. As such, they command a bureau-
cracy that has its own imperatives and vested interests. By 
virtue of their adviso~y function, the Chiefs enter in~o the 
highest mixed civilian-military councils such as the NSC, but 
are forced to defend their organizational interests and, 
imperatives in those councils. 
Historically, it has proved extremely difficult: foT the 
Chiefs to divorce themselves from their services. This· 
service connection has probably been the greatest single 
criticism leveled against the JCS. One such critic, retired 
Lieutenant General James Gavin writes: 
The Chiefs must wear two hats, one as a member of the 
JCS, and the other as a member of their own servic.e.. 
In a larger sense, they should keep the national 
interest paramount. But •.• the record will show that 
interest in the particular service usually prevails, 
although, entirely in a patriotic sense, since their 
background, loyalties, and responsibilities all suggest 
that in this manner the national interest is best 
served.236 
It may be unreasonable to expect a chief, with over thirty 
years of service in a particular organization, to take on a 
new set of perceptions or world view. Faultless or not, 
this problem must be confronted by each and every chief, as 
noted in the following remarks by former Chief of Staff of the 
Arnw, General George Decker: 
236 James Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New 
Harper & Brothers, 1958), 261. York: 
153 
As service representative ••. ! had the job of trying to 
get for my service as much of the resources available 
in the National Defense kitty as I could •••• As a mem-
ber of the Joint Chiefs ••• ! had the responsibility for 
the overall milita~y preparedness of the country. 
He went on to say that he reconciled these two roles by 
"making as much of the pitch as I could for the Army, at the 
same time keeping in mind the requirements of the other ser-
vices. "237 The inherent weakness of leaving it up to the 
individual to balance between two such powerful sets ol 
imperatives is rather apparent. The Truman administration, 
and in particular Clark Clifford, thought that the National 
238 Security Act would help alleviate this problem. Unfor-
tunately, as events were to prove such hope was unfounded, 
and this was one of the prime motivations for later reorga-
nization plans. 
The problem of the Chiefs' double role is inextricably 
connected to another dilemma they face; are they commanders, 
are they planners, or both? If they are to carry out both of 
these functions then it is quite logical for them to wear 
two hats. If not, then one of these roles should be elimi-
nated. It is this command role that motivates the Chiefs to 
237 1 t . "th G 1 G H D k J n erv1ew w1 enera eorge • ec er, anuary, 
1975, Washington, D.C. 
238
undated Memorandum on Issues~ Clark Clifford Papers, 
box 17, Unification Correspondence, folder "Unification Bill, 
Comments and Recommendations," Truman Library. 
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defend their service interests. This role confusion has 
always existed, as indicated earlier, in regard to the Chief 
of staff of the Army, who by statute, is prohibited from 
being the commander; but the confusion within the JCS is 
exacerbated by the command responsibility given the Chief. 
of Staff of the Air Force, the Chief of Naval Operations, 
239 
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The military· 
themselves feel very strongly that planning responsibilitY. 
and operational control must go hand in hand. The combi'ning 
of the two roles eliminates the development of "ivory t.ower 
planning" by individuals who will never have to worry about 
actually carrying out their plans. Former Chief of Staff 
of the Army and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer made this very clear, "to separate 
planning from operational authority is a gross error." 240 
239The National Security Act of 1947 specifically 
stated that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force "shall 
exercise command over the United States Air Force;" Title II, 
sect. 208(b). As part of the 1958 reorganization command 
was changed. to read "supervision." A similar change occurred 
in the relationship of the Chief of Naval Operations and 
the Marine Corps Commandant to their respective services. 
But a degree of ambiguity still remains. According to The 
Marine Officers Guide the Chief of Naval Operations commands 
the operating forces of the Navy and implies that the Com-
mandant is the actual commander of the Marine Corps. Robert 
D. Heinl, Jr., The Marine Officers Guide, 4th edition rev. 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), 46, 81. 
240Interview with General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, 
January, 1975, Washington, D.C. 
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A second major problem which arose out of the 1947 
legislation was the position of the Joint Chiefs within the 
chain of command. According to the statute, they were 
"subject to the authority and direction of the President and 
the Secretary of Defense," and were the principal military 
241 
advisors to both. By virtue of their service responsibi-
lities, they are also under the service secretaries. The 
administrative confusion which can result from having three 
bosses is quite obvious. Furthermore, the mere existence 
of the Secretary of Defense created not only a potential 
competitor for the role of principal military advisor to the 
President, but an official potentially capable of dominating 
the Chiefs and usurping their functions. 
These then were the problems and contradictions im-
plicit within the 1947 legislation that the ensuing amend-
ments in 1949, 1953, and 1958 attempted to rectify. Generally 
speaking, these changes followed three lines. The first was 
to centralize power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The second was to 
streamline the chain of command in an effort to eliminate the 
above mentioned ambiguities. Finally, these changes tried to 
take command responsibility away from the Chiefs and make 
them into more of a planning organization. This last point 
Was an essential step in disconnecting the Chiefs from their 
service parochialism. 
241National Security Act 1947, Title II, sect. 
211 (a). 
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The original 1947 legislation conformed to Eberstadt's 
vieW of decentralization, by creating a weak Secretary of 
Defense with only "general control" over the Military Estab-
lishment, and by allowing the military services to be 
"separately administered." This approach was institu..;.; 
tionalized by giving the services all powers not specifically 
granted to the Secretary of Defense. At first, this approach 
was totally acceptable to Secretary Forrestal, but slowly he 
began to appreciate the inherent disadvantages in such a 
decentralized system, and he came to realize the Secretary 
needed greater control over the Military Establishment. In 
his "First Report" as Secretary of Defense, Forrestal sug-
gested massive reforms designed to enhance and centralize 
the power of the Secretary: 
The statutory authority of the Secretary of Defense 
should be materially strengthened, not only by provid-
ing him with an Under Secretary, but also making it 
clear that the Secretary of Defense has the responsi-
bility for exercising "direction, authority, and 
control" over the agencies of the National Military 
Establishment.242 
The elimination of the disabling adjective "general" in front 
of "direction, authority, and control" was a necessary pre-
requisite for the centralization of power into the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD). As a corollary to this 
change, Forrestal also suggested that the National Military 
.!_he 
ing 
242National Military Establishment, First Report of 
Secretary of Defense (Washington: U.S. Government Print-
Office, 1948), 3. 
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Establishment be converted into an Executive Department, 
with a corresponding reduction in the status of the services 
and the removal of their representatives from the NSC. In 
a 8 February 1949 memorandum to the President, these changes 
were identified as "necessary if he [the Secretary of 
Defense] is to exercise adequate control over the military 
services." 243 In order to support the Secretary in his new 
centralized role, Forrestal called for an increase in the 
size of OSD. 
Secretary Forrestal's recommendations were reinforced 
shortly afterward by the report of the Military Establishment 
Task Force of the Hoover Commission. This Commission, 
officially entitled the Commission on Organization of the 
Executive Branch of the Government, was brought into existence 
in 1947 to examine all aspects of the executive branch, 
especially in terms of economy and efficiency. Former Presi-
dent Herbert Hoover headed the Commission, while Ferdinand 
Eberstadt headed the Military Establishment Task Force. The 
Commission's report identified the positions of the Secretary 
of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the two "critical 
Points" where problems existed in the National Security struc-
ture. As for the Secretary, the report supported Forrestal 
by emphasizing the need to improve the Secretary's "managerial 
243 Memorandum Clark Clifford, Frank Pace and James For-
restal to the President, 8 February 1949, subject: Revision of 
the National Security. Frederick J. Lawton Papers, box 7, 
folder "Correspondence: Director of Staff," Truman Library. 
t " instrurnen • 
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This meant centralizing his power and increas-
ing the supporting bureaucracy. As for the Joint Chiefs, 
four major problem areas were identified: 
(1) The JCS has remained detached and remote from the 
other parts of the.National Security Organization and 
have not become involved in the total i·ty of economic, 
political and scientific planning. Part of the problem 
stemmed from a lack of guidance on the part of the NSC, 
"but their [JCS] own attitude has been one of far too 
great detachment from the broader tasks of the modern 
strategic planner." 
(2) The Chiefs are influenced far too much by service 
considerations which deter efforts at integrating a 
total military policy. 
(3) The Chiefs themselves are too heavily burdened by 
service functions, at the expense of their JCS role. 
(4) The JCS is burdened by too many minor matters. 
Each of these problem areas contributed in their own 
way toward diminishing the effectiveness of the JCS in ful-
filling their statutory functions. Consistently, the Task 
Force emphasized the dysfunctional nature of inter-service 
conflict and the diffusion of energy that resulted from the 
Chiefs' involvement in service matters. It recommended 
removing the Chiefs from the chain of command and upgrading 
the service's Vice-Chiefs so that they could take over more 
of the service responsibilities. But the Task Force failed 
to supply any substantive suggestions for rectifying the 
first problem area. The Task Force criticized the isolated 
"aloofness" with which the JCS operated; the fact that the 
JCS had substantially failed to "relate their military 
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plans" to the nation's economic, industrial, and scientific 
capabilities; and that it was difficult to get advice from 
the Chiefs. As a superficial solution to the problem, it 
was suggested that the Chiefs should become more involved 
in the workings of the NSC, and that they should sit in on 
more NSC meetings. 244 Unfortunately, this naive panacea 
did not fully deal with the fundamental issue that the Task 
Force was addressing. In reality the Task Force was criti-
cizing the Joint Chiefs for two separate and distinct faults. 
The first was their service parochialism, which could be dealt 
with through organizational change. The second was that they 
were restricting their outlook to the "military point of view." 
The simple solution of more bureaucratic interface and a 
larger Joint Staff would have very little effect on such a 
narrow "radically" professional outlook. 
As a result of the desire for centralization manifest-
ed by Forrestal and the Hoover Commission, President Truman 
asked for a reorganization of the National Military Establish-
245 
ment along the lines indicated by Forrestal. Congress 
244
commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of 
the Government, Task Force on National Security Organization 
(Appendix G), (Washington: U.S .. Government Printing Office, 
1949), 66-70. (Hereafter cited as the Hoover Commission.) 
245u.s. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of 
.!._he United States (Washington D.C., Office of the Federal 
!egister, National Archives and Records Service, 1964), Harry 
S. Truman, 1949, 163 and 382. (Hereafter cited as Public 
Papers). 
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supported the President by adopting amendments to the National 
security Act that greatly strengthened the power of the Secre-
tary of Defense. This increase in power corresponded to his 
new status as head of an executive department, the Department 
of Defense (DoD). Possibly, in response to the Hoover Com-
mission's criticism of JCS remoteness, the Chiefs were named 
the "principal military advisors" to the National Security 
council, along with their duties as advisors to the President 
246 
and the Secretary of Defense. Another explanation for this 
change in function may have been the· President's growing confi-
dence in the NSC, coupled with the administration's increased 
247 
awareness of the complexity of national security problems. 
As part of the general trend toward centralizat~on 
within the Defense Department, the 1949 legislation establish-
ed the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
During the Second World War, the JCS acted primarily as the 
President's personal military staff. This relationship was 
246National Security Act of 1947, Title II, sec. 2ll(a) 
as amended in 1949. 
247u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Opera-
tions, Organizing for National Defense, Hearings before a Sub-
committee on National Policy Machinery, (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1961), I, 573. (Hereafter cited as the 
Jackson Committee). In these hearings Admiral Sidney Souers, 
Former Secretary of the National Security Council discussed 
how President Truman began to take a more controlling hand in 
NSC affairs. While the Admiral did not specifically say so, 
it may be suggested that the President simply began to get 
used to the structure and no longer feared it. 
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described by Admiral Leahy, after the war: 
He [FDR] was the Commander-in-Chief. He just appointed 
us like he would appoint a staff •••• We went to the 
President. We dealt directly with the President. We 
were the staff of the President of the United States.24 8 
This statement reflected the fact that only the President had 
the power to force an issue through the JCS, and partially ex-
plained why Leahy was given the title of Chief of Staff to the 
commander-in-Chief, as opposed to commander of all American 
forces. Leahy continued to function in this capacity until 
illness forced his retirement in 1949. Before that, however, 
his ability to deal with the complex nature of national securi-
ty problems and to minimize inter-service rivalry had diminished 
toward the end of his tenure. General Bradley noted Leahy's 
ill-preparation, in comparison to what he considered to be the 
role of the Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff. 249 As 
such, Secretary Forrestal began to look elsewhere for the kind 
of independent military advice that Leahy should have supplied. 
At first, the Secretary looked to General Alfred Gruenther, 
Director of the Joint Staff. In 1948, he sought to have the 
Chief of Staff of the Army, General Omar Bradley, named as his 
211. 
248 U.S. Congress, House, Reorganization Hearings 1953, 
249 U.S. Congress, House. Committee on Armed Services, 
F~l~ Committee Hearings on S. 1843, To Convert the National 
~l1tary Establishment into an executive department of the 
-RVernment, to be known as the Department of Defense, to pro-
!!§e the Secretary of Defense with appropriate responsibility 
~d authority and with civilian and military assistants ade-
~ate to fulfill his enlarged responsibilities, 81st Congress, 
1~t Session, 1949, 2912. (Hereafter cited as House Hearings 
-!g.) 
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special military advisor, but both Bradley and Secretary of the 
ArmY Kenneth Royall opposed the change, maintaining that ~he 
General was needed in his present capacity. 250 
Once Leahy had retired, Forrestal turned to retired 
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower to temporarily fill 
the void. By virtue of Eisenhower's age, rank, and experience, 
it was hoped he would be able to exert some pressure to coordi-
nate the Chiefs. Eisenhower's return to duty was specifically 
in response to the difficulty the Chiefs were having developing 
budgets and war plans. As Forrestal wrote to the President: 
It is in these circumstances and against this background 
that it occurred to me that the talents of Ike, in terms 
of the identification of problems and th~ accomodations of 
differing views, would be highly useful. 51 
The Secretary desired to have available to him "some dis-
interested separate professional advice from an individual 
who owned no particular allegiance to one service." 252 For a 
while, Forrestal thought about creating an independent military 
committee outside the JCS, consisting of Eisenhower, General 
250Major Changes, 21; Forrestal, Diaries, 496. 
251 Letter James Forrestal to Harry S. Truman, 9 Novem-
ber 1948, Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary File, General 
File, box 120, folder, "Forrestal General." Truman Library. 
252Memorandum Dwight D. Eisenhower to Walter Kerr, 
9 April 1951. Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, 1916-1952 File, 
Box 59, folder "Walter Kerr," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, 
Abilene. Kansas, (Hereafter referred to as Eisenhower Papers 
and Eisenhower Library.) 
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Ira Eaker (USAF), and Admiral John Towers; all of whom were 
retired. 253 Ultimately, the Secretary returned to the idea of 
a chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who could act as a link between 
the civilian leadership and the JCS, while abrogating the 
worst aspects of inter-service rivalry. Obviously, such an 
individual needed to devote his full time to these goals, 254 
but Forrestal was by no means suggesting a single chief of 
staff. It was the individual's duties, not his title, that 
was important. In this regard, the Secretary noted, "the 
fundamental question was not whether or not there should be a 
single Chief of Staff but what the scope of the single Chief 
of Staff's responsibility as agent of the Secretary should 
b ,255 e. 
Forrestal's use of the word "agent" to describe the 
relationship between the proposed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
253 Ibid., The idea of the chairman also being retired 
was discussed extensively; even the Hoover Commission considered 
using Eisenhower as the model. See U.S. Congress, House, 
Hearings, 1949, 2788. 
254u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 
National Security Act Amendment of 1949: Hearings on S. 1269 
and S.l843, 8lst Congress, lst Session, 1949, 10. (Hereafter 
referred to as Senate, Hearings, 1949.) 
255 Memorandum to the Director from C. B. Stauffacher, 
6 January 1949, Frederick J. Lawton Papers, box 7, folder 
"Correspondence, Director Staff," Truman Library. It should be 
emphasized that Forrestal had not lost any of his belief in the 
Navy's coordinated approach to administration. The chairman 
Would simply facilitate such coordination. 
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of staff and the Secretary of Dfdense reflected his desire to 
maximize institutional control over the Chiefs. The Chiefs' 
independence was based on three pillars: their natural 
prestige and expertise derived from their position as a chief of 
a service; their statutory function as advisors to the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of Defense; and their other statutory 
functions enumerated in the National Security Act of 1947. 
From the practical point of view, the Chief's statutory func-
tions would have to be eliminated before institutional control 
could be optimized. In a 8 February 1949 memorandum, Forrestal, 
along with Clark Clifford and Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, 
advocated the elimination of both of these statutory pillars. 
They considered it desirable to "delete the specific statutory 
duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" and to designate the 
Chairman as the "principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense.'' 
Moreover, they thought it desirable to reword the provision 
prohibiting the Secretary of Defense from creating a military 
staff of his own "in order to make it clear that the Chairman 
(or Chief), as well as the Joint Staff, can function as the 
. 256 
m1litary staff of the Secretary of Defense." These increases 
in the Chairman's functions were a logical extension of For-
restal's plan to use him as an "agent" of the Secretary and 
256Memorandum, Clifford, P~ce, and Forrestal to the 
President, 8 February 1949, subject: Revision of the National 
Security, Lawton Papers, box 7, folder "Correspondence, Dir-
ector of Staff," Truman Library. 
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make him a "responsible head" of the JCS: 
••• the Chairman must be in a position to secure unanimity 
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or, if he fails to secure 
such unanimity, he must be able to identify the basis of 
the differences of opinion, and he must in such a circum-
stance have the right to submit to the Secretary of Defense 
his recommendations as to the decisions which the Secretary 
of Defense should make.257 
Along these same lines, Forrestal also wanted the Secretary to 
assume the function of appointing the Director of the Joint 
258 Staff. 
The stripping away of the Chiefs' statutory functions 
was what Forrestal called the "shadow c.oncept" of control. The 
administration felt that sweeping legislative changes, such as 
"abolishing the Joint Chiefs of Staff," would run into politi-
cal difficulties. Instead, it opted for the subtler approach 
of eroding the Chiefs' functions, and with them their indepen-
dence, thereby making them more subservient to secretarial con-
trol. Such secretarial control would exist by virtue of lack 
of restrictions. In much the same manner that the elastic 
clause of the Constitution paved the way for the expansion of 
Federal power, the elimination of the delimitating statutory 
Provisions would allow for the expansion of the Secretary's 
Power. 259 
257u.s. Congress, Senate, Hearings, 1949, 10. 
258Major Changes, 24. 
259Memorandum to the Director from C. B. Stauffacher, 
6 January 1949, Frederick J. Lawton Papers, box 7, folder 
"C orrespondence, Director Staff," Truman Library. 
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Generally speaking, the Chiefs were receptive to For-
restal's desire to establish a full-time institutional modera-
tor within the Joint Chiefs. This point was made by General 
Bradley during the Congressional hearings: 
In our experience serving as Joint Chiefs, we have come 
to the conclusion that the lack of such a Chairman is a 
flagrant shortcoming of the present organization for 
security. A senior officer, of competent military back-
ground, who devotes his total time to the Joint Chiefs' 
prescribed functions, and the Joint Chiefs' agenda is 
essential. 260 
But a full-time moderator, equal to the other Chiefs, was a 
far cry from the "agent" that Forrestal envisioned. In a 25 
March 1949 reply to the Secretary, the Chiefs suggested greater 
limitations on the proposed powers of the Secretary of Defense 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Specifically, 
the Chiefs recommended that their previously prescribed duties 
be included in any future law. They reaffirmed this position 
before the Senate by recommending the following: (1) the 
Chairman should have no command power; (2) the Chiefs should 
keep their statutory functions; (3) the advisory function 
should be kept with the Chiefs as a corporate entity and that 
the chairman should be part of the JCS and not separate from 
it; (4) the Joint Staff is the operating body of the JCS and 
that the JCS should appoint the Director, not the Secretary 
of Defense. 261 
260u.s. Congress. House, Hearings, 1949, 2879. 
261M . Ch 24 aJor anges, • 
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The Chiefs were fully aware of the effect Forrestal's 
proposal would have on their prerogatives. From the admini-
stration's view, the proposals would be a major step in extract-
ing the Chiefs from the chain of command and their command 
function. This was a crucial step in eliminating service 
parochialism. From the Chiefs' perspective, the legislation 
would eliminate them from the decision making process ali 
together. They would, in effect, be relegated to that of the 
staff of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. If we can judge from the form of the 
final legislation, the Congress appeared to be sympathetic 
toward the Chiefs in this power struggle with their civilian 
superiors, although, I would suggest for different reasons. 
The highly centralized power of the chairman was too close to 
the "Prussian" model of a general staff to be acceptable. 
This is not to say that Congress was sanctioning inter-service 
competition, it is just that Congress felt it was the lesser 
of two evils. 
The 1949 amendment to the National Security Act main-
tained the Zoint Chiefs' corporate advisory function and de-
lineated their specific remaining functions. The chairman 
would serve for a maximum of four years, except in time of 
war, and while he had precedence over all other military 
Officers, he had no command authority. The question of pre-
Cedence represents an interesting study in semantics. It was 
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clear that nobody, except a few advocates of the centralized 
armY approach, wanted to see the chairman become a uniformed 
chief of staff. Clearly, the Chiefs envisioned him as the 
first among equals. The question of his rank, and its rela-
tionshiP to the other services was foremost in the thoughts 
of the Chiefs. 262 This ambiguous relationship of rank ma.y 
have prompted the administration to promote Bradley, the new 
Chairman, to the five star rank of General of the Army,. a 
rank comparable to that which was held by both of his pre-
decessors. 
The 1949 legislation further specified that the Chair-
man could not vote in the JCS. This latter provision had 
little real importance, since the Joint Chiefs is not a 
democratic institution. While it is true that they present 
their various views on programs and send recommendations to 
the Secretary of Defense, all positions are sent forward 
whether they are unanimous or not. Bradley noted during the 
hearings that, "I see no reason to give him [the chairman] 
the vote as long as it doesn't mean anything." In fact 
Bradley saw a non-voting chairman as advantageous, since it 
could mean a greater degree of non-bias if the Chairman did 
262 
U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings 1949, 108-125. 
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did not have to "commit himself by a formal vote."263 
specifically, the duties of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of staff were enumerated as follows: 
(1) To serve as the presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. 
(2) To provide agenda for meetings of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and to assist the .?"oint Chiefs of Staff to prose-
cute their business as promptly as practicable. 
(3) To inform the Secretary of Defense and, when appro-
priate as determined by the President or Secretary of 
Defense, the President, of those issues upon which agree-
ment among the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not been 
reached. 264 
Tied in with the creation of the chairmanship was an increase 
in the size of the Joint Staff to 210 officers. This would 
facilitate the JCS's planning function. The Director of the 
Joint Staff continued to be appointed by the Chiefs, though 
not by a secret ballot as Forrestal had desired. 
The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act laid 
the foundation for future DoD centralization that would ulti-
mately culminate in the McNamara Monarchy of the 1960s. 
Despite Forrestal's earlier dislike for centralization, he 
was instrumental in what he considered "an additional step 
263u.s. Congress, House, Hearings, 1949, 2903. During 
the hearings General Bradley said "He [the Chairman] should 
never have to go back to his service to answer for the things 
he did as Chairman.", 2996; Ibid., 2896. 
264Major Changes, 26. 
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. the evolutionary process." It was his exposure to the ln 
fundamental weaknesses within the defense structure that· led 
him to modify his attitude. In particular, it was the budget 
s hampered by inter-service rivalry and the lack of proces , 
cohesive strategic planning, that made the greatest impact. 
From Forrestal's perspective, Clifford's pluralistic JCS had 
failed. He sought a partial solution in the form of an Under 
secretary of Defense to help him with the massive amount of 
work that he was involved in, but it appears that he became 
increasingly convinced toward the end of his tenure that it 
was the JCS that needed to be restructured. A chairman with 
increased power to act as the Secretary's "agent" became 
Forrestal's panacea. By promoting Bradley to five star rank, 
the general had the formal rank and prestige to become the 
"agent" that Forrestal sought. He also attempted, but never 
succeeded in separating the Chiefs from their services. 
Since Forrestal understood the political difficulties 
in radically restructuring the Joint Chiefs, he opted instead 
for his "shadow concept" of control. By gaining control over 
the functions of the JCS, the Secretary would then be in a 
Position to remold the institution. Unfortunately, he was 
never in a position to put his ideas into effect. Even before 
265Memorandum to the Director from C. B. Stauffacher, 
6 January 1949, Frederick J. Lawton Papers, box 7, folder 
"C orrespondence, Director Staff," Trumftn Library. 
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the amendments to the National Security Act were implemented, 
James Forrestal was dead. Exhausted by the very factors 
that led him to seek reorganization, he committed suicide in 
May 1949. 
It remained for Harry S. Truman's successor, Dwight 
D. Eisenhower, to complete the reorganization effort that 
Forrestal began. Eisenhower's experience as f.upreme Allied 
Commander in Europe, as well as temporary Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs, left him convinced of the effectiveness of 
certain methods of organizational control. In the first 
place, he brought with him a strong conviction as to the 
necessity for unified command, both in terms of administra-
tive control and staff members attitudes. This belief was 
translated into the practical concept of teamwork which for 
him was the "essence of all 266 success." Secondly, Eisen-
hower brought from the Army very strong attitudes on proper 
organizational and staff procedures. John Donovan, the Eisen-
hower administration's court historian, observed that the 
President "imported from the army a form of the staff system, 
in which all functions and responsibilities flow in a more or 
less fixed order and sequence from the President down." 267 
266 Stephen E. Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: 
War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (New York: 
day & Company, Inc., 1969), 55. 
The 
Double-
267 Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story 
(New York: New York Herald Tribune, Inc., 1956), 69. 
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The same staff procedures that had worked so well during the 
war under the supervision of General Walter Bedell Smith, 
were very much apparent in the person of Governor Sherman 
Adams, who handled domestic affairs, and Robert Cutler in the 
National Security Council. Finally, the President arrived at 
the White House a strong advocate of civilian control of the 
military, firmly believing that civilians rather than the JCS 
268 
should control the Department of Defense. 
With these general attitudes as a backdrop, Eisenhower 
developed very specific ideas on how the defense structure 
should be organized. These ideas were enumerated in two memo-
randa written in 1948 and 1949; the former was a response to 
a Hoover Commission inquiry, while the latter was written dur-
ing his tenure as acting Chairman of the JCS. 269 The major 
thrust of his recommendations in both memoranda was central-
izing decision making power into the hands of the S8cretary 
of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such 
authorization would allow the Secretary to deal effectively 
with inter-service differences and "to render timely and 
268 . Sherman Adams, First Hand Report: The Story of 
the Eisenhower Administration (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1961)' 397. 
269Memorandum for the Military Advisor, 3 September 
1948, Eisenhower Papers, 1916-1952 File, box 34, folder 
"Eberstadt," (Hereafter cited as Memorandum 1948) Eisenhower 
Library. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 4 February 
1949; Eisenhower Papers, 1916-1952 File, box 38, folder "For-
restal ( 2), 11 (Hereafter cited as Memorandum 1949) Eisenhower 
Library. 
r· 
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decisive judgments whenever there is a major difference of 
opinion among the services and which they themselves cannot 
solve." 270 This authority would be of particular value in 
the realm of budgetary matters where the Secretary "may be 
271 forced to make specific decisions in numerous cases." 
In order to help the Secretary of Defense make these 
tough decisions, Eisenhower proposed that two new offic±al 
positions be created; an Under Secretary of Defense and a 
Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. The former 
foreshadowed the numerous assistant secretaries that came 
about as a result of the 1949 legislation and Eisenhower~s 
own Reorganization Plan of 1953. The latter was just ano·ther 
name for the title of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief 
that Admiral Leahy wore and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff position that was created in 1949. What was unique 
about Eisenhower's Military Assistant was the role he recom-
mended for him. The Military Assistant would have only genera 
administrative functions, never be a commander, and would 
normally retire after this assignment. 272 His primary function 
.was to be a coordinator, who "should have no power of formal 
decl. s1· on 1· n h1· s own r1· ght. " 273 I th d h ld b n o er wor s, e wou e a 
270 Memorandum, 1949. 
271 Memorandum, 1948. 
272 Memorandum, 1949. 
273 Memorandum, 1948. 
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chief of staff in the technical military sense. This state-
ment is also very similar in intent to the non-voting ~rovision 
incorporated into the 1949 and 1953 amendments to the National 
S€curity Act. The Chairman-Military Assistant acted essen-
tially as an intermediary between the administration and the 
Chiefs. 
To General Eisenhower, teamwork was essential bOth in 
a military staff and in a presidential administration: 
The President should state in unequivocal terms his 
determination to produce teamwork in the Security 
establishment and should seek a virtual pledge from 'Bach 
individual. .• that there will be given to every decision 
of the President and the Secretary of Defense complete 
loyalty and respect, both as to letter and to spiri~. 
He should also invite any subordinate who might feel 
him~elf unaB~i to give such a pledge to ask for another 
asslgnmen t. 
The role of the Military Assistant was central to the creation 
of teamwork because it was his job "to make certain that the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff thoroughly consider every major problem 
that should properly come to their attention," and "assure 
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reach, whenever possible, joint 
conclusions and recommendations on these problems." 275 The 
ability of the Military Assistant to assure that the Chiefs 
reach these "joint conclusions" lies beyond the realm of just 
coordination and effective administration: 
274 Memorandum, 1949. 
275Ibid. 
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His mere presence on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting 
as the trusted assistant of the Secretary of Defense, 
should do much to induce, if not compel, the attainment 
of unanimous recommendations and conclusions.276 
ThiS approach was by no means ne~ Forrestal had sought to 
establish the chairmanship with much the same desire for 
unanimity in mind. If unanimity could not be reached, then 
it was the Military Assistant's job to "present the matter 
in all its aspects to the Secretary of Defense asking for a 
decision." 277 Unquestionably, the right of access to the 
secretary and their close relationship would have great impact 
upon the outcome of the decision. 
Along with desiring to centralize the decision making 
process, Eisenhower also wanted to take the Chiefs out of the 
service's administrative channels and to have them concentrate 
upon strategic planning. Their JCS work was to take "pre-
cedence over any personal or individual service matter." 278 
Again, this followed the lead that the Truman administration 
had initiated. 
It is apparent that during this period, Eisenhower's 
thinking was running parallel to that of Secretary Forrestal. 
He, like Forrestal, identified increased centralization as 
the solution to the problems brought about by the committee 
276 Ibid. 
277 Memorandum, 1948. 
278 Memorandum, 1949. 
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nature of the JCS, but the 1949 legislation did not effectively 
eradicate these detrimental tendencies and forced Eisenhower 
to face the issue of reorganization upon his assumption of 
office in 1953. 
Even before Eisenhower's inauguration, certain prominent 
individuals, identified with the incumbent administration, 
suggested fundamental reform within the Department of Defense. 
Both Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chief of the RE:search and Development 
Board, and Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, went on record 
advocating a restructured chain of command that reinserted 
the civilian service secretaries into a position of prominence, 
increased the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and transformed the JCS into more of a planning agency. 
Both Bush and Lovett found inter-service rivalry and the 
Chiefs' service obligations as the primary source of impair-
ment to the JCS' planning mission. Bush, far more radical in 
his approach, suggested totally separating the JCS from the 
chain of command and creating a new organization to deal with 
the command functions. This would allow the Joint Chiefs to 
devote full time to planning. Lovett, somewhat more conser-
vative, merely suggested giving increased power to the ser-
Vices' vice chiefs of staff and transferring most of the Joint 
Staff to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Theoretically, 
these changes would result in the Chiefs paying more attention 
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to planning, while minimizing the services' impact upon 
. . 279 deClSlOnS. 
Upon his inauguration, Eisenhower had to deal quickly 
with the matter of defense reorganization. Through Secretary 
of Defense Charles Wilson, a special committee, headed by 
Nelson A. Rockefeller, was appointed to study the Defense 
Department. This committee, accepting the Lovett-Bush view-
point, sent forward a series of recommendations that were 
totally incorporated into the President's Reorganization Plan 
#6, outlined on 30 April 1953. 280 
The President stated that the first objective of the 
plan was the "clarification of lines of authority within the 
Department of Defense so as to strengthen civilian responsi-
bility." Civilian control was the constitutional principle 
that guided civil-military relations and this meant in orga-
nizational terms that: 
We must recognize and respect the clear lines of respc· 
bility and authority which run from the President, thrc, 
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the 
military departments, over the operations of all branches 
of the Department of Defense. 
279Major Changes, 28-30. 
280Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1953, p. 225 ff and U.S. 
Committee on Department of Defense Organization, Report of the 
Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization, 
ll April 1953 (printed for the use of the Committee on Armed 
Services, 83d Congress, lst Session). (Hereafter cited as 
Rockefeller Report, 1953.) 
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Establishing the chain of command in the above manner, 
centralized a great deal of power into the hands of the Secre-
tary of Defense and streamlined the chain of command. Further-
more, it removed the confusion surrounding the relationship 
between a chief, acting as an executive agent, and his service 
secretary and the Secretary of Defense. Prior to 1953, a 
chief of service was named as the executive agent over the 
unified commands in which his service had a primary interest. 
It was through the executive agent that communications and 
decisions were transmitted, thus placing the JCS within the 
chain of command. In his capacity as executive agent, a ser-
vice chief did not deal with his service secretary, who felt 
that his power was being circumvented. After 1953, a military 
department (i.e., the Department of the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force) was named the executive agent as opposed to an individ-
ual chief. 
This restructuring of the chain of commanc to exclude 
the JCS was part of the President's desire to "improve our 
machinery for strategic planning for national defense." Fol-
lowing this approach, the President specifically stated that 
the Chiefs "are not a command body, but are the principal 
military advisors to the President, the National Security 
Council, and the Secretary of Defense." In order to facilitate 
carrying out this advisory mission, the powers of the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs were to be enhanced. Specifically, the 
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Chairman would be made responsible for managing the work of 
the Joint Staff and approving the appointment of its members. 
It was intended that this would free the Chiefs from admini-
strative details and allow them to concentrate on their plan-
ning function. Moreover, by giving the Chairman control over 
the Joint Staff, including the veto power over any appointment, 
it was hoped that this would ensure the selection of officers 
who were above service interest281 and who would be able to 
. 282 
concentrate on the "entire effort" of defense plann1ng. 
The President's reorganization plan resurfaced the 
decade-old argument over centralization versus decentraliza-
tion. Opponents of the bill attacked it for "Prussianizing" 
the Joint Staff, transforming the Chairman into a single chief 
of staff, and perverting the original intention of the National 
Security Act. Proponents defended the bill in terms of effi-
ciency, necessity, and as the only means of eliminating inter-
. . l 283 serv1ce r1va ry. The administration carefully emphasized 
that the Chairman would not be in a position to dominate the 
281Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1953, p. 225 ff. 
282Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change: 1953-
1956 (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), 448. 
283For a full examination of the fight over centrali-
zation vs. decentralization see H. Struve Hensel, "Changes 
Inside the Pentagon," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 32, No. l 
(Jan-Feb 1954), for a defense of centralization see Eugene S. 
Duffield "Organizing for Defense," Harvard Business. Review, 
Vol. 31, No. 5 (Sept-Oct 1953) for a defense of decentraliza-
tion. 
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Cs In summary, the advantages the administration saw in J • 
the bill were: 
"better managerial superv1s1on over the Joint Staff and 
the relief of the service members of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff of the burden of this managerial function so that 
they can devote more of their time to the vital and cri-
tical responsibilities they have in the fields of service 
readiness and operations in strategic planning and advice. 
These advantages will be obtained without the possibility 
of a situation where a viewpoint could be completely sub-
merged by any action of the Chairman under the duties 
assigned to him by statute and the additional duty 
assigned to him in the reorganization plan."284 
During the next year, the planning mission of the JCS 
was greatly emphasized by a series of directives and memoranda. 
The first of these was a Presidential revision of the 1948 Key 
West Agreement on the functions of the Joint Chiefs. This 
revision, issued on 1 October 1953, deleted from the Chiefs' 
functions "the direction of all combat operations," and sub-
stituted for it "guidance for the operational control of forces 
and conduct of combat operations." While the term "guidance" 
was relatively ambiguous, it clearly was less authoritative 
than '1direction," which implied command. This put into effect 
the President's view that the Chiefs "are not a command 
body." The rewording of the functions statement was a step 
toward achieving the reorganization's objective, namely, to 
extract the Chiefs from the chain of command. On 26 July 1954, 
284Memorandum,l7 June 1953, subject: Purpose and appli-
cation of Section l(c) and (d) of Reorganization Plan No. 6, 
1953, Bruce Harlow Papers, box 19, folder "Reorganization Plan 
36," Eisenhower Library. 
181 
secretary of Defense Wilson issued a directive on "Method 
of operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their relation-
shiP with other staff agencies of the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense." This directive stated that JCS work was to "take 
priority over all other duties," and that the Secretary of 
Defense was to be fully informed as to all the deliberations 
of the JCS. It further stated that the Chairman was required 
to forward to the Secretary of Defense his own "views, advice, 
and recommendations," whenever be was in disagreement with 
the other Chiefs. Finally, on the 19th of October 1954, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford, 
issued a memorandum on "Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization, 
its structure and management," which pursuant to the Presi-
dent's intentions, consolidated the Chairman's control over the 
Joint Staff. 285 
The result of these various memoranda and directives 
was to decrease the Joint Chiefs' command functions while 
correspondingly emphasizing their planning mission. These 
documents also continued the trend toward centralization with-
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the consolida-
tion of power into the bands of the Chairman. After the July 
1954 directive, the relationship between the Chairman and the 
285 J . ff . S . t . t H. U. S. o1nt Chiefs of Sta , Jo1nt ecre ar1a , 18-
torical Division, Main Features of the Organizational Develop-
ment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Since 1947, 12 January, 1972, 
7-9 (mimeographed). 
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secretary of Defense began to resemble the one that Eisenhower 
had outlined back in 1949. Despite this increased centra-
lization, the traditional problems of service rivalry and lack 
of cohesion in policy formulation continued to be a hindrance. 
This point was acknowledged by the President in his January 
1958 State of the Union address. After stressing the impor-
tance of strategic planning and the damage that resulted from 
inter-service competition, the President indicated that a 
reorganization of the defense structure was in the offing. 
The direction of this new plan was disclosed when the Presi-
dent said the "end of interservice disputes requires clear 
organization and decisive central direction." 286 Increased 
centralization was offered up again as the panacea, just as 
it had been in 1949 and 1953. 
Following the President's State of the Union address, 
a special Advisory Committee was set up by Secretary of 
Defense Neil McElroy to study Defense Department organiza-
tional problems. For the remainder of January and through 
February, the committee met regularly. In their endeavor to 
analyze the weaknesses of the defense structure, they were 
aided by two recently completed staff studies: the top 
secret Gaither Report, produced by the Security Resources 
Panel of the Scientific Advisory Committee, and the widely 
286E. h 1s~n ower, Public Papers, 1958, 2 ff. 
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disseminated Rockefeller Brothers Report, International 
287 
security: The Military Aspects. What is of particular 
interest is the linkage between the authors of these two 
staff studies and the membership of the Advisory Corrmittee. 
Both William C. Foster, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
who co-chaired the Gaither Committee, and Nelson A. Rockefel-
ler, who headed the 1953 reorganization study, were members 
of the Advisory Committee. 
Of the two studies, it was the Rockefeller Report 
that addressed the problems of the Defense Department in 
detail. It emphasized the necessity for cohesive national 
security policy, and it was extremely critical of the DoD 
structure. As in the case of earlier studies, inter-service 
rivalry was singled out as the culprit, and increased centrali-
zation was offered as the solution. The Rockefeller Report 
recommended making the Chairman the principal military ad-
visor to the Secretary of Defense, an idea that had been 
contemplated by Forrestal almost a decade earlier. In regard 
to the chain of command, it recommended placing all forces 
under a unified or specified command and excluding the ser-
vices from the operational control of those commands. This 
287Rockefeller Brothers Fund, International Security: 
The Military Aspect. America at Mid-Century Series (New York: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1958); Security Resources Panel 
of the Advisory Committee, Deterrence & Survival in the 
Nuclear Age (The Gaither Report), (Washington: November 7, 
1957) published in Morton Halperin, National s~curity Policy-
M3king (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1975). 
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was a reversal of the 1953 Rockefeller position. With the 
services eliminated as executive agents, the chain of command 
would run directly from the President and the Secretary of 
Defense to the various forces in the field. With operational 
control ·in the hands of the civilian secretary, it was logi-
cal, as was suggested, to place the Joint Staff directly 
under the control of the Chairman who in turn would work 
288 directly for the Secretary. This would make the Joint. 
Chiefs purely a planning agency along the- lines indicat.ed' 
by Dr. Bush and Secretary Lovett in 1952. The Gaither Report, 
completed in November 1957, proposed very similar conclusions 
in regard to the chain of command and the services' role as 
289 
executive agent. 
Restructuring the chain_of command along these lines 
became the nucleus of the President's reorganization package 
presented to Congress in April 1958. Although the Advisory 
Committee did not publish a formal report, the nature of its 
advice was a reiteration of the earlier proposals. In a 
February 27th memorandum to the President, Charles Coolidge, 
a committee member, wrote: 
The concept of executive agency should be abandoned and 
unified, etc. commands should be placed directly under 
288Rockefeller Brothers Fund, International Security: 
The Military Aspect, 27-33. 
289Halperin, National Security Policy-Making, 81-35. 
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the Secretary of Defense, with the J.C.S. doing the staff 
work, supported b9 an integrated operations division of 
the Joint Staff.2 ° . 
one should not assume that the impetus for the 1958 reorgani-
zation was predominately from the outside. On the contrary, 
the evidence seems to indicate that the President was one of 
the prime movers in this area. Before a combined Armed 
Forces Policy Council and Advisory Committee meeting, the 
President emphatically said, "the use of an executive agency 
for strategic orders was crazy," and the service secretaries 
"should not be involved in the preparation of strategic plan-
ning." This meeting, occurring on 25 January, a month before 
the Coolidge memorandum and very close to the onset of the 
Advisory Committee's work, indicates the ultimate impact of 
Eisenhower's thinking. 291 
One thing that is striking is the administration's 
reversal from its 1953 position on the organization of the 
chain of command. President Eisenhower attempted to explain 
this change to the Congress by stating that the administra-
tion had become aware that the executive agency system was 
290Memorandum for the President, 27 February 1958, 
Rockefeller Records, box 18, folder "136 ( 1)," Eisenhower 
Library. Coolidge had been special advisor to Secretary of 
Defense Robert Lovett, thus partially explaining his support 
for increased centralization. 
291Memorandum for the Rf;ccrd, 25 January 1958, subject: 
Meeting on Defense Organization, Rockefeller Records, box 18, 
folder "136(2)," Eisenhower Library. 
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"cumbersome and unreliable in peace and not usable in time 
of war." He went on to explain that the technological r·evol u-
ti on of the mid-1950s demanded a greater degree of responsive-
ness from the military. 292 This of course meant increased 
centralization. A more plausible explanation for this re-
versal may be sought by examining the total package submitted 
by the President, and by analyzing the fundamental changes 
that were to be brought about within the Joint Chiefs. 
If the President's proposal for reorganizing the 
chain of command was accepted, then all major organizational 
elements of the military would be incorporated under the 
banner of either a unified or specified command, and these 
would be directly under the command of the Secretary of 
Defense. Theoretically this would separate the commanders of 
these unified and specified commands from their chief of ser-
vice, thus achieving an integral part of the President's 
overall program: 
Because I have often seen the evils of diluted command, 
I emphasize that each unified commander must have un-
questioned authority over all units in his command •••• 
I recommend, therefore, the present law, including cer-
tain restrictions relating to combat functions be so 
amended as to remove any possible obstacles to the full 
unity of our commands and the full command over them by 
unified commanders.293 
292E. h 1sen ower, Public Papers, 1958, 281. 
293 Ibid., 279-280. 
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This would finally remove the Chiefs from their command role 
and make them into a planning agency. With the President 
echoing the Coolidge memorandum of February 27, he proposed 
that in the future the Chiefs should "serve as a staff assist-
ing the Secretary of Defense." Obviously, for the Chiefs to 
accomplish this new and vital mission, the Joint Staff would 
have to be enlarged and, in words identical to the Coolidge 
memorandum, an "integrated operations division" would have to 
be created within the Joint Staff. In order to maximize the 
effectiveness of this newly integrated staff, the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be allowed to assign duties to 
the Joint Staff and, with the "approval of the Secretary of 
Defense, to appoint its Director." 294 Moreover, as part of the 
administration's effort to expand and strengthen the power of 
the Chairman, the meaningless restriction on his voting within 
the JCS was to be removed. 
The President's program was fully accepted by the 
Congress. Instrumental in the passage of the bill was the 
support it received from the members of the JCS. Only the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Randolph Pate, opposed 
the movement· toward centralization. All of the other Chiefs 
actively supported the bill and reiterated that the role of 
the JCS had not diminished. Why the Chiefs gave into 
centralization when they had so vociferously opposed it less 
294 Ibid., 281-282. 
188 
than a decade before is difficult to answer. Undoubtedly, 
the prestige of President Eisenhower on military matters was 
important, as well as the fact Eisenhower's Chiefs had been 
selected with loyalty as a key criterion. Both of these points 
will be addressed in some detail in later chapters. It is 
also possible that the Congress began to feel that efficiency 
in military matters was more important than fear of potential 
"Prussianization." The national security structure had been 
in existence for over a decade, so many of the early fears had 
eroded. Whatever the actual reason, the legislation was the 
culmination of the centralization process that had started 
under Forrestal. 
Inter-service rivalry and the lack of a cohesively 
integrated national security policy was the cause of all four 
major post-war reorganizations. In each case, the solution 
was further centralization. Theoretically, the 1949 amend-
ments gave the Secretary of Defense sufficient power to deal 
with the problems that were endemic to his department. This 
was the opinion of the Chief Counsel of the 1953 Rockefeller 
Commission: 
Subject to the President and certain express prohibitions 
••. the power and authority of the Secretary of Defense is 
complete and supreme. It blankets all agencies and all 
organizations within the Department of Defense.2~b 
Yet in every case, the increased power granted to the Secretary 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs proved to be insufficient 
295 Rockefeller Report, 1953, Appendix 1. 
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and merely led to greater centralization in the next reorga-
nization. The reason for this was that the fundamental prob-
lem within the Department of Defense was never addressed. A 
canvassing of the recommendations of the special task groups 
that analyzed the problem reveals a single common denomina-
tor, the committee nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As 
far as these studies were concerned, it was the committee 
h t t d . t . t . 296 nature t a promo e serv1ce compe 1 1on. 
As part of his 1958 reforms, the President attempted to 
deal with the committee issue, not within the JCS but within 
the Joint Staff. Since Eisenhower's failure to address the 
committee problem in 1953, the intensification of inter-service 
rivalry forced him to reevaluate the situation. If a truly 
integrated staff was to be established, as the President pro-
posed in 1958, then the committee system had to be abolished. 
This point was made abundantly clear by the President during 
the January 25th Advisory Committee meeting when he asked" ..• 
why we should not have the best integrated organization within 
the Joint Staff where the best officers would be assigned 
rather than a committee system?" 297 
296 Ibid., 4-10; Hoover Commission, 66-70; Commission on 
Organization-of the Executive Branch of the Government, Five 
Staff Papers Prepared for the Task Force on Procurement, (Wash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), I, A-54; Report 
to the President and the Secretary of Defense by the Blue Ribbon 
Defense Panel, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1970). Appendix N, Staff Report on Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Decisionmaking. 
297 Memorandum for the Record, 25 January 1958, subject: 
Meeting on Defense Organization, Rockefeller Records, box 18, 
folder "136(2)" Eisenhower Library. 
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The restructuring of the committees fell within. the 
executive prerogative, thus all owing the administration· to 
implement changes without Congressional concurrence. Under 
the President's and the Secretary of Defense's direction,. the 
Chairman announced on 27 May 1958 that the committee system 
would be abolished. In its place, the Joint Staff would be 
structured along a traditional staff format that was in normal 
operation in other military staffs. The new organization con-
sisted of six directorates: J-1 Personnel, J-2 Intelligence, 
J-3 Operations, J-4 Logistics, J-5 Plans and Policy, and J-6 
Communications-Electronics. These six directorates, along with 
the directors of Military Assistance, Advanced Studies, and 
Joint Programs, made up the newly constituted Joint Staff. 
One of the primary motivations for changing to this type of 
organization was that it allowed the Joint Staff to work 
effectively with the similar staff structures of the unified 
298 
and specified commands." In conjunction with this reorga-
nization, the Secretary of Defense revised the formal state-
ment of the JCS's functions incorporated in DoD Directive 
5100.1. While reiterating some of the traditional functions 
of the Joint Chiefs, the revision clearly reflected the thrust 
toward transforming them into a planning agency as opposed 
298Major Changes, 42-46. 
sponsibilities of the Joint Staff, 
members in the 1958 legislation. 
To deal with the new re-
it was increased to 400 
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to a command group. It specifically identified the JCS as the 
immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense and as 
a corporate group, placed them in the operational chain of com-
munication through which the Secretary of Defense issued orders 
299 to the unified and specified commands. It was also hoped, 
that by giving the Chairman more control over the Joint Staff, 
the officers selected would be above service interest. 
While the President was preparing his reorganization 
effort, the Chiefs were in the process of examining their own 
organizational structure and that of the Department of Defense. 
In December 1957, an Ad Hoc Committee within the JCS was 
created, under the direction of Major General Earl G. Wheeler, 
to examine DoD organizations in "order to determine if there 
are deficiencies" that could be eliminated through reorganiza-
tion. The report outlined five areas in which it felt there 
were fundamental problems. 
l. Problems and delays within the JCS decision making pro-
cess and "subsequently above their level." 
2. Insufficient coordination between logistics and stra-
tegic planning. 
3. Complicated channels of authority to commanders in 
the field. 
4. Confusion as to the internal lines of authority within 
the services, DoD, OSD, and the role of the Assistant 
Secretaries of Defense. 
5. Service budgets were unduly influenced by non-military 
determinants. 
299 Ibid. , 38. 
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Among those areas identified by the Wl•.eeler Report, those per-
taining to internal problems within the JCS and the complicated 
channels of authority to field commanders were also addressed 
by the President. At no time did the Ad Hoc Committee mention 
inter-service conflict, nor did it consider the committee nature 
of the Joint Staff to be a problem; despite the fact it noted 
that the Chiefs tended to reach decisions through compromise 
and that there were continual divergencies of opinion within the 
JCS. For obvious reasons the Ad Hoc Committee never could 
identify the real cause of these problems nor blame the Chiefs 
and their structure. Instead, they sought the solution through 
procedural means by which the JCS would resolve their diver-
gencies, and they advocated greater involvement by the civilian 
decision makers on appropriate issues. In regard to the chain 
of command problems·, the Wheeler Report suggested either return-
ing to the executive agency structure or giving operational 
responsibility directly to the Chiefs. In either case this 
was completely contrary to the President's desire. Needless 
to say, the President's plan superseded the JCS report, and 
1. t 300 was never acted on. 
The Eisenhower administration hoped that the 1958 
reforms would eliminate once and for all the problems of 
300u.s. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Report by the Ad Hoc 
~ommittee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Organization of the ~epartment of Defense. 24 January 1958. 
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inter-service rivalry and the lack of policy integration. 
Unfortunately, as in the case of the three earlier plaris, 
increased centralization proved to be ineffective. The reason 
for this failure, as in all the previous efforts, was that it 
never did strike at the fundamental issue, the bureaucratic 
nature of the JCS. A 1959 memorandum from the Bureau of the 
Budget outlined the continuing nature of this problem: 
The high rank of the officers involved, the importance of 
the issues with which they deal, the aura of mystery which 
surrounds their work, the very title "Joint Chiefs of 
Staff"--all have served to obscure the fact that the JCS 
is a committee. Originally it was Rn interdepartmental 
committee. Now it is an intra-departmental committee. 
All intra-governmental committees, whether manned by 
civilians or military men, are capable of performing only 
limited functions. Failures have been the inevitable re-
sult of attempts to assign to committees duties which they 
are organizationally incapable of performing. Past efforts 
to strengthen the JCS have involved the provision of a 
Chairman, later enlargements of his duties and most re-
cently an expansion of the Joint Staff which serves the 
JCS. All of the changes, however, have left the com-
mittee character of the JCS essentially intact. It is 
clear that the JCS will remain the main obstacle to sound 
staff organization in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense until (1) the committee character of the JCS is 
clearly recognized and its duties reduced to those which 
can be performed effectively by a committee and (2) the 
other dut1of of the JCS are assigned to other OSD staff 
elements. 
As the memorandum noted, all the efforts at centralization had 
left untouched the basic structure of the JCS. Almost in a 
sense of desperation, the memorandum called for the establish-
ment of independent analytic capability in the Office of the 
301 Memorandum from the Bureau of the Budget, December 
1959, Bruce Harlow Papers, box 19, folder, "Reorganization Plan 
No. 1," Eisenhower Library. 
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secretary of Defense. This had been Secretary Forrestal's 
original reason for creating the office of the Chairman, but 
in so doing he had left the JCS structure basically unchanged. 
Whether Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara read this 
memorandum is unknown, but the establishment of the Office of 
systems Analysis, and the power which he ultimately vested in 
it achieved the kind of independent analysis that the memo-
randum called for. In many ways that office fulfilled the role 
that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations tried to force 
the Joint Chiefs to take. 302 
For both the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations, 
the crucial issue regarding political/military planning was 
the establishment of an organization that could effectively 
integrate the nation's commitments and capabilities. The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff was the hinge upon which this policy integra-
tion hung. However, in the eyes of both administrations the 
JCS failed to fulfill their primary mission, the development 
of usable input into the national security policy making struc-
ture. Without this input, policy integration was doomed from 
the start. 
As the civilian leadership assessed the policy making 
structure in order to determine where the organizational break-
down was occurring, they continually pointed to the JCS as the 
culprit. It was for this reason that the JCS became the focal 
302Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is 
Enough: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Har-
per Colophon Books, 1972). 
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point of the three major reorganizations that occurred after 
1947. Within the JCS, the committee structure was identified 
as the single greatest flaw. The committee nature of the 
Chiefs appeared to precipitate the inter-service conflicts 
that destroyed the Chiefs' ability to give unified advice to 
the political leadership. Without an agreement on the nature 
and needs of the nation's military capabilities, it was impos-
sible to determine if those capabilities could support the 
political commitments that were being considered. In practice 
these differences of opinion stemmed from the twin dilemmas 
that haunted the Chiefs: their corporate role versus their 
service role, and their planning function versus their command 
function. From the very beginning, there was confusion as to 
which role or function took precedence. General Gruenther 
assumed, when he was organizing the Joint Staff, that the 
Chiefs' planning function and hence their corporate role was 
the most important. But the National Security Act of 1947 
left the Chiefs a command function, simply by not identifying 
that planning had primacy. The result was that the three sub-
sequent reorganizations sought to extract the Chiefs from the 
chain of command, thereby forcing them into the role of planner. 
The heart of all three of these reorganizations was 
centralizing power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Once it had 
been determined that a pluralistic JCS resulted in dysfunc-
tional competition, the solution appeared to be centralized 
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management from above. This was the direction that Forrestal 
marked in his First Report, but the first Secretary of Defense 
also realized that he needed to have military advice from an 
expert. It was for this reason that he wanted to establish a 
powerful Chairman so that he could become his "agent" within 
the Joint Chiefs. Based upon his experiences as acting Chair-
man, Eisenhower came to the same conclusion. A strong Chair-
man, whose rank, prestige, and power was superior to that of 
the other Chiefs, would be in a position to eliminate inter-
service conflicts and force the Chiefs to be responsible. 
What is apparent is that the Chiefs sought to main-
tain their command prerogatives in the face of these organiza-
tional changes. This goal is still very clear when one 
examines the Wheeler Report. If the Chiefs lost their command 
function they would be relegated to what Robert Golembiewski 
describes as the Neutral and Inferior Instrument (NII) model 
of a staff. 303 In the NII model the staff is outside the line 
of command and is primarily a thought and planning structure, 
as opposed to an organization concerned with execution. In 
reality it becomes purely an advisory body. From an organiza-
tional chart perspective, Eisenhower's 1958 reforms made the 
JCS a Neutral and Inferior Instrument. The Chiefs were taken 
. 
303Robert T. Golembiewski, Organizing Men and Power: 
~atterns of Behavior and Time-Staff Models, (Chicago: Rand 
McNally & Co, 1967), 11-14. 
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t of the chain of command, and the Joint Staff became less ou 
a vehicle of the services and more of a planning agency re-
sponding to the direction of the Chiefs. The Secretary of 
Defense became, in effect, the commander of the United States 
military forces, since he now had the sole ability within the 
Defense Department to issue direct orders to the unified and 
specified commands. 
While the above analysis did lead to massive organi-
zational changes, the internal problems within the JCS remained 
untouched. The reason was that there was not one single prob-
lem, but two separate problems within the JCS. The first was 
the one that everyone identified--bureaucratic infighting. 
Since it was easily identifiable the organizational changes 
attempted to deal with it. The second problem was alluded to 
bY some of the outside studies, but never formally identified. 
That problem was the nature of the Chiefs' professional out-
look. It caused the Chiefs' "aloofness" when they dealt with 
other decision making institutions. In order to fully under-
stand the impact of both of these flaws and how they inter-
relate, we must examine each one in turn, always remembering 
the organizational structure which supplies the parameters 
Within which they operate. 
CHAPTER V 
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF ·sTAFF AND THE BUREAUCRACY 
A description of organizational changes tells us very 
little about the actual decision making process. Vince Davis 
correctly noted that trying to discover how a decision is 
made by looking at an organizational chart is like trying to 
. 304 determine who will win a ball game by buying a score card. 
In order to fully appreciate the role of the Joint Chiefs in 
policy formulation, it is necessary to understand the JCS's 
own internal decision making system. The product of this 
system forms the basis of the Joint Chiefs' input into the 
national policy process. Despite extensive changes within 
the organization of the JCS, both in terms of size and 
structure, the staffing procedures of the Joint Chiefs have 
remained remarkedly stable. This personification of bureau-
cratization has been described by one author as "The Flimsy-
Buff-Green-Red Striped Nightmare. 11305 These terms refer to 
304v · D --: "Am . ". 1. t P 1. D . . 1nce av1s, er1can rul 1 ary o 1cy: eclslon-
making in the Executive Branch," Naval War College Review, 
V o 1 • XX I I , No • 9 01 a y , 1 9 7 0 ) , 7 • 
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stuart Loory, Defeated: Inside America's Military 
Machine (New York: Random House~-1973), see chapter 6. The 
following material on the Joint Chiefs bureaucratic process, 
Unless otherwise speeifically identified is taken from 
Lawrence Tatum, "Tht? Joint.Chit?fs of Staff and Defense Policy 
Formulation," in Amf•rican_Q~!~nse Policy (2nd edition), ed. 
by Mark E. Smith and Claude J. Jnhns (Baltimore: The Joh~s 
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the color coded papers which are used at the different stages 
of the process. 
The process itself begins when the JCS is asked to 
supply input on a subject. The request may be generated 
either inside the Joint Chiefs or from an agen~y outside of 
it. If it is externally generated, then the Director of 
the Joint Staff will assign a "report for the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff" to the Joint Staff agency primarily concerned with 
the problem as well as any other agencies with secondary 
interest. This "Green Directive" (usually referred to as a 
"Green Bomb") will identify the problem and the action 
officer whose function it will be to produce the paper and 
to shepherd his product through the bureaucratic maze. 
Secondary agencies concerned with the issue are also re-
quested to assign action officers to help produce the final 
product. 
From the very beginning, the primary action officer 
is impeded by the short time which is allocated to him to 
produce his product. Colonel John Harrelson, a former JCS 
Hopkins Press, 1968), 377-392. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, 
· Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the 
Department of Defense, App. N. Staff Report on Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Decisionmaking (Washington: G.P.O., 1970). J.S. 
Harrelson, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security," 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1968). 
The process described here uses the JCS structure as it 
looked after the 1958 reforms, but the general outline of how 
the JCS moved its paperwork from the "flimsy" to the "red-
striped green" was relatively constant all through the 
Period under investigation. 
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staffer, noted that "the importance of a paper is measured 
in inverse order to the amount of time allocated to its pre-
paration."306 Since the whole bureaucratic process takes on 
the average two to three weeks to complete, the miltiary 
strategist is not given sufficient time to produce a quality 
307 product. 
The first stage of the staffing process is writing the 
308 
"flimsy". The action officer normally has only forty-
eight hours to write it. Its purpose is to serve as a cata-
lyst for further discussion, and may either be a serious 
piece of work or a straw man designed to draw out the ser-
vice's positions. Once the first draft of the "flimsy" has 
been written it is then circulated to the secondary action 
officers, who represent the services and other interested 
agencies. These officers normally have only twenty-four 
hours to respond. Once concurrence is reached the "flimsy 
turns buff, "309 which means that it moves up to the next stage 
of the process. 
306 Harrelson, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National 
Security," 254. 
307Tatum, "The .?"oint Chiefs of Staff and Defense 
Policy Formulation," 389. 
308The term "flimsy" comes from the onion skin paper 
Which the first draft is written on. 
309
"Buff" refers to the manila-like legal sized paper 
that is used. 
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The "buff" is then circulated among the agencies con-
cerned. If major problems arise that are not editorial in 
nature, the action officer may call for a planners' meeting 
in order to hammer out the differences. This meeting is 
chaired by a Joint Staff planner (flag rank) and is attended 
by the agency or service planners concerned with the "buff" 
(usually of COL/CAPT rank). The agency or service positions 
are circulated in advance on formal memoranda called "pur-
ples." Surprise is normally rare, although it may be used 
if the issue is very important. The selection of specific 
service planners may also reflect the importance of the 
issue. 
Some military officers have developed wide-spread repu-
tations in the Pentagon for their skill as negotiators. 
The assignment of such an officer as a service planner 
can mean that the service involved has an ax to grind or 
a "hard" position on the subject at hand.310 
During the meeting the Joint Staff planner attempts to act 
as the mediator between the contending agency views. The 
meeting ends with either concurrence or a continued split 
in the positions. At this point, the head of the Joint Staff 
agency concerned may "turn the buff, green." 311 He may 
forward the "buff" even though there are still differences 
of opinion over it. This is called a "split green." 
310 Harrelson, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National 
Security," 249. 
311 The "green" comes from the coarse legal sized green 
sheets upon which the staffing papers are written, since the 
Paper is legal sized it usually is referred to as a 
"1 ong green". 
202 
The 11 green" is the next to last stage in the JCS 
decision making process. If nonconcurrence continues, the 
non-concurring agency can submit a "purple" outlining its 
position, which in turn is rebutted by the action officer. 
This exchange then becomes part of the "green" as long 
as the nonconcurrence exists. Once the "buff" has turned 
"green"," it falls under the jurisdiction of the Director 
of the Joint Staff, who can place it on the Operations 
Deputies Calendar or the Calendar of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. The former organization is made up of the services' 
Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Operations. If the Operations 
Deputies fail to reach agreement on the subject, it may be 
sent back to the planners for further coordination or it 
may be sent forward to the Chiefs for them to work out some 
form of agreement. When the paper is finally accepted, a 
red-stripe is placed at the bottom of the "green," denoting 
that is has become an official JCS position. It is then 
sent forward to the ~ecretary of Defense. A split may also 
be sent forward with the service "purples" still attached. 
As ponderous as this system seems, it still handles in excess 
of a thousand decisions each year. In response to consist-
ent criticism that the Chiefs are too burdened to deal with 
the really important joint issues, alternative methods to 
the "flimsy, buff" system have been created. Unfortunately, 
during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the 
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majoritY of the issues were still decided by the Chiefs 
312 
themselves. 
In this description of the JCS decision making pro-
cess, the requirement to produce consensus at every level 
of the process is critical. This requirement has led not 
onlY to the criticism that the system is ponderous, but 
that the compromises necessary to produce concurrence 
I 
actually dilute the quality of the final product. This pro-
cess of compromise and consensus building reflects what 
Roger Hilsman calls the "politics of decision making." 313 
Hilsman maintains that decisions are made by the political 
methods of persuasion and bargaining, as contending interest 
groups attempt to resolve their conflicts. Thus, the 
rational or authoritative model of decision making rarely 
exists. 
The necessity for operating in this "political" manner 
lies in the structure of the American Constitutional system 
and in the nature of the bureaucracy. Professor Richard 
Neustadt, in his seminal study of the American Presidency, 
observed that the Constitution did not create a separation 
of powers, but instead "created a government of separated 
312 See Table l for an analysis of the JCS decisions. 
313Roger Hilsman, The Folitics of Policy Making in 
~efense and Foreign Affairs (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1971), 14-15. 
Year 
-1951-52 
1953-1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
204 
TABLE 1 
JCS DOCISION STATISTICS 
Total Decisions 
1628. 1 
No conclusive data 
8873 
1038 
1066 
1405 
1458 
1460 
15634 
3017 
3281 
2690 
2675 
2339 
Sp1i ts · (No. %) 
52 ( .003) 
13 (1.5) 
24 (2.3) 
21 (2.0) 
15 (1.1) 
13 (0.9) 
42 (2.9) 
47 (1.9) 
40 (1.3) 
7 (0.2) 
6 (0.2) 
6 (0.2) 
2 (0.8) 
~anorandun for General Bradley, subject: Reorganization of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, box 4, folder 020 JCS (16 Decan-
ber 1951) National Archives. 
~ew York Times, 10 January, 1953, p. 4. The Times indicates that 
during the time frame 1951-52 (the same as covered by the Bradley Memoran-
dum) that the JCS handled 1650 matters, this figure was only 22 off the 
fo:mnl figure given in the manorandun. The Times goes on to state that 
there were 5 splits during this time. The Bradley Memorandun notes 4, but 
goes out of its way to state that it is not a complete list. It also notes 
two "withdrawn splits" which meant that there was Secretarial action 
taken before the split was sent forward. 
~port to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Depart-
ment of Defense, by the Blue Ribbon Panel (Washington, D.C.: July 1970), 
Appendix N: Staff Report on Joint Chiefs of Staff Decision-Making, 20, 
Qampiles all data on JCS decisions since 1958. 
4In 1965 the JCS instituted a new fo:rm of decision Imking, FM-133. 
This authorized the CJCS to take actions for the JCS and info:rm them after-
wards on 1) rna tters in which urgency is crucial; 2) rna tters in which a JCS 
policy has already been established; 3) matters in which the CJCS knows 
the corporate view of the JCS on a slinilar issue; and 4) rna tters not import-
ant enough to consult the JCS as a corporate body. Under certain circum-
stances Directors of Divisions in the Joint Staff are allowed to use FM-133. 
Since its institution, PM-133 has accounted for over 50% of the decision 
statistics. In 1965 it accounted for 1589 decisions or 52.7%, in 1966-
2037 (62.0%), 1967-1620 (60.2%), 1968-1507 (58.5%), and 1969-1280 (54.7%). 
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314 institutions sharing power." These separated institu-
tions and their representatives proportionally share power 
based upon their prestige, expertise, size, and impact on 
society. This power in turn becomes translated into the 
ability to influence the outcome of decisions. An institu-
tion's primary means of achieving the desired outcome is 
its ability to persuade and bargain with other institutions. 
In such a pluralistic environment, "the power to persuade 
is the power to bargain; status and authority yield bargain-
315 ing advantages." 
The reason an organization bargains is its ideology 
or prevalent belief which forms the basis for its existence. 
Some students of bureaucracy have compared organizational 
ideology to the territorialism of certain species of animals. 
Every large organization is in partial conflict with 
every other social agent with which it deals ••• the 
basic nature of all social struggle is the same - each 
combatant needs to establish a large enough territory 
to guarantee his own survival.316 
This territory becomes defined by the amount of the budget 
an organization receives or the number of functions that it 
is given. In the military, these functions become 
314Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics 
of Leadership (New York: John Wiley, 1960), 34. 
315 Ibid. 
316A h D ~ ( k nt ony owns, Inside the Bureaucracy New Yor : 
Little, Brown & Co., 1967), 217-226. 
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translated into roles and missions, and are inextricably 
connected to budget allocations. Under these circumstances, 
an organization will attempt to enhance its essence or 
mission by any means necessary. The greater the importance 
of its mission, the greater the influence the organization 
has, which in turn translates into higher survivability. 
Any encroachment upon a vital mission is a direct threat to 
the organization's existence. Conversely, the organization 
will attempt to incorporate new functions within the bounda-
ries of its mission, thereby increasing its own importance. 
While all bureaucracies operate in a similar manner, the 
military has institutionalized its essence in the form of 
d t . 317 oc r1ne. 
The service action officer is thus instilled with the 
commitment to protect the organizational essence and attempt 
through bargaining with his counterparts to achieve the 
required consensus. These action officers, who are an essen-
tial cog in the JCS staffing process, are called the "Indi-
ans," because they work for a "Chief." The service "Indians" 
317For a further discussion of this point see such 
works as Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics & Foreign 
Policy (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974); 
I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: 
The Politics of Organizational Reform (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1972); Graham T. Allison, Essence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: 
Little Brown & Co., 1971); and Frank Simonie, "Structure and 
Policy: The Evolution of the Military Staff," (Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1975). 
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are usually bright, young Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels 
who, in the words of retired Marine Corps Colonel John 
Donovan have, 
... usually demonstrated their effectiveness as leaders, 
planners and organizational managers. They may also 
have performed heroically in combat, but most of all, 
they must have demonstrated their loyalty as a pro-
ponent of their own service doctrine and their dedi§fs 
tion to the defense establishment and its policies. 
Devotion to the organizational ideology is repaid with pro-
motions and choice assignments while deviation may well 
mean the termination of a career. Thus, the "primary re-
quisite of those engaged in planning at both the service 
and joint levels becomes the attainment of a military posi-
tion which does not injure the vital interest of any ser-
. ,319 
VlCe. 
This problem is by no means exclusively restricted to 
the service representatives sitting on joint committees; it 
deeply affects the structure of the Joint Staff system 
itself. In theory the Joint Staff was to consist of officers 
detached from their particular service who would develop a 
"purple suit" mentality. A "purple suiter" is an individual 
who is truly above service interest. The color "purple" 
comes from the misconception that combining the colors of 
318 James Donovan, Militarism, U.S.A. (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), 75-79. 
319Tatum, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense 
Policy Formulation," 386. 
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the uniforms of all the services would result in the color 
purple. Thus an officer with this type of outlook would not 
be committed to any particular service ideology. The problem 
between practice and theory was that the officers assigned 
to the Joint Staff had to, at some point in the future, re-
turn to their own services. Many times their success or 
failure within their own service depends upon the positions 
they took while on the Joint Staff. This problem is further 
complicated by the fact that all papers produced within the 
Joint Staff are passed around at numerous times for service 
concurrence. Thus the Joint Staffer has to walk the tight 
rope between service advocacy and joint orientation. The 
fact that the Joint Staffer's boss will probably be from a 
320 different service exacerbates this problem. 
320To what extent the members of the Joint Staff main-
tain a "purple suit" mentality is difficult to document. A 
1955 Dartmouth College study on the attitudes of members of 
the Joint Intelligence Group and the Joint Logistics Planning 
Group reveal that of those interviewed it was almost unani-
mously agreed that an officer who was above service interest 
helped the organization fulfill its mission more than an 
officer who vigorously supported his service. Despite this, 
less than half of the officers interviewed felt that being 
above service interest would help them in the next promotion 
(slightly less than half believed that being a service advo-
cate would help in the next promotion), and the majority 
felt that a superior command performance in their own service 
carried more weight before promotion boards than a superior 
Joint Staff performance. While inconclusive, it does seem 
to support the contention that officers worry how their ser-
vice of origin will perceive their Joint Staff duty and that 
service advocacy was somewhat required. Commission on Orga-
~zation of the Executive Branch of the Government: Five 
~taff Papers Prepared for the Task Force on Procurement, 
Volume I, Defense Procurement: The Vital Roles of the 
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Since the participants in the decision making process 
have an obligation to defend their organizational impera-
tives, consensus building breaks down and is replaced by such 
artificial methods of achieving unanimity as "paperclipping," 
"waffling," and "logrolling." 321 The pressure for unanimity 
is a result of two systemic constraints. The first is the 
action officer's short suspense dates. With consensus a 
prerequisite at every stage of the staffing process, it 
becomes easier to produce artificial unanimity than it is to 
National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
(Washington, D.C.: June 1955), A-63. The issue of attempt-
ing to separate the members of the Joint Staff from their 
service has been a constant point of analysis in all the DoD 
studies conducted since the end of World War II. In an effort 
to accomplish this goal Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates 
issued a memorandum in 1959 that made joint duty a prerequi-
site for selection to flag rank. Unfortunately, his defini-
tion of "joint" was too broad and the services were allowed 
too many exceptions. One recommendation of the 1978 Stead-
man Corrmittee was that the Gates memorandum be enforced and 
that the Joint Staff be more effectively isolated from their 
services. This would seem to indicate that over thirty years 
after the creation of the Joint Staff the problem of service 
parOchialism still exists. Report to the Secretary of Defense 
on the National Military Command Structure (Washington, D.C.: 
July 1978), 63-65. 
321
"Waffling" occurs when a paper is written so that 
it never actually addresses the important issues and so means 
all things to all people. "Paperclipping" is a means of ameli-
orating conflicting demands from different institutions or 
organizations. Instead of choosing or prioritizing demands, 
all of them are simply combined into a package and sent for-
ward. Thus the different service demands are "paperclipped" 
together and sent forward as a "joint" position. "Logrol-
ling" is the time honored political means of achieving one's 
objectives and guaranteeing the passage of pet projects. In-
dividuals or organizations promise to support one another's 
Projects in return for support on their own project. 
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attempt the less rewarding conversion of attitudes. Such 
conversions are not only time intensive, which may cause a 
missed suspense date, but there is little guarantee of suc-
cess due to the pressure of organizational imperatives and 
career necessities. 
The second systemic constraint lies within the nature 
of the bureaucracy and the organizational imperatives of the 
Joint Chiefs. The purpose of a bureaucracy is to produce a 
. t. d . . 322 unified posl 1on or a ec1s1on. The failure to do so 
forces the issue one echelon higher in the structure, bring-
ing into question the rationale for the existence of the 
lower levels. It is the action officer's mission to produce 
consensus and relieve his superiors of the ponderous and 
difficult task of producing consensus at a higher level. 
The failure to achieve unanimity reflects on the action offi-
cer's capabilities and thus affects his career potential. 
If the issue is vital to the very existence of the service, 
it will have to be moved to the highest level of the bureau-
cracy for reconciliation. Even at the level of the Joint 
Chiefs, the continued existence of a split position is dia-
metrically opposed to the institutional desires of the 
organization. The military, like any organization, desires 
to see its advice accepted and its projects supported. Many 
Years ago Max Weber observed that "technical knowledge ••• of 
322Gordon Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy (Wash-
ington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965), 141. 
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itself, is sufficient to ensure it [the bureaucratic organi-
323 
zation] a position of extraordinary power." Obviously, 
if the military split on an issue, they fail to take ad~an­
tage of their technical expertise, and thus lose a substan-
tial amount of their capability to influence decisions. 
However, if the Chiefs present a unified front on a position, 
they maximize their ability to influence the final action. 
During the early 1960s the Chiefs found that if they sent 
split decisions to Secretary McNamara they enhanced his abi-
lity to make exactly the decision he wanted to. In a sense, 
the Secretary had divided and conquered the Joint Chiefs, 
enhancing even further the civilian domination of military 
policy during that time. By 1965 the Chiefs realized this 
d t -1-. • d d d. 1 . t d . . f d 324 an :-uey avo1 e sen 1ng sp 1 ec1s1ons orwar • 
What the Chiefs and the Secretary were acknowledging 
was the fact that there exists a two-way bargaining relation-
ship between the Joint Chiefs and the administration. On 
the one hand, the administration makes every effort to gain 
the Chief's support for the various political or military 
323Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Orga-
nizations, trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 379. 
324 Lawrence Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First 
~enty-Five Years, 1947-1972 (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-
Sity Press, 1976), 116. See Table 1 for a tabulation of JCS 
decisions and splits. 
212 
programs that it sends before Congress. The support of 
the JCS adds credibility to the proposals by virtue of their 
acknowledged "expertise." Conversely, their opposition.to 
a program that lies within their sphere of "expertise" may 
325 be enough to destroy the proposal. On the other hand, 
the Chiefs need the administration's support to attain the 
programs they desire to have implemented. Af:; a result, 
there occurs a vertical bargaining relationship between the 
administration and the Chiefs as corporate groups, while 
simultaneously, horizontal bargaining is occurring among the 
services. 
There is an old Washington adage that says "where you 
sit determines where you stand." An essential part of this 
bargaining is the role a Chief takes on as a "front man." 
A front man is "a leader of a constituency, the sponsor of 
a policy, and the principal builder of a consensus for it." 326 
325Examples of such trade-offs have existed all through 
the history of the Joint Chiefs, unfortunately they are dif-
ficult to document. One example which is well known was in 
regard to the limited test-ban treaty during the Kennedy ad-
ministration. Certain guarantees were included in order to 
gain the support of the JCS. See Maxwell Taylor, Swords and 
Plowshares (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1972~ 282-288. A 
more contemporary example is the exchange between the JCS and 
the administration over the Chiefs support of the SALT I 
agreements. The Navy received a go-ahead on the Trident sub-
marine missile system, and the JCS supported the administra-
tion's position on the SALT limitations. John Newhouse, The 
~old Down: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1973), 246. 
326H.l l sman, The Politics of Policy Making, 35-36. 
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A Chief's constituency is his own service, and he naturally 
sponsors its policies and strives to build a consensus among 
the other Chiefs and the civilian administration for the ful-
fillment of that policy goal. A front man is more than 
simply an advocate for a specific policy, he is the focal 
point of communication between his organization below him 
and the administration above him. He must represent and 
defend his organizational imperatives to the administration, 
while developing support within his own organization for the 
administration's policies. Most simply stated, a Chief has 
two constituencies to represent - the President and the civi-
lian administration on one hand, and his service on the other. 
If he fails to represent either one of these two groups ade-
quately, he will lose its support. Once he has lost the sup-
port of either one, he ceases to be capable of fulfilling 
his role and must be replaced. Let us turn our attention to 
an example that might help illustrate this point. 
The "Revolt of the Admirals" was a unique event in 
the history of American civil-military relations. Essen-
tially, it was a public proclamation by the naval officer 
corps that it had lost confidence in the Chief of Naval 
Operations, Admiral Louis Denfeld. At this point in our 
study, we will not concern ourselves with the specific 
budgetary and strategic aspects of the episode, but only how 
it reflects the bureaucratic nature of the Joint Chiefs and 
the roles that v~ious constituencies play in the decision 
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making process. 
The "Revolt" was a product of the unification conflict. 
The central issue was the relationship of strategic airpower 
to the future of the Navy. Airpower advocates maintained 
that a strategic nuclear bomber force was the nation's only 
reliable deterrent. The Navy countered this by claiming 
that carrier-based air power still had a role to play in 
national defense and that technological innovations would 
allow it to participate as part of the strategic deterrent. 
The key innovation the Navy counted on was the building of 
a new generation of flush deck aircraft carriers capable of 
launching jet nuclear bombers. In a period marked by de-
creasing defense budgets, each service identified its pro-
grams and strategies with the very survival of its organiza-
tion. In the Navy's case, this perception was especially 
important. The issue had been temporarily resolved in March 
1948 with~e signing of the Key West Agreement, which gave 
the Navy a limited role in strategic bombing. 327 Unfortu-
nately, the agreement did not "solve the impending problem 
of whether the flush-deck carrier should be built or whether 
327The Key West Agreement assigned to the Navy as a 
collateral function "to be prepared to participate in the 
overall air effort as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." 
For a.discussion of the developments of the Navy's effort 
to develop a nuclear capability see Vincent Davis, The Poli-
~ics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases, Monograph Series 
in World Affairs, Volume 4, Monograph No. 3, 1966-67 (Denver, 
University of Denver, 1967), 4-17. 
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itS construction required approval of the Joint Chiefs of 
f "328 Staf • 
By statute, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are an advisory 
bodY only, thus making their concurrence or nonconcurrence 
superfluous. In the real world, theory is often different 
from practice. Because of the political nature of the 
decision making process, prestige, expertise, and so on, 
may become as important as legally sanctioned power. The 
Chiefs' approval of any program that has the vast strategic 
and financial consequences of a super-carrier costing approxi-
mately one-half billion dollars was a necessity. 
At Key West, Secretary Forrestal announced to the 
Chiefs that he and the President had decided that the carrier 
should be built. Previously, he had put the Chiefs on notice 
that if they could not agree on the carrier issue, "I shall 
h t k d . . "329 ave o rna e my own ec1s1on. Apparently that was exact-
ly what the Secretary did. The Chiefs responded "that they 
would go along with it [the carrier decision] because it was 
328Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and the B-36 Bom-
ber,n in American Civil-Military Decisions, ed. by Harold 
Stein (Montgomery, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 
1963), 74. 
329 James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. by Wal-
ter Millis (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), 390. 
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330 the President's program." The Chiefs never really dis-
cussed the matter, but merely accepted it. General Hoyt 
Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, later said, "[the 
d [ ] • t d • d 11331 carrier] was not agree upon, nor was 1 1scusse •..• 
After this meeting the Chiefs "positive support" for the 
carrier was duly reported to the President. 332 
The carrier issue remained settled for about six 
weeks until it became inextricably connected to the 1949 
defense budget. Admiral Denfeld claimed, before the House 
Appropriations Subcommittee, that the Chiefs had approved 
the carrier. 333 Air Force General Carl Spaatz denied this, 
forcing the issue to be returned to the JCS for resolution. 
By a vote of three to one the carrier was approved for the 
second time. Of particular interest to our study is General 
Vandenberg's dissent. 
General Vandenberg based his dissent on two points. 
330u.s. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, 
Subcommittee No. 4, Heavy Munitions, Hearings on H.R. 6049 
to authorize the President, in his discretion, to permit 
the stoppage of work on certain combat vessels, 80th Con-
gress, 2nd Session, 1948, 6860. (Hereaftei cited as 
Hearings H.R. 6049.) 
331 Hammond, "Super Carriers and the B-36 Bomber." 475. 
332 Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, 393. 
333u.s. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, 
!earings on the Navy appropriation bill for 1949, 80th Con-
gress, 2nd Session, 1948, 13. 
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The first was that the JCS had never had the opportunity to 
fullY evaluate the carrier in terms of its impact on the 
"over-all military structure," and how it would "carry out 
joint plans." He then went on to deal with the carrier in 
relation to the budget problem. He maintained that he could 
not "at this time approve or disapprove one particular part 
of the budget of one of the services without the thorough 
consideration of the programs and budget requirements of all 
three services." Clearly, Vandenberg was basing his dissent 
on a technicality and avoiding presenting his own views on 
the carrier. The reason for his obfuscation is revealed in 
the conclusion of his statement. "Approval by the Joint 
Chiefs, as opposed to acceptance of a decision of higher 
authority, connotes military judgment based on thorough con-
• d t • 11334 Sl era 1ons. In Vandenberg's mind, the Chiefs were again 
merely rubber stamping an administration directive and 
supporting an administration policy. Ten months later, 
though, that policy had changed. 
In the spring of 1949, budget problems again brought 
the carrier issue to the forefront. Louis Johnson, the new 
Secretary of Defense, in an economy move, wanted to recon-
Sider the carrier decision. On the 15th of April 1949, he 
334 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 28 May 
1948, subject: Construction of the CA Carrier, Leahy Papers, 
J:folder, "JCS Outgoing Correspondence, May-June 1948," u. s. 
~aval Archives, Washington, D.C. (ijereafter referred to 
as U.S. Naval Archives.) 
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asked the Chiefs, for the third time, to give their opinion 
on the carrier. This time the vote was two to one against 
. h 1 Adm" 1 D f ld d" t· 335 R · the carrier, w1t on y 1ra en e 1ssen 1ng. e1n-
forced by this negative response, Johnson cancelled the 
carrier eight days later. Outraged, the Secretary of the 
Navy, John L. Sullivan, resigned and was replaced by Francis 
P. Matthews,whom the Navy officer corps believed to be a 
Johnson man. The cancellation of the carrier was the spark 
that ignited the "Revolt," but it was not the cause. The 
real cause was an increasing belief on the part of naval 
officers that Admiral Denfeld was not properly defending the 
Navy's interests in the matter. Unfortunately for Denfeld, 
he became identified with Matthews and became guilty, 
through association, for the cancellation of the carrier. 
With the traditional lines of communication apparently eli-
minated, the officer corps sought alternative expressions 
for their grievances. The result was an outbreak of bureau-
cratic warfare and public statements against the Air Force's 
pet project, the B-36 intercontinental bomber. Admiral Den-
feld had lost credibility with the officer corps and had thus 
lost control of the Navy. Professor Paul Hammond in his 
major study of the carrier controversy clearly noted this 
335
copies of the Chiefs' written responses and posi-
tions on the carrier vote are found in the Eisenhower Papers, 
1916-1952 File, box 56, folder "Joint Chiefs of Staff," 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. (Hereafter 
referred to as Eisenhower Library.) 
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loss of credibility: 
If the professional leader of the Navy, Louis Denfeld, 
the Chief of Naval Operations since December,1947, had 
ever enjoyed the full confidence of the Navy partisans, 
by September 1949, it had been withdrawn from him. His 
role as senior member of the Joint Chiefs in the carrier 
cancellation recommendations, and in the decision not 
to hold a contest between the B-36 and a Navy fighter, 
had been misunderstood within.the Navy. He had remained 
silently in office when Sullivan resigned in a blaze of 
naval glory. And when in the August hearings the Air 
Force related the times he, as a member of the Joint 
Chief~36 had approved the B-36, the misunderstandings grew. 
To this list of incriminations must be added the cuts in the 
Navy's 1950 budget and Denfeld's own reappointment as Chief 
of Naval Operations. This last act looked all too much like 
a reward for services rendered. 
Secretary Matthews' reaction to the Navy's media cam-
paign was to order that all statements critical of the 
administration's policies must stay within the chain of com-
mand. In accordance with this directive, Vice Admiral Gerald 
Bogan, the commanding officer First Task Fleet, sent a letter 
to Matthews which reflected the disenchantment of the officer 
corps. 
The morale of the Navy is lower today than at any time 
since I entered the commissioned ranks in 1916 •.•• In 
my opinion, this descent, almost to despondency, stems 
from complete confusion as to the future role of the 
Navy .••. 
Bogan's letter was an explicit indictment of unification and 
the National Security Act of 1947. The letter was endorsed 
336 Hammond, "Super Carrier and the B-36 Bomber," 507. 
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bY the Comman~r-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, Admiral Arthur 
Radford, who ~rote, "Rightly or wrongly., the majority of the 
officers in t1e Pacific Fleet concur ••• with the ideas expres-
sed by Admiral Bogan .•.. " It was further endorsed by Ac".miral 
Denfeld himseu. 337 The letter became a political bomb when 
on 4 October 1949, it was released to the press despite 
. - 338 Matthews' eff<n'ts to keep it pr1vate. Matthews, realizing 
the potential political dangers persuaded Denfeld to state 
that his endorsement was a matter of procedure and should not 
339 be construed as approval. By doing so, Denfeld destroyed 
what little credibility he had left with the officer corps. 
The release of the Bogan letter had exactly the effect 
that naval partisans had hoped for; it brought about a full 
337
see Ibid., 509-511 for a reproduction of Bogan's 
letter. Part of Denfeld's endorsement reads as follows: 
"I concur in the endorsement of the Chief, Pacific Fleet. 
Naval officers have faith in the Navy and a knowledge of the 
aggressive role it plays in the defense of the country. They 
are convinced that a Navy stripped of its offensive power 
means a nation stripped of its offensive power." 
338G. F. Bogan, Oral History Transcript, Naval Insti-
tute Oral History Program (1970), 122~127. Bogan maintains 
that he had nothing to do with the revolt and that his letter 
was merely in response to Secretary Matthews' October 1949 
invitation to discuss the morale of the officer corps. 
Captain John G. Crommlin (USN) one of the leaders of the 
Navy's attacks on the B-36 bomber released the letter on his 
own. Bogan was later demoted to Rear Admiral and he finally 
retired. He blames Admiral Forrest Sherman and Secretary 
Matthews for the demise of his career. 
339New York 'I'imes, 5 October 1949. In his public 
statement, Admiral Dfmfeld stated that "such an endorsement 
does not mean approval." He went on to say that he was en-
dorsing Admiral Radford's endorsement, and not the content 
of the Bogan letter. 
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scale Congressional inquiry into America's strategic policy. 
one by one, the Navy's witnesses marched before the Congres-
sional committee and attacked the Air Forces' programs. 
Denfeld was the Navy's last witness and although his state-
ment was moderate in nature, it did corroborate the Navy's 
position. 340 Instantly Denfeld's credibility with the 
officer corps was reestablished, but he had lost his value 
as far as the administration was concerned. A short time 
later, on October 27th, Denfeld was dismissed and replaced 
by Admiral Forrest Sherman, an officer who was not identi-
fied with the revolt and who was an outspoken advocate of 
. f. t. 341 Ulll lCa lOll. 
This particular case study reveals some very interest-
ing aspects about the Chiefs' perceived relationships with 
each other, their own services, and the administration. 
There are two sets of issues which must be examined in order 
to fully analyze the "Revolt of the Admirals." The first of 
these revolves around the three JCS votes on the carrier and 
why the various Chiefs voted the way they did. There are 
several possible explanations as to the Chiefs' voting 
340u.s. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, 
Hearings, The National Defense Program, Unification and 
Strategy, 8lst Congress, lst Session, 1949. (Hereafter cited 
as Hearings, Unification and Strategy.) 
341 . Sherman had been the Navy's representative during 
the writing of the National Security Act and had defended 
that legislation during the hearings. 
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patterns on the carrier issue. One possible explanation is 
partisan service politics. By this I mean that the votes 
reflected service values and bureaucratic interests. To 
some degree, this was obviously true, but it cannot be used 
as a total explanation. While this may explain Admirals 
Denfeld's and Leahy's support for the carrier, it surely 
does not explain General Vandenberg's concurrence at Key 
west; nor General Bradley's support for the carrier during 
the first two votes and then his reversal on the third vote. 
It is apparent that any analysis of the voting pattern lies 
beyond the simple solution of partisan service politics. 
One possible solution to the question of the Joint 
Chiefs' voting pattern may be found in the realm of psycho-
group dynamics, particularly Irving L. Janis' theory of 
groupthink. Groupthink occurs when individuals are: 
deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the 
members strive for unanimity override their motiva-
tion to realistically appraise alternative courses 
of action ••. [Groupthink] refers to a deterioration 
of mental efficiency, reality, and m~~~l judgment 
that results from in-group pressure. 
The voting pattern of the Joint Chiefs did not reflect the 
usual form of groupthink, which is a product of group 
dynamics and peer-group pressures. Instead, it reflected 
a variation of groupthink; which was the product of a set 
342 Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psycho-
~ogical Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1972), 9. 
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of social attitudes inculcated by professionalism and rein-
forced by a rank conscious system. This variation resulted 
in the Chiefs subordinating themselves to the real or the 
perceived desires of their superiors. Admiral Denfeld 
acknowledged that this was the prime motivation at Key West 
when he said "that they [the Chiefs] would go along with 
it [the carrier] because it was the President's program." 343 
vandenberg, at the conclusion to his May 1948 dissent, 
implied that this was the reason for Bradley's support in 
the second vote. Bradley's own explanation for his reversal 
in the third vote refers precisely to this type of subordi-
nation. 
This apparent agreement by me at that time [the second 
vote] was based upon my understanding that it had been 
approved by those in authority and I accepted it as a 
fact accomplished. Therefore, I was merely noting, in 
effect, a ~4~ision that had already been made by higher 
authority. 
Bradley's subordination was so total that he even rejected 
the previous two votes as "a formal decision" by the Joint 
Chiefs. This despite the fact that the May 1948 memorandum 
to Secretary Forrestal specifically stated that the Joint 
Chiefs had considered the following question, "Do the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff approve the construction of the so-called 
343u.s. Congress, House Hearings, H.R. 6049, 6860. 
344 u.s. Congress, House, Hearings, Unification and 
Strategy, 567. 
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c. A. carrier?" 345 To this question Leahy, Denfeld and 
Bradley "answered in the affirmative." Apparently, Bradley 
not only subordinated himself to Forresta1, but did so to 
Johnson as well; thus creating the semantical distinction 
of "a formal decision." It should be pointed out here that 
the type of groupthink exhibited during the carrier votes 
was not a totally unique situation. Janis notes that a 
similar type of groupthink was demonstrated during the Bay 
of Pigs fiasco, and was inextricably connected to America's 
1 . 346 Vietnam po 1cy. 
In the final analysis the voting pattern on the car-
rier issue reflected a combination of partisan service 
politics and a professionalized groupthink. The Key West 
vote was a clear example of subordination to administration 
policy on the part of all members of the JCS. In General 
Bradley's case, this subordination appears to have carried 
on into the second vote, in May 1948. On the other hand, 
Denfeld and Vandenberg manifested service interest during 
the second vote, and most openly, during the crucial third 
vote. Denfeld's defense of the carrier was based on its 
345 Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, 28 May 
1948, subject: Construction of the CA Carrier, Leahy Papers, 
folder "JCS Outgoing Correspondence, May-June, 1948," U.S. 
Naval Archives. 
346J . an1s, Groupthink, Chapters 2 and 5. 
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abilitY to support the Navy's strategic role as well as its 
traditional roles of sea control and anti-submarine war-
347 
fare. Rather expectedly, Vandenberg based his attack 
upon the carrier's potential military value. He pointed out 
that the super-carrier was not the optimal system for anti-
submarine warfare and its strategic value against a land 
locked power like Russia was questionable at best: 
The relative military value of the large carrier, when 
compared to other weapons systems procurable with the 
same resources, is of a low order. This carrier is 
designed for bombardment purposes. The resources re-
quired to make it an operational weapon would produce 
in land-based aviation capabilities considerably greater 
than the capability of the carrier. When it is con-
sidered that the carrier inherently exposes its bombing 
capability to attack by three entirely separate weapons 
systems--the submarine fleet, the surface fleet, and air 
forces--whereas land-based bombers are exposed to only 
one of these, an even greater disparity between the 
relative worth of these two systems is apparent. The 
carrier not only exposes itself to multiple forms of 
attack, but also exposes to the same dangers its atten-
dant complex of protective vessels. Even when behind 
this costly protective screen, I believe the carrier is 
today a vulnerable weapon.348 
A cost effective analysis like this was definitely designed 
to appeal to Secretary Johnson's cost consciousness. 
It is General Bradley's reversal of opinion in the 
third and final vote that is most illustrative of the 
347 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Admiral 
Denfeld, 22 April 1949, subject: The; USS United States, 
Eisenhower Papers, 1916-1952 File, box 56, folder, "Joint 
Chiefs of Staff," Eisenhower Ljbrary. 
348 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from General 
Vandenberg, 23 April 1949, subject: The CVA-58 Project, 
Eisenhower Papers, 1916-1952 File, box 56, folder, "Joint 
Chiefs of Staff," Eisenhower Library. 
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pressures that are on the Chiefs. It is doubtful that he 
was manifesting a specific service position in April of 1949. 
As an institution, the Army was merely a spectator in the 
debate over strategic delivery systems, since they had none 
of their own; although it is true that Bradley realized the 
finite nature of the budget pie and that any increase in 
expenditures for one service meant a proportional decrease 
for the other. Also Bradley's own war experience in Europe 
would have tended to minimize the role of naval airpower. 
Since Bradley had admitted subordinating his professional 
opinion on the earlier carrier vote, it may be assumed that 
Bradley did it again. This would be true providing Bradl_ey 
actually favored the carrier. It appears though, that 
Bradley's true opinion tended to support Vandenberg's posi-
tion. In a 14 September 1948 memorandum to the Secretary of 
Defense, Bradley assailed a Navy proposal to build three 
additional super-carriers as part of a mobilization strategy. 
His rejection of the Navy proposal was based on three points. 
The first was that the carriers would not be completed in time 
to ·have any impact on the war effort. Secondly, he ques-
tioned the strategic value of the carriers. He argued that 
"the Naval threat of the USSR would be diminished or a rela-
tively minor threat at that time:" 
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The CVX's [the super-carrier] cannot be justified 
exclusively on the Navy's primary roles and mis-
sions and the assignment of such a large proportion 
of our industrial effort toward the accomplishment. 
of a collateral mission is not acceptable. 
Finally, in place of the airpower supplied by the carrier, 
General Bradley foresaw the Air Force being fully deployed. 
It is true that the General did recommend the continuation 
of the experimental super-carrier itself, but then one must 
h S F t 1 t .ll . ff. 349 remember t at ecretary orres a was s 1 1n o 1ce. 
Since Bradley had subordinated himself on two earlier votes, 
there is no reason to believe that he would oppose the 
carrier at this time. Once Johnson had replaced Forrestal, 
the pressures for subordination apparently shifted. If we 
assume that Bradley was not overly infatuated with the car-
rier originally, then Johnson merely allowed him to voice 
his own feelings. In his 22 April 1949 memorandum to the 
Secretary of Defense, in which Bradley outlined his reasons 
for recommending rejection of the carrier, he repeated much 
of the same ground covered in his 14 September 1948 memoran-
dum. The super-carrier was simply not cost efficient to 
accomplish the Navy's primary missions, and the collateral 
mission of strategic bombardment was covered by the Air 
Force "which already has adequate means and capabilities 
349 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 14 Septem-
ber 1948, subject: Completion of Joint War Plan as basis for 
Short Range Mobilization Planning, Leahy Papers, folder, 
"JCS, Outgoing September 48," U.S. Naval Archives. 
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to perform this function." While Bradley did admit that 
carrier air~wer had a role; the land-locked nature of the 
Soviet Union and its lack of a navy coupled with the limited 
range of carrHr aircraft, minimized that role. In the final 
analysis, the super-carrier's cost simply outweighed its 
benefits. 350 
Our analysis of the Chiefs' voting pattern leads us 
to the second major issue to be discussed, that of the Chiefs' 
relationship to their services and the administration. As 
discussed earlier, the Chiefs attempted to play the role of 
a "front man." The "Revolt" occurred when Denfeld's service 
constituency, the officer corps, perceived that he was fail-
ing to represent them properly to the administration. Under 
such circumstances they, the officer corps, proceeded to 
develop alternative means of expressing their grievances. 
It was not until Denfeld had visibly manifested support for 
the officer corps that his credibility returned along with 
his ability to control the officer corps. Unfortunately 
for Denfeld, the situation had reached a stage where any 
support for the officer corps was viewed as opposition to 
the administration and this meant the loss of that vital 
constituency. 
350 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from 
General Bradley, 22 April 1949, subject: Construction of 
the Super Carrier U.S.S. United States, Eisenhower Papers, 
1916-1952 File, box 56, folder, "Joint Chiefs of Staff," 
Eisenhower Library. 
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It is very difficult to determine the exact point 
oenfeld lost the support of Secretary Matthews. Apparently, 
the release of the Bogan letter was the beginning of the 
parting of the ways. On 14 September 1949, Denfeld went 
to Matthews to thank him for his reappointment to another 
two year term as Chief of Naval Operations. Matthews was 
reported to have responded that "there's nothing I have done 
since I have been Secretary that has given me more pleasure 
than gettingyou reappointed."351 Three weeks later, after 
the release of the Bogan letter, Matthews told Denfeld that 
he was sorry that his endorsement had been put on the letter 
and that this might impair his value as Chief of Naval 
Operations; but according to Denfeld, Secretary Matthews 
immediately added, "I've had worse situations than this con-
front me, but I'm sure if we work together we can overcome 
this one." 352 Matthews' own comment on the meeting does 
not include such a conciliatory statement. 353 
The confusion over the exact contents of the meeting 
may exist because Denfeld felt that he had done nothing to 
cause the loss of the Secretary's support. It appears though 
351Louis Denfeld, "Why I was Fired," Collier's, Vol. 
125, No. 11 (18 March 1950), 15. 
352Ibid; this meeting took place 4 October 1949. 
353New York Times, 28 October 1949. Matthews released 
a letter in which he said that he told Denfeld that he feared 
his usefullness had finished. 
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that the administration had decided before Denfeld's testi-
mony that his value had ended. According to Admiral Richard 
L. Conolly, he was offered the office of Chief of Naval Opera-
tions in return for a pro-administration testimony. Conolly 
reported that his pro-Navy stand during the hearings destroyed 
his chances for CNO and that Johnson "hit the roof" when he 
beard what Conolly had said. The Admiral went on to note 
that Johnson supposedly turned to Steve Early, the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, and said, "There goes your candidate .. " 354 
Whether or not the administration had decided to replace Den-
feld before his testimony became unimportant once he had sided 
with the rest of the officer corps. 355 
The ''Revolt of the Admirals," demonstrates some crucial 
aspects about the interaction of the Joint Chiefs with their 
two constituencies, their service and the administration. To 
be an effective "front man," a chief must somehow balance the 
demands of these two groups. Admiral Denfeld found out that 
354Richard L. Conolly, Oral History Transcript, Colum-
bia University Oral History Program, (1960), 397. 
355The day after Denfeld testified before the Congress 
he met with Matthews and they discussed why the Admiral had 
not cleared the testimony with his service secretary. Den-
feld said that he didn't think it mattered because he had to 
do what he thought was right. Admiral Denfeld reported 
that "he had been submitting to the pressure to which he had 
been subjected as Chief of Naval Operations and a member of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and that he felt that he could not 
Pursue that course any longer; that he had to speak out in 
justice to himself and the position that he was taking." 
Memorandum of Record of conversations with Denfeld, 14 Octo-
ber 1949, Presidential Secretary File, box 58, folder, "Cabi-
net-Navy Secretary: Misc.," Truman Library. 
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the loss of the support of either one reduced, if not elimi-
nated, his ability to perform this function. It was also 
rather clear that the administration was the more important 
of these two constituencies. Denfeld lost his job only after 
he had lost the support of the administration. The Chiefs 
as a group acknowledged the supremacy of the administration 
by subordinating their professional opinion to the admini-
stration's desires during the three carrier votes. Even 
vandenberg's opposition to the carrier during the second vote 
was carefully structured along procedural grounds. By doing 
so, he was able to tread the narrow line between the admini-
stration and his service. In this regard Vandenberg was 
far luckier than Denfeld. The mere act of the Chiefs sub-
ordinating themselves to the civilian leadership raises 
questions about their responsibility to the society. Does 
their responsibility lie with their service, which they have 
served for thirty or more years; with the administration, 
that appointed them; or the society at large, which they 
have taken an oath to defend. In Matthews' letter to the 
President, asking for the removal of Denfeld, he emphasized 
the importance of loyalty as the important link between a 
service secretary and a chief: 
A military establishment is not a political democracy. 
Integrity of command is indispensable at all times. 
There can be no twilight zone in the measure of loyalty 
to superiors and respect for authority existing between 
various official ranks. Inability to conform to such 
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requirements for military stability would disqualify 
any of us for positions subordinate to the Commander 
in Chief. 35b 
In the final analysis, the Chiefs apparently understood that 
they must give their loyalty to the administration in order 
to function in any manner. 
The civilian leadership of both administrations were 
correct in linking the organizational structure of the Joint 
Chiefs to their dysfunctional bureaucratic behavior. In 
essence the various reorganizations were designed to achieve 
two goals, eliminate inter-service conflicts and upgrade 
the Chief's advisory product. Both of these problems were 
partially the result of the bureaucratic and political man-
ner in which JCS staff papers were written. Career pressures 
tended to force action officers to either defend service 
interests or achieve artificial consensus through such means 
as paperclipping and waffling. It was through the process 
of consensus building that the bureaucracy flowed smoothly, 
and the services tried to avoid open confrontation. Eisen-
hower was correct in noting that the pre-1958 committee 
nature of the Joint Staff allowed the services too much 
influence and that this guaranteed the continuation of dys-
functional bureaucratic behavior within the Staff. What he 
failed to address in his 1958 reorganization was that at 
356New York Times, 28 October 1949. 
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some point in the future, the Joint Staff action officer 
still had to return to his service and that this allowed the 
services to continue to influence decisions. 
For the Chiefs themselves, the motivations to defend 
service interest and achieve artificial consensus are just 
as strong as they are for the staff officer, but for different 
reasons. At that point in his career a chief is at the pin-
nacle of his profession, but being there generates different 
types of pressures on him. For one thing after spending 
over thirty years in his service it is only natural that he 
believes that its mission is essential to the defense of the 
nation. But simple service loyalty does not completely ex-
plain the bureaucratic nature of the Joint Chiefs. The real 
problem for the Chiefs is that they are caught between their 
twin constituencies, their services and the administration, 
as they attempt to negotiate the complex role of being a 
front man. Denfeld discovered the fate of a chief who loses 
the support of either group. In this regard the "Revolt of 
the Admirals" undermines any notion that the military ser-
vices are a homogenious authoritarian hierarchy. While the 
Navy's bureaucratic revolution was unique by virtue of its 
size and impact, it was by no means a unique phenomenon. 
General Maxwell Taylor had his "Revolt of the Colonels" during 
the late 1950s, when certain army officers perceived that the 
Prevailing strategic doctrine was going to destroy the 
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Army. Although such upheavals are rare, the fear of them 
prompts some chiefs to initiate preventive action. The 
selection several years ago of General John Vessey as the 
Vice Chief of Staff U.S. Army, has led some insiders to sug-
gest that it was motivated by a desire on the part of new 
Chief of Staff nominee, General Edward "Shy" Meyer, to defuse 
internal unrest within the service over his selection and the 
358 
rejection of Vessey. 
In reconsidering the reorganization efforts conducted 
during the period of our study, it is apparent that the criti-
cisms levied against the Chiefs were only half right. Clearly, 
there were systemic problems that led to inter-service con-
flict and the dilution of the JCS product, but these two 
flaws were caused as much by external bureaucratic factors 
as internai ones. It was true that the Chiefs engaged in ex-
tensive horizontal bargaining in order to protect service 
values and achieve the consensus that a bureaucracy demands, 
but both presidential administrations either consciously 
or unconsciously ignored the vertical relationships and 
pressures that helped magnify these flaws. The Chiefs' 
role as a front man necessitated such vertical bargaining, 
but it also resulted in tremendous pressures from above, 
especially as centralization increased. Quite openly, both 
357 Interview with General Maxwell Taylor, January 
1975, Washington, D.C. 
358I t . n erv1ew. 
235 
administrations opted for centralization in order to create 
more consensus, but such consensus would be just as artifical, 
and thus just as dysfunctional, as the consensus brought 
about by internal staff pressures. The Chiefs had to defend 
service interests in order to keep their own bureaucracies 
in check, and the best means to accomplish this was a unified 
position that hurt no ones vital interests. Consensus also 
gave the Chiefs bargaining power vis-a-vis the administra-
tion which demanded conformity to its views, and was capable 
of imposing them through centralized defense management. 
This combination of pressures put the Chiefs in an untenable 
position. 
One subject that never seemed to be addressed was the 
nature of the Chiefs' responsibility. Were they responsible 
to their service, the administration, or the nation. These 
three were not necessarily synonymous. In order to fully 
answer that question we must examine it from two perspec-
tives: the administration's perception of what the role of 
the JCS ought to be, and what the Chiefs thought their own 
role was. Once we have determined this we will then be in 
a better position to assess the true role of the Chiefs. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE CIVILIAN'S PERCEIVED ROLE 
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
one of the most important lessons to be derived from 
_ the "Revolt of the Admirals," was that the Chiefs had to be 
concerned with the desires of their civilian superiors. 
This is especially important because, by its nature, the role 
of an advisor is vague and relatively unstructured. This 
allows a great deal of flexibility on the part of both the 
Chiefs and the political leadership to determine exactly what 
role the Joint Chiefs would fulfill. Because of this flexi-
bility the perceptions of both the civilian leadership and 
the Chiefs themselves form the boundaries within which the 
Chiefs' ultimate role is decided upon. Thus in order to 
fully understand what role the Chiefs have assumed in policy 
formulation it must first be determined what role the civilian 
leadership allocated to the Chiefs and desired that they 
fulfill. 
The role that the Truman administration envisioned for the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff was by no means clearly determined at 
the time of the passage of the 1947 legislation. The adminis-
tration's position, like the legislation itself, evolved as 
the human and systemic problems inherent within the structure 
surfaced. Secretary Forrestal's reversal on the powers 
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of his office reflected such an evolution. Despite this 
evolutionary process, most of the changes revolved around 
one basic assumption, that the members of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff were the administration's professional military 
advisors. As such, the institution of the Joint Chiefs of 
staff became the reservoir for the military expertise of 
the nation. This represented more than a mere statutory 
function; it represented a philosophical conception of 
professionalism that ultimately molded the civilian's notion 
of what role the JCS should play. 
This assumption was derived from several possible 
sources. The first was the President's own lack of military 
expertise, but that was a traditional handicap for the 
civilian leadership. The second was the President's own 
good working relationship with the Joint Chiefs, which 
resulted from his personal high regard for some of its mem-
bers. The last, and probably the most important, was the 
President's philosophical concurrence with the traditional 
compartmentalization of political and military action. While 
Truman did have an understanding of the interrelationship 
between war and peace, it tended to be tied to the traditional 
ideas of civilian control and the automatonical relationship 
between the American military and the civilian policy maker. 
This traditional relationship was reaffirmed when the Presi-
dent stated "the policy of the government determines the 
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poliCY of the military. The military is always subordinate 
359 
to the government." 
On the surface, the President clearly supported tradi-
tional civilian control of the military, but analyzing it 
further, we realize that it also reinforced traditional 
American military "radical" professionalism. Central to this 
professional ethic was the belief that once the policy had 
been determined by the civilian leadership, it would be up 
to the military experts to achieve the appropriate results. 
Conversely, this rptonian image of professionalism demanded 
that the non-professional (the civilian) exit the scene after 
the political decision was made, in order to give full reign 
to the expert. More than once during the Korean War, Presi-
dent Truman articulated his support for such a functional 
division of labor. In the fall of 1950 he stated that "I 
am not a desk strategist and don't pretend to be one. I 
leave that to the military men."360 The following year in 
responding to a question on the war effort he stated; "that 
is a military matter and the President of the United States 
has never interfered with military maneuver in the field and 
he doesn't expect to interfere in it now."361 Such an outlook 
York: 
359Harry S. Truman, Memoirs of Harry S. Truman (New 
Doubleday & Co., 1956), I, 210. 
360u.s. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of 
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maY well explain his tolerance of General MacArthur's trans-
362 gressions during the early stages of the Korean War. 
The division of labor outlined above denotes support 
for traditional American military professionalism, which was 
based on the notion of military expertise and the mutually 
shared assumption, by both civilian and military alike, of 
the limits of each other's competency. Since fusionism was 
the antithesis of traditional American political/military 
bifurcation, the military professional should not and could 
not be relied upon to incorporate non-military factors into 
his cognitive processes, just as the civilians were not ex-
pected to deal with technical military issues. For the 
military to do otherwise would undermine civilian control 
while violating their own professional ethic. 
From the very beginning, this approach was understood 
by the first two Secretaries of Defense, James Forrestal and 
Louis Johnson, both of whom perceived themselves primarily 
as administrators, attempting to implement strategic decisions 
that had already been made in the White House. 363 It may be 
suggested that the more the civilian leader perceives himself 
as an administrator, the more he feels comfortable with the 
362 
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ton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), 234. 
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traditional division of labor due to his own lack of exper-
tise in military matters. While this hypothesis may appear 
valid, we will note shortly that President Eisenhower, a 
man of tremendous military knowledge, also opted for the 
traditional bifurcation of functions. Secretary Forrestal, 
unlike his successor, had enough experience to realize that 
the only possible way to effectively integrate policy was in 
some measure to violate this professional ethic. Unfor-
tunately, he failed totally in his efforts to force the Chiefs 
364 
to incorporate economic and political factors. This 
effort appears to have been a unilateral attempt on his part 
and did not signify any major change in the administration's 
attitude. More typical of the administration's true view 
was the comment made by former Secretary of the Air Force, 
Stewart Symington, who recalled that during the National 
Security Council meetings he attended, he never heard "any 
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any other military 
figure make any voluntary contributions to discussion in the 
Council." Mr. Symington went on to say that "they [the mem-
bers of the JCS] were there to answer questions with respect 
364
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VIII, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Policy Integration. 
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to matters that b:a:d to do primarily with the military."365 
From Mr. Symington's comments it is apparent that the Truman 
administration approached political/military policy making 
in a very traditional manner. 
Forrestal's successor, Louis Johnson, was far more 
of a manager than the first Secretary of Defense, and tended 
to support strict constructionalism to a greater degree. 
He became so preoccupied with his managerial function that he 
ignored substantive issues and considered political/military 
366 
coordination outside his purview. As Professor Lawrence 
Korb noted, Johnson "saw himself as the President's represen-
tative to the Department of Defense enforcing the administra-
tion's will on an avaricious military." 367 Such a narrow 
managerial approach led him to totally compartmentalize the 
"political" from the "military" and ultimately led him to 
365 
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direct that all ~ontact with the State Department should be 
carried on eL;"elusively through his office. This acted as a 
deterrent to ooordination and totally separated the two 
368 departments, forcing the Chiefs to develop their own 
t . 369 assump 10ns. 
On the other hand, the civilians did not really be-
lieve that the Chiefs were capable of incorporating non-
military factors in such a way as to supply the civilians 
with usable input. Apparently belying this assumption, 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson recalled that during the 
Korean War there was a close working relationship between 
the JCS> the Department of Defense, and the Department of 
State. To support this he pointed out that he and General 
Bradley made an agreemEm t to exclude the phrases "from a 
military point of view" and from a "political point of view" 
from their discussions. He went on to note that each agreed 
that they had their own tactical and strategic problems, 
370 
but that they "were interconnected, not separate." 
368 M"ll" 1 1s, Arms and the State, 234; also see Dean 
Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State 
Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969), 373, 
for a discussion of how this bifurcation effected the 
development of NSC/68. 
369 
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370 
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superficially, it would appear that Forrestal's goal of 
policy integration had been achieved, but on further exa~i­
nation such a conclusion becomes suspect. Acheson clearly 
attributes the good working relationship between the State 
Department and the JCS to the presence of George C. Marshall, 
the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, in his memoirs, 
Acheson criticized the Joint Chiefs for maintaining its com-
mittee structure and pointed out that because the Chiefs 
were "burdened by both staff and command duties," it was 
"extremely difficult for civilian officers engaged in foreign 
affairs to work with them". He went on to say that: 
All too often it [the JCS] produces for those looking 
for military advice and guidance only oracular utter-
ances. Since it is a committee and its views are the 
results of votes on formal papers prepared for it, it 
quite literally is like my favorite old lady who could 
not say what she thought until she heard what she said. 
Even on the tentative basis, it is hard for high offi-
cials to get military advice in our government. When 
he does get it, it is apt to be unresponsive to the 
problems bothering the civilian official.37I 
While it is true that much of the criticism directed at the 
JCS was based on its cumbersome organization, and the inser-
tion of a Chairman went a long way toward solving that prob-
lem; Acheson was actually addressing the impediments of 
371 
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professionalism. Since professional values fostered compart-
mentalization, it is doubtful that the mere elimination of 
odious and constrictive terminology would suddenly liberate 
the Chiefs and allow them to articulate non-military per-
ceptions. 
Such a strict-constructionalist approach actually 
enhanced the perception that the Chiefs were experts within 
their narrow professional arena. Since they were the Pre-
sident's professional military advisors, he desired to have 
free communication with them and sought their honest and 
open advice on military matters. This was precisely the 
goal that Clifford had in mind when he recommended, in 
December 1946, that a pluralistic JCS be created. Similarly, 
it was only through open and frank discussion that the 
National Security advisory system could work. This did not 
mean, however, that the President was willing to abdicate 
any of his prerogatives. In his memoirs, Truman recalled 
that 11 I used the council INSC] only as a place for recommen-
dations to be worked out. The policy has to come down from 
the President, as all final decisions have to be made by 
372 
him. 11 The President also understood that these recom-
mendations needed to grow out of an unconstrained environ-
ment; thus he absented himself frequently from the NSC's 
372 Truman, Memoirs, II, 59. 
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meetings, in order not to prejudice its advice. 373 Such 
openness though, demanded some form of institutional linkage 
between the President and his advisors, or chaos could 
result. Admiral Leahy had performed such a function for 
Roosevelt, and Truman continued to use him in the same man-
ner until the Admiral's retirement in 1949. General Eisen-
bower was brought in to temporarily fill the void, but 
expediency gave way to institutionalization with the appoint-
ment of General Bradley to the chairmanship in 1949. During 
his tenure as Chairman, Bradley scrupulously avoided imposing his 
views on the other Chiefs, and attempted to present their 
opinions faithfully to the President. During the Korean War, 
Bradley attempted, as Leahy had done in the last war, to 
act as the bridge between the White House and the JCS. The 
General's White House briefings and frequent conversations 
with the Fresident "kept the JCS constantly informed of what 
was in the mind of the President." 374 
Unfortunately, the same inter-service competition that 
led to the institutionalization of the chairmanship, eroded 
373 u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Covernment Oper-
ations, Organizing for National Security, Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, U.S. Senate, 1961, 
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administration's confidence in its military experts, and the 
with it the commitment to pluralistic decision making. AF: 
the military experts exhibited an increasing amount of ser-
~ice parochialism, the civilian managers became hard pressed 
to choose between expert testimony. In this regard Admiral 
Charles D. Griffin, former special assistant to Admiral 
Radford observed: 
I always felt that the Secretary of Defense always had 
enough power to do darn near anything he wanted to do. 
It was a question of not having the knowledge to make a 
determination between contradictory recommendations that 
were coming up from the various services.3 75 
These differences of opinion increased the administration's 
difficulty in dealing with congressional opposition to par-
ticular segments of the defense program. Dissent within the 
JCS became even more counter-productive when the experts 
were needed to rationalize these programs before the Congress. 
Since the civilian leadership could not receive unified 
military advice, even on matters that were "purely military 
in nature," they began to make decisions based on non-military 
factors, such as the economy. Where dissent did exist a 
skillful civilian administrator could use it to· his advantage, 
as Secretary Johnson did, when he scrapped the super-carrier 
United States. 
375 Charles D. Griffin, Oral History Transcript, U.S. 
Naval Institute, Oral History Program (1973), 395. 
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Ultimately, these inter-service conflicts lead the 
administration to believe that a greater degree of unanimity 
was required, not just to facilitate internal policy formu-
lation, but also to optimize external policy implementation. 
Even before the passage of the National Security Act, Presi-
dent Truman began to realize the impact disunity could have 
and warned the Chiefs: 
... when the President of the United States, the Commander-
in-Chief of the Army and the Navy, sets out a policy, that 
policy should be supported by the Army and the War Depart-
ment and the Navy Department.376 
Unanimity would relieve the administration of the difficult 
task of selecting among expert witnesses and would mend the 
walls against the administration's opponents. Inherent within 
this solution, though, is a dilemma that the civilian leader-
ship has yet to solve. The imposition of unanimity on the 
Chiefs destroys open and honest military advice; yet the lack 
of it destroys unification. 
Experience showed the Truman administration that a 
decision at the executive level did not necessarily end thE: 
debate, but at times even exacerbated it, thus making unani-
mity even more desirable. Slowly and incrementally disunity 
among the Chiefs became synonymous with opposition to the 
administration's policy. Initially, the presence of a Chair-
man and specifically General Bradley's promotion to five star 
37~ruman, Public Papers, 1946, 194-5. 
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rank held out the hope that the dilemma could be solved 
through internal controls. This would result in what Presi-
dent Truman called "Objective Agreements--a true meeting. of 
1 . d "377 professiona m1n s. Such internal controls would not 
mitigate the Chiefs' advisory function, for they would still 
be free to debate openly and honestly the pressing issues of 
the day. What was "objective," though, would probably be 
determined by the administration. By 1949, the administra-
tion had come to the conclusion that persuasion was an inef-
fective means of dealing with the problem, thus the decision 
to opt for the implementation of Forrestal's "Shadow Concept" 
of concentrating power via the amendments to the National 
Security Act. 
The civilian leadership made no secret of the fact that 
it expected the Chiefs to be loyal members of the administra-
tio~s team, especiall~ in regard to their relatiQns with _Con-
gress. Secretary Forrestal informed them that if they could 
not support the President's program they could resign.378 
Truman himself informed the Chiefs in May of 1948 that he 
expected them to support his program "in good spirit and 
without mental reservations." He emphasized that the time 
377 
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for debate ceased once a program became official and that he 
expected "every member of the administration to support it 
fully, both in public and in private." 379 Despite this 
directive, less than a year later, in February 1949, the 
President had to remind the JCS that "complete, undivided 
loyalty to all such decisions will be demanded at all times 
380 
and at all places." The fate of Admiral Denfeld was a 
clear example of the requirement for loyalty. In the final 
analysis these controls would only be as effective as the men 
who would implement them. It was with this in mind that 
James Forrestal "liked to insist that he was not as much 
interested in the diagram of an organization as he was in 
381 
the names in the little boxes." 
It was for this reason that the dual problem of lack 
of unanimity and public debate on national security issues 
became inextricably connected to the JCS appointment process. 
While in theory the President as CoF.~ander in Chief can 
appoint anyone he wishes, reality limits his options. The 
Chiefs themselves are chosen from a small pool of available 
flag officers. Lawrence Korb notes in his study of the JCS, 
the President's "choice is usually limited to a few top men 
379Ibid. , 437. 
380 
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in each branch of the Armed Forces, whose promotion into 
this elite is rigidly controlled by the individual ser-
,382 
vice. True, the President can reach down into the ranks 
of more junior flag rank officers for a Chief, but he will 
383 
have to do so over the protests of the service bureaucracy. 
Furthermore, the President must remain cognizant of the fact 
that the Chief maintains a "front man" relationship between 
the administration that appoints him and the service he 
represents. Denfeld discovered that the loss of the latter's 
support may make it impossible for him to carry on his job. 
Reaching too far down into the ranks may well result in such 
a degree of animosity being directed against a Chief that 
384 
it would be counter-productive to appoint him. 
While tbese factors tend to limit the President's 
choice of potential appointees to the Joint Chiefs, his 
appointment ability could potentially solve the dual problem 
presented above. If the balance between the Chiefs' two 
082 ·---
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constituencies was sufficiently disrupted so that the pre-
ponderance of loyalty resided toward the administration then 
unanimity of opinion and loyalty would be achieved. Granted 
the cost would be the destruction of Clifford's pluralistic 
JCS, but such pluralism was increasingly perceived as being 
dysfunctional anyway. At what point the administration 
realized the advantages of using the selection process to 
its full advantage is unknown, but an examination of the 
process may give us some insights. 
The membership of the Joint Chiefs during the Truman 
administration goes through two distinct phases with the 
"Revolt of the Ar'.mirals' acting as a convenient watershed. 
Up until 1949 the selection tended to conform to Richard 
Betts' model of a "Routine-Professional" appointment.385 
By this Betts' means that the officer selected was considered 
to have the highest professional stature within his service, 
or a least was one of a select group of competitors. Compat-
ibility with the administrations' policies appears to have 
been of little or no concern, although personality compatibil-
ity was still an important criteron. Almost immediately upon 
the conclusion of the Second World War, Marshall, King, and 
Arnold retired to be succeeded by the major theater commander 
from each service, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
385Betts, Cold War Crises, 53ff. 
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Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz and General Carl Spaatz. 
Each had immense public prestige and was clearly perceived 
as the expert in his respective field. With the passage of 
the National Security Act in 1947 this group turned over 
command to officers who, while well qualified, lacked the 
_ personal prestige of their predecessors. The one exception 
to this was Chief of Staff of the Army, General Omar Bradley. 
The new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis Denfeld, 
had spent the majority of the war in personnel management, 
although after the conflict he was posted to the prestigious 
billet of Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), a position 
that Admiral Nimitz previously held. The Air Force Chief of 
Staff, General Hoyt Vandenberg, h~d been primarily a tactical 
commander during the war (commanding the IX Tactical Air Force) 
and afterwards was named the first head of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency. In June of 1947, Vandenberg was named Vice 
Chief of Staff and thus began a tradition that the Air Force 
maintained for over two decades-appointing a future Chief of 
Staff first to the position of Vice Chief. Later, when 
Bradley was appointed Chairman, his Vice Chief, General 
3-8 
E. B. Potter, Nimitz (Annopolis: Naval Institute 
Press: 1976), 401. Potter in a footnote discusses Forrestal's 
opposition to Nimitz. Forrestal had a difficult time dealing 
With the strong willed King and he did not want to continue 
t~e difficulties with a strong willed Nimitz. King forced 
h1s hand and went to the President with the recommendation 
!ha~ Nimitz succeed him. It is possible that Forrestal wanted 
CNdm1ral Marc Mitscher, who supposedly declined the offer of 
0. 
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J. Lawton Collins, was named his successor. Collins also had 
been a major tactical commander during the war (commanding 
the VII Corps in F.urope). In each case the Chief designee 
had served his apprenticeship and was among the logical 
choices for selection. 
It is within this framework that the firing of Admiral 
Louis Denfeld becomes important. As discussed earlier, the 
administration hoped that internal controls and organizational 
reform would mitigate the worst aspects of inter-service con-
flict. When Denfeld became too great a political liability 
he was removed from office and replaced by Vice Admiral For-
rest Sherman. On the surface, Sherman's appointment seems 
to follow Bf:tts' routine professional model. During the war 
Sherman had been Nimitz's Chief of Staff and afterwards he 
had held important fleet commands. He was universally admired 
within the service, specifically recommended by Nimitz, and 
despite his apparent junior three star rank was still the 11th 
ranking officer in the Navy. But behind Sherman's obvious 
military qualifications there were other credentials that 
were of equal, if not greater, importance. Admiral Sherman 
was acknowledged as a pro-unification officer, who had helped 
write the 1947 legislation. He thus was politically attuned 
to the desires of the administration. Nimitz acknowledged 
this when he recommended Sherman. After narrowing the field 
to Sherman and Adroiral Richard Connolly, Nimitz told the 
President "Sherman is younger and even less involved in 
,387 
politics. 
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Furthermore, since Sherman was probably the 
Navy's foremost aviator, his selection would heal some. of 
the wounds caused by the cancellation of the United States. 
1 think it can safely be asserted that these non-professional 
qualifications guaranteed his appointment over other quali-
fied naval officers such as Admirals Connolly or Blandy •. 
It would appear that the administration decided to 
reinforce the notion of loyalty that had been explicitly 
articulated and implicitly contained within the 1949 amend-
ments to the National Security Act. While Truman had pre-
viously appointed officers on a routine professional basis, 
the appointment of Sherman may easily be interpreted as a 
step toward the politicization of the Chiefs, or to borrow 
Betts' label, a "professional-political" appointment. This 
is not politicization in the most crass terms. Instead it 
is the selection of an officer based upon professional 
qualifications,but with an appreciation to the political 
potential of the individual, especially in regard to the 
notion of loyalty to the administration's policies. 
It was not accidental that upon the death of Admiral 
Sherman in 1951, his successor was the Commander-in-Chief 
387 
. 448 h Potter, Nim1tz, • S erman originally was against 
Unification and argued, as did Leahy and other Navy officers 
that unification already existed in the form of the President 
as Commander-in-Chief. Unfortunately, we cannot document the 
source of his transformation to a unification advocate. 
Haynes, Awesome Power, 96. 
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of the Atlantic, Admiral William Fechteler. To replace the 
verY able Sherman was a difficult task and Truman deferred 
the choice to his newly appointed Secretary of the Navy Dan 
A. Kimball, under the assumption that Kimball would have to 
be able to work with the new CNO. Among the pool of senior 
admirals only Fechteler had been untainted by the "Revolt." 
Admiral Arthur Radford, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, 
was allegedly Sherman's own choice as his successor, but he 
took himself out of contention "for the good of the service." 
Kimball himself recalled that this, among other things, had 
been crucial in determing his choice of Fechteler. 388 Shortly 
after Fechteler's nomination he met with the President who 
emphasized the necessity for the "success of unification of 
389 the Armed Forces." Clearly the correct selection of the 
Chiefs, combined with the 1949 amendments to the National 
Security Act, would guarantee that success. 
The requirement of loyalty to the administration be-
came increasingly important during the last years of the 
Truman administration and changed the role of the Joint Chiefs 
substantially. As the Democratic administration was attacked 
for its foreign policy decisions, it was forced to rely more 
38\. Jack Bauer, "Dan Able Kimball," in American 
Secretaries of the Navy~ ed. by Bauer, Robert Albion and Pablo 
Coletta, Draft Copy. 
389
william Fechteler, Oral History Transcript, Colum-
bia University Oral History Program (1962), 65. 
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and more on the JCS to rationalize and defend its programs. 
Bradley, more than any of the other Chiefs, became a stalking 
horse for the administration's policies, especially as its 
civilian policy makers, such as Acheson, lost all credibility 
h R bl . 390 with t e epu 1cans. The role of the Chairman, because 
of his theoretical lack of service affiliation and his close 
ties to the administration, seems to have developed a col-
lateral function to support the administration's policies. 
Forrestal may have been alluding to this function when he 
used the word "agent" to describe the relationship between 
the Chairman and the Secretary. Unfortunately, even General 
Bradley could only trade on his prestige for a short time. 
In the end he also lost credibility. Senator Taft pointed 
this out in 1951: 
I have come to the point where I do not accept them [the 
JCS] as experts, particularly when General Bradley makes 
a foreign policy speech. I suggest that the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff are absolutely under the control of the adminis-
tration.3~1 
Under such circumstances it was impossible to keep the illu-
sion of traditional professionalism. 
The role the Chiefs were playing in 1953 was a far cry 
from the pluralistic model of traditional professionalism 
that Truman, Clifford and Forrestal originally envisioned, but 
390
samuel Huntington, Soldier and the State: The 
!_D"h~e~o_r"'-y--=:a;.::n:..:d:::......:P::...o:::...=.l=:i:-7t:.::i:..:c:..:s::.......;o::..f==:.::C:.::i7v...:i:..:l:.:1::..:· -a;n=---=--;::;M~l:-"'.:..::1~-=-i~-t;a;r;y._-:.:.:R~e-===l~a~.c:.t;-1:::.:. _;_o':::...--'n:::..--'.:::.s;_;_(7':N~e-w-·Y or k : Random House, Vintage Books, 1964), 386. 
39L ~ew York Times, 27 April 1951, 4. 
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pluralism had failed in the face of inter-service conflict 
and the new demands of the post-war world. The administra-
tion's reaction was to opt for more centralization and to 
demand greater unanimity. This unanimity would result in 
"objective agreements" to support the administration's 
policies. The firing of Denfeld, followed by the appoint-
ments of Sherman and Fechteler, and the relief of MacArthur, 
reminded the Chiefs that civilian control of the military 
was becoming a euphemism for administration control of the 
military. But the Truman administration had not completely 
forgotten the ideal of the pluralistic structure. Bradley 
carefully played the honest broker in his dealings with the 
other Chiefs. This was undoubtedly the intention of the 
President, but the administration was caught between the 
ideal and the realities of the bureaucratic and political 
world. The changing of the nature of the JCS had begun and 
would continue into the next administration. 
The Eisenhower administration's perception of the 
role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff differed fundamentally 
from that of its predecessor, primarily due to a differing 
perception of the Chiefs' advisory function and with it the 
concept and limitations of what "military expertise" entailed. 
Since Eisenhower's own military experience and prestige far 
overshadowed that of his Chiefs, he was in a very real sense 
his own military expert. As Sherman Adams wrote: 
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In fact, Eisenhower's personal experience as a profes-
sional soldier and as the wartime commander of the 
greatest expeditionary force that the world has ever 
seen made him if anything harder to deal 3~~th when ~ear­inspired pressures came from Congress ••• 
With the President as the administration's resident military 
expert, it was only natural that the Defense Department's 
civilian leadership tended to be resource managers as opposed 
to military planners. Eisenhower's first two selections for 
the office of Secretary of Defense, Charles E. (Engine Charlie) 
Wilson and Neil McElroy, respectively the presidents of General 
Motors and Proctor & Gamble, enhanced this perspective. 
Although neither had any experience in defense decision making, 
the administration believed that the management skills they 
possessed were readily transferable. One White House insider 
was reported to have said, "anyone who can run General Motors 
can run anything."393 Wilson himself described his role in 
that light: 
Actually the current trend in all big enterprises--private 
business as well as the Department of Defense--is to 
decentralize actual operations thus leaving top manage-
ment free to establish and clarify policy and follow up 
on performance.394 
392sherman Adams, First Hand Report: The Story of the 
Eisenhower Administration (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), 
396. 
393c.w. Borklund, The DE~partment of Defense (New York: 
Frederick Praeger, 1968), 137. 
394summary of Secretary Wilson's letter of June 17, 1957 
regarding the O'Mahoney amendment to the FY 58 appropriations 
bill. Harlow Papers, box 7, folder "DoD Budget 1958," Dwight 
D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. (Hereafter referred 
to as Eisenhower Library.) 
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The fact that the Eisenhower ·administration did not 
have to rely on the Joint Chiefs for military expertise also 
bad a profound impact on their role. While Truman had ·poli-
ticized the Chiefs in order to offset criticism of his adminis-
tration, Eisenhower neither needed nor desired such support. 
Instead he "desired only their agreement as members of a 
team." 395 In fact, shortly after Eisenhower assumed office 
Robert Cutler, the President's advisor on national security 
affairs, informed the JCS that the President did not like 
uniformed military officers publicly discussing policy. 
Cutler quoted the President as saying "I don't like it a damn 
bit. If it doesn't stop I know what to do about it." 396 
Cutler was obviously conveying the President's dislike of 
Bradley voicing his support for Truman's policy. 
The President was committed to the team concept as 
the backbone of any organization, especially the military, 
since he felt that unification could never be achieved without 
it. Eisenhower believed that the Chiefs had to cease being 
service spokesmen and that they had to rise above service 
parochialism, but as a former Chief he fully understood the 
service commitment. In August of 1953 he called for an 
independent examination of the service roles and missions, 
395James A. Donovan, Militarism, U.S.A. (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), 117. 
396Memorandum of Conversation between General Cutler 
anct General Matthews, 5 February 1953, Record Group 218, box 5, 
folder "091, China," National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
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and their relationship to atomic war. Sadly, he lamented, 
"such a study cannot be accomplished in a truly objectiv:e way 
bY the Joint Chiefs of Staff because of the understandable 
inclination of military men to protect the prerogatives of 
their respective services." 397 Eisenhower feared that if the 
Chiefs failed to rise above their service interests, the JCS 
would become "little more than an agency for eliminating from 
proposals and projects unconsequential differences." 398 As 
long as the Chiefs continued to represent their services they 
could never be molded into the team that the President wanted. 
such a team concept was the nucleus of the staff model that 
Eisenhower was familiar with. 
The President endeavored to achieve the team concept 
through several media. One was to require the Chiefs to 
consider non-military factors while developing their advisory 
input. This requirement was levied on the Chiefs in a direc-
tive from Secretary Wilson during the summer of 1954. Wilson 
called on the Chiefs to "avail themselves of the most com-
petent and considered thinking that can be obtained represent-
ing every pertinent point of view, including military, 
397Dwight D. Eisenhower to Carl Heinshaw, Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, 1 August 1953, Central File, 
folder 'OF 108-8 ( 1) ;' Eisenhower library. 
1948 
' bower 
398F. l 1na 
1916-1952 
Library. 
Report to the Secretary of Defense, 8 February 
File, box 38, folder "Forrestal ( 2 ), " Eisen-
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scientific, industrial and economic."399 Ostensibly, this 
directive seemed to institutionalize the key recommendations 
of the 1953 Rockefeller Report, that called for the Chiefs 
to draw upon a broader base of knowledge while developing 
their war plans; although the Report acknowledged that those 
plans should be "based primarily on military factors." 400 
The Wilson Directive seemed to reject traditional military 
professionalism and to demand a higher degree of fusion than 
previously had been espoused, but it is questionable whether 
the President actually wanted such fusion. His own background 
seemed to indicate a preference for traditionalism. He 
manifested this in his criticism of Bradley's actions and in 
his campaign promise to limit the JCS to "purely military 
401 decisions." In a 1958 staff meeting he reaffirmed this 
position by stating that "it is necessary [that the JCS sup-
ply] purely military advice and real agreements on the imple-
mentation of strategy, planning and forces." 402 
399 
. Quoted in Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 
395. 
400Report of the Rockefeller Committee on Department 
of Defense Organization, 11 April 1953 (printed for use of 
the Committee on Armed Services, 83rd Congress, 1st S6sEion), 
4. 
401 New YorkTimes, 23 April 1953, 16; for a further dis-
cussion of Eisenhower's traditionalism see Chapter VII, The 
Joint Chiefs' Own Perceived Role. 
402 Memorandum for Record, Meeting on Defense Organiza-
tion, 25 January 1958, Rockefeller Committee Records, box 18, 
folder "136 ( 3)," Eisenhower Library, (Emphasis added). 
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Given this general outlook by the President, the real 
intention of Wilson's directive seems a bit confusing. I 
would suggest that it was an effort to get the Chiefs to 
leave their service parochialism behind and take a broader 
perspective. Adwiral Radford's observation, "these damn 
so and so's, why can't they look at the broad picture," 
seems to support the contention that the Chiefs were viewed 
as being overly narrow in their outlook. 403 Forcing the 
Chiefs to take such a broad perspective had inherent advan-
tages. If the Chiefs could be forced to take the same per-
spective as the administration, then it was probable that the 
Chiefs would come to the same conclusions as the administra-
tion on strategic and economic matters. If that occurred, 
it could also be anticipated that all the Chiefs would sup-
port the "New Look" proposals. This hypothesis seems to be 
supported by General Maxwell Taylor's recollection that the 
Chiefs were told to consider the views of their superiors 
and not submit contentious recommendations. 404 Thus the 
directive's issuance shortly after the administration's first 
year in office may well have been one effort to achieve 
unanimity. This approach only differs in degree from Truman's 
demand for unanimity on the part of his Chiefs. Truman 
allowed the Chiefs to differ with the administration prior to 
403 
Griffin, Oral History, 343. 
404 
Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: 
Rarper & Brothers, 1959), 106. 
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the final decision. It was only after the decision had been 
reached that the administration sought to enforce loyality. 
one can argue that the creation of the chairmanship was ·a 
definite move by the Truman administration to require the 
Chiefs to consider the views of their civilian superiors prior 
to their giving official advice, this had been one of Leahy's 
main functions during the war, but that approach was never 
institutionalized afterwards in the form of a directive until 
the Eisenhower administration. 
A second method of guaranteeing that the team concept 
permeated the Joint Chiefs was to demand that they submit 
unified positions. This was what the President meant when 
he said "real agreements on the implementation of strategy, 
planning and forces." He specifically forbade the Chiefs 
405 
to serid split decisions forward, apparently believing that 
the elimination of split decisions would also eliminate 
inter-service rivalry. Unfortunately, this demand merely 
increased the Chiefs' natural inclination to compromise. As 
Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 
to 1961, pointed out, "if you compromise, you compromise to 
406 
get something that is not very good." However, the moti-
vation of the President went further than merely the elimi-
nation of service rivalries; it was aimed at the idea of the 
405Arleigh A. Burke, Oral History Transcript, Colum-
bia University Oral History Project, 53-56. 
406 
Ibid. 
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responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to supply mili-
tarY advice. The President accurately understood that when 
the Chiefs split on an issue, the decision was thrust up one 
level higher in the bureaucracy--in this case to the civilian 
secretary of Defense. With the experts split, the Secretary 
can make any decision he wants, and the Chiefs have effec-
tively taken themselves out of the decision making process. 
Moreover, it is probable that the Secretary will make the 
decision from a position of relative ignorance, because he 
has no other "military" experts to advise him. This was the 
position that Forrestal found himself in prior to 1949. 
Admiral Burke recalled that the President was afraid that 
if the Chiefs could not make up their minds "somebody else 
will make theirs up who doesn't know as much about the 
military requirements as the Chiefs do." 407 
Responsibility, though, was only part of Eisenhower's 
rationale for unanimity. Implicitly, the idea of being a 
member of the team was foremost in the President's mind. Like 
Truman, the importance of loyalty was also very prevalent, 
but for different reasons. His military experience left an 
indelible impression upon him as to the proper mode of 
decision making and the relationship of the commander to his 
staff. There is little doubt that the President perceived 
the Joint Chiefs as his, the Commander-in-Chief's, military 
407 Ibid. 
265 
staff. This would explain his expectation of loyalty. This 
was pointed out by Secretary McElroy when he said, "they 
[the JCS] should have their opportunity to say to the Presi-
dent what they think ..• ," but once the decision has been made 
408 
then all discussion must cease. The cessation of discus-
sion did not simply mean compliance through silence, but 
whole-hearted support for the program. Any form of dissent 
was not only dysfunctional, but disloyal as well. It follow-
ed from this that when there were differences of opinion 
within the DE!fense Department team, those differences should 
remain within the confines of the team and not be publicized. 
This included the Chiefs' requirement to go before Congres-
sional Committees, which usually resulted in bringing any 
differences out into the open. This was a phenomenon that 
Eisenhower characteristically labeled "legalized insubordi-
nation." Secretary McElroy expressed the administration's 
dislike for this form of legislative appeal, when he said, 
"the right is contrary to the normal relationship between 
the executive and the legislative branches of the government, 
it creates a divisive situation not found in any other 
executive department." 409 
408 Neil McElroy, Oral History Transcript, Columbia 
University Oral History Project, 84-85. 
409us. Congress, Senate, Committee on .A.rwed Services, 
~epartment of Defense Reorganization Act, 1958: Hearings on 
1L R. 12541, 85th Congress, 2nd s~ssion, 1958, 11. 
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Eisenhower had never liked the existence of this type 
of appeal arrangement and had noted so in his 1948 memoran-
dum· 410 Later when he became President its continued ex-ist-
ence countered"his idea of a defense team making policy in 
unity. In an effort to halt such "insubordination" he 
orde.red that differences within the defense team should not 
be made public, even to Congress. As he once told Admiral 
Burke, "once I approve a budget I don't want you people [the 
Chiefs] going up there [to Congress] and undercutting my 
411 budget." He never did understand why the Chiefs could not 
simply acknowledge support for the President's program with-
out allowing the differences to surface.412 His dislike for 
such "legalized insubordination" was such that he even con-
sidered legislation that would have negated the Chiefs' 
413 
requirement to go before Congress. 
410 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Ferdinand Eberstadt, 20 
September 1948, 1916-1952 File, box 34, folder "Eberstadt," 
Eisenhower Library. Specifically Eisenhower wrote "what is 
important under this point is the practice of the separate 
services going individually to Congressional Committees. 
Until we get firmly established the intent of Congress to 
act, in matters of basic legislation and the budget, on the 
recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as opposed to 
~ny partisan recommendations of any of the Services, trouble 
1s bound to exist." 
n.c. , 
411 Burke, Oral History, 53-56. 
412 Arleigh A. Burke, private interview, Washington, 
January 1975. 
413 Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 109. 
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Another method by which the administration sought to' 
achieve unanimity was through the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
appointment process. In his 1949 memorandum Eisenhower· 
had recommended to President Truman that he use such a pro-
cess to facilitate unification: 
While the Law of 1947 was expected to relieve the Pre-
sident of the necessity of giving personal attention 
to the details of national security problems, yet we are 
now facing, not a detail of organization, but the problem 
of energizing the whole system so that it will start to 
move effectively. In my opinion, this cannot now be done 
without a certain amount of Presidential intervention, for 
the reason that inter-service struggles have been carried 
to the point where only the official who has the appoint-
ive and assignment power can sufficiently4 f~phasize his and your determination to secure teamwork. 
By the time Eisenhower took office in January 1953, the 
attacks upon the Joint Chiefs by the Republican leadership had 
reached such proportions that .it was doubtful that the new 
President could have kept the incumbents in office even if he 
had wanted to.415 As luck would have it, three of the four 
Chiefs, Bradley, Collins, and Vandenberg, were completing 
their four year term that summer; and the remaining Chief, 
414 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 4 February 
1949, 1916-1952 File, box 38 folder "Forrestal (2)," Eisen-
hower Library (referred hereafter as 1949 Memorandum). 
Eisenhower selected his cabinet in much the same manner, he 
even did it without senatorial courtesy under the assumption 
that a staff should be loyal members of his administration, 
individuals that he could work with, and that he was the only 
one who should make the final decision; see Adams, First Hand 
_Beport, 59. 
415Aside from the pressure from the Republicans, 
Secretary designee Wilson also wanted a new team of Chiefs; 
New York Times, 13 May 1953, 1; Newsweek, 25 May 1953. 
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Admiral Fechteler, would complete his first two year term 
during the same time period. Thus the opportunity presented 
itself to change completely the membership of the JCS. 
In selecting the new Chiefs the President appears to 
have used three criteria. First, the new Chiefs had to have 
greater global perspective than their predecessors. If 
nothing else the incumbents were primarily European in orien-
tation; while the Republicans perceived Asia as a focal point 
Am . 1" 416 for er1can po 1cy. Secondly, the nominee had to bE; 
acceptable to key members of the administration and to the 
Republican Party leadership. This criterion was based on 
political reality and the President's notion of the staff 
model. Finally, the President desired to have loyal Chiefs, 
who not only had a global perspective, but who would work 
effectively in the joint arena. His 1949 recommendation that 
"joint work take precedence over any personal or individual 
service matter," 417 encapsulated his ideas on the subject. 
With these three criteria as a gauge the selection process 
began. 
The four officers whom the President nominated for 
membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff were Admiral Arthur 
116
see Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A 
Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 
1960), 303 ff, for a discussion of the impact of the geo-
graphical mind set of the Chiefs and how this impacted on 
their approach to war and its interrelationship to politics. 
417 
1949 Memorandum. 
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Radford as Chairman, and General Matthew Ridgway, General 
Nathan Twining, and Admiral Robert Carney as Chief of Staff 
of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Chief of 
Naval Operations, respectively. Each brought with him a 
wealth of military experience in different theaters of 
operations, and all had commanded one of the unified commands, 
which theoretically better prepared them for their joint 
418 duties. 
The new Chairman was Admiral Arthur W. Radford, a 
central figure in the "Revolt of the Admirals" and the Com-
rnander-in-Chief of the Pacific. His previous record of ser-
vice parochialism would appear to have removed him from con-
tention. In fact, while Eisenhower was Chief of Staff, he 
had such a dislike for Radford that he told Admiral Nimitz 
that if he "brings along that so-and-so Radford" again to a 
419 
JCS meeting he, Eisenhower, would refuse to attend. But 
the President's personal feelings were mitigated by the fact 
that Radford fit all the administration's criteria. His 
experience in the Pacific, as well as his strategic outlook, 
was totally compatible with the Republican's asian orienta-
tion and the doctrine of massive retaliation.. As John Donovan 
noted: 
418 
Glenn H. Snyder, "The 'New Look' of 1953," in 
§!rategy, Politics and Defense Budgets, ed. by Warner Schil-
~i~g, Paul Hammond, and Glenn Snyder (New York: Columbia 
n1versity Press, 1962), 412-413. 
419 
New York Times, 18 August 1973, 24. 
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His view was that American military power was overex-
tended, with too many forces committed, notably in Asia, 
to positions in which the Communists could pin them 
down. Instead of such scattered deployment, Radford 
favored concentrating American power in a strategic 
reserve in or near North America. Under this arrange-
ment the main reliance for holding the front lines would 
rest on the indigenous forces being built up in non-
communist c?untrie~, wh!1n the mobile power of the United 
States rema1ned po1sed. 
such strategic thinking made Radford completely acceptable 
to the Republican leadership, especially Senator Robert Taft 
of Ohio, 421 who was becoming very sympathetic to the notion 
that air and sea power could replace American ground forces.422 
Taft even suggested that the new Chiefs be appointed immedi-
ately so that they could begin their reappraisal of American 
strategic posture before they officially took over. After 
the adrrinistration's bitter fight over the confirmation of 
Secretary of Labor, the desires of the Ohio Senator were taken 
h . t . d t. 423 very muc 1n o cons1 era 1on. When the final list of 
nominees for the Joint Chiefs was decided upon it was given to 
424 Taft for his approval. In regard to the selection of 
420 Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 18. 
421 N ew York Times, 25 April 1953, 8. 
422 N 
ew York Times, 22 April, 1953, l. 
423 N 
ew York Times, 13 May 1953, 10. 
424 Donovan, Inside Story, 325. 
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Radford, Taft said " I am glad to have for Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff a man who has said we are capable of 
425 
fighting an aggressive war in the· Pacific." 
While it was undoubtedly the Republican connection 
that made Radford attractive for the chairmanship, it was 
secretary of Defense nominee Wilson who guaranteed his 
nomination. Eisenhower's commitment to the staff model 
meant that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to 
be totally acceptable to Mr. Wilson, since they were his 
military advisors as well as the President's. 426 During 
Eisenhower's pre-inaugural trip to Korea, he and Wilson 
427 
met with Radford aboard his flagship, the U.S.S. Helena. 
Both men were very impressed with the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Pacific, and as soon as Admiral Radford had repented 
for his earlier transgressions against unification the way 
d f h . . t. 428 was pave or 1s nom1na 1on. 
425 New York Times, 15 May 1953, 3. 
426 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (New York: 
Doubleday, 1963), 96. 
427 Admiral Fechteler claims that he arranged the 
Helena meeting and that Eisenhower had not planned to meet 
Radford. Fechteler, Oral History, 117. 
428 Adams, First Hand Report, 403-4. See Wilson's 
letter to Eisenhower recommending Radford for the Chairman-
ship, 12 May 1953, Central File/Official File, box 100, 
folder"OF 3G-JCS, 5 January-March 1955,n Eisenhower-Library. 
Also see Life magazine, 25 May 1953; Life correspondent 
Richard MacMillan reported that the key point was Radford's 
Presentation during a dinner on Iwo Jima, on the Asian 
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The rest of Eisenhower's new Chiefs were all equally 
acceptable under the various criteria that the administration 
established. All had vast experience as unified commanders-
Ridgway as the United Nations Commander in Korea and then 
as Eisenhower's own successor as Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR), Twining was Commander-in-Chief, Alaska, 
and Carney was Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern 
Europe (CINCAFSOUTH). Carney, in particular, had Eisenhower's 
respect, having gone with him to Europe, in 1951, as his 
deputy and having been given the Mediterranean command by 
Eisenhower shortly before the General retired to run for the 
Presidency. While Carney was CINCAFSOUTH he began to embrace 
the strategic ideas that would eventually be the basis for 
429 
the New Look. Until Radford's name was announced as the 
new Chairman, Carney was considered the leading candidate. 
Eisenhower may well have promised the job to him, only to 
find out that Wilson wanted Radford. Thus the only compen-
sation the President could offer Carney was that of Chief 
430 
of Naval Operations. In due course Carney was nominated 
situation. Secretary Wilson was deeply impressed and Rad-
ford was asked to 2.ccompany the group to Korea. According 
to MacMillan, Eisenhower asked his aide, "Is there room on 
our airplane for Admiral Radford?" "No Sir," was the 
response. Eisenhower then said "then see who can be left 
behind." 
429 
York: 
James Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New 
Harper, 1958), 136. 
430 
Fechteler, Oral History, 124. 
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for CNO and the incumbent, Admiral Fechteler, replaced him 
in the Mediterranean command. 
General Ridgway's selection as Army Chief of Staff 
was by no means as clear cut as Carney's selection for Chief 
of Naval Operations. Aside from Ridgway, the two other 
officers considered to have the best chance to be Collins' 
successor were General Mark Clark, the United Nations Com-
mander in Korea, and General Alfred Gruenther, Ridgway's 
own Chief of Staff in Europe. Clark's name was also promi-
nently mentioned as a possible Chairman, but his appointment 
431 
for any position was opposed by Texas Republicans. Their 
opposition to Clark stemmed from the annihilation of the 
36th Infantry Division during the crossing of the Rapido 
River during the Italian Campaign. The 36th was a Texas 
National Guard Division, and the Texans blamed Clark who, 
432 
as 5th Army Commander, ordered the attack. Given the 
importance of the Texas delegation at the Republican Con-
vention it is not surprising that Clark was passed over. 433 
General Gruenther's non-selection is a far different and 
more complicated matter. Undoubtedly, one of the most 
431New York Times, 10 May 1953, 31. 
432Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino (Washington: 
Office of the Chief of Military History, 1969), 322-352. 
433 Herbert S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the American 
Crusades (New York: MacMj_llian Co., 1972), 83-101. 
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capable officers in the Army, he had been the first Director 
of the Joint Staff and had gone with Eisenhower to Europe in 
1951 as his Chief of Staff. He continued in that capacity 
when Ridgway succeeded Eisenhower in 1952. Ridgway's own 
appointment to SACEUR is clouded by the rumor that the State 
Department wanted him out of Tokyo while the Japanese Peace 
Treaty was being negotiated. 434 If that is true, then what 
does one do with a successful army commander? Gruenther, 
was unquestionably very qualified to succeed 
Eisenhower in Europe, but his identification with his former 
commander resulted in disfavor among Democrats. I would 
suggest that a temporary solution may have been found with 
the appointment of Ridgway to SACEUR. Eisenhower still con-
sidered Gruenther "the best qualified man in the service of 
435 
the United States for the post," and may well have seen 
the nomination of Ridgway to Chief of Staff as a means of 
elevating Gruether to the post of the NATO commander, which 
he did upon Ridgway's return to \I,Tashington. 
The final member of Eisenhower's new team of Chiefs 
was Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan S. Twining. His selec-
tion appears to be free of the political machinations that 
Proceeded the selections of Carney, Ridgway, and Radford. 
4 j4Betts, Cold War Crises, 243, citing C.L. Saltzen-
berger, A Long Row of Candles (New York: MacMillian, 1969), 
748. 
435E. h 1sen ower, Mandate for Change, 449. 
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Twining had been Air Force Vice Chief of Staff since 1950 
and was acting Chief of Staff during the last months of the 
Truman administration due to Vandenberg's ill health. 
Despite his presence on the JCS, he seems to have escaped 
unscathed from the political controversy that surrounded 
the Joint Chiefs. He was even considered a non-controver-
sial figure within the Air Force and managed to avoid the 
fl . f th . d 436 D . t h. 1 intra-service con 1cts o e per1o • esp1 e 1s ow 
profile, there is little doubt that the Air Force was sympa-
thetic to the new administration's strategic outlook. All 
of these factors seem to have combined to gain the favor of 
437 
Secretary Wilson and Air Force Secretary Harold Talbott. 
In the final analysis the "new" Chiefs were selected 
because they fit the administration's criteria of joint 
experience, global outlook and acceptability. It was only 
natural that such a wholesale replacement of the Joint 
Chiefs would raise cries of politicization of the military. 
Admiral Fechteler later charged that the "Eisenhower adminis-
tration deliberately injected the Joint Chiefs of Staff into 
the political arena," 438 but one must place this action in 
436New York Times, 8 May 1953, 1. 
437New York Times, 29 April 1953, 13. Twining's only 
Possible competitor was General Loris Norstadt who at this 
time was assigned in Europe where he would eventually suc-
ceed Gruenther as the Supreme Allied Commander. 
438 Fechteler, Oral History, 124. 
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the context of the historical evolution of the JCS as an 
institution. President Truman had moved away from routine 
professional appointments after 1949 as one component of 
his program to create greater unanimity among the Chiefs; 
the other component being the 1949 amendments to the National 
Security Act. During Eisenhower's tour as acting Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs, he had also emphasized the need for 
unanimity, so it was only natural that as President he would 
use whatever means were at his disposal to eliminate dys-
functional competition. The President's rejection of split 
decisions, the demandthat the Chiefs take into account their 
superiors' views, and the administration's selection cri-
teria were all part of the President's program to implement 
the unanimity that he desired. In 1953, it was merely a 
difference in degree, not in intent. In this regard former 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Shoup recalled: 
••.• both Ike and succeeding Presidents have always felt 
that they wanted to appoint the Chief of service for a 
period of two years. In that way, they would get a 
chance to take a look at them and throw them out on the 
street if they didn't like them and get somebody else 
in their own administration.439 
During the Eisenhower administration onH does not 
find examples of the dramatic firing of a Chief as in the 
case of Denfeld; instead the President carefully examined 
his options before renominating an incumbent. By 1955, two 
439 Genf!ral David Shoup, Oral History, Columbia Oral 
History Project, 2. 
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of the "new" Chiefs, Carney and Ridgway, had failed their 
first two year loyalty test. Admiral Carney's transgres-
sions were three in number. First, he was not getting along 
with the Secretary of the Navy and the Marine Corps Com-
mandant, General Lemuel Shepherd. Second, at times he sided 
with General Ridgway in criticizing the New Look. Finally, 
the Admira.l made some off-the-record remarks about the 
likelihood of a Red Chinese invasion of the off-shore islands. 
Unfortunately for Carney, those remarks made their way into 
the press, causing the administration considerable embarras-
440 
smen t. According to former Secretary of Defer., se Thomas 
Gates, Carney was removed because of his problems with 
Navy's civilian leadership and the China speech. As Gates 
put it, "the question of his loyalty to the administration 
was involved." 441 
Ridgway, on the other hand, had a history of opposi-
tion to the administration's programs. In 1958 the President 
was reported to have remarked to Representative John McCor-
mick that "I have never been rough with a service Chief of 
Staff, with the pc,ssible exception of one man whom I told, 
when he served out his time, that his usefulness was 
":140 
New York Times, 1 June 1955, 16; also see Adams, 
First Hand Rf~port, 133 and Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 
478, for a further discussion of Carney's remarks and their 
impact. 
441 
Thomas Gates, Oral History TranE;cript' Columbia 
University Oral History Project, 24. 
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"442 over. Since the only two Chiefs the President fail~d 
to renominate were Ridgway and Carney he probably had to 
be referring to one of them. Sherman Adams reports tha:t 
the conflict between the President and the Army Chief of 
staff "had personal overtones to it." Adams goes on to 
recall that "Ridgway had been the President's successor in 
the command of NATO forces and Eisenhower's comments about 
Ridgway's service in that assignment had been less than 
glowing." 443 If that is true, then why did not Eisenhower 
simply fire Ridgway, or even Carney, for their obvious dis-
loyal actions? The answer is Presidential style: 
Before I [Sherman Adams] worked for him, I assumed 
Eisenhower would be a hard taskmaster. He did have a 
penchant for orderly thinking and procedures and par-
ticularly, for careful follow-through on his assignments. 
But he seldom called anybody down when he was displeased 
with his work and I never knew him to punish anybody. 
When General Matthew Ridgway split with him on the ques-
tion of armed forces manpower levels and when General 
Maxwell Taylor questioned the government's anti-missile 
program, the President was deeply embarrassed but did 
little more tha~ 4~rovide for the early retirement of these officers. 
In order to replace Carney, Ridgway, and all subse-
quent Chiefs, the Eisenhower administration used to varying 
degree the same careful methodology that it had used in 1953. 
The criteria used in selecting the "new" Chiefs had not only 
442 Adams, First Hand Report, 421. 
443 Ibid. , 399-400. 
444 1b1'd., ,.,,...,. Ad . b t T 1 
.:.. 1. ams 1s wrong a ou ay or. He re-
tired afterasecond term as Chief of Staff. 
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remained valid, but the requirement to have a joint outlook 
had increased in importance. The onecriterion that seems to 
have diminished in importance, if not completely disappeared, 
was the requirement to be accepted by the Republican Party 
leadership. Whether this was the result of the President's 
increased confidence, the death of Robert Taft, or the 
decline in the power of Senator Joseph McCarthy is difficult 
to say, but it did cease to be an important ingredient in 
the selection process. Replacing it as the most important 
criterion was being a loyal team player. 
Robert C~rney's successor as Chief of Naval Operations 
was the only two star flag officer ever appointed to the 
Joint Chiefs, Rear Admiral Arleigh A. (31 Knot) Burke. 
Burke's nickname, acquired during the Second World War, 
reflected the drive and intensity of this officer. Despite 
his ability and high standing within the service, his junior 
rank and earlier involvement in the "Revolt of the 
Admirals11445 probably would have excluded him from 
445Burke received his nickname while commanding 
Destroyer Squadron 23, the "Little Beavers," during the 
Solomons campaign. During one particular action he radioed 
ahead to some transports to stand aside "I'm coming through 
at 31 knots. 11 Admiral Halsey then gave him that nickname. 
During the "Revolt of the Admirals" Captain Burke was a 
special assistant to Denfeld and head of the Organizational 
Research and Policy Division, known as OP-23. Its purpose 
was to prepare the Navy's case for the hearings. As a re-
sult of his activities, Burke's name was removed from the 
Promotion list to Rear Admiral, until pressures from House 
Republicans got it reinstated. 
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consideration if he had not been supported by the Navy's 
1 d h . 446 c~vilian ea ers 1p. 
Matthew Ridgway's successor, Maxwell D. Taylor, had 
a brilliant combat record, was a charter member of the 
"airborne club," commander of the, 101 st Airborne Division, 
and later commander of the 8th Army. Subsequently, he was 
given command of all United Nations Forces in Korea. Aside 
from his combat commands, Taylor had been the Superintendent 
of West Point, the Commandant of Berlin, and the Army's 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. Taylor was obviously 
well qualified for the position of Chief of Staff, but 
appointments to the JCS had ceased to be of the routine-
professional variety since 1949. Despite Eisenbower's 
efforts to eliminate inter-service fighting through tbe 
selection process, it continued to plague his administra-
tion. Ridgway had been the key source of disharmony by his 
attacks upon the administration's New Look proposals. 
In essence the administratio~'s New Look posture was 
based upon a ree\'aluation of American military capabilities 
and commitments. This evaluation in turn was based upon 
certain assumptions as to the nature of the threat. In the 
first place, the administration believed that the possibil-
ity of economic destruct1on, through overspending, was as 
446 Thomas Gates, Oral History, 26. 
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dangerous as the military threat itself. Thus the Republi-
cans sought to balance the budget, which meant that military 
appropriations had to be cut or at least not substantially 
increased. Secondly, the administration rejected the hypc•-
thesis that there was a year of maximum danger in which the 
United States must prepare to repel a Russian attack. 
Instead the President felt that the nation must prepare for 
a long period of potential danger, and that instead of maxi-
mizing expenditures in response to the year of maximum 
danger, the nation should spread its military expenditures 
out over the "long haul." Finally, the administration 
perceived that there were certain lessons to be learned from 
the Korean War. Most noticeable was that such a war was 
extremely expensive in terms of money, manpower, and domes-
tic politics. The kind of mid-range war in the third world 
that Korea represented must be avoided because it drained 
the nation's military strength and detracted from its pri-
mary missions, the defense of the Continental United States 
and Europe. InstE·ad, indigenous populations would supply 
the ground combat power for such future wars, while the 
United States supplied high technology and if necessary 
nuclear firepower. Technology would be a substitute for 
manpower both in the third world and in Europe. Under this 
"bigger-bang for the buck" philosophy the P..rmy found itself 
at a disadvantage in competing for resources with the Air 
Force and the Navy. As a result the Army was continually 
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cut in size during this period, primarily due to fiscal 
restraints and the lack of a mission. 
Whether Ridgway's attacks were motivated by service 
parochialism or patriotic fear of the weaknesses of the 
strategy, the results were the same perceived dysfunctional 
behavior. The President may well have felt that he had made 
a mistake by selecting Ridgway and he was not going to let 
it happen again. With this in mind, prior to his nomination, 
General Taylor was recalled from the Far East for an inter-
view with the President and Secretary Wilson. This process 
was not unfamiliar to Taylor, who had been interviewed in 
1953 prior to his original assignment to command the 8th 
Army. At that time the discussion was conducted in the 
shadow of the Truman-MacArthur controversy and had concen-
trated on Taylor's willingness to carry out his civilian 
leaders' directives and follow the prevailing defensive 
strategy. After that experience General Taylor wrote, 
"having apparently passed the tests in Washington, I depart-
ed for the Far East." 447 
The issues were now much broader than whether General 
Taylor was going to be a loyal theater commander. The selec-
tion of the right Chief of Staff was as important to the 
Army as it was for the administration. The Eisenhower-
447 Maxwell Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: 
Norton & Co., Inc., 1972), 138. 
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Ridgway conflict had created a deep rift between the Com-
mander-in-Chief and his former service. It would be up to 
the new Chief of Staff to bridge that gap. Taylor's own 
recollection of the interview was as follows: 
During the two years as Chief of Staff, General Ridgway 
had had a very difficult time in the atmosphere of the 
new administration with its commitment to the strategy 
of massive retaliation. Although I admired his staunch 
opposition to this strategic fallacy and doubted that 
my attitude would be significantly different from his, 
I had no difficulty with the questions addressed to me 
by the President and Wilson. Oddly, they were not 
interested in my views on world strategy, but wished to 
be assured of my willingness to acce~t and carry out the 
orders of my civilian superiors •••• 44 8 
The President's lack of interest in General Taylor's stra-
tegic views is not all that surprising when one goes into a 
detailed analysis of the contents of the interview. The 
memorandum for record written afterwards reveals that the 
President wanted more than mere assurances that Taylor's 
Constitutional oath would be kept. First, Taylor was told 
that he had to "understand and wholeheartedly accept that 
his primary responsibility related to his joint duties." 
Second, his strategic views must be "in accord with those of 
the President." Finally, the Presjdent informed him that 
449 
"loyalty in spirit as well as letter was necessary." 
448Ibid., 156. 
449
nouglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy 
Management: A Study in Defense Politics (Lexington, Ken-
tucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1977), 41-42. 
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These precepts reflected the President's efforts to 
institutionalize the ideas he had been advocating since 
1948. In his 1949 memorandum to Forrestal, Eisenhower· 
felt that loyalty should bE; required "both as to letter and 
to spirit." 450 Admiral Burke recalled a series of meetings 
with the President, shortly before he assumed the office of 
Chief of Naval Operations, in which the Fresident emphasized 
the Chief's joint responsibilities and he told Burke that 
his primary job as a Chief was not to present the Navy's 
point of view, but to be a member of the Joint Chiefs of 
451 Staff. 
While loyalty was by no means a new requirement for 
a Chief, concurrence with the administration's strategic 
view was. Previously, the Chiefs were required to support 
the administration's position after it had been decided 
upon; now that would be obviated by the fact that both 
the administration and the Chiefs approached strategic 
problems from a mutually agreed upon perspective. Under 
these circumstances, it was only natural that Eisenhower wr .. s 
unconcerned about Taylor's strategic views, because he ex-
pected them to be the same as his. The unanimity the Presi-
dent sought would finally be achieved, but the penalty would 
450 1949 Memorandum. 
451
turke, Oral History, 20. 
285 
be the Chief's objectivity. It was explicit, as Hanson 
Baldwin suggested, that the Chiefs maintain the party line 
in order to keep their jobs. 452 One is reminded of Admiral 
carney's admonition to General Taylor upon the latter's 
assumption of office, "You're one of the good new Chiefs 
now but you'll be surprised how soon you become one of the 
bad old Chiefs." 453 
Loyalty continued to be a crucial prerequisite for 
nomination to the Joint Chiefs all through the Eisenhower 
period. When General Taylor retired after two terms in 
office his Vice-Chief, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, succeeded 
him. Lemnitzer was almost 60 years old at the time of his 
appointment and was the oldest man ever to be nominated 
for the JCS. A very effective officer who had built a 
reputation as a planner, Lemnitzer had held numerous high 
level assignments to include the Far East command in the 
wake of Ridgway and Taylor. Furthermore, his background 
indicated a broad joint outlook. As one Pentagon insider 
noted: 
Lemnitzer isn't a yes-man, but you won't see him bucking 
Ike on policy. He will present his requirements effec-
tively, btt he'll accept higher decisi~%~ as the final 
word. He's a team worker all the way. 
452 y k T · 1 J 1955 16 New or 1mes, une , • 
453 
Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 171. 
454 
Newsweek, 30 March 1959, 25. 
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In 1960 when Lemnitzer was promoted to the chairman-
ship, his Vice-Chief, General George Decker was nominated 
Chief of Staff of the Army. Decker's whole career appears 
to be an anomaly. An ROTC product who fought in the Pacific 
during the Second World War, Decker madehis fame primarily 
as a logistics and fiscal specialist rather than as a troop 
commander, although he did have the appropriate troop com-
mands, which included succeeding Lemnitzer in the Far East. 
Later when Lemnitzer became Chief, Decker moved to Washing-
ton as Vice-Chief. Decker was a classic case of the com-
petent journeyman officer who methodically punched all the 
right tickets and moved up through the hierarchy. He was 
not a member of the "airborne club," nor was he a Marshall 
protege, an apparent requirement for all the preceding post-
war Chiefs of Staff of the Army. The only other Chief to be 
appointed during the remainder of the Eisenhower administra-
tion was Air Force General Thomas White, Chief of Staff of 
the Air Force when General Twining became Chairman in 1957. 
In the case of both White and Decker the administra-
tion appears to have reverted to something along the line of 
a routine-professional appointment. Part of the reason may 
lie in the fact that both officers were Vice-Chiefs. This 
Position allowed the administration the advantage of seeing 
th . t . b f . t . th 4 55 dl h em ln opera lOn e ore nomlna lng em. secon y, t ere 
455General George Decker, Private Interview, Washing-
ton, D.C., January 1975. 
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appears to have been a lessening of tension between the Army 
and the administration during Lemnitzer's tour as Chief. 
While the President was obviously very careful in the selec-
tion of Taylor following on the hee]s of Ridgway, the rela-
tively good experience with Lemnitzer may have paved the we.y 
for Decker. On the other hand, the Air Force, which gained 
the most from the New Look posture, was not a problem during 
this period, thus making White's promotion even more natural. 
While loyalty was important for a member of the Joint 
Chiefs, it was absolutely essential for the Chairman. This 
perspective was not unj_que to the Eisenhower presidency. 
Bradley showed great loyalty to the Truman administration, 
even to the point of risking his own professionalism. Eisen-
hower expected his Chairmen to make sure that the JCS not 
only considered the problems that were brought to their 
attention, but that he should insure that the Chiefs "reach, 
whenever possible, joint conclusions and recommendations." 
Furthermore, it would be up to the Chairman to make sure that 
the Secretary was provided with sufficient information to 
. 456 
make a decision if the Chiefs split on an 1.ssue. 
While Admiral Radford personified these expectations, 
they generally applied to all the Chairmen after 1949. As 
the power of the Chairman increased, it became apparent that 
456 
1949 Memorandum. 
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he was the administration's man within the Joint Chiefs. 457 
Since the Chairman had no service constituency to worry about, 
unlike the other members of the JCS, he could play the role 
of the civilian leadership's front man. During his nomina-
tion hearing Admiral Radford pointed out that " ••• the Chajr-
man, as an individual, is expected to divorce himself com-
pletely from any service affiliation. He is supposed to be 
a member of the defense team under the Secretary of 
Defense." 458 
The requirement to be above service interest is essen-
tial if the Chairman is to represent the administration 
before the Chiefs. Furthermore, it supported EiEenhower's 
view of the primacy of the Chiefs' joint orientation. But 
this requirement brought about some strange transformations 
as indicated by the following testimony by General Lemnitzer: 
As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff I would have no 
service affiliation, Senator. I would deal with all the 
services in exactly the same way and apply my best judge-
ment to the problems as they arise. 
As Chief of the Army and throughout my service, I have 
been an ardent advocate of the role of the Army and the 
importance of the mission of the Army and naturally I 
still feel that way today. 
But as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would not 
457For a further discussion of this relationship see 
Peter F.. Wi tteried, "The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff: An Evolving Instituion," unpublished M.A. Thesis, 
University of ViJginia, 1964. 
458 . Hear1ngs Nomination, 1953, 5. 
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advocate any one service position over any other service 
position. I would like to make that clear. 459 
General Lemnitzer's testimony reflects the transformation 
that must occur within an officer when he ceases being a ser-
vice spokesman and becomes a neutral Chairman. It may be 
suggested, though, that such a sudden change is only a matter 
of self-delusion and that it would be impossible for the 
Chairman to forget the values he had acquired over a whole 
career. Despite this problem, the Chairman must attempt to 
maintain at least the facade of neutrality in order to expedite 
his relations with the other Chiefs. 
With loyalty and joint orientation the prime requi-
sites, the President selected his Chairman with the same care 
that went into the selection of the Chiefs. The chairmanship 
was first filled by Radford who was followed successively by 
Twining and then Lemnitzer. The fact the chairmanship rotated 
among the services was more of an accident than a plan. 
the President recalled in his memoirs: 
I had not felt any strong obligation to adhere to any 
unwritten understanding that the position of Chairman be 
rotated among the services--Army, Navy, Air--but I felt 
that such rotation, all other things being equal, was 
desirable. Happily, I felt that each individual appointed 
45%.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 
Hearings on Nomination of General Lyman L. Lemnitzer for 
Appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
General Ge~e--Henry Decker for Appointment as Chief of Staff, 
United States Army, 86th Congress,2nd Session, 1960, p. 12. 
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during my administrations to the Chairman's position--
Radford, Twining, and Lemnitzer~-was tb~ best qualified 
men available in any of the services.460 
What was left unsaid by the President was that all of his 
Chairman were loyal team players. Twining was the only one 
of the original service Chiefs to be renominated in 1955, 
which alone is convincing evidence of his loyalty. The Air 
Force was hurt least by the administration's New Look pro-
posals, thus Twining did not have to fight for his service 
like Ridgway did. Furthermore, Twining's anti-communist 
attitudes paralleled those of Radford. In 1960 when illness 
forced him to retire, the President appointed General Lem-
nitzer to succeed him. The same qualifications that made 
Lemnitzer a desirable Chief of Staff held him in good stead 
for the Chairman's position. He had a relatively tranquil 
tour as Army Chief, especially in the wake of Ridgway and 
Taylor; and he was a leader in promoting unity within the 
JCS. When asked about the differences that existed between 
the Chiefs during this time, he remarked that there were no 
substantial problems.461 This is indicative of his emphasis 
on the team approach to defense matters. 
Another factor that seemed to impact upon the selec-
tion of a Chairman was the correlation of his service to the 
460Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 255. 
461Lyman L. Lemnitzer, private interview, Washington, 
D.c., January 1975. 
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prevailing strategy of the administration. During periods of 
time when the administration's strategy relied most heavily 
on nuclear retaliation, the Chairman was either an Air Force 
or a Navy officer. The reason was that these two services 
were directly involved in that mission. When tt:e prevailing 
strategy called for the introduction of ground forces as it 
did during the period of flexible response, the Chairman was 
an Army officer. Thus Lemnitzer's selection as Chairman not 
only indicated tis loyalty to Eisenhower's defense team, but 
the slow movement toward the acceptance of a posture of 
flexible response.462 
The selection of the Chairman was important to the 
administration because of the vast power that resided within 
that office. Since the position was created in 1949, there 
had been no substantive increase in the Chairman's power. Even 
the acquisition of tte right to vote was a meaningless ges-
ture, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not a democracy, 
but that right did symbolize the fulfillment of Forrestal's 
belief that the Chairman should act as the administration's 
"agent 11 within the Joint Chiefs or to use Maxwell Taylor's 
phrase 11 a sort of party whip. 11 463 
462
see Table 2 for a matrix correlating the appoint-
ment of the chairman to the national strategy. 
46 ~aylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 110. 
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TABLE 2: CORRELATION OF SELECTION OF CJCS, SERVICE OF 
ORIGIN AND NATIONAL STRATEGIC POSTURE 
Name (Service) 
Bradley (USA) 
Radford (USN) 
Twining (USAF) 
Lemnitzer (USA) 
Taylor (USA) 
Wheeler (USA) 
Moorer (USN) 
Brown (USAF) 
Jones (USAF) 
Vessey (USA) 4 
Primary Geographic or 
Military Concern of the 
Aclministra tion 
Europe 
Asia 
Europe/Nuclear 
Europe/Third World 
Asia/Third World 
Asia 
Asia/Europe/Strategic 
Nuclear 
Europe/SALT 
Europe/SALT 
Administration's 1 Strategic Posture 
F.R. 
M.R. 
M.R. 
2 toward F.R. 
F.R. 
F.R. 
3 F.R.-M.R. 
M.R. 
M.R. 
1F .R. refers to a flexible response type strategy, while M.R. refers to 
a massive retaliation type strategy. 
%uring General L€mni tzer' s term as Chairman the Eisenhower administra-
tion began to move in the direction of flexible response and away fran the 
massive retaliation posture of earlier years. Lemnitzer was also the Chair-
rmn during the first two years of the Kennedy administration when flexible 
response became the prevailing strategy. 
3The first Nixon actninistratian was marked by a movement away fran 
flexible response and a return to massive retaliation. This was the basis 
of the so called Nixon Doctrine. 
~he Reagan Aclninistratian does not sean to be marked by a specific 
geographic concern, but instead a desire to meet Soviet expansianien where 
ever it presents itself. This includes both the nuclear and conventional 
arenas. 
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The source of the Chairman's power is two distinct, 
but inextricably connected, factors. The first is the fact 
that, for the most part, Secretaries of Defense have been 
managers and not military planners. Secretary Wilson, in 
particular, came into office ignorant of defense matters. 
Lieutenant General James Gavin reports that one Chief of 
staff described him as "the most uninformed man and the most 
determined to remain so that has ever been Secretary." 4 6 4 
The second factor is the nature of the bureaucratic system. 
Since the Chairman is the Secretary's primary advisor on 
defense matters, the Secretary's inexperience will naturally 
force him to rely upon the Chairman for advice. This 
natural tendency is exacerbated by conflicting opinions among 
the Chiefs. As Admiral Radford noted before Congress: 
I think the responsibility and the authority of the 
Chairman is greater than appears in law. I have often 
pointed out to the Chiefs that the mor£ they disagree the 
more power they hand to the Chairman. 405 
In a case of a split decision, the Chairman is in a 
position to articulate his views to the Secretary or the 
President, either personally or through a written memorandum. 
464Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, 155. 
465u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 
Study of Air Power, Hearings before the subcommittee on the 
Air Force, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956, 1457. 
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The latter was the style of Admiral Radford. 466 Because the 
Chairman is the administration's representative to the JCS, 
his opinion will have far greater impact than that of a 
single Chief. This phenomenon was observed by Robert Bowie, 
President Eisenhower's Special Advisor for National Security 
Affairs: 
.•• Admiral Radford •.. held a very influencial position. 
In part the differences of opjnion among the Chiefs 
enhanced the influence of the Chairman as spokesman for 
the military point of view. And since Admiral Radford 
attended the NSC meetings, th~t75ave him an opportunity 
really to exercise that role. 
Bowie's analysis of Radford's power validates the bureau-
cratic theory that power increases in proportion to a 
player's access to the decision maker. Eisenhower understood 
this clearly in 1949 when he wrote: 
His [the Chairman's] mere presence on tte Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, acting as the trusted assistant of the Secretary 
of Defense, should do much to induce, if not compel, the 8 
attainment of unanimous recommendations and conclusions. 46 
This is not to say that the Chiefs did not have access 
to the Secretary of Defense or to the President. On the con-
trary, the Chiefs apparently had all the access they wanted, 
though some by virtue of their commitment to vertical loyalty 
466 Taylor, P.ncertain Trumpet, 106. 
467 b B . 0 1 II" T Ro ert ow1e, ra 1story ranscript, Columbia 
University Oral History Project, 10. 
468 1949 Memcrandum. 
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did not avail themselves of this opportunity as much as 
others. 469 In the end though, it was the constant and insti-
tutionalized contact that gave the Chairman the advantage. 
Radford, himself, pointed out to the President that.because 
the Chairman sees the President and the Secretary of Defense 
regularly, he generally has a "closer association with these 
officials than the other Chiefs." 470 
This combination of factors led the Chairrr.an to become 
the administration's "party whip." He was in a position not 
only to attempt to achieve unanimity, but to enforce it, by 
virtue of his "clout" with the administration. In his book 
The Uncertain Trumpet, General Taylor described how the 
Chairman's position prevailed in 18 out of 21 split decisions 
471 
sent forward to tile Secretary of· Defense. Clark and 
Legere, in their study of national security management, sug-
gest that the increasing power of the Chairman was only 
partially attributable to the desires of the civilian 
469 
During the private interviews both Admiral Burke 
and General Lemnitzer said they had as much access to the 
President as they desired. General Decker, while admitting 
that he had access felt that he should not go directly to the 
President, especially to fight for an issue that had already 
been decided upon by the Secretary of Defense. 
470
"Memorandum for the Record," Meetings on Defense 
Organization, 25 January 1958, Rockefeller Records, box 18, 
folder"l36 ( 3) ;• Eisenhower Library. 
471 Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 110. 
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leadership, but that the Chiefs were also to blame by defer-
h Ch . 472 ring power to t e a1rman. The historical evidence seems 
to indicate that the Chiefs had no real choice in the matter 
and that the gravitation of power into the hands of the Chair-
man was the result of civilian directives and bureaucratic 
realities. Granted some Chairmen have been more even handed 
in their use of power than others, but this evaluation 
473 
appears to depend on whose ox is being gored. We have 
very little data on whether or not the Chairmen have truly 
divested themselves of their service affiliation, though 
Taylor supplies us with some evidence that indicates that 
Ch . t d d t t th . . f . . 4 74 the . a1rmen en e o supper e1r serv1ce o or1g1n. 
Unfortunately, since Taylor's data only covers the 1955-1959 
period more research is needed in order to develop any 
hypothesis. 
47~eith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere, The Presi-
dent and the Management of National s~curity: A Report by 
the Institute of Defense Analysis (New York: Fredrick A. 
Praeger, 1969), 183-184. 
473Navy officers familiar with the working of Admiral 
Radford maintain that he was more than fair and that he was, 
if anything, tougher on the Navy than on the other services; 
Burke, interview; Griffin, Oral History. Admiral George 
Anderson who was Radford's special assistant, feels that 
Radford was exactly what the Chairman was supposed to be, 
Anderson, interview. For the opposite view see Gavin, War 
~Peace, 260-61 or Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 106-110-.--
47~aylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 107. 
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Ironically, the unanimity the President sought came 
about toward the end of his administratior: through the return 
to a more pluralistic JCS. The vehicle for this transfor-
mation was a 29 December 1959 memorandum from Secretary of 
Defense Thomas Gates to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This 
document, .called the Gates-JCS Memorandum announced that the 
secretary of Defense would attend all JCS meetings in which 
. b . d" d 475 split 1ssues were e1ng 1scusse • It rejected the notion 
that all differences of opinion within the Joint Chiefs were 
necessarily dysfunctional and considered instead that many 
of them were "understandable." Unanimity, for the sake of 
unanimity was rejected. Gates discovered that attending JCS 
meetings was so advantageous that he institutionalized weekly 
meetings. He thus was the first Secretary of Defense to 
meet with the Joint Chiefs on a regular basis. This resulted 
in far less tension between the administration and the Joint 
Chiefs, and less dramatic public displays of disunity. Gates 
had vast eA~enence in the Department of Defense, at both the 
OSD level and within the services. This apparently gave him 
confidence that he could make the hard decisions within a 
pluralistic environment. As such, he approached the Chiefs, 
not as competitors as Wilson had, but more like partners. He 
attempted to maintain the image of the honest broker, and he 
475J.D. Hittle, The Military Staff: 
Develop~e~t (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The 
Company, 1961), 302. 
Its History and 
Stackpole 
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fullY understood the pressures that were playing on the Chiefs: 
I saw to it that everyone, particularly the Chiefs, had 
their innings. They have leaderEhip problems of ~heir 
own. They cannot afford to lose face with their own 
people. It's worth taking the time to listen before you 
do something, eveo when you know at the onset what you 
are going to do. 476 
In the final analysis the role the Eisenhower adminis-
tration envisioned for the JCS was surprisingly congruent 
with the role envisioned by its predecessor. Eisenhower, 
like Truman before him, sought unanimity among the Chiefs in 
order to facilitate the dectsion making process; and like 
Forrestal, came to look upon the Chairman as a means of 
expediting this unanimity. The reason for the requirement 
for unanimity was several fold. First, it was perceived to 
be the key to eliminating inter-service conflicts. Secondly, 
because senior civilian defense managers did not have the 
expertise to choose rationally between alternative advice, it 
was felt that a consensus JCS position was better than a 
pluralistic one. Eisenhower, in particular, was aware of the 
dangers inherent in allowing the non-experts free reign over 
defense matters. Finally, unanimity was a political asset, 
especially in the administration's dealings with Congress. 
Thus in terms of the Chiefs' external input into the policy 
Process, both administrations wantedunified military advice. 
476 Quoted in Borklund, The Department of Defense, 118. 
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The notion of unanimity among the Chiefs led directly 
to the question of how it would be imposed. After 1948 
both Truman and Eisenhower believed that the Chiefs should 
be in total concurrence with the administration's position 
on defense matters. The only difference was the degree con-
currence would be forced. Since allowing the Chiefs to 
generate their own positions had only spawned more divisive-
ness, the easy solution was to make the major decisions at 
the top. This guaranteed the integrity of the defense team, 
a con~ept that was prevalent among the civilian leadership 
all through the period of our study. By a strange kind of 
irresponsible logic it was assumed that the administration's 
position on defense matters was the best possible position, 
simply because it was not distorted by service parochialism. 
The result was the belief, that if the Chiefs could rise 
above their service interests, they would see the correctness 
of the administration's approach. This was what President 
Truman meant when he called for "Objective Agreements--A true 
meeting of professional minds" and what President Eisenhower 
was attempting to achieve by requiring that the Chiefs incor-
porate "non-military" factors. President Eisenhower's direc-
tive that the Chiefs consider the views of their superiors 
encapsulated this notion of democratic centralism that was 
accepted by both administrations. 
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In order to achieve this unanimity of ideas two 
vehicles were used. The first was the centralization of 
power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense and the 
Chairman. The latter was the crucial means by which the 
Chiefs were forced into unanimity. The second vehicle was 
the selection of the Chiefs themselves. At about the same 
time that Truman and Eisenhower came to the conclusion that 
centralization and unanimity were important, the selection of 
Chiefs changed from the "Routine-Professional" model to the 
"Professional-Political" model. Aside from this transforma-
tion it is difficult to identify any clear cut pattern in 
the selection process. Truman had the luxury of maintaining 
the "Routine-Professional" model during most of his adminis-
tration. The only major exception was the selection of the 
Chief of Naval Operations, where loyalty to the concept of 
unification was paramount. Eisenhower seems to have been 
primarily concerned with selecting Chiefs who were loyal team 
players. Despite this requirement, Eisenhower never did move 
in the direction of a purely political appointment. Even 
Admiral Radford, who was undoubtedly the most political of 
his Chiefs, was still a very senior four star admiral and 
held probably the most important field command in the Navy. 
Furthermore, the President's prior experience with the 
military staff model led him simply to assume that loyalty 
Would automatically be forthcoming from the members of the 
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Joint Chiefs of Staff--whom he believed were his staff. The 
establishment of this commander-staff relationship was the 
heart of Eisenhower's 1958 reforms. 
It was in the external role of the Chiefs that the 
Republicans differed fundamentally from their Democratic 
predecessors. While the political realities in Washington 
had forced Truman to use the Chiefs to rationalize his 
policies, Eisenhower sought only internal concurrence from 
the Chiefs. Although his familiarity with the military staff 
model led him to expect vertical loyalty from his Chiefs 
which translated into public concurrence with the administra-
tion's policies, he did not seek the kind of overt advocacy 
that Bradley was involved in. To have done so would have 
been a violation of the military ethic that the President, 
as a former professional soldier, adhered to. 
Ironically, the more the civilian defense managers 
subordinated the Chiefs to the administration's views the 
more they destroyed any chance for the professional military 
to show responsibility. One can appreciate the civilian 
leadership's perspective on the issue. Their experience had 
shown that the Chiefs were incapable of fulfilling their 
advisory role. Instead of unified and usable advice which 
could guide the civilian leadership, they received split 
decisions, fostered by service parochialism; diluted, 
"waffled," and "paperclipped" position papers; and useless 
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exaggerated demands that were politically or economically 
impracticable. From the civilian's view point the Chiefs had 
excluded themselves from the decision making process. This 
was why Eisenhower so desperately wanted the Chiefs to show 
unanimity. Unfortunately, in his desire to make the Chiefs 
a responsible and integral part of the defense team, he was 
destroying the very independence which was the basis of 
objective advice. Making the Chiefs into a series of "yes" 
men removed a vital source of expertise that was an essential 
part of the policy process. 
Part of the problem was an inability on the part of 
the civilian leadership to understand what the real source 
of the trouble was. They kept looking for organizational 
solutions to an organizational problem, when in fact the 
problem was not completely organizational. A great deal of 
the trouble lay in the Chiefs own interpretation of what 
their role was to be and how they should act as professionals. 
If the organizational structure of the national security 
policy making system and the nature of the bureaucra.cy out-
lined two of the parameters within which the civilian leader-
ship and the Joint Chiefs defined their relationship with 
each other, the civilian's perceptions of the Chiefs' proper 
role and the Chiefs' own self-perceptions completed the 
framework. With this in mind we now turn our attention to 
thE last of these parameters, the Chiefs' self-perception of 
their role and their view of professionalism. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE JOINT CHIEFS' OWN PERCEIVED ROLE 
In attempting to ascertain the Chiefs' perception of 
their role one must first attempt to separate their bureau-
cratic role from their normative ethical values. While such 
methodology will help supply empirical data on various per-
ceptual components, such compartmentalization is for heuris-
tic reasons only. In reality a Chief's bureaucratic role and 
his ethical norms constantly interact. The former is a 
result of his placement within the hierarchical structure, 
while the latter is a product of over thirty years of assim-
ilated values. They become inextricably connected through 
the Chiefs' perception of themselves as military staff 
officers. 
In our earlier analysis of defense organizations we 
noted the relationship of a Chief's bureaucratic role with 
his dual function as the military head of a service and a 
member of the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
This duality was assessed by most outside analysis as the 
primary cause for conflict within the JCS with the separation 
of the Chiefs from their services deemed the solution. 477 
477c · · 0 . t• f th E t· B h omm1ss1on on rgan1za 1on o e xecu 1ve ranc 
of the Government, Task Force Report on National Security 
Organization (Appendix G) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1949), 66-70; Committee on the Defense 
Establishment, A Report to S<-nntor Kennedy, Washington, D.C., 
1960 (~iimeographed), 6; U.S. Committee on Department of Defense 
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The Chiefs, however, perceive this duality as not only 
inherent within their role, but functional. The basis for 
this is their belief that the planning and the operational 
command functions should be combined in the same person. 
For the Chiefs, the planning function is a corollary of their 
corporate role and the command function is a corollary of 
their service role. As a group, the Chiefs have a great 
fear of "ivory tower" planning if the plans are developed by 
nonresponsible staffs, who do not have to be concerned with 
implementing them. In a secret 1958 Joint Chiefs of Staff 
self-study conducted under the leadership of Major General 
Earl Wheeler, the following points were listed as disadvan-
tages to be incurred if the Chiefs were separated from their 
services: 
l. Tends to remove the members of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff from current intimate knowledge of the capabi-
lities of their service. 
2. Would make the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for 
planning and execution of joint operations without 
the concomitant authority and responsibility to 
budget for and control all the means required. 
Organization, Repcrt of the Rockefeller Committee on Depart-
ment of Defense Organization, ll April 1953 (printed for the 
use of the Committee on Armed Services, 83d Congress, 1st 
Session), 4-10; Commission on Organization of the Executive 
Branch of the Government, Five Staff Papers prepared for the 
Task Force on Procurement, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1955), I, The Vital Roles of the 
National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, A-54, 
A-74; The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh Commission). 
Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the 
Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1970), Appendix N, Staff Report on Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Decisionmaking, 5-11; and Rockefeller Bro-
thers Fund, International Security: The Military Aspects, 
America at Mid-Century Series, (New York: Doubleday & Co., 
Inc., 1958), 29. 
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2. Would make the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for 
planning and execution of joint operations without 
the concomitant authority and responsibility to 
budget for and control all the means required. 
3. Would reduce the responsibility, authority and pre-
rogatives of the Service Chiefs to the functional 
areas of administration, logistics and training. 
Even though the report pointed out that separation would 
allow the Chiefs to devote full time to their JCS duties and 
increase their knowledge about the capabilities of other 
services, the Wheeler Report concluded that "the separation 
of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from their 
service affiliations and command responsibilities would be 
478 
unwise." While the Joint Chiefs of Staff never officially 
commented on the study, their private views tended to corrob-
orate the Wheeler Report's position. The one exception was 
General Maxwell Taylor, who advocated separation in his 
479 book The Uncertain Trumpet. 
A-corollary to the unification of planning and command 
was a tendency on the part of the Chiefs to minimize the 
actual conflict resulting from these dual roles. Admiral 
Burke saw them as basically two aspects of the same role: 
478Report by the Ad Hoc Committee to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff on Organization of the DepartMent of Defense, 24 
January 1958. (Hereafter referred to as the Wheeler Report). 
479 Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1959), 165-180. 
306 
How do you handle a wife and yourself, it's no more 
complicated than that. What would he [the Chief] 
represent if he didn't represent his service ••• the 
ability4 gd a Joint Chief is dependent on his back-· ground. 
General Lemnitzer went even further and rejected the notion 
481 
that the two functions were even separable. While most 
of the Chiefs admit that the duality exists, they feel that 
they have reconciled any conflict to the point that one role 
does not impinge on the other. General R.idgway in his Fare-
well Report to the Secretary of Defense e~pressed the rela-
tionship in symbiotic terms: 
As Chief of Staff, United States Army, it has been my 
duty to seek to maintain the capability of the Army to 
fulfill the Army's assigned commitments. However, both 
as Chief of Staff of the Army and as a member of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, it has also been my duty to 
advance the primary interests of ~gited States security 
over and above Service interests. 
General George Decker expressed similar views in an inter-
view: 
As service representative .•• ! had the job of trying to 
get my service as much of the resources available in 
the National Defense kitty as I could .•.• As a member of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff ..• I had the responsibility 483 for the overall military preparedness of the country. 
480 Interview with Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Washing-
ton, D.C., January 1975. 
481 
Interview with General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Washing-
ton, D.C., January 1975. 
482 Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier, The Memoirs of Matthew B. 
Ridgway (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), 131. 
483 Interview with General George H. Decker, Washing-
ton, D.C., January 1975. 
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Generals Ridgway's and Decker's explanation of responsibility 
to the nation is similar to our earlier discussion of General 
Lemnitzer's account of his transformation upon being appointed 
Chairman of the JCS. 
The almost mystical manner in which the Chiefs look 
upon their command function is more than just the result of 
their desire to combine authority and responsibility. It is 
a product of the social values of the military services. 
Command is considered the ultimate achievement and epito-
mizes the true soldier. Furthermore, it is a requirement 
for further promotion. Among the post-World War II Chiefs 
only Army Chief of Staff, Harold K. Johnson (1964-1968), 
did not command at the flag rank. Command is considered so 
important that one Chief even took a demotion from a three 
star billet to a two star billet in order to command at the 
484 
appropriate level. Within this atmosphere it is easy 
to see how a Chief, who is the senior officer in his service 
and its spokesman, could look upon his role as analogous to 
that of command. This situation is complicated by the 
statutory confusion that designated some service Chiefs as 
commanders. 
4g4 
In 1858 Admiral George Anderson, Chief of Naval 
Operations, 1961-63, reverted back to the rank of rear 
admiral from vice admiral in order to command Cr,.rrier Di vi-
sion 6. He needed command at that level in the hierarchy. 
See Lawrence Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First 
Twenty-five Years (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1976), 60-61. 
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If a Chief has problems identifying his own role, 
the officer corps of his service has even greater difficulty 
understanding his role. They look toward their Chief as 
the defender of their interests and the head of their pro-
fessional organization. He is, in their mind, their com-
mander. Admiral Denfeld's greatest failing was that he 
failed as the commander in the eyes of the Navy's officer 
corps. The combination of bureaucratic imperatives to re-
present the service and socialized values lead the Chiefs to 
act as commanders and defend their prerogatives. 
Closely related to the Chiefs' perception that their 
dual role is f-cnctional is a concomitant diminution of the 
dysfunctional nature of inter-service conflict. This is 
not to say that the Chiefs consider divergence of opinion to 
be a positive good. The Wheeler Report identified it as a 
t t . l f d f. . 485 B t f h Ch. f I po en 1a area o e 1c1ency. u rom t e 1e s per-
spective such divergence can result in a pluralistic 
485 . Wheeler Report; General Bradley also real1zed the 
potential area involved in split decisions based primarily 
on service parochialism. Jn this regard he had a special 
study made '·~to document cases where individual Chiefs of 
Staff took positions which were obviously dictated by pre-
judicial Service views." The study concluded that "There 
Will continue to be disagreement as long as: (l) There are 
separate Services with differing opinions on tl:.e philosophy 
of war, and; (2) The Chiefs of'those Services are charged 
collectively with the function of exercising strategic 
direction of the Armed Forces." Memorandum for General 
Bradley, 16 December 1952, subject: Reorganization of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, box 4, folder "020 
JCS ''. National Archives. 
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decision making structure. Even the most critical of the 
former Chiefs, General Taylor, maintained "that while each 
Chief had unavoidably a 'cast' in favor of his service, it 
could not be fairly called a 'bias' and that the advantages 
of that 'cast' outweighed the disad~antages." 486 General 
Taylor was articulating the belief that each Chief comes 
into office with specialized service related expertise and 
that this will naturally lead to differing solutions to 
problems. The interaction of these differences, however, 
can ultimately result in the best advice surfacing. Thus 
each Chief attempts to translate into h~ own terms Admiral 
King's adage that what is good for the Navy is good for the 
United States. Admiral Burke amply described the phenomenon 
when he said "I was responsible for doing my best with my 
background for the security of the United States and every 
Chief knew this ..• they were chosen because of their knowledge 
487 in a certain type of war." This expertise was the basis 
of Clark Clifford's advocacy of a pluralistic Joint Chiefs 
of Staff back in 1946. It appears, though, that this faith 
in such systemic rationalism is in direct proportion to the 
success that one's service has in achieving its goals. It 
486 Memorandum to Nelson A. Rockefeller from Charles 
A. Coolidge, 7 March 1958, Rockefeller Records, box 18, 
folder "136(1)", Eisenhower Library. 
487 Burke, Interview. 
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iS not accidental that the most vocal critics of the JCS 
system are former Army generals Ridgway, Taylor and Gavin. 
As long as the Chiefs failed to realize that bureau-
cratic imperatives resulted in inter-service conflict, they 
never could understand the motivation of the civilian leader-
ship. While both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations 
perceived dysfunctional behavior, the Chiefs seemed to believe 
that their actions were not only to be expected but were 
actually beneficial. Whether or not this was the actual view 
of the Chiefs or merely a means of rationalizing bureau-
cratic realities is impossible to determine, but as long as 
they believed this, the various organizational reforms would 
have no results. Taking the Chiefs out of the chain-of-
command would not change their services nor their own view 
that they were commanders. 
The admonition that differences of opinion were not 
intrinsically bad did not lead the Chiefs to the conclusion 
that artificial unanimity was to be avoided. On the con-
trary, for two good reasons, unanimity was still a goal to 
be attained. The first was the bureaucratic reality that 
when the JCS split they effectively lost any control they 
had over the decision. Not that unanimity means contrcl 
over a decision--though it is rare for the civilian leader-
ship to completely disregard it--but unanimity does allow the 
Chiefs a degree of leverage in dealing with the administration. 
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Tbis harkens back to Admiral Radford's statement that the 
more the Chiefs differed, the greater his power as Chairman 
became. The same was applicable to the increase in the 
administration's power. This led the Chiefs at times to 
project the image of unanimity even though there may be 
deep seated differences. In 1956 after the so-called "Re-
volt of the Colonels," in which army officers leaked infor-
mation about major disagreements within the JCS, the Chiefs 
beld a news conference that was designed to dispel any doubt 
as to the Chiefs'collegiality. According to one Chief, the 
news conference was self-generated, with the sole purpose 
of projecting an image of unanimity and destroying the image 
of divisiveness that the' Revolt" created. 488 The second 
was that the Chiefs clearly perceived themselves as military 
professionals. How these two factors become interconnected 
is revealed in the following response by Air Force Chief of 
Staff, Thomas D. White, to the charge that split decisions 
and inter-service rivalry is dysfunctional. 
Split decisions, though rare, occur whenever a basic 
principle or procedure is involved on which the Chiefs 
are unable to agree. This results in passing upward 
responsibility for decision. On strategic and military 
operations, however, the Service Chiefs are the experts. 
It is therefore a disadvantage for the Chiefs to seek 
others to make decdsions: on such matters. The advantage 
of a split decision is that a view or a principle is not 
submerged and hidden merely because a numerical majority 
488 Interview with General Maxwell D. Taylor, Washing-
ton D. C., January 1975. 
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may oppose it. I feel that numbers do not necessarily 
make for correct decisions. There can be good results 
from JCS splits provided higher authority resolves the 
issue with unequivocal decision .••• There is always tre-
mendous self-imposed pressure to do the best job pos-
sible because agreement among the Chiefs on military 
matters ought ordinarily to result in the best solution 
of the problem. Based on past experience, I consider 
that a compromise solution of a military ~roblem arrived 
at by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is usually better than 
a compromise decision made by civilian authority, More-
over, it has been apparent to me that when the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff forward split views there is a tendency 
to regard such action as a manifestation of "inter-ser-
vice rivalry" although such is definitely not the funda-
mental basis for the action.489 
The fact that General White described the Joint Chiefs 
as "experts" is essential in understanding their perception 
of their role. As professional experts, the Chiefs seek 
autonomy within their sphere of expertise. Thus the belief 
that a compromise arrived at by the JCS is better than one 
arrived at by the civilian leadership. White very clearly 
denotes the disadvantage of forcing an issue higher in 
bureaucracy and thus outside the control of the experts. A 
similar desire is indicated by the following 1953 statement 
by General Vandenberg, when he asserted "judgment of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the strength of the military 
forces the country is to maintain must have overriding impor-
tance. "4 90 Likewise, President Eisenhower sought unanimity 
489Letter, White to Lyndon B. Johnson, 7 January 1958, 
Rockefeller Records, box 18, folder "136(3)", Eisenhower 
Library. 
490 New York Times, 9 June 1953, 10. 
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among his chiefs because he perceived them as having the 
military expertise while the civilian managers did not.49l 
The Chiefs' desire to achieve professional autonomy is also 
reflected in the Wheeler Report. As part of the study the 
report examined various organizational options for the 
Defense Department. One particular option gave the Joint 
Chiefs direct operational responsibility of military forces. 
The advantage of this option was that it would "raise the 
stature" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and thus impedes un-
desirable civilian encroachment into the field of strictly 
"l" . 492 ml ltary operatlons. This option was not only the 
opposite of the President's 1958 plan, but it reflected the 
Chiefs growing concern for their loss of autonomy, in the 
face of ever increasing centralization. 
White's statement also directs us to another salient 
issue within the Chiefs' self-perceptions. As military pro-
fessionals they automatically embraced those traditional 
values that required them to limit their view to those 
"purely military" aspects of any issue. This demand for 
autonomy in military matters was the corollary to this 
restrictive caveat. It was not only the Chiefs' rationaliza-
tion to combat the domination of military matters by the 
491 
Arleigh A. Burke, Oral History, Transcript, Colum-
bia University Oral History Project, 53-56. 
492 
Wheeler Report, (underline added). 
314 
civilian managers, but it was also as much a part of their 
world view as the love of their service. 
The American military leader before the Second World 
war, could and did for the most part, live in a world that 
bifurcated the political from the military. With the con-
elusion of the Second World War and the advent of the semi-
war, semi-peace environment of the Cold War, that tradi-
tional value was strained to the limit. The civilians were 
the first to break with traditionalism by attempting to 
institutionalize political/military planning; unfortunately 
they never could go all the way and opt completely for fusion. 
Even their half-way efforts, however, put great pressures on 
the traditional ethics of the Chiefs. Ostensibly, the Chiefs 
gave the appearance of attempting to surmount the dilemma 
involved in making their traditional professionalism com-
patible with the new realities of the Cold War. On the one 
hand, the national security system forced them to become 
involved in the budget and foreign policy process, while on 
the other hand, they had been inculcated over a thirty-year 
career with a set of professional values that traced its 
lineage back to Upton. The nature of the dilemma was arti-
culated by General Omar Bradley in an article written for 
~ magazine in 1952: 
In these next trying years, I predict that as emer-
gencies arise, the military will be called upon for advice 
and perhaps initially to take charge of problems. I also 
am sure that as soon as civilian agencies are organized to 
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take over such civilian problems, the military will 
gladly withdraw to its purely professional duties.493 
such an apologetic position explicitly identified the fact 
that the boundaries in which a professional officer should 
operate had been transgressed and that, as good professionals, 
the Chiefs sought the return to their restricted role. 
But what were those "purely professional duties" that 
General Bradley alluded to? To fit into the traditionalist 
mold, they should emphasize the automatonical nature of the 
military profession, the bifurcation of the political from 
the military point of view, and ultimately maintain that as 
professionals they should restrict their advice to that 
which is "purely military" in nature, to the exclusion of 
other factors. Such an approach would be totally compatible 
with a narrow perception of civilian control that charac-
terized any appreciation of non-military factors by the pro-
fessional officer as undermining that American value. 
As good traditionalists, they exhibited all of these 
traits to varying degrees. The notional bifurcation of vari-
ous power factors, most noticeably the political from the 
military, is a pillar of traditionalism. Theoretically, such 
compartmentalization stems from the lack of expertise in 
these areas. Practically, it will result in misunderstanding, 
if not outright antagonism, toward the use of those 
493 omar N. Bradley, The Collected Writings of General 
Omar N. Bradley, (Washington, D.C.: 1967), Vol. III, 181. 
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non-military determinants. General J. Lawton Collins' 
sympathy for the problems of General MacArthur and his own 
difficulty in identifying the main threads in US policy in 
Asia exemplified such compartmentalization. 494 General 
Twining's resentment over political restrictions on the use 
of airpower in Korea is another. 495 But a hlfurcated or com-
partmentalized approach does not always have to lead to con-
flict; it can lead to a simple division of labor along 
functional lines based on expertise. Earlier we noted 
General Bradley posited such a functional division with his 
suggestion that there were "civil ian problems" that should 
be solved by "civilian agencies." Bradley elaborated on 
this approach in an article he wrote in 1950: 
As a soldier, I have no desire to invade the 
field of foreign policy. The conduct of foreign affairs 
is a civilian responsibility. Military policy in our 
democratic America must always remain the servant of 
national aims.496 
Despite compartmentalization, it is the exclusion of 
non-military factors that form the philosophical underpin-
ning of traditionalism. Institutionally, the Chiefs pro-
jected this by placing the restrictive caveat "from the mili-
tary point of view" on almost all their documents; and in-
stitutional philosophy that was reinforced by the personal 
4 94J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), 248. 
495Nathan F. Twining, Neither Liberty Ncr Safety (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966), 117. 
496Bradley, Collected Writings, Vol. III, 40. 
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perceptions of the Chiefs. In 1953 Bradley reaffirmed the 
idea that traditionalism was the only way for a professional 
to act: 
Generally ..• we should confine our part to pointing out 
the military implications and military capabilities .•• 
Perhaps some people might feel that the Joint Chiefs 
should stand up and resolutely and strongly recommend a 
national policy which we would prefer, but to date, I 
have not yet been convinced that this is the proper role 
for the military leader.497 
During the Eisenhower administration, the Chiefs continued 
to project the perception that this was the proper role. 
Admiral Arthur Radford, Eisenhower's first Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs, specifically stated that the Chiefs gave only 
military advice. 498 This point was further emphasized by 
GeneraliJatthew Ridgway in his retirement letter: 
I view the military advisory role of a member of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows: he should give 
his competent professional advice on the military aspects 
of the problem referred to him, based on his fearless, 
honest, objective estimate of the national interest and 
regardless of administration policy at any particular 
time. He should confine his advice to essentially the 
military aspects.499 
According to the traditionalist interpretation, the 
basis for exclusion lies in the realm of expertise. This was 
pointed out very clearly by General Eisenhower in a statement 
before Congress in 1947: 
497 Quoted in Rid~vay, Soldier, 330. 
498 U.S. News and World Report, 25 February 1955, 45. 
499 
Ridgway, Soldier, 330 (Underline added). 
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I appear before you only as a professional soldier, 
to give you a soldier's advice regarding the national 
defense. I am not qualified to procee%beyond that. 
field; and I do not intend to do so .•.. 00 
It should be noted that he did not change his views upon 
entering the White House. Despite the fact that publicly 
the Chiefs were supposed to incorporate economic factors into 
their military analysis, the President privately informed 
them they were to give him "purely military advice. ,,SOl 
Ostensibly, it would appear that the Chiefs manifested 
all the attributes of traditionalism; yet there are certain 
contradictions that haunt us. While some of the Chiefs appear 
to manifest a bifurcated approach to policy formulation 
others fully appreciated the interrelationship of the politi-
cal and military arenas. Rather incongruently, Admiral 
Radford said in the same paragraph, that although the JCS 
gave only advice from the military point of view: 
There is often no clear line of demarcation between 
foreign and military policy. Instead, there is an 
overlap. There are military implications in foreign 
policy and conversely, political implications in military 
policy.502 
500 Quoted in Ridgway, Soldier, 331. 
501 Memorandum for Record, 25 January 1958, subject: 
Meeting on Defense Organizatmon, Rockefeller Records, box 18, 
folder, "136(2)", Eisenhower library. 
502 u.s. News and World Report, 25 February 1955, 45. 
Admiral Burke also noted the interaction between military 
and political factors. See Admiral Burke's opening state-
ment to the Seminar on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Naval Academy, 
8 January 1975. 
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one must question the feasibility of bifurcating political/ 
military policy when their interrelationship is so well 
understood. Bradley's actions as Chairman as well as his 
earlier quoted apology attests to this. The complicated 
nature of the dilemma is revealed by General Ridgway in his 
memoirs. 
If the objective the statesman wishes to achieve 
is a costly one, that is not the soldier's business. 
If it is greater than the political leaders wish to 
support, or think the economy of the country can bear, 
that is not his business. It is the constitutional 
responsibility of the civilian authority to decide these 
questions. If, of course, on first inspection, the cost 
is obviously fantastic, the soldier should make that 
point clear. But within the broad area of reasonable 
appropriations--within the bracket of what a reasonable 
man would say the country could afford--he should scrupu-
lously eschew any opinion as to whether the cost is 
beyond the reach of the national purse or not. He is 
without competence in that field. If civilian authority 
finds the cost to be greater than the country can bear, 
then either the objectives themselves should be modified 
or the responsibility for the risks involved should be 
forthrightly accepted. Under no circumstances, regard-
less of pressures from whatever source or motive, 
should the professional military man yield, or compromise 
his judgment for other than convincing military reage&s· 
To do otherwise would be to destroy his usefulness. 
The nature of the dilemma outlined by General Ridgway 
appears to be the incompatibility of a Chief's perceived 
normative role with the reality of his job. He decidedly 
projected an image of traditionalism which demanded he 
restrict his attention to purely military matters and exclude 
non-military factors. In reality, though, the "traditionalist" 
503 . Ridgway, Soldler, 272. 
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realized that this was impossible. Whether or not they were 
projecting this image as a result of a professional ethic 
or in order to be congruent with the desires of their civilian 
leadership is impossible to say. Probably it was a combina-
tion of both. Undoubtedly, the concept of civilian control 
played a decisive role. This facet of the professional ethic, 
was in the words of General Ridgway, "so universally accepted 
throughout the officer corps that it needed no elaboration;" 504 
yet the incorporation of non-military factors seemed somehow 
to undermine this value system. What is apparent is that 
the traditionalists were not as pure in their traditionalism 
as had been supposed. They understood the importance of 
non-military factors and this led them at least to consider 
their incorporation. The source of the dilution of their 
purity has not been explored, but by examining the profes-
sional perceptions of General Maxwell D. Taylor we may well 
find the answer. 
Upon assuming the office of Chief of Staff of the Army 
in 1955, General Taylor perceived his role in very tradi-
tional terms. He recalled that he was the product of a 
socialized professional view that he should restrict his 
interests to that which was "predominately military" in nature 
and as such he should "stick to his native" when dealing 
321 
with the civilian leadership. He believed that this was 
also the prevalent view of his two immediate predecessors, 
Generals Collins and Ridgway. This traditionalist view 
eroded, however, as General Taylor became exposed to the 
political/military realities of his office. Later when he 
came back as Military Advisor to the President it eroded 
further. He became an advocate of the view that the profes-
sional officer had to have a broader appreciation of non-
military factors than had previously bee~ proposed. It 
should be made clear that this broadening was in addition 
to the traditional military expertise, not a replacement 
for it. Essential to Taylor's conversion to the "new pro-
fessionalism" lay in his redefinition of the word "military." 
While he still believed that his primary mission was to 
articulate effectively the military aspects of a particular 
problem, the term "military" took on a broader meaning, to 
include the economic, social, and political aspects. In his 
mind, for the Chiefs to give a "purely military" opinion 
on a matter was intellectually dishonest.505 It may also 
be suggested that Taylor's advocacy for the "new profes-
sionalism" had a bureaucratic origin. While Eisenhower 
hoped that the Chiefs would come to the same conclusions as 
the administration did on economic and political issues if 
they examined them from the same perspective; Taylor may 
sm:; 
Taylor, Interview. 
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have seen the incorporation of these non-military factors 
as a tool to increase his bargaining position vis-a-vis. 
the administration. Furthermore, there was an ironic and 
possibly unrealized implication in his advocacy for the 
incorporation of non-military factors. If successful, the 
military officer would achieve a higher degree of autonomy 
in the military field than ever before. While previously 
bifurcation enforced limits on the military professional, 
the elimination of that bifurcation would also break down 
those limits. The fusionist officer could claim complete 
autonomy based on his analysis of all possible factors. 
Such a breakdown would necessitate a restructuring of the 
traditional American approach to civilian control of the 
military, if not completely destroy it. 
While we do not have the data base, we can extrapo-
late from Taylor's experience that a similar evolutionary 
process may have led other Chiefs to gain an appreciation 
for the importance of non-military factors and to a varying 
degree to internalize them. Forsaking the danger of belabor-
ing the point, there appears to be a subtle, but very dis-
tinct difference in the minds of former Chiefs between under-
standing the importance of non-military factors and actually 
inc0rporating them into their intellectual process. The 
former implies a continued version of traditionalism. The 
323 
officer somehow manages to keep the military aspect of the 
issue separate, he understands that non-military factors 
maY affect his plans, and he may even be willing to comment 
on those non-military factors if pressed on the matter. 
Unfortunately, the exact nature of this distinction becomes 
muddied when we attempt to examine it. However, this dis-
tinction is evident in the ideas of many former Chiefs as 
exemplified by General Lemnitzer: 
Their [the Chiefs'] job is to look at it from the mili-
tary point of view, but recognizing, and not being 
oblivious of economic, psychological, political, and 
other aspects, but it's not their primary business to 
trim their estimates of requirements based upon whether 
there is going to be this amount of money available ••• 506 
By gaining an appreciation for the importance of non-
military factors and their interrelationship, the professional 
is better prepared to deal with the inevitable reevaluation 
of his plans and to integrate them into a policy package by 
interfacing with non-military agencies. Yet the Chiefs 
attempted with a high degree of regularity to maintain their 
traditionalism. In the final analysis how could they claim 
professional autonomy if they advocated expertise outside 
their professional sphere? This was one of the main themes 
of the Wheeler Report, which cited civilian encroachment and 
the use of non-military determinants as areas of deficiency. 
Aside from their traditional values, another reason 
-----------------------
506Lemnitzer, Interview. 
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for the Chiefs' continuing grasp of traditionalism was their 
own perception of themselves as military staff officers. 
For the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
role of a staff officer was by no means a new experience. 
The preponderance of their careers from the rank of Major/ 
L,T. Sommander had been in that role, rather than in the more 
glamorous role of the commander. During these assignments 
they acquired a set of norms as to what a good staff officer 
does and does not do, and how he should operate. Staff 
officers are functional experts who develop plans, give ad-
vice, and carry out the decisions of the commander. Loyalty 
to the commander is implicit within the staff officer's role. 
In fact this vertical loyalty is the very foundation upon 
which the feudal nature of military society rests. The self-
perception of the Chiefs as staff officers goes back to the 
very origin of the organization during the Second World War, 
when Admiral Leahy said "we [the JCS] were the staff of the 
507 President of the United States." General Eisenhower 
alluded to the same kind of relationship in 1949 when he 
referred to his role in the development of the FY 51 budget 
as that of "the carpenter and someone else was 
507u.s. Congress, House, Committee on Government 
Operations, Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 (Department of 
Defense: Hearings on H.J. RES. 264, 83d Congress, 1st Ses-
sion, 1953, 211. 
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the arc hi teet." 50S But it is probably General Taylor who 
most explicitly explained this aspect of the Chiefs' rqle 
when he noted "as staff officers, we do what we are accus-
tomed to in the military service. We give our best advice 
to the commanding general. Then he makes the decision." 509 
For the members of the JCS the commanding general is the 
Commander-in-Chief. 
What General Taylor left unsaid was that a good staff 
officer not only carries out the orders of the commander, 
but does so without question. This explains why the Chiefs 
tended to support the administration's programs in the public 
forum. As General Ridgway said upon the assumption of his 
office, "Now loyalty-loyalty is a state or condition like 
pregnancy, it either does exist or does not exist." He then 
went on to say how that relates to his own staff: 
I shall expect the officers of this staff to present 
their own honest views fearlessly, forthrightly, but 
objectively in light of their own conclusions as to what 
best serves the Army's overall interests. The most dan-
gerous advisor to have around is the yes-man, and the 
most useless is one who thinks of self instead of service. 
I shall also expect, at all levels, that having once 
expressed his opinions and having heard the decision, the 
508 u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriation, 
HParings, Fiscal 1951, 81Et Congress, 1st Session, 1949, 609. 
509 U.S.Congress, Senate, Preparedness Investigating 
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Armed Services and the 
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Services, Hearings, Mis-
sile and Space Activity, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959, 
107. 
326 
officer's entire support will then be put behind tbe 
execution of that decision regardless of what his views 
had been. 510 
While Ridgway was referring to his own Army staff, 
the ideal of vertical loyalty can easily be extrapolated and 
placed within the context of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Ridgway, himself, combined the factors of professionalism 
and loyalty in his Farewell Report: 
If the military ad~isor's unrestricted advice is 
solicited, he should give his considered opinion, for in 
today's climate national security planning is broad and 
encompasses many aspects ...• However, in my opinion, 
the military advisor should be neither expected nor re-
quired to give public endorsement to military courses 
of action against which he previously recommended. His 
responsibility should be solely that of loyal vigorous 
execution of decisions by proper authority.5ll 
It was undoubtedly this notion of loyalty that 
prompted Truman's Chiefs to come very close to violating 
their professionalism by defending the administration. It 
was apparently this concept of loyalty that was so prevalent 
during the votes on the super-carrier. Furthermore, it is 
this notion of loyalty that tends to keep the Chief's from 
politicizing their differences with the administration and 
making them public. For some Chiefs even the idea of going 
to the President to fight a Secretarial decision was con-
sidered "kicking over the traces." 512 General Twining 
510 . Ridgway, Sold1er, 350-51. 
511 Ibid~, 331. 
512 . 
Decker, Interv1ew. 
327 
felt that once a decision had been made then discussion of 
it had ended, even within the confines of the National 
Security Council. 513 General Decker was exhibiting vertical 
loyalty when he said that when the Chiefs go before a Con-
gressional Committee they are not about to volunteer any 
information. 514 As for carrying the fight outside the halls 
of the Pentagon, General White's comment before Congress 
seems to reflect the norm~ 
I think it would be wrong for me to step out of line as 
a member of the team, in defiance you might say of my 
legally constituted superiors and raise an issu~ •••• I 
might resign and then carry it to the Congress.515 
Loyalty precluded an open attack upon the commander 
in chief at least while the chief was in uniform. In a 
feudal hierarchical system like the military, in which fealty 
is all important, the staff officer has two choices, 
513.__ 
-u.s. Congress, Senate, Corrmittee on Armed Services, 
Hearings on Nomination on Arthur William Radford as Chairman 
of Joint Chiefs of S':aff, Matthew Bunker Ridgway as Chief of 
Staff, Army, Robert Bostwick Carney as Chief of Naval Opera-
tions and Nathan J. Arragut Twining as Chief of Staff, Air 
Force, 83n Congress, 1st Session, 1953, 30. 
514becker, Interview. General Taylor indicated that 
the Chiefs got together after President Eisenhower's heart 
attack and decided to minimize the number of split decisions 
they would send forward so as not to task the ailing commander-
in-chief; Taylor, Interview. 
519u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act 1958, Hearings on H.R. 
12541, 85th Congress, 2nd s~ssion, 1958, 100. 
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capitulation or resignation. For a chief of staff, trans-
fer is impossible. This explains why Ridgway and Taylor 
waited until they had retired before they launched their 
attacks upon the administration. Why did they not use re-
signation though, as a means of attracting public attention 
to the issues under debate? When specifically asked this 
question, General Taylor responded that "a Chief does not 
. h t. " 516 res1gn, e re 1res. I would suggest that this is not 
merely a semantical distinction, but reflected a fundamental 
ethical value which is part of the staff officer's commit-
ment to loyalty. Just as a loyal staff officer should 
expedite the commander's decisions, so he should refrain from 
politicizing his differences with the commander until he has 
gracefully retired. Then, as General White noted he would 
be free to carry them to the public. This perception is part 
of what General Taylor called the "ethics of behavior in the 
"l"t . ..517 m1 1 ary serv1ce. 
This ethic of military behavior creates a great deal 
of strain on a Chief, especially if his service has been on 
the losing side of disagreements with the administration. 
Since open capitulation would not only result in his ser-
vice's animosity, but would be a rejection of his profes-
sional belief as to what is in the best interest of the 
516 
Taylor, Interview. 
5)7 Senate, Hearings, Missile and Space Activity, 107. 
329 
nation, and sjnce resignation or open opposition is simply 
not considered, the Chief is forced to express his disfavor 
in such a manner as to prevent an open break with the 
administration. General Vandenberg's dissent on the second 
super-carrier vote is illustrative of this process. He 
could not openly attack the administration's program, yet 
he had to defend his service's interests. His use of a pro-
cedural means to reject the carrier accomplished both goals 
and appeared to support both of his constituencies. Such 
waffling on issues is not unknown among the Chiefs. One of 
the best examples occurredin December 1958 during the 
development of the Fiscal Year 1960 Defense Budget. The 
Chiefs opposed the budget levels that the administration 
thought appropriate. Before the National Security Council 
only the Chairman, General Twining, endorsed the budget. 
Secretary of Defense McElroy continued to press the Chiefs 
for a unanimous endorsement. The result was the following 
statement: 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the FY 1960 pro-
posed expenditure figure of $40,945,000,000 is adequate 
to provide for the essential programs necessary for the 
defense of the nation for the period under consideration. 
They find no serious gaps in the key elements of the 
budget in its present form, but all have reservations 
with respect to the funding of some segments of their 
respective service programs.518 
While such waffles allow the Chiefs to display 
directly a certain amount of dissatisfaction with an 
518 Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 72. 
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administration policy, they also use indirect means to 
achieve their goals. One such indirect means is the widely 
used "leak," either to the press or to the Congress. A so-
called leak in 1956 undercut Admiral Radford's efforts to 
substantially cut American ground forces. When it was 
published· in the New York Times, the West German government 
reacted quickly to this threat to lower the number of United 
States forces in Europe and forced the Eisenhower administra-
tion to drop the proposa1. 519 Congress is a particularly 
fertile ground for a leak to be planted, and may be inextric-
ably linked to an indirect means of expressing dissatisfactiop 
through Congressional testimony. While it may be true that 
a Chief will not volunteer information to the Congress, he 
will happily respond to direct-questions that will allow him 
an opportunity to discuss his dissenting views. It is not 
difficult to guarantee that the appropriate questions are 
asked. In most cases a leak is not even needed because the 
members of the congressional committee know full well the 
major points of disagreement between the Chiefs and the 
administration. This was the reason President Eisenhower 
sought to eliminate the Chiefs' requirement to go before 
congressional committees. During the debate over the rearma-
ment of Germany, the Chiefs used their testimony to put 
Pressure on the State Department to support their 
519 
Ibid., 72. 
t . 520 pro-rearmanen v1ew. 
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A third means of expressing dis-
satisfaction is through private pressure groups and former 
members of the JCS. These individuals and groups are in a 
position to convey to the public the views of the JCS, with-
out the Chiefs formally announcing their position. In 
either case these indirect means allow the Chiefs to avoid 
direct confrontation with the administration. 
The idea of staff loyalty also helps explain the 
metamorphosis that occurs when an individual is appointed 
Chairman. The role model upon which the chairmanship is 
built is that of a chief of staff of any large military 
organization. The chief of staff's primary responsibility 
is representing the commander to the various subordinate 
staff agencies and coordinating their actions. In that 
position he mitigates conflict between the various agencies. 
Only when the issues are irreconcilable does it go to the 
commander for him to choose between alternatives. Normally, 
if the staff work has been done effectively, the decision 
paper will have only one recommendation on it. In practice, 
the Chairman is the President's chief of staff, which was 
Admiral Leahy's formal title; but fear of 11Prussianization" 
effectively eliminated the possibility of using that title. 
S20 W M t. "Th A . D . .. t Laurence . ar 1n, e mer1can ec1s1on o 
Rearm Germany," in American Civil-Military Decisions, ed. 
by Harold Stein (Montgomery, Alabama: University of Alabama 
Press, 1963), 621. 
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The role model of the chief of staff as thE~ commander's 
representative also explains General Bradley's politiGiza-
tion in support of the Truman administration. 
Over the decade and a half that covered the Truman 
and Eisenhower administrations, the Chiefs exhibited a sur-
prising consistency in the way they perceived their role. 
This was true both in regards to their bureaucratic position 
as well as their normative values. 
In terms of the bureaucracy, all the Chiefs acknow-
ledged that there were inherent problems and strains placed 
on them by dual and conflicting functions. While the 
civilian leadership saw the conflict between the Chiefs' 
corporate and service roles, and their planning and command 
functions as a source of dysfunctional behavior, the Chiefs' 
perceived them as an integral part of their role. The 
Chiefs rationalized their inextricability based upon the 
belief that responsibility and authority should go hand in 
hand. 
The source of this rationalization, though, goes 
deeper than an organizational relationship between responsi-
bility and authority. Part of it stems from the Chiefs own 
belief that they are both commanders of their services and 
a staff officer to the commander-in-chief. This is the 
crucial dichotomy upon which the other conflicts are built. 
Unfortunately, it was the more superficial dualities, such 
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as planning versus commanding, that caught the attention of 
the organizational reformers. In the role of the commander, 
the service chief is forced to defend his service's interests. 
Ironically, this leads the Chiefs to accept a certain amount 
of inter-service conflict as at least theoretically func-
tional. The Chief's staff officer role motivates him to 
defend the administration's programs. This is, in reality, 
just another manifestation of the Chiefs' front man role. 
Another source of this rationalization comes from 
the Chiefs' perception of themselves as professionals. For 
them, the concept of professionalism and its relationship 
to the client society was similar to that of other profes-
sionals. Most of all they perceived themselves as the 
military experts and, as such, they demanded autonomy within 
their sphere of expertise. The Wheeler Report's linkage of 
ending civilian encroachment in "strictly military opera-
tions" to regaining the Chiefs operational responsibility is 
illustrative of the relationship of professionalism to the 
Chiefs' perceived role. Clearly, the Chiefs were opposed to 
the process of centralization that had been occurring since 
1949. Such centralization made them into automatons and 
destroyed their cherished command roles, but more impor-
tantly the very nature of their professionalism was under 
attack. 
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These attitudes, especially the requirement for 
autonomy in military matters, were the central themes in 
their traditional world view. Despite the fact they reali-
zed the importance of non-military factors, they simply 
could not let themselves consider them. This retention of 
traditional compartmentalization of the political from the 
military was the non-organizational flaw within the Chiefs. 
This had nothing to do with their place within the formal 
chain of command. The continuing claim that the JCS pro-
duct was not as useful to the civilian leadership as it 
should be, was directly tied to the Chiefs' professionalism. 
While inter-service competition did result in a diluted 
product, the inability to consider non-military factors 
resulted in the production of a potentially useless product. 
Pragmatism was the means of eliminating this flaw, but both 
the civilian and the military leadership opposed it. The 
former, out of a fear for civilian control, and the latter, 
out of a fear for their professionalism. The Chairmen of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff by virtue of their status as the 
administration's "agent" appeared to have been less stringent 
in maintaining a purely "radical" approach, but even then 
Pragmatism was not fully embraced. Merely mouthing foreign 
Policy statements, as Bradley did, did not represent a shift 
to pragmatism. Instead even he, as well as the other Chair-
men, retained his radical philosophy. 
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In the final analysis the Chiefs were caught between 
bureaucratic imperatives and ethical norms. Their dual role 
as commander of a service and staff officer to the President 
resulted in tremendous tensions. The development of informal 
means of affecting decisions, while allowing the Chiefs 
some flexibility, would only achieve marginal or incidental 
success. In the end they had to deal with their own con-
science and their own professional notion of responsibility. 
Responsibility to the nation was the founGation upon which 
their professionalism rested. That responsibility became 
intertwined with the belief that their service was essential 
to the defense of the nation. By a convoluted logic, what 
appeared to the civilians to be service parochialism was to 
the Chiefs the fulfillment of their obligation. Furthermore, 
that sense of responsibility ledthemto bifurcate war and 
politics which had disastrous results on the JCS product. 
Since the civilians were not getting the product that they 
felt they needed, they began to make the decisions without 
the advantage of integrated input that would lead to an 
integrated policy. The nature of that integrated policy is 
the subject of the next chapter. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND 
POLICY INTEGRATION 
Up to this point in our study we have examined the 
Chiefs' self-perception of their role and those of their 
civilian superiors. We have also seen how the various re-
organization efforts within the Department of Defense receiv-
ed their impetus from the civilian manager's desire to more 
effectively integrate political/military policy planning. 
But effective integration is more than a mere manifestation 
of interface on an organization chart; it is the merging 
of the organizational structure and the individual player's 
roles. In short, it is as Clausewi tz noted "where all the 
other threads meet." 
Policy integration in its simplest form guarantees 
the balancing of the state's capabilities and the state's 
commitments, which for our purpose means that the state 
has sufficient military power, not only in size, but in 
composition, to achieve its political goals. The passage 
of the 1947 legislation was predicated upon the desire to 
optimize such policy integration and to create an institu-
tional framework to achieve that goal. That framework pre-
supposed a nexus between the nation's foreign policy, the 
military planning process, and tlw devPl opment of the defense 
33G 
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budget. Each of these factors in turn become inextricably 
related stages in the policy integration process. Although 
the National s~curity Act never outlined in specific detail 
how this nexus would be achieved, the formation of the 
National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
were requisite elements in a process that would ultimately 
result in the maintenance of a military establishment that 
could support the nation's political goals. 
From the practical viewpoint, the balance between 
commitments and capabilities occurs during the budget pro-
cess, since "planning can be useless and operations impos-
sible if the necessary funds are not authorized and allocat-
d II 521 e . In the final analysis the budget is a fiscal expre3-
sion of those forces and plans which are deemed necessary 
for the security of the nation. The structure of those 
military forces represents a constraint upon the foreign 
policy planner that he ignores only at his nation's peril. 
The defense budget process thus contains all the major ele-
ments to be found in the integration of national security 
policy, and as such may be used as a heuristic tool to exa-
mine the process and determine its effectiveness. 
Examining the problem of policy integration from a 
total systems approach, the first step in a hypothetical 
521Lawrenee Korb, "The Dr·fense Budget Process in 
the United States, 1953-1970: An Examination and Evaluation," 
Unpublished paper presented at the lmerican Political Science 
Association National Conference, 1971, Chicago, IL, 2. 
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model is the establishment of foreign policy goals, which 
will act as a catalyst for the subsequent development of 
the military's operations plans and finally the defense 
budget. On a superficial level, these three stages--
national policy, military plans, and the defense budget--
appear to flow in a logical sequential pattern, but such 
an assumption fails to make the transition from the ideal 
model to the real world. Our hypothetical model ignores 
the reality of bureaucratic conflict and the necessity for 
fiscal feasibility. The defense budget in an unconstrained 
ideal environment becomes merely tbe conversion of military 
force postures into monetary amounts. In the real world, 
though, defense dollars are in direct competition with other 
national priorities, forcing budget considerations to be 
addressed at the offset of the policy process. Furthermore, 
in order to effectively determine a viable foreign policy 
the nation's commitments and capabilities must be assessed. 
Likewise, military operations plans are not based solely 
on combat effectiveness, but on technical, fiscal, political, 
and bureaucratic realities. This model also fails to con-
sider post-executive phases of the budget process, such 
as congressional review, that are part of the American 
Political system, but beyond the purview of this study. 
The result is that when our nicely structured hypothe-
tical model is placed in reality, it becomes a complex 
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process in which the theoretically sequential stages become 
so inextricably connected that it is difficult to separate 
one stage from the next. The linear nature of the model· 
is replaced by a cyclical one in which the budgetary process 
becomes an integral part of the balancing of capabilities 
and commitments. This, as we noted from our earlier discus-
sion of Clausewitz, requires the fusion of the political 
and the military aspects of national policy, which presup-
poses an intellectual fusion on the part of the decision 
maker, not merely bureaucratic interface. Although such 
interface is an essential part of the policy making process, 
it can only help facilitate and not replace fusion. Despite 
these difficulties, a .hypothetical model is heuristically 
useful in examining the process of policy integration. 
With this ideal model in mind we will examine his-
torically how the policy integration process developed during 
the Truman administration and how the budget process became 
the means of achieving integration. Particular attention 
will be given to how the military professionals perceived 
the process in comparison to their civilian superiors. The 
traditional difficulty of bifurcating political from military 
Policy is an essential aspect of these perceptual differences, 
and they clearly surfaced during the first effort at formu-
lating an integrated budget for fiscal year 1950. As such 
FY 50 is an especially useful vehicle for examining these 
Problems. The lessons learned from FY 50 resulted in massive 
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structural changes within the NSC and the JCS, as both orga-
nizations developed planning systems that more effectively 
fulfilled their missions and enhanced, at least theoretically, 
their ability to work with each other. These changes will 
be traced as the effectiveness of the policy integration 
process is evaluated during the Eisenhower administration. 
Organizationally, it was the movement toward unifica-
tion that acted as a catalyst for policy integration. The 
Army based its advocacy for unification on the advantages 
to be gained through unity of command, which theoretically 
would maximize the efficient management of resources. Im-
plicit within this argument was the assumption that as war 
became more complex, the management of resources became 
more critical and thus needed to be more effectively 
rationalized. In peacetime, unification would result in 
a more equitable distribution of resources, as well as greater 
stability in total allocations. This was the basis of Root's 
reforms in 1903, which created the General Staff to eliminate 
the more dysfunctional elements of the bureau system. The 
correctness of this organizational approach was reinforced 
by the War Department's reforms in March 1942, that created 
the Operations Division. After the war, polemical studies 
like Major General Otto Nelson's National Security and the 
General Staff seemed to prove the necessity for staff cen-
tralization and the "need for an improved General Staff 
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organization with more effective techniques of control." 
one of the central functions of such an improved General 
staff would be to facilitate political/military integration 
to include the budget process. Nelson was harkening back 
to the increased efficiency of the restructured General 
Staff during both world wars and its coordination with the 
War Industries Board during World War I and the War Production 
Board during World War I I. 
The history of the unification controversy is essen-
tially a history of conflicting approaches to policy integra-
tion. Whatever difficulties existed between the services, 
the civilian leadership definitely wanted legislation that 
would bring about policy integration, and do it in such 
a manner as to make the Joint Chiefs active participants. 
It was with this in mind that the service secretaries be-
moaned, in 1944, the lack of any "established agency of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff primarily charged with developing 
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff political, economic and fiscal 
522 Otto Nelso~ National Security and the General 
Staff (Washington, D.C.: Infantrv Journal Press, 1946)·, 601; 
ifSO-see::Lawrence J. Legere,. "Unification of the Armed Forces" 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1950). 
Both were dissertations by army officers on leave at Harvard 
University, Nelson finished his Ph.D. in 1940~ 
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policy ... " 523 The service proposals for unification offered 
differing solutions to this problem, but for the most part 
those differences flowed along service lines, with the Navy 
apparently more cognizant of the nature of policy integra-
tion than the Army. Specifically, the Army's proposals 
tended to reflect confidence in a vertical, highly centralized 
structure, which exhibited traditional compartmentalization 
of civilian from military functions. While this approach 
detracted from the total integration effor~, it supported 
the Army's own perception of its professionalism. 
It is the nature of this professionalism that helps 
explain the primacy of the Army's position, dominating even 
the JCS's own Richardson Plan, written in April 1945. 524 
Ironically, one of the Plan's primary conclusions was that 
greater policy integration was needed, especially between 
the military services and the State Department. I would 
suggest that this particular recommendation was a result 
523 Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 
the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy, undated, subject: 
Coordination of Political-Military Problems Between the 
Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, William B. Leahy Papers, folder "JCS Misc. 
Memos, " U.S. Naval Archives, Washington, D.C .. (Hereafter 
referred to as U.S. Naval Archives). 
524 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of 
National Defense (Hereafter referred to as the Richardson 
Report), Leahy Papers, box 77, folder "Reorganization of 
~tional Defense Structure and Comments: October and 
November, 1945;' U.S. Naval Archives. 
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of the Chiefs' percention that there was a l~ck of political 
guidance forthcoming from the civilian leadership. Although 
the Richardson Report recommended policy integration, it 
did not specifically link the commitments generated through 
political/military consultation to a force structure upon 
which the budget would be based. In a rather convoluted 
manner, the Report did point out that the President would 
be concerned with budgetary matters and that "the nation 
should maintain in time of peace, military forces adequate 
to support its foreign policy," 525 but how that would be 
translated into dollars and cents was not very clear. A 
partial solution was suggested in the formation of a U.S. 
Chiefs of Staff who would advise the President on the overall 
budget requirements for each service. This advice would 
be transmitted to the President by the Commander of the 
Armed Forces, who would double as the Chief of Staff to 
the Commander-in-Chief. Concurrently, the request would 
also be transmitted by the civilian Secretary of the Armed 
Forces, who sat with the Chiefs during their deliberations. 
Although, the Secretary sat in with the Chiefs, his primary 
function was not as an arbitrator of competing resource 
demands, but as a cabinet level advocate for the military 
budget. 
525 
Ibid., 21. 
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The crucial issues of procurement and mobilization 
planning also were discussed in the Richardson Report. These 
functions were placed under the purview of a civilian Under 
Secretary of the Armed Forces, who was to guarantee the 
compatibility of the Chiefs' military plans to civilian 
industrial mobilization. Unfortunately, there was built 
into the system a degree of compartmentalization that mere 
bureaucratic coordination could not easily rectify. This 
point was revealed in the observation that the military 
would be the only agency really concerned with military 
matters, while the Under Secretary would take care of the 
"l. b . tt 526 civl lan or uslness rna ers. 
On the issue of balancing requirements and resources, 
the Richardson Report naively stated that this was only a 
wartime problem. It was presumed that "in peacetime re-
527 
sources will normally be adequate." This statement re-
fleeted more than a naive approach to peacetime policy inte-
gration, it was based on the assumption that military require-
ments would drive the budget process. If this was correct, 
then the Chiefs could safely assume that peacetime resources 
would be adequate. Furthermore, given the Chiefs' view 
of professionalism, they probably also assumed that 
526
rbid., 23-24. Specifically the Report said "the 
Under Secretary of his office will initiate action on busi-
ness matters and that the commander of the Armed Forces 
on the military matters." 
527 . Ibld., 26. 
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theY themselves would establish those requirements and that 
theY would be based exclusively upon military imperatives. 
It seemed logical to the Chiefs, as military experts, to 
generate their own budget requests and forward them to the 
president, unaltered by either the civilian Under Secretary 
or Secretary of the Armed Forces. 
This organizational assumption was incorporated into 
both the McNarney and the Collins plans. Both of these 
Army proposals gave the budgetary responsibility to the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, while the civilian secretary acted 
merely as a conduit of the budget estimates to the President. 
Although, both plans emphasized the elimination of waste 
and duplication through unification, neither plan considered 
the relationship of political/military planning to the budget 
process. In defending the Collins Plan, Secretary of War 
Patterson testified that its objective was "to establish 
an integrated program of national security," and that this 
would best be accomplished by allowing the military experts 
to formulate the strategic options upon which this program 
would be based. 528 In practice this would mean that the 
military experts, the JCS, would formulate the defense budget. 
General Collins went even further than Patterson in outlin-
ing the nature of military autonomy in budgetary matters: 
528u. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, 
Department of Armed Forces, Department of Military Security, 
Hearings. 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 12. 
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One of the most valuable functions that the United etates 
Chiefs of Staff should perform in time of peace is the 
development of a balanced military program with which 
budgetary requirements are thoroughly integrated. ·After 
the President has approved the over-all military policy, 
thE' budget requirements to implement this policy would 
be initiated by the three components, the Air, Army 
and Navy, essentially as at present. These individual 
requirements would be reviewed and integrated by the 
United States Chiefs of Staff. Each Chief of Staff 
of a major component would be expected to present his 
case to the United States Chiefs of Staff with full 
freedom and vigor. The U.S. Chiefs would have to weigh 
any conflicting demands and finally come out with an 
integrated program of requirements to submit to the Presi-
dent. It is believed that legislation should require 
that these recommendations be submitted through the 
Secretary of the Armed Forces, who should be required 
to transmit them without modificatig~ 9to the President, together with his comments thereon. 
Clearly, both the JCS's Richardson Report and the Army's 
unification plans manifested traditional bifurcation of 
political and military functions, and used professionalism 
and expertise as the basis for the military's assertion 
of autonomy. 
The reason for the similarity among the various plans 
was that their central ideas appear to have had a common 
source, Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer. Palmer, 
who was George C. Marshall's mentor, had been intimately 
involved in planning a War Department reorganization immedi-
ately after World War I. Although retired, he was brought 
back on active duty in November 1941 to help with the 
nationalization of the National Guard. With the outbreak 
529Ibid., 157-8. 
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of war, he turned his attention to the dual problems of 
demobilization and post-war military organization. In .1943, 
the Special Planning Division (SPD) was created to coordinate 
the planning efforts on both of these issues, and Palmer 
was named advisor to its director. The SPD became the focal 
point for the Army's reorganization effort and its director, 
Major General W.F. Tompkins, was the lrmy's representative 
on the Richardson Committee. Because of Palmer's elder 
statesmen status, he was in a position to intellectually 
dominate the SPD. 530 The key component of all the plans 
so far discussed was the compartmentalization and the iso-
lation of military and civilian functions from one another. 
This compartmentalization was an essential part of the orga-
nization plans that Palmer helped write after the First 
World War; one of which was for a unified military. In 
these plans industrial mobilization and procurement was 
under the control of civilian managers, while war plans 
530 For a detailed study of the role of the SPD see 
Michael S. Sherry, Preparing for the Next War: American 
Plans for Post War Defense, 1941-1945 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1977); Nelson, National Security and the 
Staff, 548-551; Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," 
235-240; and "History of the Special Planning Division," 
file No. 2-3.12, Office of the Chief of Military History; 
a microfilm copy is held in the U.S. Army Command & General 
Staff College Library. As for Palmer's role in the SPD, 
Professor I.B. Holly of Duke University, who is preparing 
a biography of Palmer, claims that Palmer's ideas "infected" 
the young officers around him. 
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were generated solely by the military staffs. The incor-
poration of this approach in the National Defense Act of 
1920 led to the development of military plans without regard 
531 
to their industrial feasibility. 
Despite organizational shortcomings and structural 
flaws, the Army's unification plans conformed to that ser-
vice's traditional sense of professionalism. The effect 
of this traditionalism is substantiated by an executive 
branch analysis of the views of such Army unification pro-
ponents as Secretary of War Patterson, and Generals Marshall, 
Collins, Arnold, McNarney, and Eisenhower. Of particular 
importance was the analysis' evaluation of these individuals' 
views on two specific points: the military's need for 
"specific integration with foreign policy" and whether or 
not "control of [the] budget [should be in the hands of 
a] civilian secretary." With the noticeable exception of 
General McNarney, all of those listed were identified as opposing 
the specific integration of military policy with foreign 
policy and all, including McNarney, were identified as un-
animously opposing a civilian exercising control over the 
53~arvin A. Kreidberg and Morton A. Henry, History 
of Military Mobilization in the United States Army: 1775-
~· Department of Army Pamphlet No. 20-212 (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of the Army, 1955), 692. 
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military budget. 
A further example of the impact of such traditional 
values is illustrated in a memorandum written by Forrestal 
to Clark Clifford on 7 September 1946. In this memorandum, 
Forrestal conveyed his impressions of a dinner meeting with 
patterson, Eberstadt, Under Secretary of the Navy John Kenney, 
and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, General John Handy. 
The purpose of the meeting was to reduce the points of ser-
vice disagreement over unification. In his description 
of the discu~:sion that ensued, the Secretary of the Navy 
reported that the Army was "still wedded to the concept 
that a chart and 'straight-line of command' will solve all 
problems." This of course ran counter to Forrestal's own be-
lief in a decentralized structure and that an organization 
was only as good as the men who made it up. However, the 
Army's fascination in a "straight-line of command" reflected 
more than an organizational preference; Forrestal realized 
that it reflected the very nature of Arwy professionalism: 
The Army's real purpose is to draw a sharp black 
and white line between civilian and military functions. 
It is my view, and nobody can shake it, that the opera-
tion must be a mixed one; that there is no black and 
white line because diplomacy and military power are 
inextricably associated. Both Patterson and Handy took 
the view that the civilian secretaries should not sit 
532chart entitled "Proposals for Unification Differs 
in Opinion," undated paper, Samuel Rosenman Papers, box 4, 
folder "Unification folder #2," Harry S. Truman Library, 
Independence, Missouri. (Hereafter referred to as Truman 
Library) 
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with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to which I responded, 
"how otherwise can military policy be tied in with 
national policy?" 
Forrestal went on to write that he had great apprehension 
for the unification bill if it followed the "army thinking 
on these lines," because such an approach would fail to 
achieve the true integration of "the whole complex of our 
national, economic, military, and political power." 533 
Secretary Forrestal had hoped that the Eberstadt 
Plan would eliminate or at least avoid some of these organi-
zational problems. The National Security Council offered 
a means to "ensure that there was a balance between our 
534 foreign commitments and (military) forces." As the 
National Security Act began to take form it became more 
apparent to the administration that it was the budget process 
that guaranteed this balance. 535 However, if integration 
was to occur, it required a mitigation of the military's 
autonomy in budget matters, and the appointment of a civilian 
superior to act as an arbitrator between conflicting 
533 Memorandum Forrestal to Clifford, 7 September 
1946, Clark Clifford Papers, box 16, folder "Unification 
Correspondence-General," Truman Library. 
534
u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs, 
Report to Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy on 
Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar 
Organization for the National Security. 79th Congress, 
lst session, 1945. (Hereafter referred to as the Eberstadt 
Plan), 55. 
535 National Defense Memorandum for the President, 
22 July 1947, subject: S.758 "National Security Act 1947," 
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demands for resources. 
While there seems to have been a general agreement 
that the budget was the crucial aspect of unification, it 
was not at all clear how the budget would be developed, 
or what role, if any, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would play. 
On the surface, it appears that the Navy had a greater under-
standing of policy integration than the Army, but that may be 
more attributable to the attitude of James Forrestal than 
to the attitude of the Navy's officer corps. We can gain 
some insight into the perceptions of Navy professionals by 
examining the ideas of Admiral Forrest Sherman, the Navy 
officer most closely connected with the writing of the 
National Security Act. In January 1947, just prior to the 
drafting of the legislation, Sherman sent a memorandum to 
his Army counterpart, Lieutenant General Loris Norstad, 
expressing his views on how an ideal integrated budget 
could be developed: 
(l) Based on a study of the broad factors involved, 
the War Council would determine the national policies 
under which the Armed Forces would expect to function; 
Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary File, Subject File, 
box 156, folder "Cabinet Defense Secretary", Truman Library. 
Clifford noted that the budget issue was one "of the major 
purposes of the bill." Earlier President Truman had noted 
that unification "will help the budget to a large extent," 
Memo for Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Depart-
ment, 20 April 1946, Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary 
File, Subject File, box 145, folder, "Agencies-Military, 
Army, Navy Unification," Truman Library. 
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(2) In light of these policies and their military esti-
mate of the strategic situation, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff would formulate strategic requirements for the 
Armed Forces. In the event of disagreement among the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff the Secretary of the Armed Forces 
would exercise such powers of decision as may be delegated 
to him by the President; 
(3) The above strategic requirements would then be trans-
lated into terms of men, supplies and money by the three 
military departments; 
(4) The translated requirements of the military depart-
ments would then be reviewed and integrated by the War 
Council under the supervision of the Secretary of the 
Armed Forces, who would have powers of decision in the 
event of disagreement. The facilities of the budget 
officers of the military departments would be utilized 
for this if necessary; 
(5) The military budgets would then be presented to 
the Bureau of the Budget by the Secretary of the Armed 
Forces and their details directly to that body by the 
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; 
(6) After action on the integrated military budgets is 
taken by the Bureau of the Budget and the President, 
their broader aspects would, if necessary, be justified 
before the Congress by the Secretary of the Armed 
Forces and their details directly536 the Secretaries 
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. 
Although the power that Sherman was willing to invest 
in the civilian Secretary of the Armed Forces was the very 
antithesis of the Army's demand for autonomy, one should 
not assume that Sherman was being motivated by a totally 
different set of professional imperatives than his army 
counterparts. A careful examination of the process outlined 
536 Memorandum for General Norstadt, 27 January 1947, 
subject: Formation of Integrated Military Budget, Clifford 
Papers, box 17, folder "Unification-Correspondence, Bill 
Comments and Recommendations, "Truman Library. 
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by Sherman, reveals that the Joint Chiefs would take the 
civilian leadership's guidance and develop the strategic 
plans that would ultimately be converted into "men, supplies, 
and money by the three services." Only after these plans 
had been developed would they be measured against fiscal 
feasibility. 
The model that Sherman apparently used when he develop-
ed this budget process was that of the military operations 
plan. Within the military planning system an organization 
is first given a mission. The commander will then take 
that mission and make what is known as the estimate of the 
situation. This is the thought process by which the commander 
analyzes his mission, evaluates both enemy and friendly 
forces, considers alternative courses of action, and finally 
reaches a decision on how to proceed. Once this decision 
has been made, an operations plan is drawn up detailing 
the execution of the mission, which in turn becomes the 
basis of mission statements directed to subordinate units. 
Within Sherman's budget process the original mission state-
ment was the political guidance provided to the Joint Chiefs 
by the civilian leadership. The Chiefs then would proceed 
to make their estimate of the situation and develop an opera-
tions plan. 
This approach was structurally identical to the 
"National War Planning System," the JCS considered in 
354 
l942. 537 The first step in that system was the determina-
tion by the political leadership of the nation's strategy or 
concept of war, followed by the military's structuring of 
a strategy and operations plan to accomplish those goals. 
Since this type of planning process was universally accepted 
within the services, it was only natural that senior military 
leaders would apply it to the problem of policy integration 
and budget development. The application of this mode of 
reasoning was seen in a 1949 statement before Congress by 
General George C. Marshall. He stated that "the estimate 
of the situation" should determine the formulation of the 
budget, and that such an estimate should be made once a 
year "entirely outside of .•. civilian control." The demand 
that the generation of the estimate of the situation be 
exclusively a military function should not be looked upon 
as an attack upon civilian control, but instead a call for 
autonomy within a professional sphere of expertise. Obvi-
ously, this estimate would be linked to the political mission 
statement so that the Chiefs would have a framework within 
which to develop their force lists. While Marshall never 
did discuss the relationship of that mission statement to 
the estimate of the situation, the military staff logic 
537
vernon Davis, A History of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff in World War II: Organizational Development (Histori-
cal Division: Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
1972), II,380. 
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process presupposes a mission statement from some higher 
h d t th . t 538 ea quar ers or au or1 y. 
The methodology incorporated in Sherman's approach 
to policy integration was nothing more than a simplified 
version of what would later be called program budgeting. 
Forrestal was also enamored with this approach and felt 
that it ought to be the basis of a "new principle" that would 
govern the Military Establishment's budgetary structure. In 
his First Report of the Secretary of Defense, Forrestal 
outlined a budget system that was very similar to that of 
Sherman's: 
The National Security Council will "assess and appraise 
the objectives, commitments and risks of the United 
States in relation to our actual and potential military 
power." The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the basis of 
these evaluations, will maintain long-range strategic 
plans and correlate these with an "annual operating 
plan," indicating such matters as the composition, size, 
organization, and general deployment of the forces, 
the gPneral requirements of the material programs and 
the required levels of operations, training, mairttenance, 
construction, and other major programs. Initially 
such plans should be based solely upon military con-
siderations.539 
Forrestal's assumption that the operation plans would be 
based exclusively on military considerations reveals a 
538 
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Service, 
The National Defense Program, Unification and Strategy 
Hearings, 8lst Congress, 1st Session, 1949, 603-605. (Here-
after referred to as Unification and Strategy Hearings). 
539 NatioP.al Military Establishment, First Report of 
the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1948), 41 (Emphasis Added) 
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surprising degree of traditionalism on the part of the great 
advocate of policy integration. This paradox is explained 
when one realizes that Forrestal viewed policy integration 
as a continual process that would occur during the develop-
ment of guidance and later during the balancing process. 
The Secretary's commitment to military autonomy during the 
actual planning phase indicates a faith in the military 
and an understanding that the military had unique expertise 
in certain areas. The Joint Chiefs had a crucial role in 
the development of the budget because they were the only 
ones who could make the analysis of military considerations. 
As Senator Edward V. Robertson said during the 1947 hearings, 
"the Joint Chiefs are the key to the whole thing." 540 
The early drafts of the National Security Act speci-
fically named the Chiefs as advisors "in the integration 
of the military budget." Rather inexplicably, this function 
541 
was expunged from the final draft. Nevertheless, the 
Chiefs remained an integral part of the budget process be-
cause they were the ones that actually prepared the strategic 
and logistics plans. Possibly realizing the confusion that 
could result from this omission, Forrestal had a budget 
540 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Armed 
Services, National Defense Establishment, Unification of 
the Armed Forces, Hearings on S.758, 80th Congress, 1st 
Session, 1947, pt. 2, 330. (Hereafter referred to as National 
Military Establishment Hearings). 
541 b"d 2 ~., . 
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function inserted along with the various other service and 
JCS functions enumerated in the Key West Agreement of 1948. 
This was the nature of that budget function: 
Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for 
his information and consideration in furnishing guidance 
to the Departments for preparation of their annual 
budgetary estimates and in coordinating these budgets, 
a statement of military requirements which is based 
upon agreed strategic considerations, joint outline 542 
war plans, and current national security commitments. 
Simply assumed by both Forrestal and Sherman was 
the existence of coherent policy guidance emanating from 
the civilian leadership. This was the crucial step in our 
hypothetical model and was the reason the National Security 
Council was established. Without such guidance the Joint 
Chiefs would have nothing upon which to base their strategic 
plans. Unfortunately, the format in which that guidance 
would be disseminated was never covered in the National 
Security Act. This external communications problem reflected 
internal organizational and perceptual problems on· the part 
of the National Security Council. 
Prior to the Kcrean War, the National Security Council 
was viewed as having a narrow advisory role with no opera-
tional or implementation mission. The complex NSC infra-
structure that we now take for granted simply did not exist, 
542 The 
in Timothy W. 
(Washington: 
text of the Key West agreement is published 
Stanley, American Security and National Defense 
Public Affairs Press, 1956), 176. 
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because the Council was not charged with following up on 
decisions. Only as the demands upon the organization in-
creased during the Korean War did the staff of the National 
Security Council begin to take form. One consequence of 
this organizational and functional problem was the lack 
of systematic and continuous guidance. Another, was that 
the analyses that were produced tended to be overly narrow 
in focus, dealing only with a specific issue. It was not 
until November 1948 that "the first paper of a broad over-
all character dealing with the basic national security prob-
lems facing the United States," was adopted by the NSC and 
543 
could be used as guidance for the JCS. That document, 
NSC 20/4 "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter 
Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," would be the major source 
544 
of policy guidance until the Korean War. These problems 
exacerbated the Chiefs' perception that they were forced 
to work within a policy vacuum and that plans had to be 
made based upon their own assumptions. 
54 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government 
Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Making, Organizing 
for National Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1961), Vol II, Studies and Background 
Material, 426. (Hereafter referred to as Jackson Committee). 
544 Memorandum for the National Security Council, 
16 November 1948, subject: US Objectives with Respect to 
the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security, Truman 
Papers, Presidential Secretary File, Subject File, NSC, 
box 204, folder "Meeting #27," Truman Library. This folder 
actually contains an earlier draft NSC 20/3, which with 
only minor r8visions was formally accepted as 20/4. 
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Was there any validity to the Chiefs' perception? 
Instead of being produced as a routine matter, NSC papers 
tended to be reactive documents, promulgated by perceived 
changes in the politicallmilitary environment. Furthermore, 
there was no JCS representation on the Council's staff during 
this early period. This situation, according to the National 
Security Council Organizational History; '~ade it difficult 
to anticipate and take into account probable JCS views on 
a subject under discussion in advance of receipt of their 
formal written views.'' 545 Thus the lack of institutional 
linkages meant a total breakdown in communication. This 
was exemplified during the Berlin Blockade when the JCS 
advice was not sought until it was too late for them to 
have any substantial influence.546 Part of this problem 
urdoubtedly was the result of the Chiefs not being named 
tbe principle military advisors to the NSC, a problem that 
was alleviated by the 1949 amendment to the National Security 
Act. 
Unfortunately for Secretary Forrestal, his model 
of policy integration was predicated upon institutional 
interface that could only occur if there was continual 
545 
Jackson Committee, II, 432. 
546 
Kenneth W. Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: 
Vol II 1947-1949 (Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1978), 154. 
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bureaucratic linkages. In place of these formal linkages, 
the Secretary of Defense sought the Chiefs' advice informally 
based upon their statutory relationship to him. These in-
formal efforts apparently did not remove the belief, on 
the part of the Chiefs, that there was a policy vacuum in 
existence. The 1948 Hoover Commission study reaffirmed 
the Chiefs' fears in this regard when it noted that "the 
want of firm and clear top level national policy direction 
on which to base strategic plans leave the Joint Chiefs 
547 
of Staff to do their planning in something of a vacuum." 
This situation presented a real problem for Forrestal 
since his integration model was built upon the assumption 
that the military would take the NSC's guidance and convert 
it into strategic plans. At this stage of the process the 
military would develop their plans completely unconstrained 
by resource limitations or other mitigating factors. In 
other words, the Chiefs would base their plans solely on 
"military considerations." This was the same approach that 
Sherman had advocated. After the plans were developed, 
they would be measured against fiscal feasibility. Only 
then would changes be made to balance plans against available 
547 The Commission on Organization of the Executive 
Branch of the Government; Task Force on National Security 
Organization (Appendix G), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1949), 37. (Hereafter referred to 
as the Hoover Commission.) 
361 
resources. It was essential though, that the original policy 
statement should not be developed exclusive of military 
considerations. 
As noted earlier, the logic of Forrestal's model 
paralleled that of the military's concept of plans being 
driven by the mission statement. The problem was that the 
mission statement could only be derived from the National 
Security Council's guidance, and that agency was remiss 
in producing it. Since regularized guidance was not forth-
coming, the Chiefs began to generate their own assumptions 
upon which to base their plans. The Hoover Commission, 
although appreciating that the Chiefs were working within 
a policy vacuum, criticized them for these self-generated 
assumptions because they did not always have any correlation 
with reality. The Commission's Eberstadt Task Group pointed 
out that many of the JCS's strategic plans "are based upon 
incomplete and unrealistic assumptions," and that: 
The JCS have not done enough to relate their military 
plans to the national productive capacity in terms of 
manpower, materials, power, transportation, and facili-
ties. These vital elements of modern strategy appear 
to be too l~~tly considered in the strategic planning 
of the JCS. 
In other words, the Chiefs were not incorporating crucial 
non-military factors into their planning process. Naturally, 
548 Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 28 January 
1949, subject: Comments contained in Detailed Studies of 
the Eberstadt Committee, Chapter VI, The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, USACGSC Library C-17073, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. 
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Eberstadt laid much of the blame upon the lack of guidance 
from the NSC, probably because this was an easily identifi-
able cause. What Eberstadt and his task group failed to 
understand was that the Chiefs' professionalism was as much 
a cause as the organizational problems. Thus Forrestal 
was confronted with a total organizational breakdown as 
he prepared to implement his "new principle." 
There was one preliminary problem that had to be 
dealt with before any headway could be achieved in the bud-
get arena. That problem was getting the Chrefs to agree on 
the services' various roles and missions. Until this was 
accomplished the "deep-seated disagreements," between the 
services "made effective planning extremely difficult if 
not impossible." 549 The National Security Act of 1947 and 
its implementing Executive Orcer 9877 had merely allocated 
to the services missions based on environmental primacy. 
Thus the Army was concerned with land operations, the Navy 
conducted operations that were at sea, and the Air Force 
operated in the air. Such an environmental division did 
not address those areas where missions clashed. In particu-
lar the role of the Marine Corps and the Navy's carrier-
based air arm became points of contention. In an effort to 
eliminate these and other problem areas Forrestal called 
the Chiefs together for a meeting at the Key West Naval Base 
in March, 1948. 
157. 
549c d"t on 1 , 
The ensuing memorandum of agreement, called 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 
3G3 
the "Functions Paper," was issued by the President on 21 
April 1948 as a replacement for E.O. 9877. 550 
While the "Functions Paper" did eliminate some of 
the points of service antagonism, it unfortunately defined 
the services' primary and collateral missions only in general 
terms, le.aving the actual implementation open to interpre-
tation and technological feasibility. Thus while the Navy 
was given the collateral mission, "to be prepared to par-
ticipate in the over-all air effort as directed by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff," how this would be accomplished was left 
unspecified. During the pre-missile era, the only means 
available to the Navy to participate in a nuclear retalia-
tion operation was the carrier-based aircraft; but the Navy 
lacked a plane with the requisite range and payload capabi-
lity to deliver the nuclear weapons of the period, as well 
as a carrier that was large enough to launch such a plane 
if it were developed. The U.S.S. United StaTes was designed 
to be such an aircraft carrier, which explains why its can-
551 
cellation caused thE> "Revolt of the Admirals." Some 
550Ibid., 157-183, for a full discussion of the formu-
lation of the Functions Papers. 
551s d · · f 1 ee my 1scuss1on o t e 'Revolt' in Chapter V, 
also see Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and the B-36 Bom-
ber!" in American Civil-Military Decisions, ed. by Harold 
Ste1n (Montgomery, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 
1963), and Vincent ravis, The Politics of Innovation: 
Patterns in Navy Cnses, Monograph SC'riC's in World Affairs, 
Volume 4, Monograph No. 3, l9GG-67 (DE>nver: University 
of [enver, 1967). 
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of the remaining problems were solved at a follow-up confer-
ence held at the United States Naval War College, Newport, 
Rhode Island. Still the over-all issue of roles and missions 
continued to be one of the major causes for inter-service 
rivalry. Despite, his failure to completely solve the roles 
and missions issue, Forrestal was correct in believing that 
service roles and missions had to be defined before the 
budget process could proceed. Only after the services had 
determined their relationship with one another could they 
begin to translate the political mission statement into 
a cohesive and unified military plan. The fact that there 
were still unresolved aspects of the issue remaining was 
one of the primary reasons that Forrestal's "new principle" 
failed. 
With the roles and missions issue behind him, For-
restal proceeded to bring the Chiefs into the budget process. 
On 30 March 1948, the Secretary of Defense asked the Chiefs 
to express themselves on the allocation of a three billion 
dollar supplement to the fiscal year 1949 defense budget. 
The Chiefs responded with varying force levels and a total 
fiscal requirement of over nine billion dollars. The ad-
ministration simply would not accept this three fold increase 
and held fast to a ceiling of three billion. 552 This first 
552 Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff und National 
Policy, 183-205. 
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effort at implementing the "new principle" not only had 
failed, but foreshadowed the problems that would follow. 
Within weeks after the administration decided to 
hold the line on the FY 49 supplemental budget, planning 
began for the FY 50 defense budget. This would be the 
first budget that the Chiefs would be involved in from its 
553 
inception. Again the administration began with a pre-
conceived budgetary ceiling, this time at 14.4 billion dol-
lars. Although the Chiefs were now part of the budget pro-
cess, they had not yet developed a systematic approach to 
formulate their budget advice, this, despite the fact that 
they had always claimed that they should be the ones to 
develop the actual figures. The result was that the Chiefs 
sent forward a compilation of all three services' unilateral 
budget estimates, without any integration. This "paperclip-
ped" budget totaled almost 30 billion dollars, a figure 
554 twice the amount the administration was willing to spend. 
553 For the official JCS analysis of the events sur-
rounding the development of the FY 50 budget see Condit, 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 205-248; 
also see Warner R. Schilling, "The Politics of National 
Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Warner A. Schilling, Paul Y. Ham-
mond, Glen H. Snyder, StrQtSgy, Politics, and Defense Budgets 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). 
554 Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National 
Policy, 219-224. In October 1947 General Gruenther suggested 
that the Chiefs develop a strategic plan upon which the 
budget would be based. Unfortunately, this effort had not 
come to fruition when the Chiefs were asked for their input 
into the FY 50 budget. 
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on June 23 1948, Forrestal reacted to this situation by 
asking the Chiefs to set up a special board of senior offi-
cers to help develop the budget. This board of budgetary 
555 
advisors, chaired by Air Force General Joseph T. McNarney, 
had by August managed to cut the total requirement down 
to 23.6 billion dollars, but at that level the services 
appeared to be stalemated. From that point until early 
October, attempts to break the impasse met with little 
556 
success. 
Despite these problems, Forrestal was still convinced 
that the Chiefs had to take it upon themselves to divide 
the monies. On 4 October he verbally informed the Chiefs 
that they were to "recommend a subdivision of a 14.4 billion 
557 dollar appropriation for the fiscal year 1950." He fol-
lowed up this verbal guidance with a memorandum to the same 
558 
effect two days later. The Chiefs responded on the 7th 
555 James Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, ed. by Walter 
Millis (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 450. The other 
members of the board were Major General George J. Richards, 
U.S.A., and Vice Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S.N. 
556c d. t on 1 , The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National 
Policy, 224-225. 
557 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 6 October 
1948, subject: Budget for Fiscal Year 1950, Leahy Papers, 
folder, "Budget and Estimates - 1946-1950," U.S. Naval 
Archives. For a detailed discussion of the 4 October conver-
sation see Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National 
Policy, 231-2. 
558 Forrestal, Diaries, 499. 
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of October that they "found it impossible to reach an agree-
ment on the recommendation as to the allocation of the funds 
to the respective services." The political machinations 
surrounding the Chiefs' October 7th response brought into 
sharp focus all of the inter-service problems that had haunted 
the JCS during the previous months of negotiations. The 
split recommendation that was forwarded to the Secretary 
of Defense revealed a newly formed alliance between the 
Air Force and the Army against the Navy. Vlhile the former 
two services recommended the division of funds to be along 
the following lines: 4.9 billion to the Army, 4.4 to the 
Navy, and 5.1 to the Air Force; the Navy recommended figures 
of 4.9 billion, 4.9 billion, and 4.6 billion to each service 
respectively. Leahy recommended either dividing the 14.4 
billion dollarsequally among all three services, or simply 
taking the .5 billion dollar increase over the FY 49 budget 
d d . . d. h ll h . 559 an lVl 2ng t at equa y among t e servlces. 
559Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 7 October 
1948, subject Memorandum dated 6 October 1948 from the 
Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1949-
1950 Budget, Leahy Papers, folder "JCS outgoing correspond-
ence, October 1948- January 1949," U.S. Naval Archives. 
Enclosed were copies of the individual Chief's recommenda-
tions. Although Leahy went along with Bradley and Vanden-
berg, he also recommended equally dividing up the .5 billion 
dollar increase which would mean the Army would get 4.467 
billion, the Navy 5.067 billion, and the Air Force 4.867. 
Leahy may well have gone along with the Army and the Air 
Force in order not to appear to be siding with the Navy. 
According to the official JCS history the sug~estion to 
merely divide up the 14.4 billion dollars equally was made 
by LeahY and rejected on 5 October 1948, yet in a working 
3G8 
The djfferences in the budv.Pt figures reflected more 
than service bureaucratic imperatives; they also reflected 
fundamental differences over the strategic approach to the 
next war. All three services agreed that the ceiling resulted 
in insufficient forces to "meet the D-day demands on the 
560 Services in a war with Russia," and all three services 
tended to agree that the next war would in its general stra-
tegic aspects resemble the Second World War. None of the 
services seriously thought in terms of defending Western 
Europe by becoming involved in a land campaign with Russia. 
The forces available in the West were simply insufficient 
for this purpose. Instead, those forces that existeo would 
be concentrated on protecting Great Britain and the Mediter-
ranean Littoral. During the early stages of the war the 
allies would retreat across the Channel to England and across 
the Mediterranean to North Africa, returning to the conti-
nent only after they had sufficiently built up their strength. 
While the allies and particularly the United States were 
mobilizing their forces, the enemy would be subjected to 
draft of the 6 October Memorandum, this division is mentioned 
again and is annotated with the notation "proposed by Navy." 
This would suggest that it was not totally dropped by the Navy 
at least as of 6 October. Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and 
Estimates 1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives. Also see Condit, 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 233-236. 
560 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 6 October 
1948, subject: Budget for Fiscal Year 1950, Leahy Papers, 
folder "Budget and Estimates- 1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives. 
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a devastating air attack consisting of both conventional 
and nuclear weapons. How much money each service received 
was inextricably connected to its role in the short range 
561 
Joint Emergency War Plan "HALF-MOON/FLEETWOOD." 
Under "FLEETWOOD" the Navy's two primary missions 
were to protect the lines of communication (LOC) between 
North America and Great Britain and to maintain access through 
the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal, just as the Royal 
Navy had done during the Second World War. As part of the 
Navy's Mediterranean mission, carrier-based airpower would 
attempt to cut the enemy's lines of communication, thus 
impeding his advance. Besides these two specific missions, 
the Navy retained its collateral mission to support the 
Air Force's offensive air operations against the Russian 
homeland. According to "FLEETWOOD;' "carrier task groups 
will supplement and support the air offensive to the extent 
practically consistent with their (the Navy's) primary 
t k " 562 as . In reality, that task was to protect allied logis-
tics and communications lines and not to be in direct contact 
with enemy forces. 
5g1 JCS 1844/13, 21 July 1948, File CCS 381-USSR 3/2/46, 
National Archives, Washington, D.C. For a discussion of 
the evolution of the war plan nALFMOONJFLEETWOOD/DOUBLESTAR, 
see Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 
224-231, 275-301. 
562 JCS 1844/13, 21 July 1948, File CCS 381-USSR-
3/2/46, appendix "A", p. 123, National Archives. 
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From the Navy's perspective, retaining and acco~plish-
ing both its primary and collateral missions under "FLEETWOOD" 
were not only essential to the defense of the nation, but 
a matter of bureaucratic survival. The Navy's force levels 
were predicated upon those missions. If its nuclear retali-
ation mission was eliminated or its role in the Mediterranean 
minimized, then its force levels and in particular the number 
of carrier task groups that were to accomplish those missions 
would be appropriately lowered. Thus the !ssues that surround-
ed the development of the FY 50 budget were the same ones 
that caused the "Revolt of the Admirals" almost a year later. 
Once Forrestal had ordered the Chiefs to produce a 
14.4 billion dollar budget, the Chiefs were forced to recon-
sider their estimate of the situation. The heart of the 
Army-Air Force alliance was the elimination of the Navy's 
Mediterranean mission. As part of the 7 October budget 
debate General Bradley attacked the viability of this aspect 
of the "FLEETWOOD" plan: 
It is my opinion that to place a fleet in the Medi-
terranean without taking in ground troops to hold a 
base, or bases, makes no significant contribution to 
our initial offensive effort. It is my contention that 
the idea that Navy Air can stop any ground troop advance 
is contrary to all previous experiences. 
I believe that the Navy should have whatever air 
force is necessary to carry out its naval mission, but 
when there is a limited amount of money available, I 
think we must consider primary missions first. The 
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Navy concept of a carrier task force in the Mediterranean 
by itself is primarily designed to fight an air battle 
and stop any Army movement. Both of these functig~~ 
have been assigned to the Air Force and the Army. 
If the Army-Air Force position was sustained then the United 
States would have to rely, at least in the short term, solely 
on an atomic air attack based out of Great Britain. Hope-
fully, this would buy enough time for the Army to mobilize 
a force capable of invading the continent. The Navy would 
be relegated to protecting the lines of co~unication between 
England and North America, the role it had played in the 
European Theater of Operations during the Second World War. 
Why Bradley sided with the Air Force on this crucial 
issue is not difficult to determine. Undoubtedly, his experi-
ence in Europe during the war had something to do with it. 
More importantly, it was clear to everyone, that "FLEETWOOD" 
could not be conducted within the constraints of the admini-
stration's ceiling. Looking at it realistically, the forces 
the Navy needed to operate in the Mediterranean would have 
to come at the expense of the Air Force's atomic capability 
564 
or the Army's mobilization posture. These same arguments 
563 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 7 October 
1948, subject: Budget for the Fiscal Year 1950, Army view, 
Leahy Papers, folder "JCS Outgoing Correspondence, October 
1948-January 1949," U.S. Naval Archives. 
56 4:rms view is substantia ted by General Bradley's 
comments during the 5 October 1948 meeting of the JCS. "I 
think it is up to us to make a recommendation to the Secre-
tary of Defense of the 14.4 [billion dollars] based on what 
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were advanced by Bradley at other times to explain his anti-
carrier recommendations.565 
Whatever the reasons behind the service's action~, 
the political machinations emanating from the Joint Chiefs 
completely exasperated Forrestal. It was during this time 
that he became convinced that the Military Establishment 
needed to be completely restructured. On October 5th, he 
wrote in his diary that he was going to recommend to the 
Hoover Commission that the powers of the Secretary of Defense 
needed to be strengthened. He also added that he was think-
ing of making General Alfred Gruenther "my principle military 
d . ,.566 a VlSOr •••• His request that the JCS establish the 
McNarney Board was just another example of his desire to 
find alternative sources of military advice. The fact that 
he requested the formation of the McNarney Board as early 
as June, reveals that he might have already been having 
second thoughts about the effectiveness of the JCS. As 
part of his desire to develop alternative sources of advice, 
the Secretary wrote Eisenhower on October 8th and asked 
him to come to a meeting in which they would "talk fundamen-
tals: policy, budget and our whole military-diplomatic 
we consider the relative importance of the three Services 
in fighting the war against Russia." Condit, The Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and National Policy, 234. Also see Schilling. "The 
Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," 171. 
565
see my discussion of Bradley's rationale in his vote 
against the U.S.S. United States in Chapter V. 
566 Forrestal, Diaries, 497. 
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•t• .. 567 posl lons. This request laid the groundwork for Eisen-
hower's temporary assignment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. As we noted in Chapter IV, Forrestal's disen-
chantment with the JCS reached such proportions that he 
even considered abolishing it. 
Aside from looking for alternative sources of military 
advice, Forrestal also realized that his original approach 
to the budget process was now bankrupt. Still he was opposed 
to imposing a division of funds upon the Chiefs because 
he agreed with their contention that the 14.4 billion dollar 
ceiling was insufficient. He also disliked having to accept 
a strategy based exclusively upon a British based Air Force 
atomic assault. Since it was apparent, though, that the 
Chiefs had reached a total impasse on the division of the 
funds, Forrestal realized that he needed a whole new approach. 
On 5 October 1948, he met with President Truman and outlined 
his plan to ask the Chiefs to draw up an alternative force 
structure based upon a figure in the 18.5 billion dollar 
range. This would allow the administration the opportunity 
to choose between alternative force postures. 568 
This new approach was revealed to the Chiefs in a 
memorandum dated 8 October 1948. This same memorandum also 
56 
Ibid., 500. 
568 
Ibid., 498. 
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revealed just how far his disenchantment with the Chiefs 
had gone. The secretary began by outlining the two tasks 
that he had placed before the Chiefs: 
1. State the forces which, in your judgment, should 
be maintained during the fiscal year 1950. 
2. State the forces which, in your judgment, should 
be maintained during the fiscal year 1950 in light 
of probable fiscal limitations. 
Contained within these two tasks was the essence of the 
JCS's role under Forrestal's "new principle." The first 
task called for the development of an unconstrained budget, 
while the second task outlined the Chiefs'obligation in 
the balancing of commitments and capabilities. In regard 
to this latter point Forrestal added that the Chiefs should 
have supplied an assessment as to the impact the budget 
ceiling would have on their strategic plans. Such an 
assessment was necessary in order to make the balancing 
of capabilities and commitments a rational process. 
Specifically, the Secretary of Defense pointed out that 
he was satisfied with the Chiefs' efforts to perform the 
first task, but that he felt they had failed in their 
second task: 
The results of your work in carrying out the second 
phase of your inStructions has been inadequate, appar~ 
ently because there has been a departure from the primary 
JCS task of developing a statement of 'lesser force re-
quirements, within fiscal limitations, which would still 
provide for relative readiness of the-forces to be 
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maintained for the fiscal year 1950. By not pursuing 
the primary initial objective in this second stage it 
would appear that our efforts have degenerated into 
a competition for dollars. 
Forrestal went on to inform the Chiefs that they were to 
begin work on "force requirements that can be supported 
569 
in the general area of 14.4 billion." 
It was atthis point that Forrestal offered the Chiefs 
an opportunity to develop a force posture at a higher funding 
level, but he was not going to let them evade their responsi-
bilities. He told the Chiefs that he wanted a "statement 
of force requirements on a basis of military necessity." 
In essence the Chiefs were still to produce a plan based 
on their best analysis of military requirements, but the 
plan had to be within the President's ceiling. Even though 
alternative force postures could be considered, the Presi-
dent's ceiling was still the goal to be strived for. The 
following week he called in the Chiefs to outline the speci-
fics of his new proposal. He started by emphasizing the 
importance of the Chiefs' credibility and its relation to 
the budget process: 
It is vitally important that the concept of the JCS 
not lose face with the country •.•• I think it is a danger-
ous thing for the country if it does. You accept, to 
some extent, a confession of inability to get away from 
569Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 October 
1948, no subject, Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and Estimates 
1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives. 
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service interests and look at the whole business in 
the light of what national interest is. That will 
be the public interpretation of it.570 
On the surface, Forrestal was suggesting that the Chiefs 
return a budget within the President's ceiling, even if 
it meant accepting a "very minimum" atomic air assault force 
stationed in Great Britain. Forrestal wanted the Chiefs 
to point out the "absurdity" of such a posture, so that 
he could argue for raising the ceiling. On a deeper level, 
though, Forrestal seemed to be asking the Chiefs to consider 
non-military factors, such as the nation's financial sta-
bility, when they prepared their force analysis. By doing 
so they would be conducting themselves in a responsible 
manner and producing a budget that would be in the national 
interest. 
On the 3rd of November, the Chiefs met to decide 
how to respond to Forrestal. The Secretary had imposed 
upon them an 8 November deadline, and warned them that if 
they could not divide the funds themselves, he would impose 
a division upon them. 571 Since the October 15 meeting in 
Forrestal's office, the JCS had been trying to come to some 
kind of compromise on the budget issue. They had returned 
the budget to the McNarney Board with the twin goals of 
producing a budget within the Presidential guidelines and 
57~orrestal Diaries, 504 ff. 
57~ondi t, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National 
Policy, 238. 
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producing an al terna ti ve budget as outlined by For.restal. 
In regard to the Board 1 s first goal, no substantial improve-
ment had been made since the 7th of October. According 
to the Army•s representative, Major General George Richards, 
there was "no material change in the views previously held by 
(the services]." In an effort seemingly to substantiate 
this statement, Richards recommended a budget distribution 
that was identical to the Army•s position on October 7th. 
He freely acknowledged that such a division of funds would 
result in an exclusive reliance on a Great Britain or North 
African based Air Force atomic assault, and that it would 
eliminate the Navy•s ability to implement the Mediterranean 
portion of "FLEETWOOD." In terms of force structuring, 
this lack of a mission could lead to the reduction in the 
size of the Navy•s carrier task groups. 572 The basic stra-
tegic differences that had inhibited the budget process 
from the start were still very much in evidence. 
With the budget assistants still stalemated over 
the October figures, the Chiefs themselves moved to formu-
late a compromise position. Sometime between the 3rd 
572 
Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 Novem-
ber 1948, subject: Force and Fund Allocations under the 
14.4 billion Program, Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and 
Estimates 1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives; for General McNar-
ney•s view, which was similar to Richards•, see Memorandum 
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 November 1948, subject: 
Analyses of Force Rf:quirements for Budget Estimates, Truman 
Papers, Presidential Secretary File, General File, box 114, 
folder "Bradley," Truman Library. 
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and the 8th of November, the Chiefs realized that since 
they could not come to an agreement on a rational division 
of the monies based on an integrated strategy, that the 
best alternative was simply to scale down their requests 
so that they fell under the ceiling. This kind of simple 
quick fix solution was exactly the opposite of what Forrestal 
wanted. Warner Schilling, in his study of the development 
of the FY 50 budget, points out that neither the Army nor 
the Navy were tempted by Forrestal's suggestion to accept 
an unbalanced strategy with the hope of increased service 
allocations. They did not believe that the Secretary of 
Defense could prove the "absurdity" of the 14.4 billion 
dollar strategy to the President; but that once the Chiefs 
had agreed to the strategy, they would have to live with 
573 
it. The Air Force also apparently came to the conclusion 
that without the support of the other services, no JCS spon-
sored budget would be accepted at all. It is probable that 
the Chiefs realized that if they did not act quickly, they 
might be cut out of the budget process altogether, and possi-
bly permanently. On the 8th of November, the Chiefs sent 
a memorandum to Forrestal outlining a division of funds 
within the ceiling's requirements. The Army would receive 
4.8 billion, the Navy 4.6 billion, and the Air Force 5.0 
Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: 
Fiscal 1950," 196. 
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billion. Despite this agreement on the general breakdown 
of the monies, the memorandum pointed out that there still 
remained a difference of opinion as to the number of air-
craft carriers the Navy needed. The Army recommended six, 
the Navy wanted nine, and the Air Force felt that four was 
sufficient. Without some kind of agreement on an integrated 
strategy the division of FY 50 funds had not really solved 
anything, and the Chiefs were no closer to being prepared 
to truly participate in the budget process than they were 
574 before. 
Shortly afterwards, the Chiefs submitted a 16.9 billion 
575 dollar alternative budget. As they probably expected 
the administration kept within its ceiling, thus negating 
the value of the alternative budget. 
The development of the FY 50 budget reflected most 
of the problems that would continue to hamper efforts at 
effective policy integration during the remainder of the 
period of our study. From the very beginning, the Chiefs 
574 __ ~emurandum for the Secretary of Defense, 8 Novem-
ber 1948, subject: Allocation of Funds for 1950 Budget, 
Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and Estimates 1946-1950," U.S. 
Naval Archives. The fact that this was somewhat of a pyrrhic 
victory for Forrestal is indicated in a 9 November letter 
to Truman in which he outlined his problems with the Chiefs 
and that he wanted Eisenhower's help in the future, Truman 
Papers, Presidential Secretary File, General File, box 120, 
folder "Forrestal- General," Truman Library. 
575 
-Letter, Forrestal to Truman, 1 December 1948, 
Clifford Papers, box 17, folder, "Unification - Secretary 
of Defense," Truman Library. 
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were workingunder the twin handicaps of lacking a systematic 
means of developing their own unified plans, and working 
within a policy vacuum. The political mission statement, 
which was the essential first step in Forrestal's "new prin-
ciple,'' was not forthcoming. Early in the FY 50 process, 
Forrestal had asked the National Security Council for guidance 
upon which the Joint Chiefs could base their budget assump-
tions: 
I believe that it is imperative that a comprehensive 
statement of national policy be prepared, particularly 
as it relates to Soviet Russia, and that this statement 
specify and evaluate the risks, state our objectives, 
and outline the measures to be followed in achieving 
them ..•. such a statement is needed to guide the National 
Military Establishment in determining the level and 
character of armament which it should seek and, I believe, 
to assist the President in determining the proportion 
of our resources which should be dedicated to military 
purposes. I also believe that it is fundamental to 
decisions concerning the size of, and relative emphasis 
in, our national budget. 
While Forrestal's request may be construed as a ploy to 
raise the budget ceiling, it also clearly was an effort 
to refocus the budget process in the direction that he origi-
nally envisioned it. Although the NSC began to work on 
a response, the President informed his Secretary of Defense 
that it was his responsibility to "establish a program within 
the budget limits which have beeri allowed," and that the 
~~6 
effort should not wait on the NSC.J' 
576 Memorandum for the Executive Secretary National 
Security Council, 10 July 1948, subject: Appraisal of the 
Degree and Character of Military Preparedness Required 
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Forrestal's failure to elicit specific guidance from 
the NSC forced the Chiefs, as individuals and as a corporate 
group, to generate their own assumptions and to determine 
certain strategic priorities which were reflected in their 
war plans. Ultimately, however, the Chiefs did have an 
opportunity to become involved in the NSC policy integration 
process, when they were asked to comment on a draft of NSC 
20/3. On May 25,1948, the JCS were formally asked to develop 
a catalog of American commitments "involvi'lg the use or 
possible use of Armed Forces." Such a list would be an 
integral part in the development of the political mission 
statement. In putting together the catalog, the Chiefs 
interpreted the term "commitments" in its broadest context 
"to include not only actual assignments of force, ..• but 
also commitments of a iess tangible nature, such as those 
implicit in pledges, pacts, contingent military actions 
and our foreign policies." The conclusion drawn from this 
study was to be expected: 
It is clear from the above summary of commitments and 
their implications and from the attitude and capabilities 
of the USSR, together with the determination of the 
United States to resist communist aggression, an 
over-all commitment which in itself is all-inclusive 
' of the World Situation, Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary 
File, box 156, folder "Def. Sec. of -Mise folder #1," Truman 
Library. The President's response was a memorandum dated 
13 July, 1948, same folder. 
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and with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff are firmly 
in agreement, that it is essential to our national 
security to bring our military strength to a level 
commensurate with the distinct possibility of global 
warfare.577 
The obvious solution to the imbalance between national 
capabilities and national commitments was to increase the 
size of the military. Thus the catalog supplied the Chiefs 
with a perfect weapon with which to attack the budget ceiling. 
The trouble with this approach, was that the Chiefs waited 
too long before releasing the document. It was not sent 
to Forrestal until 2 November 1948, and was referred to 
in their formal comments on NSC 20/3 two weeks later. Again, 
the Chiefs pointed out "the dangers inherent in undue dis-
parity between the nation's capabilities and commitments." 578 
In effect the Chiefs were charging the civilian leadership 
to carefully point out exactly what they wanted to accomplish 
with America's military forces. On the one hand, this would 
allow the military to shift the blame to the civilians for 
an inadequate force posture, and reinforce the Chiefs' claim 
to autonomy in the budget process. On the other hand, if 
577 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 2 November 
1948, subject: Existing International Commitments Involving 
the Possible Use of Armed Forces, Leahy Papers, folder "JCS 
Outgoing Correspondence October 1948-January 1949," U.S. 
Naval Archives. 
578 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 15 November 
1948, subject: U.S. Objectives with Respect to the U.S.S.R. 
to counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security, Truman Papers, 
Presidential Secretary File, Subject File, National Security 
Council, Box 204, folder, "Meeting #27," Truman Library. 
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the administration failed to effectively outline their mili-
tary goals, then the Chiefs would again be in a position 
to claim autonomy. This was the reverse of what appeared 
to be the PresidenVs approach in which the Chiefs were asked 
to define what they could accomplish within the budget 
. . G~9 
celllng. If the Chiefs actually intended to use their 
catalog and NSC 20/3 as a means of changing the budget ceil-
ing, it failed primarily due to the fact that the document 
was issued too late in the process to have any effect. By 
then Forrestal had already issued his ultimatum to the Chiefs 
and whatever credibility they may have had as a corporate 
entity had been lost. Had it been available earlier, it 
might have forced the administration into rethinking the 
rationale behind the ceiling, or at least would have served 
as a focus for Forrestal's desire to restructure the budget 
process in the way he originally envisioned. 
A collateral factor that impeded the effective formu-
lation of FY 50 was Forrestal's desire that the Chiefs develop 
their proposals based solely upon military requirements. 
This was made very specific in his October 8th memorandum 
to the Chiefs, in which he outlined his goal of an alternative 
budget: 
In carrying out this assignment, I do not feel that 
it is necessary for you to consider such matters as 
579c d"t on l , The Joint Chiefs of Staff in National 
Policy, 232. 
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political complications, possible commitments made in 
earlier Congressional testimony, etc. In other words, 
I want from you a statement of force requirements on 
a basis of military necessity. Other considerations 
will, of course, be taken into account in the making 
of final decisions, but in the final analysis the respon-
sibility for taking such considerations into account 
will be that of the President, assisted to the extent 
he.deems necessary by the suggestions of his political 
advisers .580 
There is an apparent paradox in the Secretary's desire on 
the one hand to have the Chiefs retain their traditionalism, 
while on the other hand, understand the budget limitations 
and work within them. This paradox is explained when one 
recalls Forrestal's original outline of his "new principle." 
The Chiefs would take the administration's policy guidance 
and convert it into an integrated military plan initially 
b d " l l . 1. t . d . "581 ase so e y on m1 1 ary cons1 erat1ons. Once that 
had been accomplished it would then be evaluated against 
fiscal and political feasibility. The result would be a 
force structure that would achieve the greatest degree of 
military security within the limits of those constraints. 
As important as it was to have the Chiefs involved in this 
stage of the process, it was even more important that they 
be involved during the firststage, the formulation of the 
political mission statement. If the Chiefs' military advice 
589Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 October 
1948, no subject, Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and Estimates 
1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives. 
58~irst Report of the Secretary of Defense, 41. 
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was effectively integrated into the system during the first 
stage, then it made sense to restrict the Chiefs to solely 
military considerations at the later stage. The evaluation 
of fiscal and political feasibility would be merely a check 
stage to guarantee that the JCS's military plans did in 
fact support the political goals that were agreed upon earlier 
and were within the fiscal limitations also agreed to. 
Ultimately, the problem of the stage at which the 
Chiefs should be participants was the cause of Forrestal's 
efforts being ruined. The first stage of the process, that 
of developing an integrated and balanced policy never did 
occur. The formulation of NSC 20/3 and the JCS's catalog 
of commitments were never directly connected with the budget 
process, despite Forrestal's and the Chief's efforts. These 
two documents should have been an integral part in determining 
the political mission statement. Instead the Chiefs were 
brought into the process much later, after the parameters 
of that mission statement had been established. Thus the 
Chiefs lacked an understanding of the rationale behind the 
setting of priorities that led to the ceiling. Without 
this understanding, this requirement that they develop their 
military plans "based solely on military considerations," 
had a different meaning than Forrestal envisioned. The 
Chiefs' analysis of the situation from the military 
386 
perspective naturally resulted in a budget in excess of 
the administration's ceiling. Expecting the Chiefs to some-
how remain within their professional limits, yet conscious 
of the non-military issues, when they had not participated 
in the decision making process, resulted in a high degree 
of organizational frustration. The Chiefs believed that 
they were expected to give their professional imprimatur 
to a force posture that had been arrived at without any 
professional input. 
The fact that the Chiefs could not "objectively" 
arrive at the administration's budget ceiling for both 
the FY 49 supplement and the FY 50 budget pointed out to 
the administration the dangers of allowing the Chiefs budgetary 
autonomy. From that time on, during the remainder of the 
Truman administration and during the Eisenhower administra-
tion, the Chiefs would have to endure budget ceilings at 
the onset of the planning cycle. Professor Lawrence Kerb's 
research into the budget process clearly substantiates the 
Chiefs' own view that as a result of these ceilings, they 
had "virtually no impact upon determining the actual size 
582 
of the military budget." While individual Chiefs such 
as Ridgway and Taylor voiced their disapproval of this mode 
582 Lawrence Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The 
First Twenty-Five Years, 1947-1972 (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1976), 128. 
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of operation, it was the Wheeler Report that captured the 
JCS's institutional dissidence on this matter: 
The manner and timing in which the Services' budgets 
are justified, appropriated, and apportioned sometimes 
unduly determine military policy and strategy on the 
basis of peacetime economy and management rather than 
the readiness for war. 
Determinations which are essentially military have been 
affected by means of fiscal controls and adjustments 
so that the resulting military funds, as finally appor-
tioned, are often askew from the military requirements 
upon which the budget was originally predicated. 
The end result of the use of these non-military determinants 
and the imposition of the budget ceilings was to prevent 
"the objective determination of requirements based upon 
directed roles, missions and plans followed by a tayloring 
to fit a feasible financial plan." 583 
Clearly, the Chiefs appeared to be calling for a 
return to Forrestal's original concept of the budget process 
which they assumed would allow them a greater degree of 
autonomy over matters they considered "essentially military." 
But a careful examination of the Wheeler Report's attack 
upon imposed budget ceilings reveal fundamental differences 
between the Forrestal model of policy integration and the 
military's model. Forrestal presupposed the Chief's par-
ticipation during the early stages of the process, when 
583u.s. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Report by the Ad 
Hoc Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Organization 
of the Department of Defense, 24 January 1958 (Hereafter 
referred to as the Wheeler Report), 13-14. 
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political and fiscal guidelines would be established. This 
was the basis of his criticism of the Army's "straight-
line of command" and its sharp black and white distinctions 
584 between military and civilian functions. Those guidelines, 
which were the result of integrating political and military 
policy, would become the mission statement which would drive 
the remainder of the process. The military's integration 
process as outlined in the Wheeler Report assumes that there 
would be no consideration of fiscal feasibility until the 
Chiefs' had submitted their requirements statement. The 
notion of tayloring the force structure at that point implies 
that the Chiefs were not involved at an earlier stage when 
fiscal limitations of a non-military variety would naturally 
be discussed. They, in essence, were expecting the civilians 
to develop political guidance without fiscal considerations, 
while they themselves would develop their military require-
ments in a similar vacuum. Ironically, this was precisely 
the pattern that was exhibited during FY 50, with the one 
exception, that the civilians did consider financial matters 
from the start. Under the military's integration process 
model, the Chiefs would constantly be producing military 
plans that were divorced from reality, as they did in FY 50. 
It was this very inability to develop plans that was in 
tune with reality that resulted in their exclusion from 
584 
Memorandum Forrestal to Clifford, 7 September 
1946, Clifford Papers, box 16, folder "Unificatio~ Correspon-
dence - General," Truman Library. 
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the budget process. The only other option would have been 
for the Chiefs to have considered non-military factors when 
they developed their force requirements, but this may have 
been impossible given their professionalism and the civilian's 
fear of subverting civilian control of the military. 
The only other time the Chiefs were allowed the oppor-
tunity to redeem themselves occurred a decade later during 
the formulation of the Fiscal Year 1959 budget. Again the 
Chiefs based their requirements on their professional analy-
sis of the situation, excluded non-military factors, and 
produced a budgetary requirement 10 billion dollars in excess 
of the administration's . 585 des1res. Ironically, the Wheeler 
Report attacked the FY 59 budget as an example of an imposed 
budget ceiling, claiming that it was "contrary to accepted 
budgetary practices. 586 Ignoring the fact that budget ceil-
ings had been the norm for a decade, the sequencing of events 
actually conformed to the Chiefs' process model, in that 
after the Chiefs had developed their requirements, they 
were measured against "financial feasibility." 
The primary lesson learned from the formulation of 
FY 50, and reinforced during the development of FY 59, was 
that the Chiefs' desire for budgetary autonomy was incompati-
ble with the civilian leadership's obligation to consider 
585K b or , The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 106-7. 
586 Wheeler Report, 13. 
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a broad spectrum of factors influencing national security. 
The Chiefs' concept of professionalism demanded autonomy 
and any attenuation of their estimates meant an affront 
to their professional capability and a violation of tradi-
tionalism. In an effort to get around this traditional 
professionalism, the Truman and the Eisenhower administra-
tions reorganized the Department of Defense. It was hoped 
that if the Chiefs achieved unanimity, the kinds of dysfunc-
tional inter-service rivalry that took place during the 
formulation of the first budget would be eliminated. The 
establishment of budgetary ceilings was simply one approach 
to dealing with the unrealistic estimates that were being 
produced by the JCS. While it is true that "realism" is 
relative, in this case the lack of it had the effect of 
removing the Joint Chiefs from any meaningful role in the 
budgetary process. The fact that the Chiefs, themselves, 
were at least partially at fault was never understood by 
the military professionals. 
While the lessons of FY 50 had a negative effect, 
at least in terms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's future 
role in the formulation of the defense budget, they also 
had a positive effect on the political and the military 
planning systems. After the failure of the budget, the 
civilian leadership and the Joint Chiefs apparently agreed 
that it was necessary for both the NSC and the JCS to 
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develop cohesive planning systems within their own structures 
and that these newly formed systems would merge their pro-
ducts together to form a unified integrated political/military 
plan. This would remove the twin handicaps that had faced 
the Chiefs during the formulation of FY 50: the lack of 
policy guidance, and the lack of a unified military plan. 
In an effort to fill the vacuum in policy direction 
a process of codifying national security policy began during 
the Korean War and continued on vigorously during the Eisen-
bower administration. This process had two facets. First, 
the National Security Council Staff expanded into a more 
structured system in order to process guidance. Second, 
the NSC formalized and regularized its guidance. This move-
ment culminated, during the Eisenhower administration, in 
the publication of an annual document entitled Basic National 
Security Policy (BNSP). According to Lawrence Legere, the 
BNSP "broadly defined U.S.interests and objectives, analyzed 
the major trends in world affairs that might affect them, 
and set forth a national strategy for achieving them, cover-
ing political, economic, and military elements thereof."587 
The BNSP was the result of the President's own inclination 
to structure things in a military staff manner. Maxwell 
587Keith C. Clark and Lawrence J. Legere, editors, 
The President and the Management of National Security: A 
Report by the Institute for Defense Analysis (New York: 
Fredrick A. Praeger, 1969), 218. 
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Taylor recalled that "it was just like his [Eisenhower's] 
old staff at SHAEF; all the committees of the NSC were like 
588 
his general staff divisions." Undoubtedly, Eisenhower 
looked upon the BNSP as the operations order upon which 
the JCS would base its planning. 
As the National Security Council began to codify 
its own product and establish communication with other govern-
mental agencies, it was apparent that the JCS would have 
to do likewise. In 1950, a representative of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff was added to the NSC staff, but still the 
589 
communications problems remained. Until the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff developed a system that produced a unified military 
plan it would be almost impossible for them to supply useful 
advice to the NSC. The lack of such a system had contributed 
significantly toward the failure of the FY 50 budget. It 
was with this in mind that the Joint Chiefs of Staff estab-
lished their "program for planning!! in July 1952. 
This concept was first outlined by Vice Admiral Arthur 
Davis, the Director of the Joint Staff, in 1949. Rather 
58 \axwell D. Taylor, !!Reflections on the American 
Military Establishment,!! in Evolution of the American Military 
Establishment Since World War II, ed. by Paul Schratz (Lexing-
ton, Virginia: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 
1978), 9. 
58 ~ackson Committee, 432; for a discussion of how 
the JCS and NSC ultimately developed very effective linkages 
during the Viet Nam War see William Shawcross, Sideshow: 
Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1979). 
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inexplicably, although the Korean War had to have had some 
impact, the program was not put into effect until almost 
three years later. In its final form, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Memorandum of Policy (MOP) #84 outlined the formu-
lation of three basic policy planning documents, the short 
range Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the mid-
ranged Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), and the long-
ranged Joint Long Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE). The 
JSCP was the successor to the short range Joint Emergency 
War Plans that were the only integrated planning documents 
prior to the Kcrean War. The JSCP dealt with the contemporary 
world situation, outlined the services'capabilities and 
described how they would react to certain contingencies. 
The JLRSE (at times identified as the Joint Long Range Stra-
tegic Study, JLRSS) is a long range study, ten years or 
more in advance, which emphasized broad trends rather than 
attempting to outline specific operational plans. the JLRSE 
was particularly valuable in the area of research and develop-
ment where lead times of a decade or more are normally 
required. 
While both of these documents are important in the 
planning precess, it is the JSOP that is the focal point 
of the JCS interface with the budget process. According 
to the official definition, the Joint Strategic Objectives 
Plan is: 
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A mid-range objectives plan which translates u.s . 
. national objectives and policies from the time frame 
5-8 years in the future into terms of military objec-
tives and strategic concepts and defines basic unde-r-
takings for cold, limited, and general war which may 
be accomplished with the objective force levels. 5~U 
The JSOP filled the crucial void in the Forrestal/Sherman 
approach to the budget process. It was this document that 
translated the NSC's political mission statement into a 
military force posture. The JSOP was exactly the type of 
document that Forrestal wanted the JCS to develop during 
the formulation of FY 50, and as such it should be the central 
document in the policy integration effort. 
The JSOP, however, can only be as good as the guidance 
the Joint Chiefs received from the National Security Council. 
Despite the Council's vigorous_ efforts, the Chiefs all through 
the Eisenhower administration felt that the NSC's guidance 
was still insufficient. This view was reinforced by indepen-
dent analysis such as the Task Force on Procurement of the 
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the 
Government which conducted its study in 1955.591 This con-
tinued criticism of the political guidance is central to 
590 Dictionary of United States Army Terms, Army Regu-
lation 310-325 (Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 
1972), 290. 
591
commission on Organization of the Executive Branch 
of the Government, Five Staff Papers Prepared for the Task 
Force on Procurement, Volume I, Defense Procurement: The 
Vital Roles of the National Security Council and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (Washington, D.C.: June 1955), A-44. 
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understanding why the Chiefs continued to believe that the 
policy integration process was a failure and that they were 
operating in a policy vacuum. Probably, the foremost military 
critic of the BNSP was General Maxwell Taylor. General 
Taylor described that the BNSP "should be the blueprint 
for the security programs of all departments of the govern-
ment and provide the JCS with a firm point of departure 
for their strategic planning:" 
Unfortunately, such is not the case. The end product .•. 
has thus far been a document so broad in nature and 
so general in language as to provide limited guidance 
in nr~ctical appljcation. In the course of its develop-
ment, the sharp issues in national defense which confront 
our leaders have been blurred in conference and in 
negotiation. The final text thus permits many different 
interpretations. The protagonists of Massive Retaliation 
or of Flexible Response, the partisans of the importance 
of air power or of limited war, as well as the defenders 
of other shades of military opinion, we are able to 
find language supporting their divergent points of view. 
The "Basic National Security Policy" document means 
all things to all people and settles nothing.5~~ 
Since the Chiefs perceived that the BNSP failed to supply 
them with appropriate guidance, they, according to Generals 
Taylor and Decker, were forced to generate their own assump-
593 
tions upon which they based the JSOP. In a cyclical 
kind of scenario, this resulted in the Chiefs supplying 
useless advice to the civilians. While the Task Force on 
Procurement was criticizing the NSC for its guidance, it 
592 Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 82-83. 
593 Interview with Generals Taylor and Decker, January 
1975, Washington, D.C. 
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was also pointing out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had 
failed to develop a coordinated and integrated war plan 
and that "efforts to bring non-military·advice into the 
. . 594 process had been relat1vely unfru1tful." 
The fact that the Chiefs had to generate their own 
assumptions when they wrote their first Joint Emergency 
595 
War Plans, "BROLIER/FROLIC", in 1946, was explicable; 
but once the NSC became operational it was dysfunctional. 
This was partially the cause of the continual disparity 
between the JCS generated force requirements and the fiscal 
constraints outlined by the civilian leadership. Granted, 
the JCS did supply input during the writing of the BNSP, 
but from the Chiefs perception it was simply "feeding the 
596 
paper mill over at the NSC." · Conversely, one can get 
a sense of what Eisenhower thought of the JCS input by 
recalling that in 1958 he not only restructured the Department 
of Defense, but specifically reorganized the internal staff-
ing structure of the Joint Chiefs. 
The failure of the policy integration program that 
General Taylor noted was reflected in the continual existence 
of the budget ceilings, which in turn meant that the JSOP 
594c . . 
omm1ss1on on the Organization of the Executive 
Branch of the Government, Task Force on Procurement, A-44. 
595c d" 
on 1t, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National 
Policy, 276-77. 
5961 t . 
n erv1ew with General Taylor, January 1975, 
Washington, D.C. 
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was not being considered in the generation of a force pos-
ture. Forrestal realized that a JSOP type document was 
essential to the budget process, because it would translate 
the political mission statement into forces, missions, and 
dollars; but the budget ceilings superceded the political 
mission statement and reversed the process by which force 
levels were determined. This reversal effectively took 
the Chiefs out of the decision making process, and led General 
Taylor to write that "nowhere in the machinery of government 
is there a procedure for checking military capabilities 
d l . t. l . t t 597 an po 1 1ca comm1 men s. 
With the Chiefs' efforts at attaining autonomy in 
the budget process blocked by the imposition of budget ceil-
ings, they apparently tried the next best thing; to influence 
the formulation of the political mission statement in such 
a manner that it would allow for the force levels the Chiefs' 
sought. This effort met with mixed success in regards to 
the three major policy statements written during the period, 
NSC 20/3, NSC 68 (written in 1949-50), and NSC 162/2 (written 
in 1953). In all three cases the Chiefs attempted to create 
the image of a disjuncture between the nation's strategic 
commitments and its military capabilities. This was obviously 
59 
Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 83. General Taylor 
tried to get Secretary of State Dulles to meet regularly 
with the Chiefs. While he did meet with the Secretary 
informally, there never were established regular meetings. 
Taylor, interview. 
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the intention of the Chiefs in their use of the catalog 
of commitments to criticize NSC 20/3. While their efforts 
failed in 1943, they met with greater success the following 
year during the writing of NSC 63. This documents was written 
in response to the shocks of the Russian explosion of an 
atomic bomb and the fall of China, and was designed to lay 
the foundation for future American mobilization. Although 
the Chiefs remained conspicuously aloof from the document's 
actual development, a representative of the Joint Staff's 
Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Major General Truman H. 
Landon, was deeply involved in its writing. When the stra-
tegic implications of NSC 68 were translated into dollars 
and cents it came surprisingly close to the Chiefs' original 
recommendations for FY 50. 598 NSC 68 was never put into 
effect because of the advent of the Korean War. 
While the Chiefs met with mixed success in their 
first two efforts to substantially influence policy, they 
were far more successful during the formulation of the NSC 162/2. 
Shortly after his election, President Eisenhower called 
his new Chiefs together and asked them to examine America's 
strategic posture and generate supporting budget estimates. 
Their first efforts resulted in estimates that were six 
to seven billion dollars in excess of the administration's 
598
see Paul Y. Hammond "NSC-68: Prologue Rearma-
ment", in Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets. 
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figures. The Chiefs argued through their spokesman, Admiral 
Radford, that since the military had not been notified of 
an official administration position on the use of nuclear 
weapons, they had to plan for every possible contingency 
across the whole spectrum of war. According to policy analyst 
Glenn Snyder, Admiral Radford maintained that if the Chiefs 
"were told what kind [of war] they were to prepare for, 
and, in particular, if they were given permission to use 
nuclear weapons whenever it was tec~nically advantageous 
to do so, then the costs of defense would be lower." 599 
Radford's position that nuclear firepower could substitute 
for manpower became one of the pillars of the New Look. 
These three examples seem to indicate, at least super-
ficially, that the Chiefs were being drawn into the policy 
process and were capable of influencing the formulation 
of strategic guidance, but the Chiefs were successful only 
when their goals were in congruence with the goals of the 
administration. In 1949 the Truman administration and especi-
ally the State Department was very interested in redeveloping 
the military option. This created the situation for a re-
evaluation of the whole strategic force structure in NSC 
68. In 1953 Radford's arguments for replacing expensive 
_,mm 
Glenn Snyder, "The New Look," in Strategy Politics, 
and Defense Budgets, 427 
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manpower with firepower was supported by Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles, who was already committed to the U$e 
600 
of nuclear weapons. When there was a lack of congruence, 
as in the case of the development of NSC 20/3, the JCS had 
little impact. 
The essence of a process to produce an integrated 
political/military policy was to achieve a nexus between 
the nation's political goals, the military planning process, 
and the development of the defense budget. As management 
specialist Fredrick Mosher pointed out in his 1954 study 
of the defense budget process, "military plans are ineffec-
tive unless they are supported by the budget; and the budgets 
are meaningless unless they are based upon sound military 
planning, itself built upon approved objectives in foreign 
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policy." It was in an effort to achieve this nexus that 
the rationalism of program budgeting was first introduced. 
The problem was that this logical and rational process broke 
down with each side blaming the other for the failure to 
produce an integrated political/military policy with neither 
60~1952 Dulles published an article in Life Magazine 
entitled "A policy of Boldness," in which he advocated a 
massive retaliation type strategy. Eisenhower pointed out 
toTiulles that such an approach lacked flexibility. Townsend 
Hoopes, The Df!Vil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little 
Brown & Co., 1973), 126-28. 
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side fully understanding why the breakdown occurred. The 
civilian leadership's experience, first during FY 50 and 
later with FY 59, convinced them that the Chiefs could never 
be allowed the budget autonomy that they demanded. The 
constant interse warfare over weapons systems acquisition 
reinforced this assumption. 602 Thus both the Truman and 
the Eisenhower administrations established budget ceilings, 
which seemed to substantiate the Chief's contention that 
the nation's capabilities and commitments were not being 
effectively analyzed and balanced. Unfortunately, such 
a superficial examination of the breakdown fails to tell 
us actually what happened. In order to understand what 
did happen we must go through the process and analytically 
compare it to our hypothetical model. 
First let us examine the nature of the political 
mission statement that starts the budget process. The Chiefs 
claimed that these statarents were ineffectual, forcing them 
to operate in a policy vacuum. While such a perception 
is quite understandable when there was a lack of institutional 
linkage between the JCS and the NSC, the creation of the 
602For a discussion of the debates over weapons sys-
tems see Michael Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: 
The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1969); Edmund Beard, Developing the ICBM: A Study 
in Bureaucratic Politics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1976); John Me~aris, Countdown for Decision (New 
York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1960); James Baar and William 
E. Howard, Polaris: The Concept and Creation of a New and 
Mighty Weapon (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1960); 
Richard Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy: 1946-
l962(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974). 
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BNSP should have changed that. One possible explanation 
for the continuation of this perception may have been the 
Chief's own experience with the military's mission statement. 
Within the military logic process, the mission statement 
is the essential ingredient, since the commander's "estimate 
of the situation" cannot begin without it. Only after he 
has received the mission statement is it possible to begin 
to look at the enemy situation, the forces available to 
him, the terrain, and so forth. The primacy of the mission 
statement is clearly noted in the following extract from 
the 1940 edition of the United Stat€s Army Staff Officer's 
Field Manual: 
Every military operation should have a definite aim. 
All missions assigned incident to an operation are con-
tributory to that end. A commander's mission as conveyed 
in orders or instructions from higher authority should 
require the adoption of a definite course of action 603 
in meeting the situation which confronts his command. 
It is essential that the mission statement define with great 
precision the exact objective of the operation. Conversely, 
according to one military commentator, "a complex and vaguely 
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worded objective induces inefficiency and ineffectiveness." 
Compared to the specificity of the typical military mission 
statement, the NSC's general policy statements epitomized 
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vagueness and complexity. This represented a problem when 
one realizes that the Chiefs apparently were looking to 
the leadership of the Defense Department or to the NSC to 
supply them with a military-like mission statement upon 
which they could base their planning. In the formulation 
of both NSC 20/3 and NSC 162/2 the Chiefs went back to the 
administration and asked for greater precision in what was 
desired of the military forces. This explains why the Chiefs 
opposed the use of ceilings which in effect asked them what 
they could accomplish within certain budgetary limitations. 
Their opposition to budget ceilings loses credibility, though, 
in the face of further examination of the mission statement 
model. One of the normal elements of the mission statement 
is the allocation of forces to accomplish the mission. If 
the commander feels that the forces given to him are insuffi-
cient he can request more, but if that fails he must attempt 
to carry out the mission with the forces at his disposal. 
The budget ceiling may be viewed as merely the allocation 
of forces to the military, and thus fits perfectly within 
the mission statement model. Since the Chiefs were opposed 
to it, there must have been another reason. Most likely 
it was the fact it was developed by non-military professionals 
and based upon non-military factors. 
It is the use of the military mission statement model 
that clarifies the differences between the military's 
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approach to policy integration from that of Forrestal's. 
The military wanted to receive a political mission statement 
from the civilians that would be specific enough for the 
development of supporting military plans, but not too specific 
as to infringe upon their professional prerogative. The 
Chiefs would proceed to generate technical military plans 
in an economically unconstrained environment with the only 
yardstick of effectiveness being the achievement of the 
political goals. Most likely, those goals would have to 
be framed in geopolitical terms (e.g., the containment of 
communism or the defense of Europe) in order to facilitate 
their translation into military operations orders. Only 
then would they be measured against economic feasibilitY. 
In practice this balancing stage would have no meaningful 
affect on the_process, since the plans were professionally 
developed. If the costs proved unrealistic, then the fault 
lay in the original mission statement, which required that 
too much be accomplished. It would be the original mission 
that would have to be rewritten, either excluding certain 
items or becoming more specific (e.g., allowing the use 
of nuclear weapons as in the case of NSC 162/2). 
Forrestal's approach was fundamentally different, 
especially in the first stage. For the first Secretary 
of Defense, it was the development of the political mission 
statement that was the heart of the policy integration process. 
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It could not and would not be made exclusively by civilians 
without military considerations being included. Thus the 
Chiefs had to be involved in writing their own mission order. 
Such a process would include consideration of all determi-
nants to include economic and budget factors. Once the 
mission statement had been written, the Chiefs would then 
apply their expertise and develop a strategic program to 
support that mission. The development of this plan would 
be unconstrained, except for the constraints that were already 
included in the mission statement. Under this approach, 
Forrestal was as against the establishment of budget ceilings 
without military input, as the Chiefs were, but for obviously 
different reasons. 
The perceptual difference about the first stage of 
the integration process was the tragic fJaw that ruined 
the best efforts at making the system work. Since the Chiefs 
apparently could not work within the framework supplied 
by the vague and clearly non-military political mission 
statements, they generated their own assumptions upon which 
to start the planning process. Naturally, these assumptions 
were laced with service perspectives. One example of this 
occurred during the writing of NSC 162/2. Radford had built 
his argument for the freedom to use nuclear weapons upon 
a dysjuncture between commitments and capabilities. This 
of course had been the approach taken by the Chiefs in 1948, 
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but Radford and his supporters defined commitments very 
narrowly to mean only agreements in which military force 
was actually committed. This would allow for a much smaller 
force structure than if the definition would include all 
possible commitments as the Chiefs used in their 1948 catalog 
and Ridgway argued for in 1953. This broader definition 
would allow for a larger force structure, especially for 
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the Army. It was differences like this that resulted 
in paperclipped budgets that far exceeded the civilian's 
expectations. Although the Chiefs may have differed on 
service matters, they all agreed that the budget should 
only consider military expediency. The Chiefs did not con-
sider this to be dysfunctional because this was the way 
their professional and organizational ethic was structured. 
Autonomy in the budget process meant the exclusion of non-
military considerations. 
The Truman and Eisenhower administrations tried to 
bridge this gap between the Chief's military requirements 
and reality by requiring that the Chiefs take economic factors 
into consideration. ForrEstal tried this in his 8 October 
memorandum, and Wilson tried it wih his I9M Directive, but 
this only created a potentially greater problem and a major 
dilemma for the Chiefs. If the military professionals 
605 Snyder, "The New Look," 427. 
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began to take into account non-military factors, then the 
foundation of American civilian-control of the military 
would be undermined. Only a truely integrated and fusionist 
approach during the first stage of the process could solve 
this problem. Fusionism, if understoood correctly by both 
the civilians and the professional military would not endan-
ger civilian control, and possibly would reinforce it. From 
the Chiefs' perspective, mo submit to the administration's 
desires and incorporate economic factors net only violated 
their professionalism, but also made them vulnerable to 
attack since they lacked the expertise to generate economic 
assumptions. Furthermore, any conclusion that differed 
from the administration's would be deemed wrong and further 
weaken their credibility. Another factor that the Chiefs 
undoubtedly considered was that the development of alternative 
force structures would allow the civilians to make crucial 
military decisions. In the bifurcated world of the military 
professional, only the expert should be allowed to make 
those decisions. The Chiefs did not seem to understand 
that their rejection of fusionism allowed the civilians 
to exclude them totally from the budget process, leaving 
the non-military leaders of the administration to make the 
important military decisions anyway. Given their professional 
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ethic, it was only natural for the Chiefs to posit these 
non-experts could never adequately balance the nation's 
capabilities and commitments. While the placement of blame 
might be at least partially wrong, the Chiefs were right 
that policy integration had failed. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
In January 19ol, a new Democratic administration came 
into office, and like his two predecessors, President Kennedy 
understood the necessity of having an effectively managed 
defense structure. With this in mind, Kennedy asked former 
Secretary of the Air Force, Senator Stuart Symington, to 
form a committee to examine restructuring the Department 
of Defense. The Symington Committee reported that the re-
organizations of 1949, 1953, and 1958 had not fundamentally 
altered the original 1947 structure and that these reorgani-
zations had "failed to bring the organizational structure 
of the Department [of Defense] into line with the require-
t f t d ' . 1. t d. . ,606 men s o o ay s m1 1 ary con 1t1ons. 
The fundamental structural problem the Committee 
pointed out was the confusion that arose from having both 
a service and a Department of Defense chain of command. 
The solution to this duality was to eliminate the service 
secretaries. Their functions would be absorbed by two new 
super-directorates that would be formed within the Defense 
Department: one for Weapons Systems, and the other for 
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Administration. Each would be headed by an Under Secretary 
of Defense. This same duality was also pointed out as im-
peding the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
because it forced the Chiefs to assume a "two-hatted charac-
ter" which resulted in inter-service rivalry. The solution 
was to eliminate the JCS as it was then configured and to 
replace it with a new Military Advisory Council consisting 
of senior officers, possibly retired, who would have no 
service responsibility. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff would be redesignated the Chairman of the Joint 
Staff (which would be expanded in size) and named the 
principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary 
of Defense. While the chiefs of service would still exist 
they would not be a member of the expanded Joint Staff nor 
on the fdvisory Council, and their precise role was left 
rather unclear. In regard to the defense budget, the pro-
fessional military's role was never mentioned, forshadowing 
Rdbert McNamara's total assumption of this responsibility 
when he came into office. The logic of this further concen-
tration of power was reaffirmed by Secretary McNamara who 
discovered upon assuming office "that the three military 
departments had been establishing their requirements inde-
pendently of each other" and that these "so-called require-
ments bore almost no relation to the real world." 607 
607 Robert McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflec-
tions in Office (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 90. 
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The problems that both the Symington Committee and 
Secretary McNamara described were by no means new ones. 
Every staff analysis since Forrestal's First Report of the 
Secretary of Defense had repeatedly pointed out that the 
JCS was not effectively coordinating its plans with other 
agencies and that their plans tended to be divorced from 
reality. Furthermore, these studies had continually main~ 
tained that there was a relationship between dysfunctional 
inter-service rivalry and the fact that th9 Chiefs had to 
assume both the role of a service commander and a planner 
within the corporate structure of the JCS. Yet, three re-
organizations later, these problems still remained and the 
panacea of earlier reorganizations, greater centralization 
into the hands of the civilian defense managers, was again 
offered as the solution. 
The reason for this constant reinvention of the orga-
nizational wheel was that the civilian leaders did not under-
stand that there were two root causes to these problems 
and not just one. The first cause, which was more readily 
identifiable, was organizational and bureaucratic. It was 
manifested symptomatically by inter-service rivalry and 
became the primary target for reform. Furthermore, concen-
trating on the organizational and bureaucratic causes had 
the advantage of dealing exclusively with structural matters 
and avoiding having to address the more complex and 
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controversial fundamental values and relationships that 
existed between the civilian leadership and the military 
professional. The second cause, which was less apparent, 
but inextricably related to those values and relationships 
that were untouched by organizational reform, was the nature 
of military professionalism. The civilian defense managers 
never did understand that they could not totally solve the 
first problem without understanding the second. 
It was the issue of inter-service rivalry that captured 
the attention of critics of the defense planning system. 
Unfortunately, that rivalry was all too easily attributed 
to the Chiefs having a "two-hatted" role. Once it became 
dogma that there was a cause and effect relationship between 
the Chief's placement within the chain of command and inter-
service rivalry, it was axiomatic that the removal of the 
former would eliminate the latter. This explains why exclud-
ing the Chiefs from the chain of command became the organiza-
tional panacea for both the Truman and the Eisenhower admini-
strations. But this over-concentration on the chain of 
command issue merely obfuscated the fact that it ~as the 
services that were in conflict, not just the Chiefs. 
The military services, like any large bureaucratic 
organization, had vital interests to protect. Those interests 
were generally outlined in the service's roles and missions, 
and were more specifically identified in the allocation 
413 
of combat missions under the various war plans. Any change 
in one of these missions had far-reaching fiscal and organiza-
tional consequences. The protection of these vital interests 
led the Chiefs to engage in the same type of bureaucratic 
decision making that was occurring all over Washington. 
While considered quite acceptable behavior when conducted 
by civilian decision makers, it was looked upon as dysfunc-
tional when exhibited by the professional military. 
This double standard also ignored the reality that 
inter-service rivalry was not just the result of petty 
bureaucrats fighting among themselves for a larger slice 
of the budget. The Chiefs, as representatives of military 
services that had totally different approaches to waging 
war, honestly belieYed that their service was essential 
to the nation's defense. Since the military budget was 
a reflection of the problems associated with inter-service 
rivalry, any objective evaluation of service representation 
was impossible. It was forgotten that the Chiefs were 
appointed because of their service experience and their 
ability to advise based on experience. From the Chief's 
perspective, that advisory ability was directly tied to 
their command function. One is reminded of Admiral Burke's 
statement that "if the Chiefs didn't represent their services 
who were they to represent." 
Most of the Chiefs saw divergencies of opinion, 
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resulting from service representation, in a positive light. 
The Truman administration, plagued with service conflict, 
rejected such pluralism almost from the start. Furthermore, 
the civilian leadership did not seem to appreciate the fact 
that the Chiefs performed a valuable function while playing 
the service "front man" for the administration. They not 
only added authoritative support to the administration's 
position, they also channeled service discontent. Admiral 
Denfeld lost control of his service's officer corps when 
it was felt that he could no longer be trusted to defend 
the Navy's vital interests. As a result, the officer corps 
believed that it had no choice but to seek alternate means 
of expression, such as the Congress or the press. Thus 
a certain amount of rivalry was necessary, if for nothing 
more than constituent consumption. 
A related organizational problem was that of the 
bureaucratic nature of the Joint Staff. Within the Joint 
Staff the problem of service bureaucratic imperatives was 
exacerbated by its interconnection with individual career 
enhancement. During both the Truman and the Eisenhower 
administrations, there were organizational efforts to elevate 
the Joint Staff above service interests. The expansion 
of the Armed Forces Staff College and the creation of the 
National War College was designed to broaden the base of 
understanding by America's future military leaders, and 
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to minimize service parochialism. This latter goal was 
the rationale behind Secretary Gates' requirement that all 
officers serve a tour at the joint level prior to promotion 
to flag rank. President Eisenhower's reorganization of 
the Joint Staff in 1958 was also aimed at limiting the ser-
vice's impact on the Joint Staff, by eliminating the committee 
system. Unfortunately, none of these efforts had the desired 
results. 
What the civilian defense managers really wanted 
was the independence and analytic skills of a professional 
general staff. Such an institution would not only be com-
patible with their management styles, but would also be 
theoretically above service interests. Fear of Prussianiza-
tion made such a military general staff anathama to the 
civilian leadership, so they proceeded to create a civilian 
general staff within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
Once the decision had been reached by Forrestal and 
Truman to abandon the notion of a pluralistic Joint Chiefs, 
because it apparently led to conflict, the basic pattern 
for defense reorganization was set. In the place of pluralis-
tic divergency, the Chiefs would be required to supply only 
unanimous advice. In order to guarantee this unanimity, 
the power of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff was increased, the politicization 
of the selection process occurred, and the chain of command 
416 
was restructured to make the JCS into more of a planning 
agency. This latter reform was all important because it 
directly related to the Chief's advisory function which 
was the real reason for the creation of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. Forrestal knew he had to have sound military 
advice on political/military matters. The failure of the 
Chiefs to agree forced Forrestal to consider disbanding 
the JCS, just as the Symington Committee recommended, and 
ultimately to decide upon making the Chairman his "agent" 
within the institution. 
Complicating this problem even further, was the 
Chiefs' desire not to abdicate their advisory function sim-
ply because they could not come to an agreement. Fully 
understanding the realities of the bureaucracy, they tried 
to use artificial means to facilitate agreement. This only 
exasperated the civilian leadership further. In a parodox 
of logic, the civilian managers thought that unanimity would 
eliminate all this dysfunctional behavior. What they failed 
to realize was that while such unanimity did present a solid 
front to Congress, the more it was forced, the more the 
Chiefs' advisory function dissipated. 
Despite these massive organizational efforts, the 
reforms failed to address the other fundamental problem, 
military professionalism, that plagued the Chiefs' effective-
ne~s. Of the three elements of professionalism: corporateness, 
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responsibility, and expertise; it was the latter one that 
had the greatest impact. There is little doubt that the 
Chiefs perceived themselves to be the administration's 
military experts, a role that the administration normally 
granted them. Such a perception impacted on the Chiefs' 
effectiveness in two ways. First, the nature of a profes-
sion required that the professional demand autonomy within 
his area of expertise. Second, the demand for autonomy 
meant that the expert could not consider factors that were 
outside his expertise in the development of professional 
advice. Thus, expertise clearly defined the parameters 
within which the Chiefs could operate and excluded the 
incorporation of non-military factors in the process of 
developing advice for their civilian superiors. The result 
was the domination of the Huntington/absolutist model. One 
hundred and fifty years ago Clausewitz suggested that it 
was absurd to ask that the military professional limit his 
advice to the military point of view. The advent of nuclear 
weapons and the cold war have made it all the more absurd. 
The problem was that pragmatism or fusionism appeared to 
be incompatible with America's traditional notions of 
civilian control. 
This apparent incompatibility is at the heart of 
the failure of the policy integration process. The assump-
tion that fusionism was somehow anti-American was taken 
418 
for granted by both the civilian leadership and the military 
professionals. Furthermore, the parameters determined by 
professional expertise were also accepted by all the parties 
concerned. Even Forrestal seemed to accept the notion that 
the Chiefs were to look at things only from the military 
point of view. The difficulties confronting both groups 
were more than semantical, they were based on fundamental, 
historical, social, and professional beliefs. 
Aside from the demand for unanimity and the politici-
zation of the selection process, the ultimate result of 
the constant disunity among the Chiefs was to impede, if 
not eliminate, their ability to have any meaningful impact 
upon such important defense matters as the budget. Without 
effective military participation, the administration's 
imposed budget ceilings became the main means of molding 
defense policy. This is not to say that the amounts allocated 
were insufficient, just that the process by which they were 
derived was divorced from professional military input. From 
the Chief's perspective, this use of non-military determi-
nators failed to analyze and balance capabilities and com-
mitments in a meaningful way, forcing the Chiefs to tailor 
their force levels and war plans to fit fiscal criteria, 
and increasing their institutional frustration. 
While technically the Chief's criticism of the budget 
process was correct, it failed to take into consideration 
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the fact that their own actions had, to a great extent, 
led to their exclusion. Instead, the Chiefs blamed the 
civilians for the flaws within the NSC structure and vague 
policy directives. To be sure, there was substance to their 
claims, but a more fundamental cause for the breakdown of 
communication was a lack of understanding on the part of 
the Chief's civilian superiors about the nature of military 
professionalism. 
As military professionals the Chiefs sought autonomy 
within their sphere of professional competency. Based upon 
the concept of expertise they claimed exclusive control 
over military matters, and conversely excluded non-military 
considerations. This striving for autonomy, as well as 
their own career experiences, led the Chiefs to expect that 
the budget process would follow the steps of the operations 
plan model; a model that both Admiral Sherman and Secretary 
Forrestal advanced. Under this model the political leader-
ship would determine the long-range political goals of the 
state, while the military determined the most effective 
military means of attaining those goals. The major point 
of contention occurred when fiscal reality was balanced 
against military effectiveness. The creation of ceilings 
meant that the administration had determined the level of 
the balance prior to the military's involvement. 
Another problem that emanated from the military's 
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professional experience was the relationship of specific 
mission statements to the operations plan model. Within 
the military such mission statements were quite specific 
in order to facilitate planning. Structural flaws and the 
natural tendency of political statements to be general, 
led to vague and imprecise directions being given the 
military. From the Chiefs' point of view, they were opera-
ting within a policy vacuum that they were forced to fill 
themselves. It was only natural that as they generated 
their own assumptions upon which to base their planning, 
those assumptions would be based exclusively on military 
factors. This, of course, led to what the civilians charac-
terized as unrealistic plans and programs. Thus, each side 
blamed the other for the breakdown in political-military 
planning. 
To achieve real policy integration required a rein-
terpretation of the liberal definition of civilian control, 
and the military's perception of the nature of professionalism 
which relegated the soldier to that of an automaton, and 
demanded the exclusion of all non-military factors from 
consideration. Instead the traditional interpretations 
of both civilian control and military professionalism pre-
vailed, creating an obstacle to policy integration. The 
more the soldier strove for the type of autonomy in policy 
formulation that his professionalism demanded, 
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the more he produced highly professional, but dysfunctional 
advice. This advice not only excluded many of the non-
military factors that the civilian leadership considered 
important, but it also excluded many factors that were cri-
tical to military planning. This undermined the Chiefs' 
credibility and forced the civilian leadership to seek alter-
native sources of military advice. The more these alterna-
tive sources of advice became dominant, the more the Chiefs 
became alienated from the policy system, and the more they 
attacked the system for not considering their professional input. 
As each side simply blamed the other, they proceeded 
to offer new organizational structures that merely papered 
over the problem. The civilians were afraid to upset the 
traditional soldier-client relationship that was the basis 
for the American version of civilian control. The military 
was equally reluctant to break down the delimitating bar-
riers of traditionalism. The soldier's whole ethical back-
ground had instilled in him a reverence for those barriers, 
and his whole career had prepared him for his place within 
the staff structure. He would fulfill his role as the 
Le Grande Brut, and await for the issuance of the political 
mission statement. 
This is not to say that both sides were unaware of 
the real cause of the policy bifurcation. The professional 
soldier was fully aware of the political, social, and 
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economic consequences of his actions, but to articulate 
that understanding or project the image that those factors 
were taken into consideration might be interpretated as 
a challenge to civilian control. Maxwell Taylor's "new 
professionalism" came precariously close to such a pronounce-
ment, but even he stayed within the pale. The civilians 
also understood the problem or at least diagnosed the symp-
toms. One after another of the independent DoD studies 
came up with the same conclusions in regard to the JCS; 
but like a doctor who has no theoretical foundation behind 
his medical knowledge, they merely treated the symptoms 
hoping that it would cure the disease. All of these studies 
recommended new organizational panaceas that led to further 
centralization, and all called for better coordination between 
the national command authority and its military advisors. 
Never once did they address the issue of coordination outside 
the context of an organizational chart. It was as if they 
had never heard of Secretary Forrestal's admonition on the 
importance of the men who make up that organizational chart. 
Coordination and policy integration was viewed only in 
bureaucratic and managerial terms. They never addressed 
the necessity for both the civilians and the military to 
have mutually shared values, and an appreciation for the 
complete spectrum of the military, political, social, and 
economic issues at stake. 
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While the scope of this study ends with_the ·comple-
tion of President Eisenhower's second term, the problems 
that have been discussed continued to exist. During the 
1970s, two major studies of the Defense Department were 
completed and they confirmed the hypothesis that treating 
the symptoms would not cure the disease. The first of these 
studies was the 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. While the 
Panel's report identified the recurring problems of inter-
service rivalry, the committee nature of the JCS, and the 
Chiefs' dual and conflicting role as planner and commander, 
this study, unlike its predecessors delved deep enough to 
actually find the source of the disease. 
Ideally, the JCS must be fully prepared to provide 
competent professional technical military advice, while 
recognizing and giving full due weight to non-military 
considerations, the political, economic, and social 
realities of national security affairs. They should 
accept the fact that professional military advice must 
be balanced and tempered by higher authority with fuller 
cognizance of those other factors. Nevertheless, the 
prime mission of the JCS, in their view, is to point 
up the hard military risks which may arise from decisions 
weighted more heavily, as will happen, toward non-military 
factors. The JCS, in short, must be ready to make 
clear the national security consequences of alternative 
top-level decisions. Their deep conviction, born of 
their professionalism and their statutory responsibili-
ties, is that military viewpoints and security risk 
assessments should not become submerged at the point 
of decision by political or economic factors; over-
weighed, perhaps, but not submerged.608 
Surprisingly, the Blue Ribbon.Panel offered no organizational 
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solutions. Instead, it seemed to have faith that the Chiefs 
were evolving toward the ideal. How this evolution would 
occur or how it could be facilitated was rather unclear, 
but the Panel indicated that the 11 new professionalism" and 
total policy integration was at hand. 
A second major study conducted during the 1970s was 
the Steadman Report, published in 1978 under the direction 
of President Carter. Generally speaking, this report showed 
that the Blue Ribbon Panel's optimistic view was unwarranted. 
The same problems that had been observed since the passage 
of the National Security Act remained unchanged, despite 
thirty years of structural efforts to eliminate them. Although 
the Blue Ribbon Panel had been unduly optimistic, it at 
least had identified the narrow military point of view as an 
obstacle to policy integration. Unfortunately, the Stead-
man Report, while implicitly substantiating this contention, 
never followed through with an analysis and offered no solu-
tion other than traditional procedural panaceas: changing 
the make up of the Joint Staff, changing the method by which 
the JCS produce their paperwork, and creating a separate 
group of national military advisors composed of former chiefs 
609 
or Cines. This is almost identical to the ideas that 
Forrestal flirted with. 
609 
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After examining the various organizational recommenda-
tions, as well as the underlying factors that led to the 
breakdown in effective policy integration, the obvious ques-
tion is what is the solution. I find unpersuasive the more 
radical solutions that would replace the Chiefs with a com-
mittee of senior military advisors who would have no command 
responsibility. While removing the duality that exists 
within the JCS, I believe the cure can be just as bad as 
the disease. In the first place, there is no guarantee 
that senior advisors, whether retired or simply relieved 
of command responsibility, would be immune from service 
parochialism. As we noted earlier, inter-service rivalry 
is at least partially derived from a real commitment to 
ones service and a belief in the importance of that mode 
of fighting wars. After nearly forty years in a single 
service, it is doubtful that such loyalty would be eliminated 
by virtue of retirement. The real drawback to this sugges-
tion though is the separation of planning from command 
responsibility. The dangers that can result from irrational 
ivory tower planning is every bit as dangerous, if not more 
so, than an over-concentration on purely operational reali-
ties. The total elimination of the Chiefs would remove 
a valuable counter-balance in the planning process. This 
is not to say that there are not a number of major changes 
that could be implemented that would increase the Joint 
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Chiefs effectiveness. Among those possible ch~nges the 
following would be my recommendations. 
1) Give the Chairman a fifth star and make him the 
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. This would give 
him the status and the leverage to more effectively deal 
with inter-service rivalry, as well as be in a better posi-
tion to articulate the Chief's views to the civilian leader-
ship. A strong argument can be made for making him a full 
member of the NSC or at least its sole military advisor. 
Obviously, the selection of the Chairman is important in 
order to guarantee that he is above service interests. In 
order that he understands the internal workings of the JCS, 
he should formerly have been e"i ther a Chief, the Director of 
the Joint Staff, of the Assistant to the Chairman. Historically, 
with the exception of Admiral Radford, all of the Chairman 
have had experience somewhere within the JCS. The Chairman 
should be looked upon as an objective professional and not 
a creature of the administration. If the JCS staffing pro-
cess becomes more responsive to the goals of the administra-
tion and the Chiefs input more usable, then the motivation 
behind making the Chairman the administration's "agent" 
will have ended. Thus I would oppose having the Chairman's 
term expire automatically upon the advent of a new administra-
tion. Such a policy would totally politicize the position 
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and erode his credibility as a professional advisor. 
2) The procedures by which the Joint Staff generates 
its product need to be totally revamped, eliminating the 
"flimsy, buff, green, red striped nightmare." The key ele-
ment that made it such a nightmare was the requirement for 
service concurrence at every level, which if removed short 
of the green stage, would minimize the waffled positions 
that have become the hallmark of the JCS. Obviously, some 
service input is required at the initial filmsy stage; but 
between then and the final Joint Staff product, the Joint 
Staff should work apart from the service staffs. While 
this will probably result in more split decisions being 
forwarded, it will be positive in the sense that the issues 
will be clarified and the opportunity to choose between 
real alternatives will be at hand. This had been the Truman 
administration's original intent until inter-service rivalry 
forced it to replace pluralism with unanimity. This recom-
mendation will only work if the civilian leadership is will-
ing to accept more split decisions and not seek unanimity 
as a means of escaping their constitutional obligations. 
3) With the implementation of the previous recommen-
dation, the role of the Joint Staff will have been enhanced 
and reliance upon the service staffs minimized; nevertheless, 
two internal structural changes are needed to increase its 
effectiveness. First, the Joint Staff needs to develop 
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its own analytical capabilities, especially in the budget 
and costing areas. It was the lack of this capability that 
cost the JCS its influence during the McNamara period. Since 
the services have developed their own capability, the Chiefs 
are forced to rely to a great extent on that self-serving 
data. 
Secondly, since the JCS plans are criticized for 
being divorced from non-military reality, I would suggest 
the establishment of a small independent think tank designed 
to develop military positions that incorporate non-military 
perspectives. Such a think tank would be staffed by bright 
young officers selected for their ability to bridge the 
gap between the military and the non-military points of 
view. Their independence would be guaranteed by making 
the assignment permanent, along the lines used by the per-
manent faculty at the military academies. The members of 
this think tank would have given up the opportunity for 
higher command within their service in exchange for the 
opportunity to analyze complex political-military issues 
and have an impact on policy formulation. Since, they would 
never return to their service of origin, the pressure to 
conform to a service viewpoint would be eliminated. They 
would, in effect, be a mini-General Staff along the Prussian 
model. Two factors would work to mitigate the danger of 
ivory tower planLing. First, new officers would periodically 
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be brought in so that the group would not stagnate. Second, 
the staff would have no command function. The sole purpose 
of the think tank would be to develop alternative analysis 
on the issues the Chiefs examine. By having such analysis 
the Chiefs might be better able to impact effectively on 
policy development. 
4) Aside from the major changes within the Joint 
Staff outlined above, there are several minor changes that 
would enhance the Staff's effectiveness. One would be to 
increase the length of time an officer can stay on the staff. 
This would increase the institutional memory of the orga-
nization. Second, assign a small number of civilians to 
the Joint Staff. While their number should remain small 
so as not to become dominant, they would form a permanent 
nucleus of the staff and broaden the base of the Joint Staff's 
experience. Some of the civilians could be rotated from 
other agencies within DoD, State or the CIA, thus increasing 
the institutional linkages between those organizations and 
the JCS. Such a procedure would go a long way toward eroding 
the isolation that the Joint Chiefs have been so correctly 
criticized for. It is axiomatic to say that the officers 
assigned to the Joint Staff should exhibit a "purple suit 
mentality'' and that such an approach should be rewarded 
in the officers' next assignment. Promotion above the rank 
of colonel/captain should be predicated upon assignment 
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on a joint staff. Such mandatory exposure to the joint 
arena and the problems related to other services will do 
much to minimize service parochialism. 
5) The Director of the Joint Staff should be given 
a fourth star and made a full member of the JCS. This would 
reflect the increased responsibilities of the Joint Staff, 
and allow him to more effectively argue for the Joint Staff's 
product, especially since concurrence would not be sought 
during the product's development. He sho~ld also serve 
as acting chairman if the incumbant is not available. Under 
the present structure the senior Chief takes over and 
naturally brings with him his service biases at possibly 
crucial times. It is essential that the Director be con-
sidered an honest broker and that the job not simply be 
a ticket to be punched for higher command. To preclude 
the Director protecting his ties to his own service, he 
should not be considered for the position of a Chief after 
leaving the Joint Staff. Given his joint experience and 
the prominence of his former position, the only realistic 
position that would be available to a former Director would 
be that of Chairman or a commander in chief of a unified 
command. His background should emphasize joint planning 
with at least one prior tour on the Joint Staff and some 
experience at the unified command level. 
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6) Consideration should be given to the creation 
of a joint general staff. Such a staff would consist of 
a small number of officers, who upon graduation from their 
service staff colleges and the Armed Forces Staff College 
would be permanently assigned to the joint general staff. 
Such officers would make up a substantial portion of the 
Joint Staff and the joint staffs of the various unified 
commands. They would have their own promotion system, with 
the goal being the Director of the Joint Staff. There would 
be fundamental differences between this organization and 
the basic Prussian model. First of all, the members of 
the joint general staff would not all be working for the 
Director of the Joint Staff. Those that were assigned to 
unified commands would be working for that commander in 
chief. The reason for their assignment to the unified com-
mands would not be to guarantee continuity of implementation, 
but to bring joint staffing expertise. Second, members, 
of the joint general staff are not expected under any cir-
cumstances to command, nor would they be assigned at echelons 
lower than the unified commands. Finally, the continued 
existence of the service chiefs and their own staff would 
act as a check against the joint general staff becoming 
too dominate and act to counter-balance any ivory tower 
planning. While this is obviously, the most radical of 
my recommendations, in the long run it may be the most 
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necessay. 
The above recommendations have totally focused on 
the organizational aspect of the problem, despite the fact 
that the major thesis of this study is that it is the narrow 
perceptual basis of professionalism that led the Chiefs 
to exclude non-military factors from their planning process. 
The reason is that value transformation does not lend itself 
to the same type of itemized recommendations that organiza-
tional changes do. Since this aspect of the problem focuses 
on the value system of the officer corps, the only effective 
way to deal with it is to change that value system. It 
needs to be carefully pointed out that the incorporation 
of non-military factors does not destroy the experts know-
ledge. On the contrary, fusionism is simply the use of 
differing data to develop the most useful military advice. 
The officer must always remember that an overconcentration 
on any one factor will be as dysfunctional as the compart-
mentalization that has plagued the national security system 
since the end of World War II. To say that fusionistic 
balancing would be easy is to totally underestimate the 
problem. 
Clearly, the attainment of a new value system is 
easier said than done. A value system is acquired slowly 
over time as a result of role modeling, peer pressure, and 
value inculcation. Despite the problems, there are several 
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ways it can be accomplished. First, the curriculum of the 
service schools offers an invaluable tool in fostering_ prag-
610 
matism. Second, role modeling by senior officers would 
have a great effect on junior and middle-grade officers, 
especially if they realize the relationship between promo-
tion, and maintaining a joint perspective and incorporating 
non-military factors. Finally, the belief on the part of 
the civilian leadership that such an approach is in the 
national interest is essential to its success. In this 
regard Forrestal's plan of asking the Chiefs to develop 
an unconstrained and then a constrained budget, can serve 
as a model for future administrations. The breakdown in 
Forrestal's system occurred when the Chiefs failed to handle 
the second assignment. 
Mere acceptance of fusionism would have little or 
no value if the Chiefs' input was ignored or the institutional 
linkages non-existent. The civilian leaders must bring 
the Chiefs into the policy process at the earliest possible 
stage. The administration must carefully outline its politi-
cal goals so that the Chiefs can generate a strategy and 
a force structure to achieve those goals. 
6i 6 For a discussion of the absolutist position in 
the service staff college curriculum see John Binkley and 
Donald Vought, "Fort Apache or Executive Suite: The United 
States Army Enters the 1980s," Parameters, Journal of the 
United States Army War College, 8 (June 1978). 
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That force structure then must be balanced against 
fiscal and political realities. As part of this balancing 
the original assumptions and goals must be reexamined and 
all alternatives fully and rationally explored. It is at 
this stage that a pluralistic JCS is essential because it 
will supply viable alternatives from which the administra-
tion can choose. At every stage it must be a joint effort 
or dysfunctional compartmentalization will occur. 
Without such an approach the American government 
will continue as it has for over thirty-five years, attempt-
ing to resolve through structural means a problem that is 
essentially intellectual and perceptual. True policy integra-
tion will never be attained until it is finally agreed that 
"indeed it is an irrational proceeding to consult profes-
sional soldiers on the plan of war that they give a purely 
military opinion upon what the Cabinet ought to do." 
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